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1From 2–5 December 2017, the conference on ‘the 
evolution of fragility’ was held at the Getty Museum, 
Los Angeles. I presented an introductory paper (‘The 
Evolution of Fragility: Towards a New History of the 
Ancient World’), and James Scott offered a response. 
During the next two-and-a-half days we – that is, 
eleven participants – discussed pre-circulated papers, 
the discussions led by a designated respondent for 
each paper. The sessions were recorded, and notes 
were taken by Aparna Kumar.1 The chapters in this 
volume are the revised papers from the conference. A 
subsequent volume, provisionally entitled ‘The Unfold-
ing of Fragility: New Directions in Archaeology and 
Ancient History,’ written by me and the members of 
the conference, will appear in due course.
Jan Bemmann (who discussed the fragility of 
early Mongolian cities2) offered an epigram for the 
conference: ‘there are no innocent terms’. What do we 
mean by ‘fragility’? and why do we use the term to 
bring together research into a variety of societies so 
that we can study both their differences and the ‘dif-
ferences, which resemble each other’ (as Broodbank, 
citing Lévi-Stauss, has written [Broodbank 2013, 20]). 
Much archaeological literature and ‘social evolutionary 
theory’ treats the appearance of early cities and states,3 
and other more-or-less complex, stratified societies as 
‘integrated’ (by political or ideological means) and thus 
‘stable’. Explanations for the ‘collapse’ (see Middleton 
2017) of such societies assumed that this occurred when 
something bad happened, usually climate/environ-
mental change (whether caused by humans or not) or 
because enemies overwhelmed them. In fact, many of 
these early cities and states represented in this volume 
lasted for a relatively short time (in archaeological reck-
oning). Others were longer-lived, struggled to overcome 
structural weaknesses and historical contingencies that 
eventually resulted in the fragmentation or a large-scale 
undoing of political orders.4
The central theme of this volume is to undermine 
some of the traditional themes of evolutionary narra-
tives, namely those that naturalize the state and thus 
legitimize its historical claims to permanence. This, of 
course, was the view propagated by rulers of early states 
themselves as well as some scholars who seem to regard 
the state as having an adaptive advantage over small-
scale societies. In this volume, we explore the logic of 
these claims about early societies. However, we do not 
relinquish the term ‘evolution’ to narratives of political 
integration which are façades hiding instability and, 
at times, the incoherence of state orders. Indeed, the 
evolution of states includes earlier systems of kinship 
and local authority that endure and are refocused as 
part of the development of cities and states.
Our case studies do not seek to elide the vari-
ability among early cities, states and civilizations (see 
Yoffee 2005), their specific histories and socioeconomic 
formations. Rather, we explore how rulers attempt 
to impose their goals of governance and how elites, 
sub-elites and a variety of community leaders tried to 
resist these goals. That is, we study the social infra-
structures and the vulnerabilities of the new political 
and socio-economic systems of early cities and states, 
their fragile nature and the means by which rulers 
sought to manage their fractious infrastructures. We 
also consider how the collapse of some political systems 
did or did not lead to the regeneration of rulers and 
dynasties, and how new systems of political organiza-
tion emerged from these collapses.
The evolution of the first cities and states, as we 
can measure these from settlement pattern changes in 
certain areas, was a demographic revolution in which 
people from the countryside moved into new urban 
centres, often quite rapidly. The countryside of these 
cities was then created as new villages and settlements 
were founded as peripheral to and dependent on the 
new urban centres. 
Chapter 1
Introducing the Conference:  
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tax collectors, and various state dependents, including 
slaves. We also identify farmers, craftspeople, wage-
labourers, corvée workers, and others who worked 
in state-enterprises, and who sometimes received 
contracts from the royal estate. Early cities and states 
were mixtures, as it were, of royal enterprises and those 
outside the absolute control of kings. Many of our 
authors find the widely used term ‘heterarchy’ useful 
because it calls for an examination of various hierar-
chies in any society and the possibility that an actor 
could have different roles in several such hierarchies, 
for example, in kin hierarchies, economic hierarchies, 
and political hierarchies.
Our studies attempt to discern the local rules of 
incorporation and the various hierarchical structures 
that lay outside state controls. Indeed, we find that 
the ‘glue’ holding social parts together in early cities 
and states was not necessarily strong. The evidence 
for the short(ish) duration of many of our early cities 
and/or states implies that such social and political 
integration was fragile. We also perceive instances of 
local conflicts, external wars, war captives as part of 
the social fabric, slaves, unfree labour, corvée labour, 
and the flight of citizens from state-imposed duties 
and taxation. These characteristics of oppression and 
dissent are found in most of the examples in this book. 
In our studies we foreground the arenas of com-
petition within early cities and states. We ask about the 
reasons for internal resistance to the power of kings. 
We speculate about the irony that the most centralized 
states with the most brutal kings and mighty despots 
are often the most fragile and subject to dismember-
ment and collapse. If the rulers of early cities and states 
seek to ‘simplify’ their societies (Scott 1998), that is, to 
regiment them for purposes of bureaucratic control 
and to disembed resources from local communities, 
the process of simplification can lead to instability and 
impel resistance. Resistance, of course is not always 
successful because resistance, like sovereignty itself, is 
constrained by historical understandings and cultural 
commitments. When states break-down, we must also 
study the products of break-down, why some states 
regenerate and why some do not. 
In brief, the purpose of our conference and this 
volume is to re-evaluate the evolution of early cities and 
states. Many of our authors propose that early political 
systems were ‘experiments’ (see Wright 2006). Instabil-
ity was a likely result of unprecedented amounts of 
population aggregation and the new rules of statehood 
and divine rulers who had special access to the high 
gods. And, in instances when instability is balanced by 
flexibility in the construction of political institutions, 
and resilience shows the innovative responses to fail-
ing experiments, we can consider how and why this 
That is, long-term population growth and a 
gradual development of increasingly larger sites 
don’t account for the rise of the new cities. These 
new capitals/centres of smaller and larger territo-
ries consisted of people coming from various places 
with their own social organizations and beliefs and 
rituals and migrating to cities for defence, exchange 
and markets, and celebrations of the high gods. New 
conceptions were invented justifying why diverse 
people should live together, how they should settle 
disputes, why there should be rich and poor, and that 
everyone should be ruled by kings. This is the stuff of 
what some commentators call ‘integration’. However, 
local organizations, ethnic groups and their leaders, 
and diverse cultural systems did not disappear with 
the appearance of rulers. In fact, the existence of a 
variety of local (community) organizations could 
(and did) become cleavage planes of resistance to the 
goals of the leaders. Whereas ‘fragility’ appears to 
be a widespread condition of states, we use the term 
as an analytic, a lens that focuses the observer’s eye 
on the cracks and fissures that lurk under the ruler’s 
pretensions of sovereignty (Smith 2011, 2015).
In recent archaeological literature, there are dis-
cussions of ‘cooperation’, ‘collaboration’, and ‘collective 
action’ (Halperin 2016, Jennings & Earle 2016, Blan-
ton with Fargher 2016, Fargher & Heredia Espinoza 
2016) that rightly draw our attention to ‘bottom-
up’ aspects of early cities and states. They see that 
small-scale cooperative units, such as households, 
lineages, or neighbourhoods (Halperin, p. 285) are 
vital components of early cities and states. However, 
these discussions also contend that some early cities 
and states were ‘held together’ (Halperin) by these 
putatively cooperating groups – not that local groups 
could also resist sovereign authority. For example, 
some authors hold that the putative stability and inte-
gration of some early cities and states depended on 
consensus-making by these groups which ‘constrained’ 
the formation of ‘a centralized system of government’ 
(Jennings & Earle 2016). The literature on collective 
action has not included studies that delineate the 
nature of such collectivities or how such a society was 
governed by a collectivity and, in many cases of early 
cities and states, why such societies collapsed.
In our conference there was much discussion 
about how we need to break-down the notion of the 
‘collective actions’ of non-ruling actors. We point to 
research, for example, about the interaction of various 
kinds of elites, for example, mercantile elites, political 
elites, religious elites, kin and ethnic-group leaders. 
We find that urban assemblies, community courts and 
judges, and wealthy landowners co-existed with kings 
and bureaucrats, royal courts, state military officials, 
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local resentment and resistance to royal power, and 
constraints on the actions of kings through Egyptian 
concepts of proper action (ma’at), there were also 
strategies employed to mitigate social and economic 
problems. Changes in dynasties can be correlated 
with overt strategies to overcome these problems. 
Underlying these strategies, furthermore, was the 
‘exceptional’ physical situation of the Egyptian state: 
the Nile provided ‘soil that could not be more fertile’ as 
well as the transportation link that connected regions 
and various resources. Egypt was also ‘exceptional’ in 
being located in a relatively narrow river valley bor-
dered by significant deserts. Not only were invasions 
from the periphery of Egypt unlikely, but both efficient 
governments and local communities could be engaged 
for mutual benefit. Of course, the Old Kingdom state 
did end, and new strategies of negotiation within 
Egyptian cultural norms were born in the regenera-
tion of a new Egyptian state. If in the Old Kingdom 
state there were aspects of fragile social and political 
relations, there were also norms and institutions of 
flexibility and a cultural commitment with attendant 
historical understandings.
Miriam Stark finds an inherent fragility in the 
Angkorian state in Cambodia which flourished for 
about 600 years. This state was largely rural with a 
megalopolis capital in which kings lived, central tem-
ples were located, and where ceremonies, parades, and 
spectacles took place. (These spectacles are characteris-
tic of many early states; see Baines 2015 for an Egyptian 
example). However, rulers were also dependent on 
their subjects for rice and other subsistence goods and 
labour. The state was held together in a Hinduized 
‘cosmopolis’, and kings were tied to priestly elites 
in Angkor and to local temples in the countryside. 
Whereas the collapse of Angkor (as centre of a large 
state, but not as an urban centre) has been variously 
ascribed to failure of an enormous hydraulic regime 
and also to the defeat of the city by Thai forces in 1431, 
Stark also points to the disequilibrating factors of the 
sponsorship of Buddhism by a late Angkorian king and 
the failure of the always fragile ability of the royal court 
to negotiate with the local powers in the countryside. 
Stark shows that these local social systems survived 
the disintegration of central authority. 
These two chapters both emphasize the continu-
ous adjustments and negotiations within the inner 
elite (Baines & Yoffee 1998, 2000, 2018) and between 
the rulers and local systems of organization. The study 
of fault lines and cleavage planes in the two regions 
differed significantly, just as the environments, agricul-
tural regimes, nature of belief systems, social systems, 
and histories are also different. Nevertheless, it is the 
study of ‘fragilities’, rather than posited ‘successful’ 
happened. We do this by studying not only political 
institutions but also the survival of ideological systems 
or, indeed, their replacement. Peter Robertshaw asks: is 
apparent stability (for several centuries) in some early 
states a result of constant adjustments and accommoda-
tions with internal and external forces? We submit that 
by examining the fragility of early cities and states, we 
provide points of entry into critical social dynamics, 
and we contest the notion that ancient societies were 
in any way social wholes. It is perhaps obvious that 
early cities and states were the products of emergent 
properties, the roles of kings and the naturalization of 
social and economic inequality. However, fragility is 
also an inherent property of early cities and states, part 
of the evolutionary (or just historical) past, played out 
in various dimensions, across many stages, and over 
a variety of chronological scales. Fragility is thus con-
ceptually and empirically the subject of our chapters. 
Mapping the chapters
The chapters in this volume are vademecums to 
their regions. They delineate aspects of fragility, how 
societies are constructed, and what are sources of 
political vulnerability which lead to resistance and 
how, in some instances, resistance is forestalled. The 
chapters in the volume are authoritative depictions of 
considerable research and new ideas about research. 
(A synthesis volume that digests data and condenses 
explanations and which is intended to reach a public 
of non-specialists will follow this on-line publication).
Here I introduce the chapters in groups. The 
groups are not, however, silos but beginning efforts 
to stimulate comparative studies. They are: (1) long-
term apparent stability, including chapters on Egypt, 
Cambodia/Angkor, and the Indus; (2) the fragility 
of city-states, but which ironically are long-lived, in 
Mesopotamia and the Maya. In this volume, we define 
‘states’ as the specialized political system of the larger 
cultural entities that we denominate as ‘civilizations’. 
Civilizations may be made up of many states, notably 
city-states, or of one state. The tension between city-
states and the attempt to create an overarching and 
culturally appropriate territorial state is evident. (3) 
The infrastructural fragility of ideological power in a 
variety of sub-Saharan African states and in the North 
American polities at Cahokia and Chaco. (4) Imperial 
fragilities in early China and the Inka.
Apparent long-term stability
Ellen Morris discusses fragility and ‘the art of not 
collapsing’ in Old Kingdom Egypt, a state that per-
sisted for nearly 800 years. Whereas there were many 
instances of management failure, corruption, graft, 
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of ‘foreigners’ into Mesopotamia. Within city-states 
various corporate groups existed, kin-groups, elite 
mercantilists, temple and palace dependents. Com-
munity assemblies decided trouble-cases in courts in 
which royal authority was notably absent. Constant 
negotiations and adjustments were in play in order 
to support any king or dynasty which was normally 
far from stable. Nevertheless, Mesopotamian cities 
were long-lived, some for more than two millennia, 
enduring the vicissitudes of conquests and attempted 
incorporation into territorial states.
In Mesoamerica, Patricia McAnany discusses 
urban ‘experiments’. In a dramatic episode the larg-
est city of all, Teotihuacan, which flourished from 
around 200 bc to ad 550, crumbled. There was not a 
competitor in sight who could have been responsible 
for the massive burning of the ceremonial district 
of Teotihuacan. McAnany supports the view that it 
was internal resistance to rulers that led to end of the 
regional dominance of Teotihuacan.
McAnany notes significant differences between 
the northern and southern Maya regions. As in Meso-
potamia, there was competition among cities in the 
Classic period to establish large, territorial states, but 
those states that managed to effect a regional hegemony 
were successfully resisted. As in Mesopotamia, alli-
ances among urban rulers were also unstable. It is 
striking that new evidence of markets, traders, and 
crafts people characterizes the diverse nature of Maya 
cities. The role of kings, especially in the south, was 
to intercede with the gods and to create ‘monumental 
time’ as a charter of rulership. This appears to have 
enhanced fragility and diminished long-term sustain-
ability of cities. Increasingly, kings were reliant on 
rural agricultural production and labour in the Late 
Classic when everything was peaking (population, 
monument dedications, conflict). Kings and their 
courts abandoned untenable positions, moving to 
other cities where new conflicts inevitably ensued. In 
the northern region, cities and their kings were able to 
adapt to regional instability by changing overarching 
ideological justifications for their power and to live 
within increasingly important mercantile structures 
and among newly wealthy elites. 
The infrastructural fragility of ideological power
In the previous sections, our conference considered 
the apparent stability of political and urban systems, 
the negotiations and transformations that resulted 
in kings and cities persisting for centuries. In some 
cases, urban experiments resulted in abandonments 
while the resilience of a rural countryside survived 
politicide. The research into fragility was not to find 
a single form of vulnerability of political power or 
mechanisms of rule that can lead to understanding 
of political and social change. George Cowgill and I 
(1988, viii) wrote ‘societies in trouble may often reveal 
more about what is really vital for their operation 
than societies in reasonably good shape.’ Now, at 
the distance of some 30 years, it seems that ‘societies 
in reasonably good shape’ may well be rarities and 
chimeras.
Another instance of a relatively long-lived politi-
cal and cultural system is the Indus civilization, whose 
half-dozen cities lasted around 700 years. Cameron 
Petrie uses the term ‘civilization’ because, unlike 
Egypt or Angkor, the Indus civilization consisted in 
a number of city-states, politically independent from 
one another, but with a common material culture 
inventory and presumably cultural system. The com-
mon material data include painted pottery, seals and 
script, weights, bangles, and beads. The small number 
of cities in the large territory of the Indus civilization 
leads Petrie to describe the settlement pattern and 
demographic character as ‘mostly rural’. Indeed, our 
knowledge of the rural nature of the Indus civiliza-
tion is largely due to Petrie’s recent research. Petrie 
finds significant similarities in the better-known Indus 
cities, Mohenjo Daro and Harappa. In the former, 
Petrie reviews arguments of elite residences (palaces 
according to Vidale 2010) and aspects of planning as 
well as organic growth. In Harappa, Mark Kenoyer’s 
research (1997) identifies local, rival communities 
within the site. The fragility of the Indus cities lies in 
the ‘predictable unpredictability’ (as coined by Naomi 
Miller) of the South Asia environment, the increasing 
reluctance of the rural countryside to support cities, 
and the intra-urban rivalries among local leaders. The 
Indus cities, that Petrie describes as ‘experiments’, 
were abandoned while, as in the Angkor case, rural 
life was ‘embraced’ without the demands of support-
ing the cities.
The fragility of city-states in the desert and in the jungle
The political scene in Mesoamerica, particularly in the 
Maya region, and in early Mesopotamia was dominated 
by city-states. In Mesopotamia, Andrea Seri and I 
discuss the fragility of territorial states and the resist-
ance of the city-states to be governed by a powerful 
king from one of the city-states. Although there was 
a belief that Mesopotamia should be governed by a 
single city-state, the reality was that this was impos-
sible. War was the enduring condition in Mesopotamia: 
there was hardly a year from c. 3000 to 1500 when there 
was no war. Guillermo Algaze (2018) has considered 
disease vectors in Mesopotamian cities. Morbidity 
and mortality in cities and the demands (such as 
corvée labour) on people led to serial in-migrations 
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A native in these areas would have been awed by the 
major constructions in these places. Cahokia was then 
effectively abandoned by ad 1250; Chaco was similarly 
abandoned by ad 1150. In both cases, explosive growth 
could not be sustained.
The two cases, however, were significantly 
different. Cahokia was a city, with several major neigh-
bourhoods (including Cahokia itself, St. Louis mounds, 
and East St. Louis mounds), with a regional population 
estimated from 40,000 to 50,000 people. Chaco had 
relatively few permanent residents, perhaps 2000–3000, 
but was the centre of the ‘four corners’ area of the 
American Southwest. In the summer, many ‘pilgrims’ 
came to Chaco, and distant Chacoan ‘outliers’ were 
connected to Chaco in material culture, by actual and 
ceremonial roadways, and through a common belief 
system. Both Chaco and Cahokia were major centres 
in their regions and influenced far-flung settlements. 
According to Pauketat, Cahokia was the scene 
of much immigration of various people in its region. 
And, Chaco was also the centre of belief of distant 
people who were connected to Chaco. In both places 
leaders were vested in ritual power. Processions of 
people came to Chaco to celebrate rituals seasonally; in 
Cahokia Monks Mound was the centre of ritual activi-
ties (which also took place in other mounds). Pauketat 
writes that neither place was sufficiently ‘inscribed’ in 
its landscape. In oral histories of Chaco, the place was 
abandoned by the gods who were displeased by the 
hubris of its leaders. In Cahokia, the attempted ‘inte-
gration’ by ritual leaders could not succeed in holding 
together the numerous constellations of people and the 
social orientations of its many inhabitants.
Imperial fragilities
At 1200 bc the largest city in the world was Anyang, the 
last capital of the Shang dynasty. It covered roughly 
30 sq. km and is estimated to have had 200,000 inhab-
itants. It lasted less than two centuries. Across the 
globe from China, the largest pre-modern empire in 
world history was the Inka empire in South America. 
It lasted less than a century (ad 1425–1515). These 
two cases, early Chinese cities of the second millen-
nium bc and the Inka empire, require investigations 
of their fragility.
The popular conceptions about the Inka – that 
the empire provided benefits to its far-flung subjects 
through economic integration and by a bureaucracy 
whose accounting practices through knotted-strings 
were as sophisticated as any writing system; and that 
the ‘insatiable appetite’ for expansion was curbed 
only by an armed but modest Spanish expeditionary 
force – are contested by Tom Dillehay and Steven 
Wernke. The Inka empire was pre-assembled by the 
resistance to the goals of leaders, but to examine the 
structure of governance and the social infrastructure 
that rulers sought to simplify and control.
In the examples briefly described in this section, 
I report on the conference’s discussions about fragility 
in parts of the world in which political systems devel-
oped precociously, how societies were transformed by 
these political systems, and which by any estimation 
are significant examples of new forms of stratification. 
The appearance of new socio-political and economic 
institutions requires explorations into the fragility of 
these polities.
Peter Robertshaw reports on polities in sub-
Saharan Africa, three examples of many states in 
Africa (see his map of such states). One case is Great 
Zimbabwe, a territorial state that lasted two centuries, 
whose monumental capital included a population of 
around 2000 people. The region included numerous 
‘peer-polities’ and short-lived peripatetic ‘capitals’. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the site in the memory 
of the region’s people and its monumentality are why 
this ancient capital was chosen to give its name to the 
modern country of Zimbabwe. Swahili city-states, 
bound into an Indian Ocean trading network and 
competing within an Islamic sphere of merchants and 
clerics, were also embedded in the local system of trade 
and kinship networks. Kings negotiated with fellow 
kings and with their own councils of elders. Bunyoro 
(or Nyoro) states were led by kings who sought to 
construct multi-clan polities based in part on their 
claims to healing power. Common to these polities was 
a struggle to accumulate wealth in followers. These 
potential subjects constituted at times a ‘disgruntled 
peasantry’, and would-be leaders appealed to ‘alter-
nate’ ideological powers, spirit-mediums, and tried 
to link into traditional forms of ancestor veneration. 
These examples are complex and the three regions and 
their histories are not identical. In all of them, however, 
Robertshaw notes the resilience of ‘the system’, that is, 
local forms of authority and organization, which could 
be and often were restraints on the various forms of 
overarching political power.
Whereas Robertshaw could employ archaeologi-
cal, historical, and ethnographic information for his 
study of sub-Saharan African states, Tim Pauketat’s 
chapter is based on archaeological evidence, with ref-
erence also to oral histories. The data for the rise and 
abandonment of Cahokia in the American middle west 
and of Chaco Canyon in the Southwest are impressive. 
Cahokia was born in a ‘big bang’ explosion around 
ad 1050, whereas the Chaco Canyon ‘phenomenon’ 
appeared in the late ad 800s (and underwent a major 
expansion c. 1040). Both arose from modest settlements 
in their regions; their resulting size was unprecedented. 
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and how political leaders sought to ‘integrate’ their 
societies. In short, many scholars have sought to 
identify ancient states and to understand what states 
do. The chapters in this volume, while not ignoring 
such questions, now seek to identify what states do 
not and cannot do.
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Chimor, whom the Inka conquered. The royal succes-
sion was marked by corruption, crises, and regicide. 
Although the empire provided material and services 
to conquered peoples, the far-flung network of roads 
and infrastructural facilities often left constituent local 
authorities, in ayllus, with practical control of their 
everyday lives. The struggle to ‘mediate’ the recipro-
cal obligations of the state, including provisioning of 
ancestors, was fraught with vulnerabilities of supply 
and demand and ‘little cohesion’ over large distances. 
Spanish invaders found the Inka empire enmeshed in 
a succession crisis and on the brink of civil war. The 
empire was already in its death throes. 
A few years ago the Longshan culture of central 
and northern China, in roughly the third millen-
nium bc, was described as ‘Neolithic’. Now, as Li Min 
reports, cities like Taosi flourished in the late Long-
shan, and earlier cities like Liangzhu also flourished. 
The great cities of the second millennium, Erlitou, 
Zhengzhou, and Anyang are only some of the cities 
now being studied in this time period. As Li Min 
makes clear, however, large cities, powerful and brutal 
kings, vast palatial areas, extensive craft industries, 
and ‘giant conglomerates of residential communities’ 
which were migrants into the new mega-sites were 
not commensurate with stable regimes. There was 
factional competition at court, and even the mighty 
kings of the late Shang period were travelling men, 
their hegemony over territory, and their capture of 
massive numbers of people were dependent on their 
yearly campaigns to put down revolts. None of the 
great cities lasted more than a couple of centuries 
before they were abandoned. This new research on the 
spectacular early cities and states in China is matched 
by the important studies of their fragility.
The challenges of fragility
In this introduction with its bowdlerizations of detailed 
and complex chapters, I only intend to advertise the 
data-rich contributions and authoritative analyses of 
the participants of this conference. What brings the 
chapters together and makes this book more than a 
series of excellent studies is the goal of understanding 
how early cities and states struggled to survive and 
often did not. The volume represents a new agenda 
in research, the attempt not only to get beneath the 
structure of the ruling stratum, but also to recognize 
the institutional strands of resistance to central power 
in early states. Whereas many studies have been writ-
ten about ‘the evolution of complexity’, that is, the rise 
of states and political hierarchization, new research 
must consider ‘the evolution of fragility’. Traditional 
studies have sought to understand how states arose 
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9the non-elites within them (Scott 1998). Governmental 
institutions also can reify and reproduce existing power 
inequalities by serving only those who fulfil certain 
requirements, thus perpetuating existing patterns of 
social status, gender, race, and ethnicity. Together 
these processes conspire to lend the apparatuses of 
governmentality an air of naturalness and permanence, 
despite their objective constructedness and ephemeral-
ity when considered within the full sweep of the human 
story. Much theorizing in anthropological archaeology 
is dedicated to how this might be. However, the very 
framing of the problem as the emergence or ‘rise’ of 
complex hierarchical societies elides exploration of 
other forms of complexity (a point made by Carole 
Crumley long ago [1974]) and predisposes the observer 
to narratives of how institutions form in the face of 
various sociocultural and natural impedances and 
inertias. In short, archaeological theories of social 
complexity have underplayed the vulnerability and 
fragility of apparatuses of governmentality in general. 
In this chapter, we address institutional vulner-
abilities of Andean states, especially in procedures of 
ruler succession and in the symmetrically partitioned 
and hierarchically nested political organization within 
urban and rural settings in the states of Chimor and 
Inka (~ad 1200–1515; Figs. 2.1–2.2).1 These precon-
ditions of vulnerability led to some successes but 
ultimately to structural fragility within these states 
and to their demise. We also examine the administra-
tive difficulties that Spanish colonial authorities had 
in adapting their institutions to these indigenous 
procedures and organizations. 
In this paper, we see ‘vulnerability’ and ‘fragil-
ity’ as serially related processes. ‘Vulnerability’ is 
a precursor to fragility, entailing the relative sus-
ceptibility of the ideological, political, economic, or 
military apparatuses of the state to physical trauma 
(e.g., earthquakes, floods) and social stress (e.g., war, 
State institutions are of enduring anthropological 
interest not only for their novel means of formalizing 
inequality and hierarchical decision-making, but for 
how they draw upon and reveal forms of cultural 
rationality which underlie social and economic projects, 
which in turn give rise to apparatuses of governmental-
ity (sensu Foucault) and to wider principles of societal 
organization. Institutionalized political structure and 
policy, religion, long-distance trade and exchange, 
and so forth can be considered a mixture of hegem-
onic cultural norms, social rationality, administrative 
techniques, and material systems. Accordingly, our 
interests in this presentation are not in institutions 
per se but in what they tell us about the organization, 
practice, success, and failure of ancient state societies, 
in this study the Andean region. As socio-cultural 
forms, states shape the nature of social networks and 
the pace, capacity, temporality, and direction of their 
movements, as well as their vulnerabilities, which 
can under certain conjunctures lead to fragility and 
breakdown.
The term institution commonly applies to both 
informal institutions such as customs, or behaviour 
patterns important to a society, and to particular formal 
institutions such as administration and bureaucracy, 
codified religions, and the military. Institutions are 
constructed networks that facilitate the flow of goods, 
people, and ideas and allow for their exchange over 
time and space. Thus, they comprise the primary social 
and administrative architecture for circulation, literally 
providing the parameters for the kinds of subjects best 
suited for rule, thus undergirding subject formation. 
In this sense, they generate the power-laden ambient 
environment of everyday life in rural and urban areas 
of state-ordered societies. When both urban and rural 
communities rely heavily on state institutions for 
services, wide-scale vulnerability and breakdown can 
often leave these communities fragile, especially for 
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famine, class conflict).2 Vulnerability is thus a necessary 
but insufficient precondition for fragility. Fragility in 
turn refers to weakened, disintegrating, or collaps-
ing state apparatuses. That is, before a state becomes 
fragile, there first must be social and/or environmental 
conditions of vulnerability that potentially foster its 
demise. Fragility comes about, to borrow from Sahlins 
(Sahlins 1981, 2004), as a consequence of a ‘structure 
of the conjuncture’: of the interaction of events on the 
vulnerabilities of a state. Fragility is conditioned by 
vulnerability (see also Sewell 2005). We thus envi-
sion vulnerability and fragility as two different but 
potentially sequential and recursively reinforcing 
processes. As discussed below in regard to the Inka, 
social institutions within the state, such as procedures 
of ruler succession, were inherently vulnerable to 
corruption, manipulation, and coercion, which either 
led to socially durable and beneficial political outcomes 
or to ineffective and fragile decision-making and cor-
ruption. Furthermore, while the environment may be 
susceptible to certain types of physical stress, such as 
excessive flooding during an El Niño year in northern 
Peru, in the long run inundated land is very benefi-
ciary, renourishing soils and increasing agricultural 
production for decades. Both the vulnerability and 
especially the fragility of states can have oscillating 
trajectories that determine the transient, often short-
lived, nature of successful or failed states. However, 
neither vulnerability nor fragility necessarily implies 
imminent failure and collapse of the state and, in some 
cases, these conditions can lead to a more effective and 
efficient political apparatus. 
Figure 2.1. Location map of Chimor state  
















Fragility of Vulnerable Social Institutions in Andean States
We specifically consider the strengths and weak-
nesses in procedures of political succession of Chimor 
and Inka lords from one generation to another and the 
cleavages inherent in the partitioned and hierarchically 
arranged nature of Andean social structure. These pro-
cedures and structures are viewed as the vulnerable 
pre-conditions, which when not managed effectively 
by state systems, fostered fragile social and economic 
institutions that eventually failed and collapsed. As 
Andean states generally had a dual role, namely pro-
viding security and order for their citizens (internal 
role) and serving as the building blocks of a functional 
economic system (external role), state fragility would 
not only have affected the members of the state and 
communities in question, but also neighbouring polities 
and the wider society at large (La Lone 1982; Kolata 
1986). In the case of the Chimor and Inka, fragility was 
where their central administrative apparatuses did 
not exert effective control over their own territories or 
were unable or unwilling to assure the provision of 
vital services to significant parts of their territories in 
times of stress, and where legitimacy of their political 
organizations were questioned or rejected by intermedi-
ate- and lower-level social sectors. It should be noted 
that although the fall of both states was due to conquest 
by outsiders (Chimor by the Inka and the Inka by the 
Spanish), the historical and archaeological evidence 
indicate that it was the weakened or vulnerable inter-
nal orders of both, combined with major assistance by 
autochthonous rivals that fostered their fall. 
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Lastly, in this paper, we do not consider climate 
anomalies and other processes of environmental 
change of natural and anthropogenic origin that 
often severely disrupted Andean societies throughout 
history (e.g., tsunamis, El Niño floods, earthquakes, 
droughts). It is well-documented that these processes 
occurred serially and generated potentially catastrophic 
changes in the landscape, as well as induced transfor-
mations in the social and demographic organization 
of regional populations. It has been argued previ-
ously that innovations in production strategies and 
economic infrastructures in these societies reflect dif-
ferential historical social responses to both transient 
and protracted environmental change (Dillehay and 
Kolata 2004). There also are many cases in the Andes 
whereby local communities were only slightly or rarely 
impacted by environmental stress, thus indicating the 
differential and intermittent role of physical stress in 
the survivability of these societies.
Vulnerability and the fragile state 
There has been some scholarly debate regarding 
definitions, terminology and the characteristics of 
‘successful’, ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, ‘failing’, ‘failed’ and ‘col-
lapsed’ states (e.g., Boas and Jennings 2007; Chesterman 
et al. 2005; Rothberg 2004). To say that a state succeeded 
or failed or collapsed is a normative judgment that is 
only meaningful in comparison to something else; in 
the Andes, that something else has most often been 
Western, successfully expansionistic, centralized states 
and/or city-states (e.g., Mesopotamian, Greek, and 
Roman polities) (see MacCormack 2007). People admin-
istered by these polities were transformed into subjects 
by the work of state institutions such as ideological 
premises, labour projects, religious events, armies, 
and so forth. Yet, although these states provided for 
(internal) order, protection, security and conflict man-
agement, they also amassed means of violence, control 
and coercion on a large scale. Thus, they potentially 
contributed to vulnerability, insecurity, and fragility 
within their own societal realm. 
In the Andes, there is no secure historical or 
archaeological evidence to suggest unitary rule and 
that people within any early states had a single ethnic 
identity (Janusek 2008; Schreiber 1992). Also, none 
of these states appeared to have shared a common 
language or even a unitary pan-Andean culture. And 
from the viewpoint of the ethnic peoples incorporated 
within them, this process seemingly brought with it 
significant costs in social, economic, and political terms. 
Andean scholars have not always recognized this latter 
point. The state-centred literature in the Andes has been 
so concerned with emphasizing the benefits of states, 
especially for elites, their elaborate infrastructures 
(e.g., temples, palaces), their great ecological reach 
and means of economic integration, and their expan-
sionistic tendencies that the other side of the account 
has gone almost unnoticed (c.f., Isbell 2008; Kolata 
2015). Historically, some of this problem lies with the 
‘exceptional’ place of Andean civilization within the 
archaeological literature. John Murra, dean of Andean 
studies, was concerned primarily with differentiating 
the nonmarket, redistributive, and adaptive aspects of 
Andean states from capitalist or mercantilist states, 
rather than the diversity of forms and the inequali-
ties that they produced (see Van Buren 1996). Yet, the 
social costs of state development often included the 
sacrifice of local ethnic identities and structures that 
were inimical to the hierarchies of control that states 
sought to impose. Furthermore, both early and late 
Andean states appear to have lacked roots in their 
recipient societies (e.g. Chimor), particularly in places 
where there was no unitary form of rule or pre-existing 
centralized government. In short, Andeanists have 
tended to uncritically assume that state institutions 
were always accompanied by the development of 
economic, political, social and cultural structures and 
capacities that provided the basis and framework for 
an efficiently functioning political order in the course 
of the evolution of the state, at least up to the point of 
its demise or collapse. 
We argue here that the conventional perception 
of Andean states as successfully expansionistic is too 
short-sighted and does not adequately consider the 
short-lived, weaker, failed and transient aspects of these 
polities which led to their eventual demise. As a result, 
environmental or climatic factors often come in as a deus 
ex machina in narratives of the rise and fall of Andean 
states. As noted above, the discourse on Andean states 
and state development is traditionally founded upon 
criteria of Old World states, that is, highly centralized 
formal organizations with absolute rulers, great art 
styles, clear distinctions between elites and common-
ers (e.g., Moseley 1992). Yet this form of state probably 
never existed in Andean reality. Rather than thinking in 
terms of successfully built and thriving expansionistic 
states it might be theoretically and practically more 
fruitful to think in terms of different types of polities, 
including weak, fragile and successful ones, as well 
as states with mediated political orders derived from 
various local and state-wide institutions, including 
both high- and low-ranking rulers, intertwined urban 
and rural areas (D’Altroy 1992; Janusek 2002; Schreiber 
1992; Wernke 2006), and often with many different 
cooperative and competitive socio-economic strategies 
operating within them (Dillehay 1976). (We use the term 
mediated to encompass a variety of local and non-state 
13
Fragility of Vulnerable Social Institutions in Andean States
forms of order and governance on the traditional kin-
ship side, to focus on a combination of elements that 
stemmed from different societal sources which fol-
lowed different logics, yet all fundamentally Andean in 
origin, and to affirm that these spheres did not exist in 
isolation from each other, but permeated and generally 
complemented each other and, consequently, gave rise 
to different and political orders.) We also argue that 
Andean states (including early and late ones) should 
be conceptualized along a continuum of successfully 
emerging and expanding polities to declining state 
performances or, from a different perspective, from 
initially successful expansionistic states to weak states 
through failing states to failed and finally collapsed 
ones. As discussed later, we believe that higher-ranking 
sectors and procedures of political succession in Andean 
states produced some conditions of vulnerability that 
often led to social and political fragility as opposed to 
intermediate- and lower-ranking sectors that managed 
certain degrees of social and economic independence 
which allowed them to survive and to sustain them-
selves after turmoil and political demise. 
Instead of adopting a narrow state-centric view, 
which has and still is currently guiding most theori-
zation of the state in the Andes, we therefore suggest 
going beyond it and trying to comprehend the context 
of what may have constituted a wide range of socio-
political orders. As a first step, it must be acknowledged 
that speaking of ‘vulnerable’ conditions and ‘fragile’ 
states implies that, comparably speaking, there were 
other actor states on the stage that were strong or 
stronger in relation to a weak or failing state. That 
is, the ‘state’ was only one actor among others, and a 
‘centralized state order’ may only have been one of a 
number of orders claiming to provide security, frame-
works for conflict regulation, and ideological, social 
and economic services. (As an example, the Inka state 
initially competed with the Chanka, Chincha, Chimor 
and other provincial actors, which represented various 
types of expanding, weakened, and failing polities.) In 
such cases, although state institutions and high-ranking 
rulers may have claimed absolute authority within 
the boundaries of a given territory, in large parts of 
the territory only outposts of the state existed. This is 
certainly the case for the short-lived Inka empire (less 
than a century), as revealed by scattered newly con-
structed ‘compulsory’ towns and cities (Morris 1972), 
Inka tambos (way stations), road and canal networks, 
and other infrastructures in a vast, highly differential 
Andean environment that often was to a large extent 
stateless. In fact, the archaeological record suggests 
that no Andean state ever really permeated its entire 
rural territories and extended its effective control to 
the whole of its society. Statelessness or weak state 
representation in these territories, however, does 
not mean anarchy or total independence, nor does 
it imply the absence of state institutions. In many 
places, traditional non-state institutions of govern-
ance that had existed prior to the era of the Chimor 
and Inka states, for instance, may have survived the 
onslaught of imperialist expansionary strategies from 
these larger societies. Although these institutions were 
probably subjected to considerable change and must 
have adapted to new circumstances, they also appear 
to have shown remarkable resilience. Customary law, 
traditional social structures, and local authorities (such 
as community rulers or kurakas, traders, religious lead-
ers, etc.) most likely determined the everyday social 
reality of large parts of the population, particularly 
in intermediate- and lower-ranking rural and remote 
peripheral areas. Thus, while a direct command could 
be given from the highest political level, it was only 
an order. For it to be accepted and executed, it had to 
have been discussed, negotiated, and agreed upon by 
all intermediate- and lower-ranking levels. Issuing a 
command and then having it executed were two dif-
ferent yet not always compatible practices. Many of 
these polities seemed to have developed and demised 
as a result of continuous trial-and-error. 
Mediated political orders: succession and partition 
The Inka state was excessively expansionistic (Fig. 2.2). 
The motives for its sustained aggressiveness are not 
well understood but we can surmise from historical 
documents that the first conquest of neighbouring eth-
nic groups could have been undertaken for vengeance 
and a desire to consolidate their geo-political position 
in the Cuzco region (e.g., Cieza de Leon 1984; Cobo 
1979). As the power and wealth of the Inka lords and 
royal kin groups increased, there seems to have devel-
oped an insatiable appetite for more, and each new 
conquest enriched the state and added to the glory of 
the ruling elite. The royal Inka of Cuzco by privilege 
grew up in an hereditary aristocracy, exempt from 
a labour tax, and being polygamous, they increased 
rapidly. The structure and expansion of the ruling elite 
were thus in an unbalanced condition, which required 
expansion in order to maintain stability.
The Inka state had two other inherent weaknesses. 
One was there was no fixed method by which the 
ruling lord designated his successor, and any of his 
sons by his principle wife could be chosen. The other 
weakness was excessive centralization in the empire. 
Every official was responsible to the one above him 
and so up to the highest lord himself, but there was 
little or no cohesion between those of the same grade, 
and lords at the highest levels increasingly lost power 
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and authority as they descended into the intermediate 
and lower ruling levels. It was a strictly structured 
hierarchical pyramid, but one weakly built, and when 
stressed, as it was at the time of the Spanish conquest, 
it crumbled rapidly.
More specifically, Spanish written records indi-
cate that Inka royal successions were intense and 
vulnerable occasions that often led to internal strife 
and bloodshed between powerful families and to 
political scheming and ideological manipulation by 
some rulers in order to assure that their chosen sons 
and supporters gained key positions of wealth and 
authority (c.f., Cabello Balboa [1586] 1951; Murra 1958; 
Rostworowski 1961,1988, 1990; Netherly 1990; Ram-
irez 1986; D’Altroy 2001). Written records show that 
the Inka ruling elite treated eldest sons as legitimate 
candidates to the throne or as bastard sons, depend-
ing on the politics of the moment. Regardless of birth 
order, the son chosen to lead usually was the one most 
capable of continuing the policies of his ruling father. 
If a son showed that he was incapable or disobedient, 
another son replaced him, which often led to several 
brothers ruling in succession. Clearly, within the Inka 
state, procedures of royal succession advantaged those 
who manipulated the situation to their own benefit. 
Among the Inka, criteria for succession of rule 
were both ascribed (consanguinity) and achieved 
(assessment of fitness for rule), and decisions regard-
ing succession were not under the exclusive purview 
of the Inka ruler. The nobility of royal descent groups 
and the ruler’s wives both held considerable influence 
and perhaps outright approval authority regarding the 
fitness of a successor. The royal insignia – the maska-
paycha (the tasselled headdress of the ruler) – could 
be bestowed to a successor by the nobility without 
consent of the reigning emperor. In part because of 
these ambiguities, the chronicles are rife with tales of 
factionalism, succession crises and regicide among the 
Inka elite (Covey 2006:191–4). Prior to the Spanish inva-
sion, the Inka had never faced a serious outside threat 
(indeed, all Inka militarism was offensive in nature), 
and the apex of the state apparatus had reconstituted 
itself several times prior to the Spanish invasion. It was 
only through the conjuncture of the Spanish invasion 
during a time of a succession crisis that this vulner-
ability came to manifest as an acute fragility and the 
swift decapitation of the state apparatus. That is to 
say, such conflict – a vulnerability of the apparatus 
of governmentality – was a feature, not a bug, in Inka 
courtly politics. Thus, as pointed out by Covey, ‘We 
cannot consider Pizarro to have merely euthanized an 
empire that was already in its death throes’ (2006:194). 
In short, among the Inka, factional competition implied 
that successful candidates obtained the throne through 
political intrigue, coup, assassination, and even war 
(Platt 1975; Duviols 1979; Zuidema 1990). Given that 
the earlier Chimor state had a similar system of succes-
sion (Netherly 1990), it is likely that its political system 
also was equally vulnerable and potentially fragile. 
During the colonial period, Spanish administra-
tors often had serious problems with succession to the 
Inka crown, which did not adhere to the idea of primo-
geniture and thus no legitimate genealogical successor. 
Being accustomed to primogeniture, the Spanish were 
puzzled by Inka succession to power. This often led to 
local kuraka leaders exploiting the situation by playing 
Spanish and Inka administrative policies against each 
other according to the circumstances at hand. Most 
confusing was when younger sons would be given 
rule, which produced numerous difficult court battles 
over land and other resource claims, some of which 
were never resolved by the Spanish. 
Inka and other Andean political systems also 
were vulnerable to internal conflict and incapacity in 
administrative decision-making due to several layers of 
ranking or social divisions within the social structure 
of local communities. Traditionallly, communities 
were organized by at least one ayllu (ancestor-based 
corporate descent group), the most widespread kin 
group in Andean society, which usually contained 
with several lineages and hundreds of households. 
These communities were generally characterized by 
economic self-sufficiency, an asymmetrical hierarchical 
moiety of upper (hanan) and lower (hunin) divisions 
segmented into additional sub-moeties and other 
partitions, relatively equal gender relations, and socio-
economic reciprocity. Status and rank within ayllu 
lineages and sub-lineages could differ significantly, 
depending on ancestry, economic holdings, and indi-
vidual leaders, sometimes making decision-making 
and alliance-formation unpredictable and complicated. 
Nonetheless, as local participants within the state, 
ayllus carried out core functions on-the-ground that 
the state apparatus heavily depended on, especially 
during times of expansion.
It appears that Inka imperial policies promot-
ing centralized and bureaucratized administration 
(through decimal administration, a growing network 
of imperial centres, shrines, and state farms, as well as 
a growing class of attached retainers and craft special-
ists) were on the rise near the end of the empire but 
were truncated by the Spanish invasion. Nonetheless, 
Tawantinsuyu is best described as a vast fractal political 
landscape, made up in the first instance by its constitu-
ent ethnic polities (arranged as described above), each 
conceived as an assemblage of people, things, and 
places that were regulated by relations of reciprocal 
obligation – the circulation of energy (read: labour) 
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and matter – between humans and their ancestors. 
Ancestors mediated the productive and destructive 
forces of the world. Thus, as humans cared for their 
ancestors through offerings, rituals, incantations, and 
the like, so the ancestors would in turn care for them 
through plentiful water, bountiful harvests, and so 
on. At the apex of each polity was a tutelary ancestral 
huaca (landscape deity), to whom all in the polity traced 
descent. The paramount lord (kuraka) of each claimed 
privileged genealogical descent from the paramount 
huaca. Thus, subjects likewise owed tribute to the 
kuraka as the embodiment of ancestral magnanim-
ity. As a fractal political landscape, these structural 
properties and principles repeated down to the level 
of individual lineage-like arrangements (ayllus) and 
their respective huacas and kurakas. 
The Inka represented himself and the body poli-
tic of Tawantinsuyu as merely a natural extension 
of these properties and principles (see Fig. 2.3). The 
conceit of Inka imperialism, then, was to naturalize 
obligation – i.e., labour tribute extraction – by liken-
ing the relationship between subject communities and 
the state to ayllu kin relations and their obligations. 
Indeed, the Inka claimed ancestry to all Andean ethnic 
polities. The root metaphor of obligation was feed-
ing and being fed – as the patrimonial ancestors fed 
their ayllu descendants, so they were obliged to feed 
them in return (Mannheim and Salas Carreño 2014; 
Salomon 1986; Silverblatt 1988). Since the pioneering 
work of the late Craig Morris (Morris 1982; Morris 
and Thompson 1985; Morris 2013), we have come to 
appreciate the theatricality of Inka imperial centres 
and other installations – with their massive public 
plazas and ceremonial platforms – as a means for the 
production and naturalization of obligation through 
pageantry, and especially, commensal ritual (Coben 
2006; Dillehay 2003; Moore 1996; Wernke 2013). 
This arrangement facilitated an essential politi-
cal legibility by which the Inka could claim legitimate 
rule, but it smuggled along with it inherent imperial 
vulnerabilities. First, it did not supplant obligations 
among subjects and their kurakas and huacas, nor their 
essential loyalty and intercessions to them. It instead 
produced partitioned loyalties through each fractal 
level, and partitioned political economies, as significant 
labour and resources continued to flow to kurakas and 
huacas qua ancestors. Such allegiances and exchanges 
of matter and energy thus put caps on the kinds and 
quantities of extractive demands the emperor could 
make. Second, given the reciprocal logic inherent to the 
relationship between subject and Inka, tribute rendered 
produced the necessary corollary expectation that the 
Inka was obliged to return the gift. Effectiveness and 
justness of rule was largely adduced on these terms. 
Seen in this light, the vulnerabilities of the system 
become more readily apparent. But these logics and 
dynamics of Inka expansionism are most often cited 
as part of the unique genius of Inka statecraft – they 
feature as explanations for how the Inka empire came 
to expand over such a vast and diverse political and 
ecological landscape over such a time in the state-
centric literature. That is, expansion moved by leaps 
and bounds as the machinery of the state (via ceremo-
nialism, clientelism, and to a lesser extent coercion and 
violence) imbricated these large ethno-political blocs 
into an imperial fractal landscape. However, as we 
see, the production of authority in this arrangement 
depended on something like its antithesis: the com-
munitarian ethos of kinship, of community (Silverblatt 
1988). Put simply, the emergent system facilitated 
rapid expansion (clearly a feature of Inka imperial-
ism), but it also created profoundly divided loyalties, 
limited extractive capabilities, and high expenses. With 
few levers to oblige more tribute from incorporated 
populations, further expansion was perhaps the best 
option. The apparent ‘strength’ or motor force of Inka 
imperialism carried with it its core vulnerabilities. 
Another organizational feature found in the 
Andes is that lineage rulers on the north coast of Peru, 
even the highest ranking, shared decision-making with 
lower ranking individuals. Internally, ayllu authority 
took the form of a primus inter pares arrangement. 
Among ayllus, though one lord may have had a higher 
ranking within the hierarchical political structure, his 
power and authority (and thus control over labour-
ers) was restricted because he directly administered 
only one part of the intermediate- and lower-levels of 
his ayllu within the polity (Fig. 2.4). Moreover, at any 
one horizontal level within the hierarchy, there was 
no political or administrative coordination among 
local and regional rulers, making the state pyramid of 
power and authority, albeit centralized, even weaker 
and more unstable.
The structure of kuraka and ayllu authority is 
therefore nested; decision-making from the top to the 
bottom of the hierarchy was mediated by each subor-
dinate level below. The necessary position of lords of 
the intermediate- and lower-sections mitigated any 
unilateral decision-making and political action by the 
higher-ranking lord of the polity (Netherly 1977, 1990). 
As a ruler’s command descended farther within each 
side of the dualistic structure, it required approval 
from an increasingly larger number of lower-level 
rulers, which could lead to his diminished power 
and authority in the intermediate and lower ranks. As 
Netherly notes, ‘This conciliar political organization 
is one of the salient features of Andean government. 
Its efficiency for the mobilization of human energy 
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is the reason for the success of the Andean states…
and how it was possible for large expansive states to 
grow so quickly and why lower-level political units 
did not disappear when the large empires broke apart’ 
(Netherly 1990:464). But this same political structure 
also can make these states vulnerable to lower-raking 
protest and rebellions and this rupture.
However, late prehispanic Andean polities were 
not crystalline structures, given the vagaries surround-
ing succession and structure of leadership at each of 
Figure 2.3. The Inka ruler (in this case, Tupa Inka Yupanki) addresses the huacas (local ancestral landscape deities) 
arrayed below the apical huaca Uanacauri (Huanacauri): “Huacas, Willkas! Who among you has said ‘don’t rain,  
don’t snow, don’t hail?’ Speak! That is all.” To which they reply “It wasn’t us, Inka.” From Guaman Poma de Ayala, 
Nueva Coronica y Buen Gobierno, 1615, f. 261/263. The Royal Danish Library, GKS 2232 4to.
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these levels. Much of the work of Inka provincial poli-
tics can be characterized by an attempt to crystallize 
(and in the case of smaller ethnic polities, consolidate 
and amplify) latent structures into more enduring 
hierarchical forms. This was a two edged sword, as 
such latent structures were readily at hand, but carried 
with them multiple levels of checks on state-ordered 
prerogatives. Census taking and tribute assessment was 
greatly facilitated, but actual mobilization of labour 
was largely filtered through local authorities (Costin 
1996). In the imperial heartland, ayllus had begun to be 
rationalized more formally into decimal administrative 
hierarchies, though the functional reality of decimal 
administration is highly variable (Julien 1988; LeVine 
1987). Thus, if absolute rule existed, it was only at the 
highest level of the political order, yet this also was 
the level with the smallest support population and a 
population that was highly privileged and thus not 
involved in state labour and other projects. 
This form of political organization was clearly 
present in Inka and Chimor states and probably existed 
as far back as the Huari and Tiwanaku polities, despite 
all the misconception of single kings or emperors in 
the Andean literature (Schreiber 2001; D’Altroy 2001). 
It is one of the unique features of Andean political 
organization. When it worked, the efficiency of this 
organizational structure for the mobilization of human 
energy was the primary reason for the developmental 
success of Andean states. The structure of this organi-
zation particularly explains why it was possible for 
states to expand so quickly and why intermediate- and 
lower-level political structures of incorporated ethnic 
groups and other populations did not disappear once 
incorporated into an Andean state. The persistence of 
the polities at these lower levels of organization also 
explains the lines of cleavage and internal conflict 
found when the larger aggregation was weak or had 
broken up, as also was the case of the Inka conquest 
of the Chimor and of the later Spanish conquest of 
the Inka empire. 
This type of ruler succession and nested social 
hierarchy was inherently vulnerable, often leading to 
insecure conditions and at times quite fragile politi-
cal circumstances. The intermediate- and lower-level 
lines or cleavages constantly were places of potential 
resistance to the formal state. The vertically and hori-
zontally partitioned yet complimentary nature of the 
Andean political structure required much more internal 
manoeuvring and negotiation among its many differ-
ent levels and parts than the Spanish monarchy or a 
single king. These manoeuvring parts often became the 
subject of power struggles between competing leaders, 
lineages, and sub-moieties, and were utilized by those 
groups and leaders for their own benefit, regardless of 
the needs of the state or the wider citizenry. 
The intrusion of large-scale, formal state impacts 
on local orders was disruptive in many ways. Local 
systems of order became subjected to deconstruc-
tion and re-formation as they were incorporated into 
central state structures and processes under both the 
Chimor and the Inka. Some local leaders (e.g., kurakas) 
adopted an ambiguous position with regard to these 
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newly constructed hybrid forms derived from their 
new mixed identities. As Kosiba (2012) has shown in 
the highlands near Cuzco, many of these identities, 
in the form of material expressions were deliberately 
‘unmarked’, illegible and inconspicuous to the Inka, 
in order to purposely create labour communities that 
were beyond complete state control and surveillance. 
To be unmarked or beyond surveillance meant adapta-
tion, resilience and empowerment by subjects which 
produced weakened fractures within the state apparatus. 
This type of resistance and resilience on the part 
of transient labourers working under state rule might 
have been particularly true where not all state agencies 
were present on the ground and when the state did not 
deliver efficient services with regard to infrastructure 
or security. Rather, it is the mixed transient community 
itself, this case the mit’a labourers. that often provided 
the nexus of order, security and basic social services. In 
these cases, the state was perceived as an alien external 
force, far away not only physically (in Cuzco or other 
urban areas), but also psychologically. Individuals 
were thus more loyal to their own group, however 
mixed ethnically, not the state. As members of mit’a 
communities, people were tied into a network of social 
relations and a web of mutual obligations, and these 
obligations were much more powerful than obligations 
as an Inka state citizen. That is, whether under Inka or 
Chimor rule, people did not always obey the rules of 
the state, but the rules of their group or community. 
As Netherly has noted for the Chimor, legitimacy 
rested primarily with the leaders of local authorities, 
and less so with the higher-ranking state authorities 
– or only with state authorities insofar as they were at 
the same time leaders in a local societal context. We 
can identify this practice as a mediated legitimacy in 
the Chimor and Inka states: local legitimacy and state 
authorized legitimacy.
This type of mediated practice was a special 
problem for Spanish administrators, with their focus 
on absolute monarchy, concentrated their attention on 
the higher-ranking Inka royals rather than on the inter-
mediate- and lower-levels of articulation subordinate 
to them. In fact, local leaders were largely discredited 
in the Spanish era because they had often been incor-
porated into (indirect) state rule as instruments of the 
Inka, and the new political elites of the Spanish crown 
attempted to do away with them as anachronistic and 
reactionary forces of the past. This made the Spanish 
empire vulnerable in many Andean provinces and 
fostered its fragility because many revolts and upris-
ings began in these informal lower-levels that had not 
received legitimate recognition from the Spanish. The 
problem was that the Spanish never fully understood 
that the Inka ‘outposts’ were mediated by both formal 
states, appropriating state functions, but at the same 
time pursuing their own agenda under the guise of 
the state authority and power. These approaches to 
state development, however, aimed at instrumental-
izing local authorities for state purposes (e.g. taxes, 
corvee labour) and thus as a means for reinforcing the 
wider authority of the state, did not always constitute 
a genuine partnership. Under Inka rule, for instance, 
recognition of local leaders was conceptualized as a 
practice that confirmed the state’s authority. Local 
leaders on the other hand might nevertheless have 
utilized their new position to reinforce their author-
ity; but they also were in danger of losing authority 
in the local context, precisely because they were now 
perceived as agents of the state. These policies and 
circumstances made the state vulnerable on all levels 
to internal conflict and potentially to fragility.
In the best case scenario, the dual role as repre-
sentatives of the communities and agents of the state 
put local leaders in a position to merge the local and 
the state domains, but they also risked losing their 
authority and legitimacy. Again in drawing on the Inka 
case, the complex fragile nature of state and local gov-
ernance was further complicated due to the emergence 
and growing importance of institutions, movements, 
and formations that had their origins in the effects of 
and reactions to the socio-economic linkages between 
newly formed cities and rural areas. Occasionally, these 
urban formations seized power in certain regions of the 
state’s territory. Under such expansionistic conditions, 
there were often combinations of forces from the local 
sphere – like local lineage rulers, religious authorities 
and their constituencies – and from the sphere of the 
wider Inka state itself – like the mit’a (rotating forced 
labour groups) and mitma (state colonizers) who often 
served as labourers on public projects. The protago-
nists of the traditional societal entities such as local 
lineages and religious orders, on the other hand, often 
introduced their own agendas into the overall picture 
to fill any voids of the state or to outright manipulate 
state administrators.
To provide an example of the latter, when the 
Inka state expanded across the Andes in the fifteenth 
century, it resettled thousands of people on newly 
formed labour colonies to work on state projects such as 
land reclamation, road building, craft production, and 
so forth. Within these colonies, the Inka had intended 
to create a class of loyal subjects but many of these 
resettled labourers, who were drawn from multiple 
ethnic groups from many different areas, manipulated 
their predicament to re-establish their own identify 
through different yet often incoherent artefact styles, 
architectural spatial aesthetics not typical of the state 
but more in line with their original homelands or 
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To summarize briefly, our argument is that fra-
gility in the Andes generally occurred in times of 
diverse and competing claims to power and when 
differing ethnic logics of social and political order 
co-existed, overlapped and intertwined, namely the 
logic of the formal state, the local ‘informal’ societal 
order, and the associated social cleavages within 
this social order (which also likely existed in other 
forms: ethnic, religious, kinship, economic). In such 
a social environment, the state did not always have 
a privileged position as the political framework that 
provided security, welfare and representation; it often 
shared a mediated authority, legitimacy and capacity 
with other usually intermediate- and lower-ranking 
structures. These mediated structures were the cultural 
bedrock on which attempts at Andean state-building 
were constructed and sustained. These conditions also 
made the Andean state vulnerable and thus fragile and 
usually short-lived.
The mediated state
We believe that despite the types of structural and 
procedural problems discussed above, the best hope 
for a successful Andean state may have been in the 
explicit pursuit of a mediated structure – in which 
a central state government with limited power and 
capacity relied on a diverse range of local authorities 
to execute core functions of government and negoti-
ated relations between local communities and the state. 
In this approach, the top-down project of building a 
central government and the organic emergence of 
informal polities should not be viewed as antithetical 
(though in some cases they may have been invariably 
political rivals, coexisting in uneasy partnership), but 
instead be seen as harmonized or nested together 
in a mediated division of coexistence. Such positive 
mutual accommodation may have resulted in Andean 
states that might look very different from, or not con-
form to, previous ideals of what absolute authority 
structures were supposed to have been in the Andes 
and thus might appear to us to have been ‘weak’ or 
‘fragile’ with regard to institutions and enforcement 
capacities. But this very weakness also may have been 
a strength as the state gained legitimacy in the eyes of 
the intermediate- and lower-ranking people, because it 
acknowledged the strengths of those people and their 
local institutions and did not always attempt to impose 
its absolute supremacy, and because state authorities 
did not try to displace all local orders of governance, 
but worked with them, providing a coordinating or 
harmonizing organizational framework. Constructive 
interaction between state and local governance thus 
was vital in the Andes, as a formal centralized state 
and informal indigenous societal institutions and that 
local rulers followed their own cultural (ethnic) logic 
and rules within state structures. Local customary 
forms of governance persisted, and finally the Spanish 
authorities – like their former Chimor and Inka rulers 
– realized that it was more promising to incorporate 
them rather than try to suppress and displace and 
dismiss them. 
The Spanish also had administrative problems 
with other Andean cultural institutions. Andean leader-
ship and the political economy operated on the basis of 
reciprocity at all levels of society, from ruling kurakas 
to ayllus and local families. Apart from their admin-
istrative functions and their rights to have their lands 
worked, kurakas reciprocated with gifts, food, drink 
and coca for labour and service from their followers. 
As the sixteenth century Spaniard Cobo observed, 
‘In place of paying tribute, [labourers] worked in the 
service of the Inca, the religion, or their caciques…
they [followers] were given the tools and…necessary 
equipment…they did not invest anything of their own 
except manual labor’ (Cobo 1979, 209–10). ‘Tribute’, 
thus, consisted basically not of goods or cash but of 
labour that the indigenous community gave to the 
state and the kurakas. 
As noted above, ignorant of the limited decision-
making power of kurakas and the reciprocal nature of 
authority and labour in the Andes, Spanish officials 
believed that all kurakas had absolute power over their 
ayllu followers and thus could avoid the traditional 
obligations of reciprocity and gift-giving and rather 
easily shift to a cash economy. Due to reciprocity, 
however, Andeans resisted paying taxes in cash, 
which stymied the Spanish economy. As the decades 
passed, traditional institutions began to break down 
and by the mid-seventeenth century, Spanish admin-
istrative reforms loosened the reciprocal communal 
relationships central to Andean political economies. 
Spanish insistence gradually eventually forced Ande-
ans into a cash economy, which eventually promoted 
more private than communal conceptions of property 
among local communities. But the traditional system 
never fully broke down until modern times and even 
today many communities still operate under recipro-
cal rules of labour and goods exchange. As a result, 
Spanish administrators spent enormous amounts of 
time attempting to turn a system based on multiple 
sets of reciprocal relationships between multiple and 
varying tiers of leaders and commoners into a better 
defined, more permanent, and neatly ordered hier-
archy with power flowing from the top. Reciprocity 
and gift exchange were institutions that complicated 




were arranged in each type of Andean state can pro-
vide a useful way to categorize the state’s regime or 
the specific form of government and its strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Traditionally, Andean archaeology has been a 
polity or state-centred discipline, focusing heavily on 
the Inka, Chimu, Huari and Tiwanaku societies and not 
always giving consideration to the significance of local 
customary institutions and alternative actors such as 
ayllus and other on-the-ground socio-economic units 
that performed core functions not always fulfilled by 
the state. We have underestimated how the actions 
and internal inconsistencies of these institutions and 
units could potentially have made states vulnerable 
and fragile on administrative levels well below high 
royalty and upper-level hierarchical decision-making. 
The reality is that state institutions co-existed with 
and depended on the family, religious, economic and 
cultural institutions of these lower units. The extent to 
which state institutions were rooted in these custom-
ary institutions, especially kinship structure, could 
be decisive for the state’s stability, effectiveness, and 
legitimacy (Dillehay 2018). While the state, in the final 
analysis, had a coercive capacity to determine outcomes 
which local units lacked, this does not necessarily 
mean that state institutions were always the primary 
determinant of integration, security, welfare or legiti-
macy. It was institutions at all levels within society 
much more critically determined these factors. But 
when state institutions did work, it also was because 
they were embedded in local social and cultural norms 
and practices The challenge to archaeologists is to find 
appropriate forms of mediated complementarity and 
interaction at all administrative levels. 
By re-conceptualizing some Andean institutions 
as mediated political orders and as structurally and 
procedurally vulnerable to certain conditions and 
administrative levels of social and/or environmental 
stress, some states became weak or fragile and thus 
demised or collapsed. The possibilities of internally 
influencing procedural structures should be re-exam-
ined in the Andes, shifting our focus from narrow 
models of centralized state-building to understanding 
and engaging with a full spectrum of strong to weak 
mediated institutions. So far, in the Andes, we have 
tended to impose our Westernized idea of what a 
successful state is on the past. Closely related to this 
attitude has been a functionalist understanding of the 
state as a set of institutions that delivered like a product, 
using certain principles of institutional organization 
and techniques of social engineering such as large-scale 
public ceremonial feasting, road and canal building, etc. 
This approach ignores (or conceals) the fact that states 
were not merely technical and ideological exercises 
was not only a problem of political will, capacities, 
functions, institutions and powers of enforcement and 
implementation, but also a problem of expectations, 
perceptions and legitimacy. State weakness or fragil-
ity thus had two sides to it: weakness with regard to 
capacities of effective implementation and enforce-
ment, especially as it expanded into new territories, 
and weakness of legitimacy outside of local lineages.
In particular, some Andeanists preferring to 
employ traditional state-centred models may have a 
hard time imagining that life continued in the Andes 
in the absence of the formal state. In reality, however, 
alternative actors such as local rulers performed the 
core state functions that the state never or no longer 
fulfilled when it abandoned a certain space. Accord-
ingly, it is perhaps important to stress some of the 
positive potential rather than the negative features 
of so-called weak or fragile states – de-emphasizing 
weakness, fragility, failure and collapse, and focus-
ing on mediation, negotiation, generative processes, 
innovative adaptation and ingenuity. This also entails 
perceiving local community resilience and customary 
institutions not so much as resisters, protesters, and 
problems, but as assets and sources of solutions that 
could have been drawn upon in order to forge con-
structive relationships between local kin groups and 
communities and centralized state governments, and 
between customary and introduced political and social 
institutions. Local kinship-based societal formations 
were valuable social support networks that had their 
own checks and balances. Through engagement and 
mobilization, these networks could have positively 
contributed to political order. Engaging and mediating 
with communities and non-state customary institutions 
was just as important as working with central state 
institutions and governments. For at the end of the 
day, the extent to which Andean state institutions were 
rooted in society was decisive for the state’s stability, 
effectiveness and legitimacy. Of course, encouraging 
local governance on the one hand could have been at 
odds with building and expanding central institutions 
of the state on the other; strong local communities 
might have lacked the incentive to support central state 
institutions, which was the case with many provinces 
within both the Chimor and Inka states. 
Conclusions
This paper has argued that a central driver of fragil-
ity in the late pre-Hispanic Andean states of Chimor 
and Inka (and probably others before them) is weakly 
structured social institutions such as rules of succes-
sion and hierarchical decision-making. It seems to us 
that studying the way social and political institutions 
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shared both commonalities while being distinguishable 
by their unique outcomes from contingent chains of 
events and interactions. While each context was his-
torically different and each vulnerability within each 
state distinctive, research in the Andes points to a set 
of common and interrelated factors that affected, either 
in causing or sustaining, fragility. These include: weak 
political institutions, economic decline, ideological 
rupture, environmental stress, and violent conflict. A 
state’s geography and history could also have played 
a role in driving fragility, as in the case of the Inka 
empire spread over several thousand kilometres in 
highly diverse and rugged mountainous terrain. And 
there are other factors, such as regional influences 
that are linked with fragility, but also these require 
further study. 
Another theme worth pursuing is whether states 
were strong beyond their centres or homelands of con-
trol, but fragile at home or the reverse. In contrast to 
strong states, failed states probably could not control all 
of their borders, losing authority over some sections of 
territory. Furthermore, the expression of official power 
might have been limited to a capital city and one or 
more ethnically specific zones. Plausibly, the extent 
of a state’ s failure can be measured by how much of 
its geographical expanse was genuinely controlled 
by the ruling government, if this can be documented 
through archaeology and ethnohistory. The issue is 
how nominal or contested was the central government’ 
s sway over provincial towns and rural roads, and who 
really expressed power in the hinterland.
If we assume that some failed or failing states 
were tense, deeply conflicted and contested by warring 
factions, then what are the archaeological indicators 
of these conditions? In most failed states, if armed 
conflict is involved, then the material correlates are 
more visible in fortresses, weaponry, and perhaps 
physical trauma on human skeletons. Furthermore, 
most failed states probably had disharmonies between 
communities, which should be revealed in varieties of 
civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, 
and a plethora of dissent directed at the state or at 
elite or administrative groups within the state, some 
or all expressed in iconographic forms or destruction 
of temples.
We also need to establish clear criteria for distin-
guishing collapse and failure from generic weaknesses 
or apparent distresses (e.g., social or physical), and 
collapse from failure. We also should examine the 
nature of state weakness and advancing reasons why 
some weak states succumbed to failure, or collapse, 
and why others in ostensibly stressed circumstances 
remained weak and at risk without ever destructing, 
at least in the short term. It also would be helpful to 
governed from above, limited to enhancing the capaci-
ties and cost effectiveness of state institutions and their 
expansion into new ethnic territories. Rather, state 
development and sustainment were difficult political 
endeavours that likely involved serious internal and 
external political conflicts as existing distributions of 
power were threatened. Hence a techno-ideological 
approach to Andean state development, primarily 
guided by a centralized administrative view of the 
state, tends to gloss over its political and its top to 
bottom and horizontally across socially partitioned 
kinship character.
The challenge in state-level Andean archaeology 
is to find appropriate forms of socio-political comple-
mentarity and interaction across institutions within 
all types of states. These kinds of problems related to 
different degrees strong to weak states (or moments 
of weakness during the demise of a previously suc-
cessful state) have attracted relatively little scholarly 
attention, particularly in relation to local traditional 
forms of governance and their interaction with state-
based endeavours. Instead, dominant approaches to 
Andean states have rested on a narrow understand-
ing of the sources of political and social order, mainly 
the place and role of elites and their control of state 
institutions (e.g., corporate labour) for public projects. 
The reality is that state institutions co-existed with 
and depended heavily on local kinship, religious, 
economic and cultural institutions. While Andean 
states, in the final analysis, had a coercive capacity 
to determine outcomes that other institutions lacked, 
this did not mean that state institutions were the pri-
mary determinant of integration, security, welfare or 
legitimacy. Andean state institutions worked because 
they were embedded in a wide range of legible social 
and cultural norms and practices at inter-regional and 
local levels. These institutions seemed to have been 
more successful when combining state institutions, 
local customary institutions and new elements of the 
wider society in networks of governance which were 
not introduced from the outside, but embedded in 
regional and local societal structures on the ground. 
But in the end, state failure is largely man made, not 
accidental. Institutional fragilities and structural flaws 
contribute to failure, but those deficiencies usually 
hark back to decisions or actions of people. So it is 
that leadership errors across history have destroyed 
states for personal gain.
Several themes require additional study. In study-
ing the pressures, or risk factors, associated with 
ancient state fragility in the Andes, we need to take 
into account that there was no simple causal process 
and that each case, whether it be Chimor, Inka or 
earlier states such as Tiwanaku and Huari, probably 
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contrast failed and successful states. Characterizing 
failed Andean states is thus an important and relevant 
endeavour for archaeologists, especially because the 
phenomenon of ancient state failure or success is under-
researched, without precise definitions and a paucity of 
sharply argued, instructive, and well-delineated cases. 
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una historia del Perú antiguo. Universidad Nacional 
Mayor de San Marcos, Facultad de Letras, Instituto 
de Etnología, Lima.
Cieza de Leon, Pedro de, 1984. Crónica del Peru: primera parte. 
Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Catolica 
del Per.: Academia Nacional de la Historia, Lima. 
(Originally written 1553.)
Chesterman, Simon, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Chandra 
Thakur, 2005. Making states work: state failure and the 
crisis of governance. United Nations University Press, 
Tokyo.
Coben, Lawrence S., 2006. Other Cuzcos: Replicated Theaters 
of Inka Power. In Archaeology of Performance: Theaters 
of Power, Community, and Politics, edited by Takeshi 
Inomata and Lawrence S. Coben, 223–60. Altamira 
Press, Berkeley.
Cobo, Bernabe, 1979 [1653]. History of the Inca Empire: An 
Account of the Indians’ Customs and Their Origin, Together 
with a Treatise on Inca Legends, History, and Social Insti-
tutions, translated by Roland Hamilton. University of 
Texas Press, Austin.
Costin, Cathy Lynne, 1996. Craft Production and Mobiliza-
tion Strategies in the Inka Empire. Craft Specialization 
and Social Evolution: In Memory of, 211–25.
Covey, R. Alan, 2006. Chronology, Succession, and Sover-
eignty: The Politics of Inka Historiography and Its 
Modern Interpretation. Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 48 (1):169–99.
23
Fragility of Vulnerable Social Institutions in Andean States
Salomon, Frank, 1986. Native Lords of Quito in the Age of the 
Incas: The Political Economy of North-Andean Chiefdoms. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Scott, James C., 1998. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes 
to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
Schreiber, Katharina J., 1992. Wari Imperialism in Middle 
Horizon Peru. Ann Arbor: Museum of Anthropology 
University of Michigan.
Schreiber, Katharina J., 2001. The Wari empire of Middle 
Horizon Peru: The epistomological challenge of 
documenting an empire without documentary evi-
dence. Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and 
History, eds Alcock SE, D’Altroy TN, Morrison KD, 
Sinopoli CM. Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, 
UK), pp. 70–92.
Sewell, William H., 2005. Logics of History: Social Theory and 
Social Transformation. Chicago Studies in Practices 
of Meaning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Silverblatt, Irene, 1988. Imperial Dilemmas, the Politics of 
Kinship, and Inca Reconstructions of History. Com-
parative Studies in Society and History 30 (1):83–102.
van Buren, M., 1996. Rethinking the vertical archipelago. 
American Anthropologist 98:338–51.
Wernke, Steven A., 2006. “The Politics of Community 
and Inka Statecraft in the Colca Valley, Peru.” Latin 
American Antiquity 17 (2): 177–208.
Wernke, Steven A., 2013. Negotiated Settlements: Andean 
Communities and Landscapes under Inka and Spanish 
Colonialism. University Press of Florida, Gainesville.
Wisner, B., 1993. Disaster Vulnerability: Scale, Power and 
Daily Life. GEOJOURNAL 30 (2): 127–40.
Zuidema, Reiner T., 1990. Inca civilisation in Cuzco. Univer-
sity of Texas Press, Austin.
Notes
1 It is difficult to examine this topic for earlier Andean 
states, such as Huari, Tiwanaku and Lambayeque 
(ad 500–1200), because there is no reliable evidence to 
infer their socio-political organization and thus their 
strengths and weaknesses. It is likely, however, that 
their organizational structures were similar to those of 
the Chimor and Inka since these states derived their 
fundamental cultural logics from the earlier ones. 
2 Vulnerability is usually more closely related to environ-
mental hazards and the potential for loss and recovery. 
Socially, vulnerability is perceived as those populations 
living in a marginalized state of emergency or poten-
tial emergency as a result of negative power relations 
resulting from social and economic living conditions 
(Wisner 1993).
Morris, Craig, 1972. Compulsory Urbanism in the Inca State. 
In Contemporary archaeology; a guide to theory and con-
tributions, edited by Mark P. Leone. Southern Illinois 
University Press, Carbondale.
Morris, Craig, 1982 The Infrastructure of Inka Control in the 
Peruvian Central Highlands. In Inca and Aztec States, 
1400-1800: Anthropology and History, edited by George 
Allen Collier, Renato Rosaldo, and John D. Wirth, 
153–71. Academic Press, New York.
Morris, Craig, 2013. El Palacio, La Plaza Y La Fiesta En El Imperio 
Inca. PUCP: Lima.
Morris, Craig, and Donald E. Thompson, 1985. Huánuco 
Pampa: An Inca City and Its Hinterland. Thames & Hud-
son, London.
Moseley, Michael Edward, 1992. The Incas and Their Ancestors: 
The Archaeology of Peru. Thames & Hudson, New York.
Murra, John V., 1958. On Inca political structure. Bobbs-Merrill, 
Indianapolis, Indiana.
Netherly, Patricia J., 1977. Local level lords on the north coast of 
Peru. University Microfilm International, Ann Arbor.
Netherly, Patricia J., 1990 Out of Many, One: The Organiza-
tion of Rule in the North Coast Polities. In The Northern 
Dynasties: Kingship and Statecraft in Chimor, edited by 
Michael E. Moseley and Alana Cordy-Collins, 461–88. 
Platt, Tristan, 1975. Espejos y maiz. Centro de Investigación y 
de Promoción del Campesinado, La Paz. 
Ramirez, Susan, 1986. Provincial patriarchs: land tenure and the 
economics of power in colonia. New Mexico University 
Press, Albuquerque.
Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, María, 1961. Curacas y suc-
esiones. Costa norte, Lima.
Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, María, 1988. Conflicts over 
Coca fields in XVIth-century Perú. Ann Arbor, University 
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political resistance within Bronze Age society through 
the second millennium bc? How did the cultural 
resilience of past legacies contribute to the fragility 
of newly forged regimes and become the basis for 
resistance? The shift of central political theatres east-
wards over time: Taosi, Erlitou, Zhengzhou, Anyang, 
respectively, set the stage for the Zhou state-building 
enterprise at the end of the second millennium bc. As 
the western power of Zhou developed its political 
framework to accommodate these complex legacies 
spanning approximately 1000 km, architects of the 
Zhou state evoked political legacies associated with 
the past traditions for their dramatic reconfiguration 
of the political landscape in early China. 
The first quarter of the second millennium bc: 
collapse of the great Longshan centres
Emergence
Prehistoric societies in early China saw the exten-
sive collapse of the major mound centres in lower 
and middle Yangzi in the south as well as the rise of 
large Longshan centres in the highland basins and 
the lowland plains of the Yellow River Basin and the 
Huai River Basin in northern China (Zhang Chi 2017; 
Renfrew & Liu 2018). Both the prehistoric cities at Shi-
jiahe in middle Yangzi and Liangzhu in lower Yangzi 
collapsed in approximately 2300 bc leaving behind no 
urban traditions in these two regions. This dramatic 
change in the configuration of political landscapes 
coincided with the increase of agropastoralism in the 
Neolithic economy derived from expanding Eurasian 
interactions. The Jinnan Basin and Ordos in the middle 
Yellow River Valley saw the most significant political 
development in the Longshan world. 
The proto-urban centre of Taosi stood out in the 
Longshan society for its large population, marked 
social differentiation, cultural diversity, instability, 
Henry Wright (2006, 316) defines the dynamics of early 
statecraft as processes of political experimentation 
which ‘characterize the organization of successive 
efforts to build successful political or social forma-
tions, and the factors that led to failures and successes’. 
‘Experimenting’, Wright (2006, 315) argues, involves 
‘the building of knowledge based on understandings 
of the past’. The concept of political experimentation 
highlights the fragility and fluidity of state forma-
tion wherein instability, collapse and regeneration 
frequently occurred. 
The experimental characteristics of the Bronze 
Age cities in early China contributed to their fragility. 
Through the second millennium bc, five phases of 
urban development in early China, namely Late Long-
shan, Erlitou, Early Shang, Late Shang and Western 
Zhou periods, each lasted approximately a quarter 
millennium before their collapse and deurbanization 
(Fig. 3.1). This paper explores the rapid rise of these 
early urban centres, their political incorporation of 
diverse groups, their rapid downfall, the limitations 
of state power associated with them, and the legacy 
of each urban episode in the formation of a historical 
tradition in early China. I argue that tension between 
the state dominated political order, often represented 
by a homogenous material culture, and the hetero-
geneity of political networks present in major cities, 
some associated with the deurbanized centres of the 
fallen regimes, contributed to the fragility of Bronze 
Age cities in early China.
Taking the recurrent issues of emergence, fra-
gility, collapse and resilience as touchstones of this 
investigation, my archaeological inquiry is guided by 
these questions: What were the built-in tensions that 
contributed to their crises and deurbanization? What 
were the parallel networks and diverse traditions that 
the leaders of Taosi, Erlitou, Zhengzhou, Anyang, 
Zhouyuan had to cope with? What is the evidence of 
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leader and a king, Su Bingqi (1994, 71) used the notion 
‘the aura of kingship’ to describe the exceptional 
grandeur that the Taosi rulers attempted to project. 
The heavy concentration of the burials at Taosi 
and their alignment towards the central peak of Mt. 
Chong reveal that the proto-urban growth occurred in 
a landscape that symbolically inaugurated the sacred 
peak as the focus for new social identity for migrants 
with diverse cultural backgrounds. Several urban-size 
centres created by major aggregations of population 
emerged in basins on both sides of the Chongshan 
mountain range (Su 1994, 29). This circum-Chongshan 
settlement conglomerate may represent a confederation 
of polities. Its presence made the Jinnan Basin the most 
densely populated and politically significant region in 
Longshan society. 
and the emergence of defining attributes of early king-
ship in Bronze Age China (Zhongguo & Shanxisheng 
2015). An unprecedented population concentration 
took place in Taosi during the final quarter of the third 
millennium bc. Various groups from the countryside 
migrated into Taosi, whose settlements grew from 50 
hectares in the Early Phase to 300 hectares in the Mid-
dle Phase (He 2013). The large cemetery associated 
with the settlement had approximately 10,000 tombs, 
an unprecedented scale in early China (Gao 1993). The 
awe-inspiring tomb M22 of the Middle Taosi Phase 
rivals the tombs of the Shang and Zhou high elite in 
scale (e.g. the tombs of Fu Hao in Anyang and Duke 
of Guo in Sanmenxia, both associated with high elite 
of the Shang and Zhou states) (Zhongguo et al. 2003). 
Instead of making distinctions between a paramount 
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the expansion of an agropastoral economy revealed 
the divergence between changing socioeconomic cir-
cumstances of Longshan society and the conservative 
ideology of the Taosi leadership. This fault line in the 
great proto-urban centre probably contributed to the 
crisis at the transition between the Middle and Late 
Phase. At Taosi and its secondary centres, the elite 
tombs from the early and middle phases were sys-
tematically plundered and the palaces were levelled 
at approximately 2000 bc (He 2013). Whether it is the 
work of external conquests or internal conflicts, the 
widespread destruction of elite tombs at Taosi and 
nearly every major contemporaneous site in the region 
was a defining characteristic of the political instability 
prior to the emergence of any consolidated form of 
political structure. 
The purpose of these looting activities was ritual 
destruction of the body, as many grave goods sur-
rounding the coffins were left intact. In contrast to the 
pig dominated assemblage of the Early and Middle 
Phases, the fauna remains of the Late Phase displayed 
a significant increase of cattle and sheep bones, which 
suggested that the highland infiltration and intra and 
inter community conflicts at Taosi were probably 
caused by the failure to accommodate a culturally 
diverse population (Brunson et al. 2015). Clearly, 
the landscape cult and the emergence of a new set of 
ritual traditions that defined the Taosi social identity 
were not successful in removing the tensions within 
a rapidly changing Longshan society. The presence of 
other highland Longshan centres (e.g. Shimao in Ordos 
and Lushanmao in Yan’an) suggested that the tensions 
among multiple highland centres contemporaneous 
with Taosi might have contributed to their instability 
(Jaang et al. 2018). The relationship between Taosi 
and Shimao is currently the most contested issue in 
Chinese archaeology (Shaanxisheng et al. 2013, 2016). 
However, Late Taosi society did not experience a 
demographic decline after the destructions of its elite 
cemetery and palatial structure. Instead, the great 
Longshan centre as well as its neighbouring com-
munities south of Mt. Chong saw population growth 
during the Late Taosi phase, presumably from the 
influx of population from the loess highlands to the 
north of the basin. Evidence for political authority, 
however, was absent from these large sites, as no elite 
burials were identified from this period (He 2013). An 
extensive collapse took place during the nineteenth 
century bc, which was part of a widespread Longshan 
collapse in early China. The Jinnan Basin appeared 
to have been deserted and the remaining residents 
scattered into tributary valleys of the loess highland. 
When Erlitou expanded into the Jinnan Basin during 
the second quarter of the second millennium bc, its 
Crisis and decline
Expanding interactions during the late third millen-
nium bc brought extraordinary diversity to Longshan 
cities like Taosi, including key components of the Bronze 
Age society (e.g. metallurgy, a metal-based conception 
of political and economic landscapes that involved 
prospecting and mining) as well as new notions and 
apparatus of kingship shared by the second millennium 
cities. At the same time, the emergent political and 
ritual authority at Taosi seems not to have developed 
a political framework to accommodate this diversity, 
resulting in the violent rupture in its urban history. 
As a critique to the categorical difference of com-
plex chiefdom versus state as represented by Taosi and 
Erlitou, Henry Wright characterized Taosi as a major 
episode of political experimentation in early China (Li 
Min 2018). This proposal captures the challenge of early 
state building, wherein the attempt at integration itself 
contributed to the risk of failure. During the Longshan 
period, increasing interactions between the Neolithic 
farming society and the agropastoral communities 
further contributed to tensions in Taosi society and 
became the source of the fragility of cities. 
The mortuary inventory at Taosi revealed a con-
flicting trend of the failed social experimentation. On 
the one hand, pigs occupied a central place in the 
mortuary assemblage of Taosi elite. The top tier elite 
burials featured the ritual display of whole pigs split 
in halves and the culinary assemblage of pig heads 
and pig feet on cutting boards, which highlight the 
culinary refinement of the Neolithic farming tradition. 
The second-tier burials also included extensive display 
of pig mandibles, up to a hundred in each grave, pre-
sumably curated from the feasting events sponsored 
by the deceased during their lifetimes (Zhongguo & 
Shanxisheng 2015).
On the other hand, the presence of cowrie shells 
and copper objects at Taosi indicated a growing 
agropastoral component at the site, which seemed com-
pletely underrepresented in elite mortuary displays 
– no signs of cattle and sheep bones were represented 
in Taosi’s mortuary context. Cowries were brought 
into the highland Longshan society from the coast of 
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean through Eurasian 
exchange networks since the late third millennium bc 
(Peng & Zhu 1995). Their appearance was concurrent 
with the spread of cattle and sheep herding in the high-
land. The closest sources of Taosi’s metal objects were 
Ordos to the north and western highland regions of 
Qinghai and Gansu to the west, where highland Long-
shan centres of Shimao, Lushanmao, and Qijiaping 
flourished (Fitzgerald-Huber 1995, 2003; Li Min 2018). 
An overwhelming emphasis on the Neolithic pig 
feasting tradition in the Taosi elite mortuary ritual and 
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next major urban episode was set in motion at the end 
of the second millennium bc, the Zhou military colony 
granted to the Lord Tang Shu Yu was established with 
reference to the legendary landscape of the Jinnan 
Basin in the third millennium bc. The discovery of 
the Zhou military colony and the lineage cemetery of 
Lord Tang Shu Yu at Tianma-Quncun (1100 hectares), 
approximately 20 km south of Taosi, provided the 
touchstone for the archaeological landscape and the 
historical legacy in textual narratives. 
The second quarter of the second millennium bc: 
the emergence and decline of Erlitou
Emergence
Erlitou (c. 1750–1500 bc) emerged after the collapse 
of Taosi and other great Longshan centres in the Jin-
nan Basin and in the lowland regions in the east. This 
new episode of development unfolded in the Luoyang 
Basin to the southeast of Jinnan, which was previously 
a sparsely populated region during the Longshan 
period. The ceramic assemblage indicates the influx 
of population from all directions outside of the basin 
(Zhang Li 2012). The size of Erlitou was approximately 
the same as Taosi, but secondary sites around Erlitou 
were smaller and fewer of than those around Taosi 
during the Longshan period. Overall, the population 
of early China during the second quarter of the second 
millennium bc appears to be significantly lower than 
that of the Longshan period (Sebillaud 2014). The rise 
of Erlitou was not the direct cause for the depopula-
tion in the surrounding regions. Rather, its emergence 
represents a reconfiguration and regeneration of popu-
lation that survived the collapse (Fig. 3.2).
The rise of Erlitou involved contributions from 
the east and the west of the Luoyang Basin. Influx of 
communities associated with the lowland ceramic 
tradition from the upper Huai River Basin to the east 
and the south of the Luoyang Basin led to the rapid 
increase of settlement size, while highland immigrants 
contributed metallurgy to this highland gateway to 
the lowland plains. Moving eastward down the Wei 
River Valley, highland groups associated with the 
Qijia material culture crossed the Qinling mountain 
range at Lantian and established the highland outpost 
at the Donglongshan site at the northern end of the 
Shangluo Corridor. From Donglongshan, they crossed 
the narrow watershed in Luonan, entered the Luoyang 
Basin along the Luo River Valley, and prospected the 
rich turquoise mines near the southern end of the 
corridor and the copper mines in the middle Yangzi 
further downstream (Shaanxisheng & Shangluoshi 
2011). The southern expansion of this western high-
land agropastoral network into the highland gateway 
outpost Dongxiafeng was disproportionately smaller 
than those of the great Longshan centres and the out-
post appeared to have moved into a no-man’s zone 
(Zhongguo et al. 1988). 
Legacy
The momentum of the political experimentation at the 
Jinnan Basin against the backdrop of extraordinary 
socioeconomic change left its legacy both in the rep-
ertoire of symbols for political representation and in 
the emplaced social memory. Taosi was experimenting 
with new ritual institutions by marking social distinc-
tions through a syncretic process. Unlike a redundant 
display of grave goods in prehistoric tombs of the 
pre-Longshan era, the Taosi elite burials featured a for-
malized mortuary syntax that highlights an elaborate 
culinary set revolving around pig feasting and musical 
apparatuses consisting of wooden and earthen drums 
and chimestones (Zhongguo & Shanxisheng 2015). 
The distinctive elite objects and their configuration 
indicated an emerging high culture and these resulting 
forms will later become primary symbols of political 
authority in Shang and Zhou civilizations.
The discovery of a cast copper waist bell in a 
Late Taosi tomb presents the first evidence for metal 
acoustic instruments in early China (Zhongguo & 
Shanxisheng 2015). Its production technology was 
likely derived from the North Asian bivalve bronze 
casting technique with suspended core for spear 
production in the northern Altai. Bells were powerful 
instruments in shamanistic rituals. It is striking that the 
ritual aspects of early metal production were present 
at Taosi while the military aspect was absent. Over 
the centuries, the production of bronze bells evolved 
from this modest prototype into grade sets, matched 
with chimestone sets, in marking elite status in Zhou 
society during the first millennium bc. Two characters 
written in vermillion on a pottery bottle in Late Taosi 
represent a potential source of Chinese writing, based 
on their close resemblance with the Late Shang oracle 
bone inscriptions of the late second millennium bc 
(Zhongguo & Shanxisheng 2015). Chinese writing, 
therefore, was probably invented at a critical moment 
from indirect interactions with Bronze Age society in 
West Asia through Eurasian and Central Asian inter-
mediaries. This could explain the cowrie-based value 
system in later Chinese writing (Li Min 2018). 
Although the Jinnan Basin experienced a demo-
graphic recession through the second millennium bc, 
the Taosi legacy was shared among highland Long-
shan memory communities that survived the collapse. 
Evidence can be seen from their preservation of Taosi 
vessel forms and ritual configurations in elite mortuary 
contexts. As I will argue later in this chapter, when the 
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turquoise mosaic inlaid bronze plaques, waist bells, 
and cowrie shells brought in through the Eurasian 
exchange network that had been established since the 
Longshan period. Erlitou elite occasionally holding 
black jade sceptres that was found in massive quanti-
ties in the Longshan centre of Shimao in Ordos, which 
might have had some temporal overlap with the early 
Erlitou urban centre. 
The discovery of elite burials and palatial com-
pounds attests to the presence of political authority 
at Erlitou, but the nature of the leadership is difficult 
to decipher (Zhongguo 1999, 2014). In contrast to the 
large cemeteries at Taosi, the cemeteries at Erlitou were 
small and scattered, each representing only a lineage 
group. The mortuary syntax highlighted the performa-
tive aspect in the social definition of the Erlitou elite 
persona, instead of military ethos, whereas ritual 
dance might be associated with the religious efficacy 
of Shamanism associated with the metallurgists. An 
elite in a burial at the centre of a palatial courtyard was 
buried with a turquoise mosaic serpent with a copper 
bell suspended on it (Zhongguo 2014) (Fig. 3.3). Some 
lesser elites were buried in sunken plazas at the ritual 
precinct with layers of trampling surfaces, wherein 
trampling activities continued over new soil layers 
added on top of the layers cut by the burials. 
regions of Luoyang and Shangluo linked the two key 
components of the Bronze Age political landscape – 
establishing the political base in the heartland of the 
historical Central Plains and maintaining access to 
the copper ore of middle Yangzi. 
Access to these resources accounted for the strong 
focus on bronze production and turquoise works at 
Erlitou, which laid the foundation for the political 
economy of Shang and Zhou states in later periods. 
The Erlitou ceramic assemblage displayed a hybrid 
character. Round pots of the western highland tradition 
were added with solid tripod construction character-
istic of the lowland culinary tradition. The drinking 
assemblage from Erlitou represented sources as far as 
the northern communities associated with the Lower 
Xiajiadian material culture in the Chifeng region along 
the eastern edge of Mongolian Plateau and the coastal 
communities associated with the Maqiao material 
culture in the lower Yangzi (Xu 2009; Zhongguo 1999). 
Besides ritual and commensal consumptions, 
social solidarity at Erlitou was achieved with the 
performative experience tied to Erlitou ritual tradi-
tion. Instead of being buried as warriors with bronze 
weapons, Erlitou elites were buried with a set of 
distinctive consumption apparatuses fabricated in 
bronze or pottery, wearing garments adorned with 
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Xingyang, and Wangjinglou in Xinzheng), which 
provided security to the major lowland gateways to 
the Luoyang Basin. 
Beyond its heartland, Erlitou outposts were 
established along major trade routes to the middle 
Yangzi River Basin and the Jinnan Basin, appeared to 
control the metal ores, turquoise, salt, cinnabar, and 
other resources critical to the Erlitou political economy 
(Liu & Chen 2003). The emphasis on the production 
of bronze vessels at Erlitou and the expansion toward 
metal producing regions suggests the rise of a metal-
centric ideology of political landscape characteristic 
of Bronze Age China (Li Min 2018). 
Crisis and decline
The differences between Taosi and Erlitou were 
present in their formation process and social circum-
stances instead of an evolutionary difference between 
complex chiefdoms and states. There were no signs of 
political centralization and administrative apparatus 
to set Erlitou apart from its Longshan predecessors. 
It is also difficult to characterize Erlitou as a territo-
rial state. Its expansion did not represent episodes 
of conquest and incorporation of well-populated 
cities and communities. Rather, the spread of Erlitou 
Colour, sound, ritual dance, consumption of 
psychoactive substances, and the metallurgical trans-
formation taking place at Erlitou collectively defined 
its urban spectacle and enhanced its attempts at com-
munal solidarity. Many elite regalia in Erlitou burials 
were elaborations of highland Longshan tradition (Li 
Min 2018). The ritual emphasis on pig feasting in Early 
and Middle Phase Taosi elite tombs disappeared in 
Erlitou burials. Instead, the abundance of cattle and 
sheep bones in Erlitou faunal assemblages highlighted 
the consolidation of an agropastoral economy in the 
region historically known as the Central Plains (Yang 
2008). The Bronze Age tradition of placing cattle limbs 
in elite burials gradually prevailed through the second 
millennium bc in early China. 
The absence of significant destructions at Erlitou 
through its four urban phases suggests different tactics 
towards integration than at Taosi. This is also attested 
by the absence of defence walls around Erlitou, where 
the great city probably used the mountain range 
around the Luoyang Basin as its defence perimeter. 
To the east and southeast of the Luoyang Basin, a 
series of Erlitou walled strongholds were constructed 
in river valleys connecting the basin and the lowland 
plains (e.g. Dashigu in Zhengzhou, Dongzhao in 
Figure 3.3. Turquoise inlaid objects from Erlitou elite burials (Left, the turquoise inlaid serpent in tomb 2002VM3 from 
the courtyard of the No. 3 palatial compound, after Zhongguo 2014, Colour Plate 120; middle and right, two turquoise 
inlaid bronze plaques from Erlitou elite tombs VIM11 and 81YLVM4 after Deng 1998, Plates 257 and 258).
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on the li pouch-legged tripod vessels (Zou 1980). After 
the collapse of its major Longshan centres in Shan-
dong, post-Longshan communities associated with 
the Yueshi material culture inhabited the lowland 
plains to the east of the archaic lower Yellow River, 
which exhibited a much lower population density 
and reduced technological repertoire in comparison 
to their Longshan predecessors. 
The decline of Erlitou did not result from an 
abrupt invasion. During Phase III of its urban occu-
pation, Erlitou saw a gradual increase of Xiaqiyuan 
style li vessels from the Henei Basin (Zhongguo 
1999) (Fig. 3.4). The change suggested an increasing 
infiltration into the basin from communities north of 
the Yellow River which contributed to the increas-
ing cultural heterogeneity of the Bronze Age city. 
At the same time, these vessels appeared in the Jin-
nan Basin, the Guanzhong Basin, and the Shangluo 
Corridor. The Xiaqiyuan style li vessels eventually 
settlements appeared to be a repopulation in deserted 
regions, incorporating refugees from the aftermath 
of a significant social collapse.
Current archaeological evidence suggests that 
Erlitou’s failure to incorporate the regions imme-
diately north and east of the archaic lower Yellow 
River contributed to its demise and deurbanization 
during the middle second millennium bc. While it 
was successful in incorporating the Jinnan Basin, and 
the Huai River Basin into its political orbit, Erlitou 
did not incorporate the Henei Basin and the loess 
highland north of the archaic lower Yellow River, as 
well as the plains in western Shandong east of the 
river. After its Longshan towns were deserted dur-
ing the early second millennium bc, the Henei Basin 
was repopulated by highland communities moving 
downstream from the Taiyuan Basin west of the 
Taihang mountain range, brought along with them 
the diagnostic highland ceramic assemblage centred 
Figure 3.4. The distribution of archaeological sites associated with the Xiaqiyuan material culture in the Henei Basin 
in relation to sites associated with the Erlitou material culture to the south, the Yueshi material culture to the east, and 
highland sites to the west of Taihang mountain range.
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the failure to cope with an increasing highland com-
ponent in the early city led to the demise of Erlitou. 
Legacy
The Erlitou incorporation of the Jinnan Basin and the 
upper Huai Basin into its political hinterland marks the 
beginning of the Central Plains as a geopolitical entity 
that straddles the highland basin and the lowland plains 
(Li Min 2018). The early Bronze Age city transformed 
the Luoyang Basin from a highland gateway to a pivot 
of the four quarters, where the basin rose to political 
eminence for the first time in early China during the 
Erlitou period. It started a long geopolitical tradition in 
Chinese history, where successive regimes repeatedly 
returned to the Luoyang Basin for legitimation. 
With the deurbanization of Erlitou and the sub-
sequent abandonment of Yanshi fortress, the political 
significance of the Luoyang Basin declined during 
the second half of the second millennium bc. The 
next urban episode came at the end of the second 
millennium bc, when the emerging Zhou state built 
a new royal centre in the Luoyang Basin, in the name 
of returning to the old place of the legendary Xia 
regime. As I will argue in the later part of this paper, 
this spatial definition of legitimacy was likely a tribute 
to the Erlitou legacy.
Besides the emplaced social memory, an impor-
tant Erlitou legacy was its repertoire of ritual vessel 
forms and its introduction of the first assemblage of 
bronze vessels in China. The ritual and commensal 
consumption activities revolving around various 
sprouted wares for the consumption of alcohol-based 
psychoactive beverages were part of the deliberate 
effort to foster a new cultural and religious tradition 
at Erlitou. The earliest bronze vessels in early China 
were produced in Erlitou’s bronze foundry according 
to these shapes (e.g. the tripod beaker and the enclosed 
tripod pitcher with tubular extension) which attested to 
the cultural significance of these consumption activities 
in shaping the Erlitou urban experience. 
The need for using these bronze vessels for 
precision heating and mixing of psychoactive ingre-
dients became the major impetus for the technological 
innovation that ushered in the piece-mould casting 
technology which was a significant elaboration from 
the bivalve bronze casting technology used primarily 
for the production of weapons, tools, and accessories 
in the northern Altai. The close association with the 
palatial precinct suggested that the Erlitou bronze and 
turquoise workshops were strictly controlled royal 
production. Through the second and first millennia bc, 
this bronze assemblage had outlived the lifespan of 
the Erlitou regime and became the primary symbols 
of the Sandai Bronze Age states in the Central Plains. 
dominated the ceramic assemblages of Erlitou Phase 
IV (c. 1560–1520 bc), the final phase of Erlitou’s urban 
occupation, and of the post-urban phase at Erlitou. 
This change in ceramic assemblage coincided with the 
abandonment of the Erlitou palaces during late Phase 
IV and the construction of a heavily fortified city in 
Yanshi, approximately 6 km east of the undefended 
urban centre at Erlitou. 
Built around the early sixteenth century bc, 
the walled enclosure (approximately 80 hectares) at 
Yanshi was first constructed to secure its palatial foun-
dations and several warehouses, probably to provide 
military surveillance over Erlitou. It was subsequently 
expanded to 200 hectares with the construction of an 
outer wall that extended its protection to the craft 
production areas (e.g. the bronze foundries, pottery 
kilns, and bone workshops, and storage facilities) 
(Zhongguo 2013). In contrast to the hybrid charac-
teristics of the Erlitou ceramic assemblage, the new 
assemblage found at Yanshi displayed a remarkable 
resemblance to the Xiaqiyuan ceramic tradition in the 
Henei Basin, extraneous to the Luoyang Basin and 
the lowland plains south of the archaic Yellow River. 
The stylistic and technological consistency of this 
vessel type was created by the lineage-based crafts-
man tradition, in which techniques and knowledge 
were transmitted within close-knit kin networks. 
Members of each lineage group shared ideas about 
elements of their technical process as part of their 
cultural identity: ‘raw materials, source of energy, 
tools, actors, where and when things should take 
place, etc. And these technical representations are 
part of wider symbolic systems’ (Lemonnier 1993, 
4). Given the lineage organization and the social 
transmission of ceramic production techniques, the 
distribution and use of these distinctive cooking ves-
sels reveal intriguing connections between a larger 
sociopolitical phenomenon of state expansion and 
domestic life at the household level. 
The rise of the new centre at Yanshi inside the 
Luoyang Basin and at Zhengzhou immediately east 
of the basin, both associated with the Xiaqiyuan 
ceramic assemblage from Henei, coincided with the 
deurbanization of Erlitou during the middle second 
millennium bc. By the end of Erlitou Phase IV, the 
great urban centre at Erlitou was abandoned and its 
population appears to be absorbed into the newly 
constructed walled cities, Yanshi and Zhengzhou 
(Zhongguo 1999). With the construction of two well-
defended cities associated with a ceramic assemblage 
from north of the Yellow River, the dramatic shift in 
the configuration of political landscape and material 
culture in the Luoyang Basin strongly favoured a 
scenario of military conquest from Henei. Like Taosi, 
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in later historical texts. However, the shared design 
attributes, orientation of their architectures and cities, 
patterns of the temporal and spatial framework in 
historical geography, and cultural continuity with the 
material culture in the Late Shang capital of Anyang 
served as compelling evidence that these fortified cities 
represented the early royal centres for the emerging 
Shang state (Sun 2009). 
From the first introduction of these distinctive 
pouch-legged tripod vessels among the Longshan com-
munities in highland basins to the west of the Taihang 
mountain range, to their spread to the Henei Basin to 
the east of Taihang, to their increasing presence in the 
Luoyang Basin during the final phases of Erlitou, and 
finally to their rapid spread from Zhengzhou across a 
vast territory, the consistency in its production tech-
niques, stylistic attributes, associated assemblage, and 
distribution of the highly diagnostic li pouch-legged 
tripod vessel marked it as the ‘index fossil’ of the Shang 
state formation process (Zou 1980). It provided us with 
the empirical basis to link Yinxu, the only site with 
inscriptions identifying itself as the Late Shang royal 
centre, with its outposts and with its predecessors in 
Zhengzhou and Henei (Li Min 2018). Its distribution 
pattern concurred with the descriptions in later textual 
sources of the Shang as a major cultural and political 
group active in the Central Plains during the second 
half of the second millennium bc.
The homogeneity in material culture, how-
ever, concealed the potential fault lines within the 
Bronze Age city of Zhengzhou. Based on our current 
knowledge on the density of sites associated with the 
Xiaqiyuan material culture, the population of the pre-
conquest confederation from Henei was low relative 
to the Luoyang Basin. Even with the contribution of its 
allies from the plains of Shandong associated with the 
distinctive Yueshi material culture, the population is 
still far from meeting the need to populate two great 
cities of Zhengzhou and Yanshi as well as manning the 
Early Shang outposts that were established in all direc-
tions. The apparently homogeneous material culture 
of Early Shang sites, therefore, masked the complex 
makeup of the cultural groups that were incorporated 
into the Shang political enterprise. The end of the 
Erlitou ceramic tradition after the deurbanization of 
the city, in particular, suggests that the Shang state 
deliberately erased the cultural identity of the subju-
gated communities after its conquest.
Besides the highly homogenous material culture, 
the Zhengzhou political tradition placed significant 
emphasis on military ethos, an important devia-
tion from the Taosi and Erlitou mortuary traditions 
that highlighted feasting, music, and ritual dance. In 
addition to bronze vessels for ritual and commensal 
The third quarter of the second millennium bc: the 
rise and decline of Zhengzhou 
Emergence
Current evidence suggests that Zhengzhou and 
Yanshi were both constructed during the end of, 
or right after, the urban phase of Erlitou. From the 
perspective of geopolitical configuration, the change 
in the archaeological landscape of the middle second 
millennium bc could be characterized as a shift from 
a Luoyang-centred political order to a Zhengzhou-
centred one. The construction of the Yanshi city in the 
Luoyang Basin served as the critical link for political 
transition. 
Built approximately 85 km to the east of Erlitou, 
the fortified city of Zhengzhou (approximately 15 sq. 
km) had two rammed-earth enclosures built over 
the site of an Erlitou settlement. The rectangular 
inner city (300 hectares) was roughly the same size 
as Taosi and Erlitou. A palatial precinct consisting of 
dozens of rammed-earth foundations spanned over 
approximately 50 hectares at the northeast quarter 
(Henansheng 2001). Some featured an audience hall 
with a courtyard enclosed with roofed corridors. 
Located approximately 1 km south of the inner city, 
an outer wall flanked the bronze foundries, pottery 
kilns, bone workshops, and other craft production 
facilities in the southern half of the city. 
The rapid rise of Zhengzhou as the new political 
centre likely benefited from the transfer of technological 
expertise, manpower, and administrative apparatus 
from Erlitou. Two bronze foundry sites in Zhengzhou 
produced a large number of clay mould fragments for 
the production of bronze vessels, tools, and weapons 
(Henansheng 1989). The clay piece-mould production 
techniques and the functional assemblage of Zheng-
zhou bronzes strongly resembled the Erlitou bronze 
industry, which had ceased to operate around the time 
that Zhengzhou foundries started. With expertise from 
Erlitou artisans, the products from the Zhengzhou 
workshops reached an impressive size. This expansion 
of vessel size occurred in tandem with an increased 
emphasis on cattle in elite feasting activities and royal 
rituals, which marked an important departure from 
the millennia-old Neolithic tradition based on pigs 
as seen in Taosi elite burials (Okamura 2005; Yuan & 
Flad 2005). 
The Zhengzhou expansion followed Erlitou’s 
footsteps. With the exception of Henei and Shandong, 
Zhengzhou outposts were either built next to or con-
structed on top of Erlitou strongholds (Li Min 2018). 
Unlike the Late Shang royal centre in Yinxu, there are 
no archaeological inscriptions that identify Zhengzhou 
and Yanshi with specific early Shang capitals named 
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Zhengzhou. The massive deposits of cattle for royal 
dedications at the site marked the beginning of a 
cultural focus on cattle in state ritual as seen in oracle 
bone inscriptions of the Late Shang period (Okamura 
2005; Yuan & Flad 2005; Lü 2015). The Xiaoshuangqiao 
ceramic tradition combined techniques associated 
with three cultural traditions, namely Xiaqiyuan from 
Henei, Erlitou from the Luoyang Basin, and Yueshi 
from Shandong, indicating that the construction of a 
Shang identity through material culture remained an 
ongoing process. 
Partially overlapping with the late Upper Erligang 
Phase (c. 1450–1300 bc) occupation in Zhengzhou, 
Xiaoshuangqiao was either a ritual centre attached to 
the royal capital in Zhengzhou or a new royal capital 
established after the decline of Zhengzhou (Henan-
sheng 2012). The flourish of Xiaoshuangqiao was very 
brief – less than five decades after its construction. Its 
palaces were burnt down and the city was abandoned 
at the end of the fifteenth century bc (Henansheng 
2012, 725). The causes for the abandonments of Yanshi, 
Zhengzhou, and Xiaoshuangqiao remain unknown. 
The unusual appearance of Yueshi material culture at 
Xiaoshuangqiao seemed to indicate that the factional 
politics among the Shang alliances could have contrib-
uted to the brief flourish and decline of the site. By the 
end of the fourteenth century, the urban settlements 
at Yanshi, Zhengzhou, and Xiaoshuangqiao were all 
abandoned and the centre of political gravity shifted 
back to the Henei Basin.
Legacy
The construction of Zhengzhou and Yanshi immediately 
east of the Luoyang Basin reinforced the Central Plains-
based political framework first laid out by Erlitou. This 
was further consolidated by the Shang incorporation 
of the Erlitou network of outposts in middle Yangzi, 
Jinnan, and the Huai River Basin. This vision of a politi-
cal landscape centred around the Luoyang-Zhengzhou 
regions around Mt. Song left a long-lasting legacy in 
the political history of China (Li Min 2018). 
Elaborating upon the Erlitou prospecting, mining, 
and metalworking foundations, Early Shang bronze 
workshops in Zhengzhou produced some of the most 
impressive bronze vessels of early China, and the 
technological knowledge of piece-mould casting was 
brought to Shang outposts such as Panlongcheng in 
middle Yangzi, Taijiasi in the middle Huai River Basin, 
and Daxinzhuang in Shandong. With the decline of 
Shang state power during the Late Shang period, these 
technologies became the basis for the political repre-
sentation of emerging regional powers, which filled 
in the political vacuum left by the withdrawal of the 
Shang military presence (Bagley 1999; Steinke & Ching 
consumption, bronze weapons held a prominent place 
in elite tombs from Zhengzhou and its outposts. These 
elite burials belonged to lineages of elite warriors, 
which constituted the main forces of the Shang expan-
sion out of Zhengzhou. Evidence for massive ritual 
violence were found across the Zhengzhou political 
network. The victims presumably were captives of 
many military campaigns waged by Zhengzhou’s 
forces. Previously, human sacrifice was primarily 
observed at highland Longshan centres at Shimao 
and Taosi. Being a highland force, the Shang brought 
the violent practice to a new level. This emphasis on 
violence revealed that the early Shang state was largely 
a coercive enterprise, which is often overlooked by 
scholars who emphasized the monopoly of religious 
communication by Shang kingship (Chang 1983). 
Crisis and decline
The Early Shang expansion from Zhengzhou soon 
reached its limit, and a series of crises weakened Shang 
hegemony. The Yanshi fortress in the Luoyang Basin 
was abandoned at the end of the fifteenth century bc 
(Zhongguo 2003, 218). The palatial buildings, work-
shop, and water management facilities in Zhengzhou 
appeared to have been gradually abandoned a century 
later without evidence for deliberate destruction 
(Zhongguo 2003, 228). After the decline of the palatial 
quarter, the Zhengzhou bronze foundries operated for 
some time before the city was completely deserted by 
the turn of the thirteenth century bc. 
Three impressive hoards containing large bronze 
ding vessels were placed between the outer and inner 
wall enclosures at Zhengzhou, not long before the end 
of Early Shang occupation in the city. Two of these 
hoards were symmetrically placed near the two corners 
of the inner city, with cinnabar and charcoal layers 
deposited over the bronze vessels, suggesting that they 
were ritual dedications sponsored by the ruling elite 
in Zhengzhou, possibly to counter the forces making 
the city uninhabitable before its eventual abandon-
ment (Henansheng & Zhengzhoushi 1999). These 
ritual events would have taken place with elaborate 
ritual protocols and contributed to the grandeur of 
Zhengzhou as an extraordinary place. 
Located some 13 km northwest of Zhengzhou, 
Xiaoshuangqiao (150 hectares) flourished as an impor-
tant royal centre in the final phase of Zhengzhou’s 
urban occupation during the fourteenth century bc 
(Henansheng 2012). The discovery of palatial structures 
with rammed earth foundations, bronze foundries, and 
large-scale ritual sacrifice involving human victims and 
domestic animals inside the walled palatial precinct (9 
hectares) defined the site as an important ceremonial 
and political centre in the immediate hinterland of 
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on the king list in Han Dynasty sources, the Huanbei 
city was probably established by the nineteenth king, 
Pan Geng, who was responsible for relocating the 
Shang capital to the place of Yin in historical accounts. 
The late second millennium bc, therefore, presented 
the beginning of a convergence between textual and 
archaeological representations of history. 
Unlike the Early Shang royal centres, however, 
the Late Shang royal centre at Yinxu was not walled. 
Instead, it was a giant conglomerate of residential com-
munities, craft workshops for bone, jade, bronze, and 
ceramic production, and cemeteries located around 
the royal compound at Xiaotun. Yinxu grew from 
approximately 12 sq. km in Yinxu Phase I (late thir-
teenth century bc) to 30 sq. km in Phase III (late twelfth 
century bc), which was disproportionately larger 
than any of the major settlements within or beyond 
its political orbit. 
Like all great urban centres before its time, Anyang 
incorporated diverse populations. Ceramic evidence 
identified urban enclaves inhabited by communities 
from the coast. Given the scope of human sacrifice that 
took place at the city, Anyang should have had quarters 
for the confinement of war captives. For example, the 
zhang sceptre-shaped clan emblem on bronze vessels 
from a recently discovered jade carver’s tomb suggested 
that the deceased likely came from an elite artisan line 
of the Longshan-Erlitou tradition, where the zhang 
sceptres held a significant place it in its rituals (Zhong-
guo 2017). Although this prehistoric jade form was not 
incorporated into the Shang ritual tradition, the artisan 
lineage had retained its ancestral symbol while offering 
their service to their Shang patrons. Beyond the Shang 
political domain, the Longshan-Erlitou jade form was 
still revered by the highland communities (e.g. the 
Sanxingdui-Jinsha civilization in the Sichuan Basin). 
As I will elaborate in the next section, these highland 
communities under the Zhou leadership played a 
significant role in the demise of the Shang hegemony. 
The massive use of cattle scapulae for royal 
divination relied on a well-developed agropastoral 
economy, in which cattle herding rapidly expanded as 
part of the Shang ritual economy (Okamura 2005). In 
contrast to preservation of merchant records written on 
clay tablets that informs on the Assyrian commercial 
system, the Late Shang inscribed oracle bones came 
from a much more restricted source – royal lineage 
and inner elite lineages. Outside of Anyang, only one 
inscribed oracle bone was discovered in the entire 
Shang domain from a secured archaeological context, 
which came from the eastern outpost of Daxinzhuang 
across the Shang domain (Li Min 2008). From these 
inscribed bones, we can catch a glimpse of the geo-
politics and elite life in the Late Shang world from the 
2014). This decentralization of bronze casting technol-
ogy effectively undermined the political authority of 
the Shang states, whose claim to power was partially 
based on the monopoly of this technology. 
The fourth quarter of the second millennium bc: 
the rise and decline of Anyang 
Emergence
The political dynamics between the abandonment of 
Xiaoshuangqiao in Zhengzhou and the construction 
of the Huanbei city in Anyang remain unclear (Tang 
1999; Thorp 2006). Later textual sources mention a 
period of chaos and disruption in the Shang political 
order, which might have been caused by a crisis in 
royal succession, as seen in irregularities in the Shang 
king list. The Shang royal power might have moved its 
capitals around, as suggested by later textual sources, 
or disintegrated into multiple centres. If this was the 
case, these crises were certainly not great enough to 
generate major disruption in Shang material culture, 
unlike the change observed in the Erlitou-Erligang tran-
sition in the Luoyang Basin. Instead, ceramic typology 
of the pouch-legged li tripod vessels displayed strong 
continuity from Erligang to Yinxu phases. The Shang 
royal power eventually settled at Anyang in the Henei 
Basin, the very region where the archaeological assem-
blage defining the Zhengzhou tradition originated. 
The first royal centre was established at Huanbei 
(470 hectares) on the northern bank of the Huan River. 
Within the walled city, there was an impressive palatial 
precinct (10 hectares) with dozens of rammed-earth 
foundations. Both the city walls and the buildings were 
orientated about 13 degrees east of true north, which 
was a characteristic of Shang walled cities, palatial 
foundations, and royal burials in Yanshi, Zhengzhou, 
Panlongcheng, and Yinxu (Jing et al. 2013; Sun 2009; 
Tang et al. 2000). After less than a century of occupation, 
however, the royal palatial precinct at Huanbei was 
burnt down like Xiaoshuangqiao, presumably from 
civil wars or highland raids. An elaborate gatehouse 
of the main palatial complex collapsed in intense fire 
and filled its entranceway with burnt architectural 
debris. The walled city was abandoned after this crisis. 
Its residents relocated to the south bank of the Huan 
River where they established a new royal centre in the 
area historically known as Yinxu, the Ruins of Yin, 
in operation from the middle thirteenth to middle 
eleventh century bc.
The discoveries of the royal cemetery, palaces, 
inscribed oracle bones at Yinxu present compelling links 
with the Late Shang kings from the twenty-first king, 
Wu Ding, to the twenty-ninth king, Di Xin, in historiog-
raphy (Chang 1980; Keightley 1978, 1983, 2000). Based 
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sources of its tensions. First, succession through broth-
ers was a major fault line for factional politics within 
the Shang political structure (Wang Guowei 1917). 
The Shang king’s list had nine generations where the 
throne was transferred among brothers. Many of these 
transfers involved factional conflicts that weakened 
the Shang state power. 
Second, the overwhelmingly large city of Yinxu 
did not have a well-functioning network of interme-
diate-level authorities and was vulnerable to highland 
raiding. There were signs of economic, institutional, 
and military difficulties after the long reigning period 
of Wu Ding in the early Yinxu phases. Hedged by a few 
strongholds, the last Shang kings clung to their royal 
city albeit with reduced hegemony while Shang forces 
folded back from other key positions in the middle 
Yangzi, the Jinnan Basin, and the Luoyang Basin. While 
the vacuum left by the Late Shang withdrawal from 
the Panlongcheng garrison was filled by indigenous 
groups of the middle Yangzi, both the Jinnan Basin and 
the Luoyang Basin became sparsely populated zones 
after Yinxu Phase II (Liu Xu 2014). The Late Shang 
state could no longer hold on to these basins for its 
own prosperity, economic integration, and security. 
These two empty basins became huge gaps between 
the Shang strongholds and royal heartland, which 
perspective of the Shang royalty and its inner elite. 
The special nature of these inscriptions also meant 
that information on parallel networks of power (e.g. 
local assemblies, councils of elders, and the like that 
represent the ‘community’ in the Mesopotamian texts) 
was absent from this earliest repertoire of archaeologi-
cal writing. 
This ritual bias in the perspective of the early 
archaeological writing, however, does not mean that 
commerce did not exist. The flow of cowrie shells, for 
example, suggests an extensive trade network linking 
the Shang cities in the Central Plains with Eurasian 
societies and ultimately to the shores of the Persian 
Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Trade arrangements were 
made with highland intermediaries and continued to 
operate through the first half of the first millennium bc, 
until the antagonism between the rising Xiongnu 
empire and the centralized states in the Central Plains 
severely undermined the cowrie trade during the War-
ring States period.
Fragility and decline
Although Yinxu was the largest city in early China 
during its time, the inherent fragility of governance in 
the Shang political structure accounted for its relatively 
short urban lifespan. Several factors stood out as the 
Figure 3.5. The routes of eastern campaigns led by pre-dynastic Zhou kings, whereas the northern route represents 
King Wen’s campaign through the Jinnan Basin, and the southern route represents King Wu’s campaign through the 
Luoyang Basin.
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cemetery at Yinxu. The widespread use of oracle bone 
divination practices indicated that these elite lineages 
each had their own access to religious communica-
tion, which was a counternarrative to assertions of 
monopoly of religious communication by the Shang 
kingship (Li Min 2008). 
Fourth, with the great geographic span of Shang 
strongholds and the absence of a formalized administra-
tive system, the Shang political ties became increasingly 
fluid. Political marriages were one among many of 
the strategies for consolidating Shang royal power. 
Lady Fu Hao’s distinctive highland style double niche 
burial construction and entries in oracle bone inscrip-
tions about her highland campaigns against Shang’s 
rivals suggested that this royal consort might have 
been a highland elite woman among the three dozen 
royal women married into King Wu Ding’s household 
(Zhongguo 1980) (Fig. 3.6). The role played by the 
predynastic Zhou state also presented an example of 
the highland alliance-building. While the Shang king 
was preoccupied with the coastal campaigns against 
the Renfang confederation, the Zhou leaders were 
designated as the Western Lord to curb the revolts 
of the nine states in the Xia territory (Li Ling 2003). 
The subsequent Zhou conquest of the Shang was a 
increased the fragility of the late Shang state. Once the 
frontier defence was breached, the rival groups could 
reach royal hinterland without encountering major 
resistance in between the frontier and the heartland 
(Fig. 3.5). This was evident in the eventual fall of Yinxu 
to Zhou campaigns. 
Third, royal oracle bone inscriptions from Yinxu 
suggests a lack of formalized administration in Shang 
kingship. While the Late Shang oracle bones inscrip-
tion might have projected an impression of Anyang 
domination over northern China, its constant refer-
ences to armed conflicts with highland groups and 
coastal confederations under the labels of numerous 
fang suggested the limit of Shang hegemony. Besides 
the immediate deterrence of royal inspection tours 
and royal campaigns, the Shang king frequently called 
upon the hereditary leaders of Shang strongholds 
for military duties. These elite warriors were often 
addressed by their lineages rather than by their office, 
indicating the segmentary characteristics of the Late 
Shang political and kinship structure. This was also 
attested by the widespread use of clan emblems on 
inscribed bronzes, some of which allowed us to link 
the Shang elite lineages dispatched in Shandong with 
the members of cadet lineages buried in the royal 
Figure 3.6. The mortuary context and the distinctive double niche construction of Fu Hao’s tomb.
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The crisis of fragility soon set in. Three Zhou 
lords established around the Shang heartland to moni-
tor the fallen Late Shang royal city contested the order 
of the Zhou rulers and allied with Shang revolts led by 
the leader of the Shang royal lineage at Anyang. The 
Zhou order was at the edge of collapse. In its second 
campaign of the eastern territories, the Zhou army 
defeated the groups that participated in the pro-Shang 
revolt and deported tens of thousands of people from 
Anyang and other major Shang settlements into the 
Zhou heartland in the Guanzhong Basin as well as the 
military strongholds newly established in the Luoyang 
Basin and other strategic locations. These deportees 
worked under the supervision of Zhou administra-
tors in the new capitals and regional states granted 
to Zhou lords as builders and craftsmen, a scenario 
very much parallel to the Assyrian case described in 
Yoffee’s and Seri’s paper in this volume. 
At 1200 bc, Yinxu was the largest city in the world. 
At 1000 bc, no settlements of any demographic signifi-
cance remained. To destroy the potency of Anyang 
as a Shang ancestral place, Zhou troops systemati-
cally plundered the Shang royal tombs at Xibeigang, 
north of the royal palace in Xiaotun. The region never 
regained its political eminence as the seat of a great 
royal centre in Chinese history. 
The first quarter of the first millennium bc: 
addressing fragility and resilience in the Zhou 
political order
Besides cultural and political differences, vast distances 
in geopolitical space was in itself a source of fragility 
for the newly forged Zhou political order. At the turn 
of the first millennium bc, the newly established Zhou 
state faced a great east-west divide in the political 
landscape with Guanzhong and Henei as the bases of 
two great political powers separated by nearly 1000 km 
and a constellation of resilient legacies associated 
with each episode of major political development in 
between. When Anyang flourished in the Henei Basin 
during the final quarter of the second millennium bc, 
the great basins hosting previous urban episodes were 
already deserted. 
With the Zhou rising from the Guanzhong Basin 
to the far west of these central theatres of political 
development during the second millennium bc, these 
deserted basins served as a major fault line for the Zhou 
subjugation of Shang communities in the Henei Basin 
in farther east. The Zhou also faced the political chal-
lenge of incorporating this diverse landscape endowed 
with resilient political legacies from different urban 
episodes through the second millennium bc. Since 
these earlier urban episodes took place in the now 
consequence of such Shang fragility of relying on a 
fluid network of allies and vassal states. 
Finally, the highly porous structure of Shang 
political tradition was detrimental to the Shang claim 
of legitimacy. David Keightley’s (1983, 2000) charac-
terization of Late Shang society as full of holes like 
Swiss cheese (and not solid like tofu) was critical for 
the understanding of the presence and operation of dif-
ferent non-Shang traditions and memory communities 
in the broadly defined Shang world. The transmission 
of social memory associated with the pre-Shang legacy 
among elite lineages of the regional powers between or 
beyond Shang military strongholds posed significant 
challenges to successful political integration. 
This was particularly important for understand-
ing the political dynamics on the loess highlands (Cao 
2014). These highly mobile agropastoral groups could 
be described as the highland Longshan memory com-
munities, who were never fully incorporated into the 
political orbits of Erlitou, Zhengzhou, and Anyang. 
Their ancestral claim could be traced back to the 
Taosi-Shimao legacy of the late third and early second 
millennium bc, when they actively resisted the Shang 
hegemonic order based in Anyang to the east of the 
Taihang mountain range (Li Min 2018). 
The Shang political efforts to build allies behind 
enemy lines in the Guanzhong Basin only led to the 
expansion of the Zhou political influence. When the 
last Shang king was committed to his royal campaigns 
on the eastern front, his western front was poorly 
defended by an archipelago of outposts and subsidi-
aries. Nearly a month of travel from the Shang royal 
centre, many of these subsidiaries were subjugated 
polities and were not fully incorporated into the Shang 
political system. Once the major Shang strongholds 
in the Guanzhong Basin fell to the Zhou campaigns, 
the rest shifted their loyalty and joined the western 
alliance force in its march toward Anyang. Without 
major Shang strongholds in Jinnan Basin, Luoyang 
Basin and Zhengzhou, the fully exposed Late Shang 
royal heartland soon fell to the Zhou conquest around 
1046 bc. 
Anyang remained as a major urban centre for 
some time after the Zhou conquest when its artisan 
lineages were busy casting commemorative bronze 
vessels for the Zhou victors. These vessels came in Late 
Shang form, with inscriptions honouring participation 
in victory ceremonies and the distribution of royal 
rewards. They would be brought to the new settlements 
granted to their patron as a part of the Zhou military 
colonization and also to the Zhou political base in 
the Zhouyuan-Baoji region which was located in the 
Guanzhong Basin, where they would be displayed in 
the ancestral temples of these prominent elite lineages. 
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considered as regeneration or reurbanization of these 
two basins. In both cases, the Zhou founders evoked 
the Xia and predynastic legacies associated with 
these historically important basins. The Zhou royal 
speech incorporated into the Yi Zhou Shu outlined the 
symbolic and logistical considerations for the choice 
of building a new royal centre in the Luoyang Basin, 
which had been deserted for nearly five centuries 
after the abandonment of Erlitou and Yanshi during 
the middle second millennium bc: 
To secure Heaven’s protection, we must 
reside near the Heavenly Chamber. We 
must single out the evil people and remove 
them as I did to the King Zhou of Yin. Day 
and night we must reward and comfort the 
people to secure our land in the west. I shall 
promote my works until my good deeds are 
clear to all. From Luorui (the bend in the 
Luo River) to the Yirui (the bend in the Yi 
River), the land is easy to settle and without 
deserted basins lying between the Zhou and Shang 
heartland, the geopolitical and historical considera-
tions were entangled. 
To consolidate Zhou political integration, the 
Zhou set in motion a grand reconfiguration of the 
political landscape by systematically establishing a 
network of military colonies in strategic places and 
deporting subjugated Shang lineages to the Zhou 
heartland and strongholds. Zhou lords were granted 
domains as far east as Shandong and Beijing, approxi-
mately 1100–1200 km east of the Zhou political base 
in Zhouyuan. Shang elite warrior lineages from the 
Qufu region in Shandong were deported to places 
as far west as Gansu in western China, a distance of 
1100 km, whereas these political refugees eventually 
became the ancestors of the Qin state (Zhao 2014; 
Liang 2017). 
Historical geography served as the blueprint for 
Zhou’s grand scheme of state building in the Jinnan 
Basin and Luoyang Basin (Li Min 2016) (Fig. 3.7). From 
a demographic perspective, these efforts could be 
Figure 3.7. The political landscape of early China imagined from the perspective of Zhouyuan at the turn of the first 
millennium bc, wherein the Jinnan Basin and the Luoyang Basin were located between the Guanzhong Basin in the west 
and the Henei Basin in the east.
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1600 bc. Zhou described the choice of this royal 
centre as the pivot of the world and the old place of 
the Xia regime – thus evoking a pre-Shang notion of 
world order to regenerate the urban tradition in the 
Luoyang Basin. This was one aspect of resilience – the 
deeply entrenched legacy of a historical place and 
its place-world, which had survived deurbanization 
and deportation of its urban dwellers in the middle 
second millennium bc. 
In the Jinnan Basin, the Zhou state-sponsored 
regeneration was under the command of Lord Tang 
Shu Yu, a brother of the King Cheng. The royal 
investiture address incorporated into the Zuozhuan 
(compiled in the fifth–fourth century bc) detailed the 
historical relics, lineages of highland colonial subjects, 
lineages of Zhou administrators, and the political 
instructions to the Lord of Tang. The royal speech 
used the legacy of the predynastic polity of Tang (a 
legendary polity active in the Jinnan Basin during 
the late third millennium bc) and Xiaxu, the Ruins of 
Xia, the legendary first dynasty attributed to the early 
second millennium bc as its geographic and political 
touchstone for Zhou state-building: 
To Tang Shu was allotted a grand chariot, 
a Mixu drum, Quegong armor, a Guxian 
bell, nine ancestral lines of the Huai clan, 
and five regulators for overseeing official 
duties. He was given his command in the 
Tang Proclamation and enfeoffed at the 
Mound of Xia. He led his people by means 
of Xia regulations and surveyed the land 
in accord with Rong models (Durrant et al. 
2016, Lord Ding 4.1e).
Although the account was put in writing centuries 
after the investiture of Lord Tang at the turn of the 
first millennium bc, the archaeological landscape 
offers the touchstone for understanding the Zhou 
colonizing mission. Separated by Mt. Chong, the Zhou 
military stronghold at Tianma-Quncun, the site of the 
lineage cemetery for the descendants of the Lord of 
Tang, was 20 km south of the great Longshan centre 
of Taosi and was surrounded by some of the largest 
Longshan sites from the turn of the second millen-
nium bc (Li Min 2016, 2018) (Fig. 3.8). Evidence for 
marriage alliances between Zhou and highland elite 
lineages at Quncun and Dahekou reveals a pattern 
previously observed in Fu Hao’s tomb in Anyang.
The convergence of historical and archaeologi-
cal landscapes at the turn of the first millennium bc 
revealed that Zhou was fully aware of the pre-Shang 
legacies associated with the two great basins and 
used their legacies for military colonization and 
obstructions. Here was the old place of the 
Xia. If I might gaze south to Mt. Santu and 
north to the settlements at the foot of the 
Sacred Peak, if I might look back to the [Yel-
low] River and look out to the Luo River 
and the Yi River, this place would not be 
far from the Heavenly Chamber. (adapted 
from the translation of Nienhauser 1994, 
63–4; the original transliteration has been 
changed to Pinyin)
The Heavenly Chamber refers to Mt. Song on the 
southern edge of the Luoyang Basin, which was 
regarded as the axis mundi in the cultural landscape 
of early China. While this account comes from a later 
transmitted text, inscriptions from bronze vessels 
commissioned not long after these events supported 
its general accuracy. The He zun vessel cast during 
the reign of King Cheng, for example, highlighted the 
association of axis mundi with the newly established 
capital Chengzhou in Luoyang: 
It was when the King initially laid out his 
royal seat at Chengzhou. The King returned 
from extolling King Wu in the feng sacri-
fice, with sacrificial meat from the [Hall of] 
Heaven. In the fourth month, on bingxu day 
(ganzi no.23), in the ancestral temple, the 
King exhorted the junior princes of the royal 
lineage, saying: ‘In the past, your fathers 
were able to aid King Wen, whereupon King 
Wen received this [Great Mandate]. When 
King Wu conquered the great state of Shang, 
he reverently announced to Heaven: “Let 
me dwell in this central territory and from 
here govern the people.” Hark! While you 
are still minors lacking in understanding, 
look to your father’s scrupulous respect 
for Heaven. Comprehend my commands 
and respectfully follow orders! Your sov-
ereign’s reverential virtue finds favor with 
Heaven, which guides me in my dullness.’ 
The King’s exhortation having finished, He 
was presented with the thirty strings of 
cowries used to make this treasured sacri-
ficial vessel for (his father), Lord [X]. It was 
the King’s fifth year. (translated by David 
W. Pankenier in Cook & Goldin 2016, 18) 
As seen in Figure 3.2, the new Zhou royal centre was 
only 40 km west of Erlitou and Yanshi. At 1000 bc, the 
deported Shang subjects were building a new royal 
centre for the Zhou in the very basin where their 
royal ancestor overthrew the Erlitou regime around 
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to lead ‘his people by means of Xia regulations and 
surveyed the land in accord with Rong models’). The 
Zhou unified these historical legacies with the notion 
of Mandate of Heaven, which defined an overarching 
cultural order for Zhou governance (Li Min 2018). 
Zhou political rhetoric frequently connected the 
dynastic fortunes with their major landmarks: ‘In the 
past, when the Yi-Luo River dried up, the Xia regime 
failed. When the Yellow River dried up, the Shang 
regime failed’ (Guoyu 1978, 26–7). 
In this historically configured political land-
scape, the Zhou leaders acknowledged that each basin 
was endowed with its historic legacy and highlighted 
that the Zhou’s claim to legitimacy upstaged that of 
the descent groups of the great powers in the past. 
The Zhou, therefore, used the political ideology of 
the Mandate of Heaven to neutralize the potential 
for resistance within a society with diverse historical 
political consolidation. The important role played by 
the Longshan memory communities in the political 
development of the Shang-Zhou transition suggested 
that the pre-Shang legacy defined the shared political 
ideology among the Zhou and its highland allies. The 
Zhou did not have to invent the pre-Shang history of 
the two great basins – the descent groups of these pre-
Shang powers were still active in the political arena 
during the final century of the second millennium bc. 
These highland communities served as major sources 
of Zhou’s historical knowledge and fought as Zhou’s 
allies in the campaigns against the Shang. 
By adopting the historical modes of governance 
specific to each region, the Zhou state founders recog-
nized the resilience of the past legacies (e.g. the Zhou 
adoption of a dual calendar system, Xia calendar for 
the Tang (Jin) state and Zhou calendar for the rest of 
the political domain, and the Zhou request of Shu Yu 
Figure 3.8. The Archaeological Landscape of the Quwo Basin in Jinnan. The dashed line in the Quwo Basin outlines the 




The five episodes of political developments reviewed 
in this chapter grant greater insight into the nature 
of fragility in ancient states of early China during the 
second millennium bc. Lineage organization and his-
torical legacy constituted the focal points of cultural 
resilience and provided the potential for resistance 
when incorporated by a new state. Amidst the rise 
and fall of early cities and ephemeral states, an over-
arching Sandai (Three Dynasties) political culture 
developed in the historical Central Plains and set 
itself apart from the Bronze Age peers in continental 
East Asia (Li Min 2018). It was defined by the graded 
instruments of food and music that first took shape 
in Taosi and the Longshan society at the end of the 
third millennium bc and further elaborated through 
the Erlitou, Zhengzhou, Yinxu, and Zhou royal cen-
tres. This stream of tradition persisted through the 
second millennium bc despite the political shift at an 
approximately quarter millennium timescale. 
Despite the frequent dynastic change, the resil-
ience of the lineage organization worked also as the 
sources of fragility for new regimes. The historical nar-
rative of the predynastic Zhou lord being ordered by 
his Late Shang king to suppress the revolts of the nine 
states of Xia manifested such a fault line among the 
historical and geopolitical traditions (Li Ling 2003). In 
these historical circumstances, memory communities 
of past regimes often functioned as foci of resistance 
to the goals of new political leaders. 
Fragility due to the divergent interests of dif-
ferent power networks became a constant concern of 
the early thinkers who had observed these historic 
episodes of breakdowns. Confucius’ solution was to 
make good governance of the rulers mimic the role of 
lineage leaders thus merging the interests of kingship 
and kinship. This ideological pursuit, however, did 
not always work to satisfy the need of the expanding 
state. As legalist Hanfeizi (c. 280–233 bc) of the Qin 
state warned: ‘A man who is a filial son to his father 
may be a traitorous subject to his lord.’ (Hanfeizi juan 
19) Legalist reforms implemented by the Qin and 
other states were aimed at bypassing powerful elite 
lineages and the exercise of direct state control over 
the population. 
After the Qin unification, the political empha-
sis on elite lineage lines in the Zhou system was 
thoroughly abolished. The ambitious political experi-
mentation of the Qin Empire, however, did not outlast 
its second ruler. The imperial Qin collapsed due to 
rebellions that arose from all of the fallen states. 
The decision of the imperial Han government to 
adopt a hybrid system that combined state appointed 
traditions. By acknowledging the historical shift of 
the heavenly mandate, the descent groups of the past 
regimes found themselves a legitimate place within 
the Zhou political framework (Li Min 2018). 
This historical conception of the political land-
scape allowed the Zhou to work its way into a stream 
of tradition starting with the Xia civilization in the 
Jinnan and Luoyang Basins in the middle, followed 
by the Shang civilization in the Henei Basin in the 
east, and succeeded by the Zhou civilization in the 
Guanzhong Basin in the west. This strategy privileged 
the emplaced historical legacy associated with the 
two great basins in the middle and contributed to the 
consolidation of the Zhou political order by closing the 
fault line between the Shang and Zhong heartlands. 
At the same time, however, this attempt to articulate 
the Zhou into the great historical tradition of the 
Central Plains centred at the Luoyang Basin left the 
Zhou homeland in the Guanzhong Basin suspended 
in the west. Without a well consolidated hinterland, 
the Zhou royal centres in Guanzhong were vulnerable 
to infiltration by highland groups unincorporated 
into the Zhou political domain. 
Although the Zhou had moved away from the 
fragile Shang succession system involving the trans-
mission of power among siblings, beginning with the 
revolt of the three Zhou lords against the Regency 
of the Duke of Zhou at the onset of Western Zhou, 
factional conflict continued to unfold in court politics. 
During the reigning period of King You, factional com-
petition in the Zhou court over succession triggered 
the fall of the Guanzhong Basin to highland invasion 
in 771 bc. Zhou’s ambitious plan of colonizing the 
vast domain to the east with military strongholds, 
therefore, laid the conditions for its disintegration – 
at the time of highland crisis, no major states from 
the military strongholds in the east were capable of 
providing aid in time (Li Feng 2006). 
After the death of the Zhou king, the two west-
ern states, the Tang (Jin) state granted to Lord of 
Tang and the Qin state established by the Shang 
lineages deported to Gansu, worked together to aid 
the safe transfer of King Ping to the sole remaining 
royal centre in the Luoyang Basin. The royal house 
lingered on for another five centuries before it was 
finally annexed by the Qin state in 255 bc. By then, Qin 
had moved into the Guanzhong Basin left behind by 
the Zhou and grew to be the greatest military power 
among all the Zhou states. With the unification of 
the empire in 221 bc, the Shang elite warrior lineage 
from the far east, deported to the western highlands 
by the Zhou conquerors at the turn of the second 
millennium bc, finally returned to its homeland in 
eastern China. 
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If we equate, as Yoffee (2018) has suggested, the 
evolution of fragility with the evolution of complexity, 
there are large implications. Basically, we are asserting 
that humans moved from a lived experience of small 
groups (very successful over the long run) to large-
group aggregations (which are prone to hierarchy 
and violent ruptures). This transition took place quite 
possibly with full knowledge that the latter posture 
was inherently more fragile, prone to authoritarian-
ism, and ultimately to dissolution. As Wright (2006) 
has suggested, the term experimentation seems to cap-
ture appropriately this transformation in which new 
modes of self-governance were tested for efficacy and 
durability. Scott (2017, 183), likewise, emphasizes the 
improvisational qualities of early states. 
In the pages to follow, I first discuss how experi-
mentation might be relevant to the topic of fragility 
and then refer to some early experiments from across 
the globe. Thereafter, the focus narrows to the Maya 
Lowlands where early experiments in large-group 
aggregations share commonalities but later exhibit 
pronounced divergences in the manner in which 
authority was anchored in monumental time and 
hereditary (dynastic) rule. Based on empirical pattern-
ing, such anchoring produced a political constellation 
of considerable fragility.
Political experimentation
In an effort to depart from a paradigm that seeks to 
understand political formations in terms of ‘rise and 
fall’, I consider the human proclivity towards experi-
mentation. Here, the term experimentation is used to 
mean a test or trial to see if something works. Deployed 
in this way, experimentation is conceived as social 
practice with political import. This usage is less for-
malized from that of nineteenth-century philosophers 
Auguste Comte or John Stuart Mill who codified the 
Notions like fragility or its obverse, robusticity, have 
at their core an idea of durational time. Entities that 
are fragile may not last very long, are prone to dissolu-
tion or breakage, and may be unstable arrangements. 
Conversely, entities that are robust are said to possess 
staying power and to be sustainable. But how long 
must an entity survive to be considered sustainable 
or how briefly before it is perceived to have been 
fragile? Quantification of these qualities is problematic 
although Yoffee (2018) notes that many early states – 
here defined as fragile constellations of power with 
aspirations of long-term societal integration – tended to 
last about 200 years, perhaps four generations. By way 
of comparative analysis, Feinman & Carballo (2018) 
argue that more authoritarian modes of governance in 
Pre-Columbian Mesoamerica tended to flame out more 
quickly while those asserted to be less authoritarian 
and more collectively organized were sustained over 
longer periods of time. I return to a critical analysis of 
these assertions in the pages to follow but by way of 
introduction point to the important cross threading of 
political strategies with notions of time and temporal 
duration. 
In certain regions of Mesoamerica – the southern 
Maya lowlands particularly – this cross threading 
constituted a central strut that supported governance 
along the lines of hereditary rulership. A ruler was 
positioned metaphorically within vast folds of time 
that created the supra-reality of rulership or, as Paul 
Ricoeur (1985, 106) has written – monumental time: ‘To 
this monumental time belong the figures of authority 
and power that form the counterweight to the living 
times experienced….’ In the southern Maya lowlands, 
the fleeting evanescence of a human life combined 
with strategies of governance emphasizing authority 
and social difference were yoked to monumental time, 
which lent an aura of stability and durability regard-
less of the reality of the situation. 
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archaeologists refer to as ‘early states’ often emerged 
from a milieu of intensely competitive polities, which 
often is argued to have been the situation in the Pre-
classic Maya Lowlands (Clark & Hansen 2001; Freidel 
2018; Ringle 1999). Frequently there is archaeological 
evidence of violent termination of places at which 
authority was concentrated, which is particularly the 
case throughout Mesoamerica. Nonetheless, why and 
how humans disassemble (à la Scott 2017, 183) political 
experiments is one of the most persistent (and over-
dramatized) questions of archaeological research. The 
popularity of this societal transformation perhaps is 
due to the fact that political dissolution can cause great 
suffering and misery for many although Scott (2017) 
contends that disassembly liberates ordinary people 
by removing the authority to extract taxes and labour 
in kind from power brokers.
Before examining how political experimentation 
might be pertinent to Lowland Maya governance, I 
range farther and examine some political forms with 
which humans experimented before a funnelling effect 
constrained variation and entrained selected forms of 
political relations – those with a more authoritarian 
bent.
Large ‘anomalous’ aggregations
Wengrow & Graeber (2015) have written about seasonal 
experimentation with less equal political relations 
during the very distant Upper Palaeolithic – a time 
for which narratives of egalitarianism are more com-
monly proposed as an accepted correlate of hunting, 
gathering, and collecting modes of subsistence. By sug-
gesting that humans, as self-conscious political actors, 
shifted between more and less authoritarian modes of 
organization, Wengrow & Graeber (2015, 613) argue 
that ‘no social order was immutable: that everything 
was potentially open to negotiation, subversion, and 
change.’ While this assertion is open to contention, such 
a dynamic model of political relations prior to what is 
conventionally called early state formation unmoors 
us from a comfortable stage sequence. That sinking 
feeling of sand shifting underfoot is compensated by 
the discovery that providing wider latitude for politi-
cal experimentation in the Upper Palaeolithic renders 
more comprehensible archaeological evidence from 
this period that indicates pronounced differentiation 
in burial practices and other ritual actions that previ-
ously were considered anomalous. 
Concomitant with the poor fit between archaeo-
logical evidence and stage schemes is the increasingly 
large array of Post-Pleistocene sites investigated by 
archaeologists that are characterized as anomalous – 
a sure indication that something is amiss in the way 
use of experimentation as a critical component of the 
scientific method (Loizides 2014), although their usage 
does not preclude the central role of experimentation 
in early state formation. 
Because political forms codify relations of power 
and positions of authority, they are frequently con-
tested and sometimes ephemeral constructions as 
noted by Scott (2017, 183–218). Blanton & Fargher 
(2008, 5) link such fragility to rational but selfish social 
actions. But rationality is not always relevant to the 
construal of authority that oftentimes was rooted in 
mythic time and cosmic forces. Nonetheless, political 
forms tend to be unlike social, religious, or economic 
forms, although all can be imbued with significant 
relations of power. There is a resiliency – particularly 
to religious constellations – that is not often seen in 
political forms. By nature of their negotiated sta-
tus, political arrangements often are finite, with an 
emphatic beginning (or founding event) and a mud-
dled yet definitive ending. As Wright (2006, 316) notes, 
resurgent political entities frequently fine-tune more 
fragile aspects of earlier structures and in the process 
become more resilient. Such Lamarckian ‘descent with 
modification’ is observable in the Maya lowlands. In 
Postclassic Yucatán, rulers were called true men or 
halach uinic rather than the title of holy lord (k’uhul 
ajaw) in use during the Classic period. Elsewhere, 
Yoffee and I (2010) have emphasized the distinction 
between political cycling and cultural resilience – the 
former tends towards dynamism and instability while 
the latter often prevails against all odds. Examining 
the fragility of political forms does not equate with 
cultural fragility or negate the possibility of political 
resurgence or ‘descent with modification’ as men-
tioned previously.
In their reiterations, political forms parallel the 
structure of scientific experimentation. Thus, archaeol-
ogy – although not an experimental science – may be 
thought of as the study of political experimentation. What 
might we perceive as the range or continuum of human 
possibilities vis à vis political experimentation? Like 
the human imagination, variations are nearly endless 
(more on this shortly), but through time a funnelling 
effect occurred that resulted in surprisingly similar 
structures of authority among early states, such as those 
discussed in this volume. The polar extremes of this 
variation can be grossly characterized as authoritarian 
leadership, on the one hand, and voluntary collabo-
ration (some would use the term anarchism, others 
collective action) on the other (Blanton & Fargher 
2008; Graeber 2004; McLaughlin 2007). In between 
are councils, elected officials, and other variations on 
hereditary, achieved, elected, and appointed posi-
tions. Wright (2006, 314) argues that the experiments 
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Further, he wonders if the builders of Cahokia intended 
for the construction to last forever, despite substantial 
investment in the Monk’s Mound complex. Increas-
ingly, we are beginning to understand that it was the 
process of building – the coming together of people to 
work on crafting something – that was significant. The 
end product – a built environment of monumental scale 
– did not necessarily evoke the sense of permanence 
that we impart to it today. Perhaps this investment in 
process represented a realistic assessment that political 
experiments can be fragile and finite.
This increasingly large array of old places – 
called anomalous, weird, or special depending on 
your investment in stage schemes – can be viewed as 
early political experiments in human sociality. Rather 
than being set aside as anomalous, these places rep-
resent key moments in time when humans tried with 
varying success and durability to thrive, to express a 
large group identity, and to perform their spirituality 
while promoting group cohesiveness and negotiat-
ing internal and extra-community conflict. Stanish 
(2017) advances the thesis that these ‘anomalous’ 
places represent experiments in large-group coopera-
tion among complex but stateless societies. In effect, 
Stanish argues for the successful scaling up of human 
cooperation to accommodate large groups (greater 
than 1000 persons), deal with the free-rider problem, 
and manage common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990). 
He envisions a managerial authority structured in a 
manner that dissuaded authoritarian excess while ritual 
sanctions, covenants, and celebrations played a large 
role in promoting group solidarity and adherence to 
group norms (Stanish 2017, 40). 
Whether or not Stanish’s thesis is accepted, there 
is no denying that these evolutionary-stage defying 
places display more variation than exists among 
early states, lasted a good bit longer than the 200-year 
average of early cities, and rarely yield evidence of 
pronounced authoritarianism or rulership. Empirically, 
there is reason to suggest that these enigmatic places 
represent a societal transformation that is qualitatively 
different from the emergence of archaic states. Their 
remnant presence on the landscape indicates a deeper 
and richer well of political experimentation than older 
schemas of lineal evolution suggested. 
In many respects, this realization aligns the study 
of the past with a perspective expressed by Indigenous 
leaders of the Americas and Hawai’i. At a 2008 con-
ference on Indigenous Perspectives on Cultural Heritage 
organized by the Maya Area Cultural Heritage Initia-
tive and the Penn Cultural Heritage Center (held at the 
University of Pennsylvania), Indigenous participants 
expressed the view that ‘ancestral places and social 
memory are repositories of Indigenous knowledge 
we are thinking about the past. Göbekli Tepe, Turkey, 
comes to mind – a central node of great ritual sig-
nificance that is too early and too elaborate given our 
current scheme for understanding the role of religion 
during this time. 
Roland Fletcher (2018) repeatedly has brought 
together archaeologists who study anomalous giants (as 
they are sometimes called) with the goal of developing 
terms that might accommodate such anomalies. While 
new terminology has not been quick to percolate to 
the surface, discussion of these places has deepened 
our understanding of sites that violate archaeological 
assumptions about when and where large sites with 
evidence of planning and monumentality should occur. 
We might think of these sites as canaries that give us 
early warning that political experimentation with a 
discernible material imprint is entering the repertoire 
of human strategies of socialization. 
Early experiments are present on most continents 
and some bear familiar names: Cahokia, Hopewell, 
Caral, Stonehenge, Ukrainian Trypillia, oppida of Iron-
age Europe, Cô Loa in Southeast Asia, and Zimbabwe 
in east Africa, along with the many pre-Shang dynasty 
mega-sites of China (see contributions in Kim et al. 
2018). These are places that cannot be explained by 
reference to our great grandfathers’ neo-evolutionary 
scheme. They are too big and too early to shoehorn into 
a preconceived, gradualist understanding of social 
transformation suggested by older social theories. 
Rather than evincing a step-like or incremental increase 
in societal size and complexity (e.g., bands, tribes, 
chiefdoms, and states), these very large aggregations 
appear with little prelude and some included popula-
tion concentrations exceeding 5000 people.
A common feature of early mega-sites is the 
presence of significant and often monumental con-
structions – mounds, ramparts, enclosures, and stone 
walls. Arguably, the cooperative work of building 
these constructions was not novel but the large scale 
on which they were conceived must have been highly 
innovative at the time. Something was changing as 
places were constructed at which thousands of people 
would assemble and witness negotiation and conflict 
resolution, perhaps within the context of spiritual 
practice. Such places would truly have been public 
architecture and, as Takeshi Inomata and colleagues 
(2015) have argued in reference to the 1000 bc E-Group 
construction (more on E-Groups shortly) at the lowland 
Maya site of Ceibal, they need not be causally linked 
to emerging elites. 
For the middle Mississippi Valley of ad 1000, 
Timothy Pauketat (2018) suggests that Cahokia was the 
product of political negotiation and experimentation 
with ways of communicating with supernatural forces. 
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north-south was constructed (Fig. 4.1). If one stood on 
the western platform and sighted along the eastern 
platform, the solstice and equinox (for example) could 
be observed at pre-marked positions. This construc-
tion is now recognized as the earliest nonresidential 
architecture built for ritual practice in the Maya region 
(Freidel et al. 2017; Inomata et al. 2015). Contemplat-
ing the significance of E-Groups for the archaic states 
that followed, Inomata and colleagues (2015) question 
whether a direct line can be drawn connecting the two. 
E-Groups in their original conception might be closer 
to the ‘anomalous’ constructions discussed above than 
to incipient states. From this perspective, E-Group 
construction signals the cooperation of persons from 
a large catchment who came together seasonally (thus 
the lack of identifiable residences that are coeval with 
the earliest E-Group at Ceibal).
During the ensuing Middle Preclassic period 
(1000–350 bc), there was explosive growth of settle-
ments with and without monumental structures. 
E-Groups continued to be constructed through the 
Early Classic period (ad 250–600), but during the latter 
part of the Middle Preclassic period these constructions 
were eclipsed by massive pyramidal shrines built for 
deities (Chase et al. 2017). Spectacular examples of 
massive Middle and Late Preclassic (1000 bc–ad 250) 
shrines – likely dedicated to patron deities – exist across 
Mesoamerica and include the Pyramid of the Sun at 
Teotihuacan (Valley of Mexico); Cholula in Puebla, 
Mexico; La Venta on the Gulf Coast of Mexico; La 
Blanca (Pacific coastal Guatemala); Dante at El Mirador, 
Guatemala; Xocnaceh in the Puuc Region of Yucatán, 
Mexico; and Lamanai, Belize (Fig. 4.2), to name just a 
few. Tunnel and trench excavations at many of these 
massive, squat pyramids have yet to reveal the presence 
of a royal tomb. This fact indicates that these structures 
were not funerary monuments dedicated to deceased 
rulers but shrines built to venerate deities. 
Stucco masks that adorn the façades of many 
lowland Maya Late Preclassic (300 bc–ad 250) shrines 
represent a range of supernaturals, some of which were 
local to a place (i.e., a patron deity) while others were 
more widely venerated. The important point here is 
that a monument to a locally important deity proved 
an effective mechanism of large-group integration and 
identity-building during Middle and Late Preclassic 
times (1000 bc–ad 250) across Mesoamerica. But mas-
sive monuments have a way of massively restructuring 
a built environment (Love 1999). These colossal con-
structions created zones of restricted access and thus 
facilitated practices of inequality. Sacred shrines also 
engender the need for protection since they become a 
focal point of both internal contestations and external 
threat (McAnany 2010, 150–3). 
and experimentation. They provide a wellspring of 
innovation and resilience.’ By reframing the past as 
a repository of knowledge and experimentation, the 
old paradigm of the past as a study of the rise and 
fall of political regimes is cast aside in favour of an 
examination of the variable ways in which humans 
self-organize into large-group aggregations. 
Preclassic Maya lowlands: E-Groups and patron 
deity shrines
As we grapple with newly synthesized understandings 
of group aggregation and the implications for coop-
eration, hierarchy, and conflict, the highly enigmatic 
Preclassic Maya Lowlands provide an important case 
study. In contrast to the Gulf Coast where Olmec sites 
dominated the landscape during the Early Preclassic 
period (2000–1000 bc) with prominent displays of 
rulership, at this coeval time there is only a faintly dis-
cernible footprint of settlement in the Maya Lowlands 
at resource-specific locales such as the chert quarry at 
Colha, Belize (Iceland 2005). 
At the cusp of the Early/Middle Preclassic and 
in the absence of appreciable settlement, a particular 
kind of non-residential architecture has been docu-
mented by Inomata and colleagues (2015) at Ceibal 
in the western part of the Maya Lowlands. Called an 
E-Group complex after its first recognition at Uaxactun 
where the complex of structures was found in map 
quadrant ‘E’ (Blom 1926), E Groups initially were 
built for ground-based solar and planetary observa-
tion. They are composed of a simple square western 
platform fronted with an open plaza to the east. On the 
eastern side of the plaza, a long, thin platform oriented 
Figure 4.1. Plan of Preclassic E Group at Cenote, Belize 
(after Chase 1983:1302, reproduced courtesy of Arlen 
Chase).
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through family lines either was not practised or is not 
visible archaeologically in features such as funerary 
pyramids that signal a large role for ancestor venera-
tion (Freidel 2018). 
Much of the Mexican Highlands also continued 
to embrace a ritual politics in which patron deities and 
those of naturally potent forces (such as rain and sun) 
provided the focus for large-group identity and ritual 
practice. The Aztec imperium was no exception. The 
twin pyramid complex at the centre of their capital 
at Tenochtitlán was dedicated to their patron deity 
Huitzilopochtli and to the god of rain, Tlaloc. Despite 
the absence of royal ancestor veneration among the 
Aztecs, pronounced social strata (in fact, an aristocracy) 
existed within a highly militarized society. Important 
decisions – particularly regarding imperial succession 
– lay in the hands of a high-level council; sodalities 
also provided an organizational matrix for cadres of 
soldiers and other professions. The Aztec marketplace 
at Tlatelolco – avidly described by Spaniards – indicates 
that commerce was brisk and unfettered. But whether 
this marketplace activity and other forms of domestic 
organization can be deployed to assert collective action 
around common-pool resources à la Ostrom (1990) is 
highly debatable. Feinman & Carballo (2018) assert that 
collective action was a strong organizational character-
istic of Aztec society (and also of earlier Teotihuacan). 
Broadening the temporal and spatial focus of 
deity shrines, consider the fact that widespread burn-
ing of ritual structures along the Street of the Dead 
at Teotihuacan (now thought to have occurred about 
ad 550) is widely interpreted as an inside job (Cow-
gill 1997; Millon 1988). Also relevant is the fact that 
among Postclassic Aztecs, the final task of invading 
Mexica warriors was to torch the patron deity shrine 
of a conquered altepetl (a city-state entity). Although 
deity shrines provided a strong and compelling focus 
for group identity, solidarity, and well-being, such 
structures also could become the focus of intra and 
intergroup conflict precisely because they catalyzed 
group membership and, in the process, engendered 
categories of ‘other’. 
Thus, the presence of a deity shrine did not pre-
clude intense competition and violence both within 
and between groups; in fact, such shrines probably 
accentuated identity-based conflict. But these colossal 
structures certainly did not instantiate governance 
through hereditary rulership with all of its lineal con-
notations. The ensuing Classic period (ad 250–600) is 
the time during which political practices that placed 
emphasis on rulership through lineal descent crystal-
lized in the southern Maya Lowlands. This impulse 
towards dynasty stood in contrast to the northern 
Maya Lowlands where hereditary rulership that passed 
Figure 4.2. The 33 m-tall Preclassic deity pyramid at Lamanai (courtesy of Wikipedia commons).
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population maximum of perhaps 3–4 million (Kennett 
& Beach 2013). Somewhere between 60–80 per cent 
of ordinary people lived within the satellite orbit of 
about three dozen royal courts (Inomata & Houston 
2001a & b; Martin & Grube 2008; Miller & Martin 
2004). Most artefacts and monumental constructions 
that are considered quintessentially ‘ancient Maya’ 
were made, inscribed, or painted during this 200-year 
heyday of royal courts. 
During the Late Classic period, the design of 
pyramidal monuments morphed into taller and thin-
ner pyramids, many of which were associated with 
or housed the remains of members of ruling families 
(Fig. 4.3). As at Palenque’s Temple of the Inscriptions, 
funerary shrines often were erected or completed by 
sons or survivors of deceased rulers who inherited 
the throne or sought to make a statement about their 
right to the throne. Within southern lowland society 
of the Classic period, rulers were heavily vested in 
hereditary rulership and unequal access to power 
and wealth became entrenched. As Joanne Baron 
This assertion does not sit well with the highly visible 
militaristic and authoritarian rulership that existed 
among Aztecs and earlier at Teotihuacan. As a coun-
terpoint, Murakami (2016) provides a compelling 
analysis of the standardized apartment compounds 
of Teotihuacan as indicative not of collectivization but 
of a dialectic of control and promotion of a corporate 
ideology. Thus, the absence of named rulers and funer-
ary pyramids is not necessarily an indicator of equality 
and democratic decision-making about common-pool 
resources in the manner modelled by Ostrom (1990).
Authority and hereditary rulership hybridized: 
southern lowland Maya experiment
The divergent pathway followed in the southern low-
lands reaches back to Preclassic times but unfolded 
during Classic times and particularly during the 
Late Classic period – a short time span of about 200 
years (ad 600–800). During the Late Classic period, 
the southern lowland is thought to have reached a 
Figure 4.3. Late Classic funerary pyramid 
(Temple 1) of Tikal ruler, Jasaw Chan 
K’awiil (photo by author).
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alongside contemporary events. The long-count calen-
dar originated during Preclassic times outside of the 
Maya region and there is good reason to suspect that 
this count of monumental time was invented to cre-
ate deep narratives of place for patron deities thereby 
rooting group identity in a mythic past. Only later 
was the long count adapted to the cosmic framing of 
earthly rulers. 
Stuart (2011, 229–51) illustrates how social order 
and continuity was reaffirmed using massive bun-
dles of time at southern lowland sites. The ability of 
scribes to extrapolate bundles of days and years to the 
nineteenth order (Stuart 2011, 237) allowed time to 
be abstracted in a truly monumental fashion. Rulers 
could key into auspicious folds of monumental time 
to emphasize their accession to rulership, martial 
campaigns, or building dedications. K’inich Akhal 
Mo’ Nahb of Palenque did just this. His accession took 
place on a Tzolk’in (Calendar Round) anniversary of 
the earlier ‘accession’ of the maize god in 2325 bc and 
also commemorated the ‘seating’ of a Palenque patron 
deity (GI) much earlier (Stuart 2011, 248–9). At Tikal, 
where the k’atun or 20-year passage of time was the 
focus of much celebration and monument erection, 
Stela 31 depicts and describes the ruler Siyaj Chan 
K’awiil as one who tends to the k’atun much as one 
would a maize field (Stuart 2011, 274). K’uhul ajaw were 
master cultivators of monumental time, which stood 
for longevity and durability and provided a sharp 
contrast to the realpolitik of fragile political authority. 
The way in which the royal chronicling of the 
long count meshed with the older agricultural Cal-
endar Round to create a complex whole indicates the 
perceived importance of grounding the abstractness 
of very large numbers with the seasonal concerns of 
farmers who were served by the Calendar Round (Fig. 
4.4). Notably, the farmer’s Calendar Round proved far 
more durable than the long count and the former is 
still observed in parts of the Maya region. The abstract 
quality of large numbers – particularly in reference to 
bundles of time – presumably would not have been 
very effective in mediating the social distance that 
stood between Classic Maya royals and their support-
ers who likely were more vested in mundane affairs 
that included planting, harvesting, and transporting 
heavy tumplines filled with crops or goods from place 
to place. Thus, the genius of Waxaklahuun Ubaah 
K’awiil (thirteenth ruler of Copan, ad 695–738) who 
is shown on Stela D with a long-count date carved in 
full figural glyphs (Fig. 4.5). In this extraordinary stela, 
each unit of time is represented by a figure that carries 
a bundle (of time) in a tumpline. The message is clear: 
time is a heavy burden to be borne by those who have 
authority over (and responsibility for) the wellbeing of 
(2016, 18) has shown, Classic-period consolidation of 
rulership did not eliminate the need for patron deity 
shrines. Rather, such shrines became active agents in 
the political ecology of royal courts. Patron deities 
were promoted or demoted as part of a strategy of 
governance by a ruling faction. 
Interestingly, long-count dates (five-position 
calendrical notation associated with Classic royal 
courts) were deployed to provide ‘birth’ dates for 
patron deities. With origins in a mythic past, dei-
ties bridged the gap between mythic time and lived 
time. The Palenque Triad of patron deities are prob-
ably the best-known examples of local deities with 
histories that extend back to primordial times but 
there are many others (see Baron 2016, 173–87; Stuart 
2011, 245–51). Since the long-count was capable of 
expressing bundles of time in excess of thousands of 
years, the mythic past (and future) could be chronicled 
Figure 4.4. Part of inscription from Quirigua, Stela C, 
that contains a ‘creation’ date of 13 August 3114 bce 
or 13.0.0.0.0 in the long count followed by a calendar-
round date of 4 Ajaw 8 Kumk’u (reproduced from Looper 














Terminal Classic palace complexes and the popularity 
of carved stone mosaic façades indicate that there was 
no shortage of stone or skilled stone workers in the 
north. Yet an explicit and omnipresent link between 
political authority and the long count does not seem 
to have been a central strut of northern rulership. In so 
far as a hieroglyphic collocation called an emblem glyph 
has been used to signify the presence of a royal court 
among archaeologists and epigraphers, the under-
representation of emblem glyphs (and stone-carved 
hieroglyphs in general) has produced a quandary in 
nomenclature. Was there a royal court at Uxmal or 
at Chichén Itza? Few doubt it but the accompanying 
corpus of texts with emblem glyphs and long-count 
dates provides weak evidence by southern standards. 
The contrast between north and south is displayed 
in a not-so-subtle manner at Ek’ Balam – a northern site 
located in the eastern part of Yucatán, México. At Ek’ 
Balam, George Bey and colleagues (1998) document 
a history of occupation going back to the Preclassic 
(Balam ceramic complex, 600–450 bc) and continuing 
through colonial times. More recent work by Leticia 
Vargas de la Peña & Victor Castillo Borges (2017) 
on the acropolis of Ek’ Balam yielded what Alfonso 
Lacadena (2004, 116) referred to as a ‘tomb never seen 
before north of Calakmul’. The latter site is located 
about 400 km south of Ek’ Balam and considered the 
northernmost (and a very powerful) player in the nodal 
the kingdom. One cannot help but imagine that such 
representations strove to create an intersubjective or 
shared basis of experience between ruler and ruled. 
Such conventions address what Kurnick (2016, 19–20) 
refers to as the paradox and incongruity of governance 
by rulership that simultaneously reinforced social 
inequality and also promoted solidarity.
The southern lowland experiment celebrated 
named rulers in both life and death and sought to 
place them within a grand cosmic order that mimicked 
the thousand-year folds of time within which deities 
were placed. Just as patron deities were metonymically 
linked to place, so a royal court might be founded and 
conceived as an axis mundi – a central place of cosmic 
importance. Extensive use of the long count lent an air 
of stability and immortality to the fragile and shifting 
nodes of power that dominated the southern lowland 
landscape during the Late Classic period. 
Northern ambivalence to monumental time
The northern lowlands differ from the south in a 
number of ways but despite significant contrasts the 
two are grouped together as the Maya Lowlands. The 
points of contrast that are most relevant to the topic 
of fragility are the underrepresentation of royal tombs 
and carved hieroglyphic texts with long-count dates in 
the northern lowlands. The presence of massive Late/
Figure 4.5. Stela D (back side), Copan, with a long-count date rendered in double-column full-figural glyphs that 
emphasize the burden of deep time accepted by dynastic ruler Waxaklajuun Ubaah K’awiil: (a) photo by author; (b) 
drawing by John Montgomery (copyright 2000, JM 00602).
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long-count dates figured prominently in positioning 
the ruler within cosmic time. 
With the accession of Ukit Kan Le’k Tok’ there 
was an explosion of hieroglyphic texts – especially 
painted texts – at Ek’ Balam (Lacadena 2004, 3–84). 
The abundance of painted over stone-carved texts is 
significant because long-count dates were more often 
chiselled into durable stone than painted on to plaster. 
True to the northern tradition of kingship and despite 
all the writing at Ek’ Balam, only four long-count dates 
are known and one of them is Stela 1, which bears 
the image and name of Ukit Kan Le’k Tok’ (Lacadena 
2004, 98). The four dynastic counts are outnumbered 
by twelve Calendar-Round dates (Lacadena 2004, 84) 
– the older calendar that marks seasonal agricultural 
and ritual events. 
Ek’ Balam is further distinguished by the fact 
that its glyphic texts are an eclectic mix of Classic 
Cholan grammar/vocabulary (identical to southern 
lowlands texts) and ancestral Yucatec conventions 
and word usage (Lacadena 2004, 117–20). Houston 
and colleagues (2000; see also Law et al. 2009) have 
network of royal courts that dominated the southern 
lowlands during Late Classic times. As a northern 
outlier to this network, the royal court of Ek’ Balam 
was founded in the eighth century during the reign of 
Ukit Kan Le’k Tok’. Referred to as a kalo’mte’ (a ruler 
more powerful and possibly more skilled in martial 
tactics and strategy than a k’uhul ajaw), Ukit Kan Le’k 
Tok’ was buried in a crypt within the acropolis (Fig. 
4.6). Also found on the acropolis was a room contain-
ing a painted mural of 96 hieroglyphs that opaquely 
describes the arrival in ad 770 of a powerful person 
who witnessed the accession of Ukit Kan Le’k Tok’ to 
rulership (Vargas de la Peña & Castillo Borges 2017). Of 
course, Ek’ Balam existed before ad 770. As mentioned 
previously, Bey and colleagues (1998) documented the 
deep history of this place at which occupation started 
nearly 1500 years earlier. Rather, this date marks the 
establishment of a royal court and the founding of 
a kingdom called Talol of which Ek’ Balam was the 
centre (Lacadena 2004). The mural of 96 glyphs marks 
the beginning of a northern experiment with southern-
style sacred kingship in which hieroglyphic texts and 
Figure 4.6. Entrance to burial chamber of Ukit Kan Le’k Tok’ behind ornate white stucco façade on the Acropolis of Ek’ 
Balam (photo by author). 
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with architectural and ceramic evidence of abandon-
ment – indicates that royal courts could not muster 
the resources necessary to celebrate highly significant 
dynastic and calendrical events of the ninth century. 
The seating of a new Bak’tun in ad 830 is one such 
event that many southern courts did not/could not 
celebrate. In fact, ad 830 often is invoked to separate 
the Late Classic from the subsequent Terminal Classic 
period (~ad 830–950/1000) during which remnants of 
royal courts were radically reformulated and survived 
in distinct pockets of the lowlands (Ebert et al. 2014; 
Kennett & Hodell 2017). 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the process of 
court dissolution is the diversity of ways and variable 
tempo by which Classic Maya places were terminated 
(also see Aimers 2007 and Masson 2012). This pattern 
suggests that one external crisis – such as drought or 
invasion – was not responsible. Rather, specific vul-
nerabilities coalesced with stochastic processes (some 
of which may have been climatic or environmental) 
to render the congeries of lowland Maya cities no 
longer livable, initially for royals and then for nearly 
everyone else. As elaborated elsewhere (McAnany 
et al. 2015), several trends stand out: (1) royals left 
first – perhaps fleeing to a more secure environment 
– while sustaining populations generally remained; 
(2) within one to three generations, sustaining popu-
lations moved elsewhere; and (3) the termination of 
royal courts cascaded irregularly across the Maya 
lowlands (Ebert et al. 2014). Islands of more resilient 
and resurgent Terminal Classic courts re-organized 
in a less hierarchical manner and – judging from 
costuming representations – in conversation with 
polities to the north and west in which hereditary 
rulership was less emphasized. Nonetheless, Terminal 
Classic attempts to regroup and reinvent rulership in 
the southern lowlands met with only limited success, 
although a greatly transformed style of rulership 
eventually was reinstated throughout the lowlands 
and might have coalesced into larger-scale political 
entities in the absence of sixteenth century Spanish 
invasion and subsequent wars of conquest.
A reluctance to leave among ordinary people liv-
ing around royal courts is a determinative factor that 
contributed to the long-term cascade phenomenon 
that characterizes the abandonment of the southern 
lowland landscape. The archaeologically documented 
sequence of leaving throughout the lowlands unfail-
ingly indicates that royals – who were able to move 
strategically within a network of royal courts – aban-
doned their royal courts. Yet, the interdependence 
between courts and sustaining populations is rarely 
discussed in collapse scenarios. The fact that most 
sustaining populations chose to migrate elsewhere 
suggested that the written and spoken language of 
royal courts likely was distinct from the language of 
ordinary people living in the southern lowlands. As 
such, sacred hieroglyphic texts would have reinforced 
social differences within a polity. But at Ek’ Balam, 
both the court language of the southern lowlands 
and the local language of the north were painted on 
preserved texts from the acropolis. Thus, Ek’ Balam, 
capital of the kingdom of Talol, adopted many charac-
teristics of southern-style rulership including the visit 
of a foreign dignitary concurrent with the founding 
of Talol and the spectacular entombment of Ukit Kan 
Le’k Tok’ upon his death. The literacy of the scribal 
community at Ek’ Balam is beyond doubt yet only 
four long-count dates have been discovered thus far 
and texts display a hybridity between Classic-period 
Cholan and ancestral Yucatec languages. The final 
dated text from Ek’ Balam records a date that is less 
than 100 years after the ad 770 founding date. Thus, 
the incorporation of southern elements of rulership 
at Ek’ Balam was short-lived and highly selective. 
Over the long run, the conjoining of monumental time 
with political authority seemingly was not of extreme 
importance in the northern lowlands. Successors to 
Ukit Kan Le’k Tok’ chose not to portray themselves 
as master cultivators of monumental time.
Fragility in its many guises or how political 
experiments end
As mentioned earlier, political arrangements tend to 
be finite, with a clearly defined beginning that often is 
expressed materially as a founding event and a messy 
ending that in the Maya region is often interpreted 
as a violent termination. Generally, the founding of 
a Lowland royal court was textually documented – 
as at Ek’ Balam – and witnessed by an emissary or 
representative of an overlord from a more powerful 
court. With a founding event of ad 770, Ek’ Balam may 
have been the last royal court to be have been founded 
and to join the intricate network of court alliances that 
appear to have pivoted around the two influential 
courts located at Tikal and Calakmul. Freidel (2018) 
argues that the philosophy of governance differed 
fundamentally between these two supra-states with 
Calakmul representing an older, sodality-based system 
of governance and ruler selection while Tikal embraced 
hereditary rulership with chains of succession bolstered 
by reference to monumental time. 
Elsewhere, we have reviewed the evidence for 
the end of royal courts and the abandonment of the 
southern Maya ‘urbanized’ landscape (McAnany et al. 
2015). Since the long count provided support for the 
institution of rulership, its absence – in conjunction 
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syllabary to Bishop Diego de Landa in the sixteenth 
century. Extant Maya codices – now held in Madrid, 
Paris, Dresden, and Mexico City – were created dur-
ing the Postclassic period. These amazing records of 
Maya literacy postdate the threshold year of ad 830 
by as much as 500 years. Thus, the fragility of Classic-
period political constellations should not be confused 
with the scribal literary tradition, which survived the 
political transition at the end of the Classic period. 
Ek’ Balam continued to be a seat of power through 
the Postclassic period although construction activity 
diminished greatly. Nonetheless, sixteenth-century 
Spanish encomendero Diego de Contreras stated in a 
relación that (before the coming of Spaniards) the peo-
ple of Tahcabo (a town just 17 km north of Ek’ Balam) 
gave tribute to Namon Cupul, a Late Postclassic ruler 
of Ek’ Balam (RHGY 1579[1900], 50). By this measure, 
political authority at Ek’ Balam proved vastly more 
resilient than the southern variants.
Final considerations and conclusions
Rulership meshed with concepts of monumental time 
as southern rulers assumed responsibility for the 
order of days (Stuart 2011). Such coupling established a 
durability to political authority that, in reality, can be 
ephemeral and fleeting regardless of whether we are 
examining Maya rulership in the eighth-century or the 
U.S. presidency in the twenty-first century. Because 
political forms codify authority through governance 
and the imposition of order, they are more fragile than 
social or religious constellations. The construction of 
massive shrines and the origins of the long count in 
the Preclassic period suggest an initial linkage between 
patron deities and deep, mythic time, which later was 
adopted by southern rulers to establish a deep-time 
temporality to their rule. 
Significantly, the practice of yoking rulership to 
the long-count calendar didn’t become widespread 
in the north – an area in which sixteenth-century 
Spaniards found thriving populations. Perhaps the 
practice of framing rulers within folds of monumen-
tal time masked a tacit recognition of the fragility 
of rulership. The northern lowlands – less vested in 
hereditary rulership although greatly involved in 
monumentality – appears to have been engaged in a 
more integrative and resurgent political experiment. 
Perhaps for this reason, archaeologists continue to 
draw parallels between the northern Maya lowlands 
and central México.
Political formations can be approached as fragile 
yet dynamic social experiments fraught with contes-
tation. By discarding the ‘report card’ approach to 
political forms, archaeologists gain an opportunity to 
within one to three generations of court abandonment 
suggests that, over the long run, the experience of living 
without the social order and hierarchy imposed by a 
royal court was not easy. Even though the politics of 
densely networked courts heavily vested in hereditary 
rulership and monumental time proved unsustain-
able, so too did life without vertical obligations, royal 
mediation with the gods, impressive pageantry, and 
security within a patron-client relationship. 
The southern-style experiment in sacred rul-
ership and cosmic time – beautiful to behold and 
expensive to maintain – was closely tied to local 
landscape so that subsequent regeneration within the 
same landscape was either not possible or perhaps 
not necessary. A kind of path dependency seems to 
have frustrated attempts at regeneration in the south. 
Kennett and colleagues (2012, 790) examined the con-
cordance between proxy evidence of dry spells and 
archaeological data that includes long-count dates 
and other indicators that the southern courts were in 
trouble. Droughts between 820-870, around 930, and 
again from 1000-1100 are clearly indicated and must 
have stressed lowland Maya populations. But when 
correlated with hieroglyphic accounts of martial activ-
ity and the erection of monuments with long-count 
dates, it’s clear that Maya royal courts were in trouble 
before the droughts began. Were courts further de-
stabilized by the dry spells? Probably, but droughts 
likely provided the final blow to a network of royal 
courts situated within an already politically frac-
tured landscape. To borrow a term from James Scott 
(2017, 202–9) – politicide – rather than ecocide appears 
to be a major contributing factor to the dissolution of 
the Lowland Maya royal courts.
Even after the southern courts ceased to be politi-
cal capitals, they were not completely abandoned 
but rather entered into a new use regime as places 
of pilgrimage, ritual commemoration, and a focus of 
hunting activity. Into the twentieth-century, Lacandon 
Maya visited old royal courts along the Usumacinta 
River – Palenque, Bonampak, and Yaxchilan in par-
ticular – and left offerings to their deities until tourist 
traffic rendered these practices untenable because of 
the rampant theft of Lacandon offerings (Palka 2005). 
Significantly, in the northern lowlands, where 
practices of governance were never as vested in heredi-
tary transmission and the trope of monumental time, 
the political experiment endured for another hundred 
years. During the Terminal Classic period, Chichén 
Itzá became the most powerful and influential polity 
– some would say imperium – in the Maya region. The 
northern scribal community survived several profound 
political transitions. Postclassic scribes continued to 
use a modified hieroglyphic script and taught the 
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analyse complexity as experimentation and to under-
stand more deeply human political constructions that 
are beautiful, awesome, and sobering in their capacity 
to engender inequality. But critically pertinent to this 
consideration is the limited ability of pre-industrial 
states to wreak environmental havoc and large-scale 
destruction to the degree that is possibly today. Our 
crises were not necessarily their crises and we need to 
keep this in mind in order to develop more realistic 
narratives of the past.
As humans experiment with political relations, 
there is a noticeable pulsing between authoritarianism 
and more representational styles of governance. Today, 
we can see that societal trauma – especially economic 
insecurity and rapid social change – tends to move 
people in the direction of authoritarianism. Whether 
or not these factors are relevant to understanding the 
past requires much more thought. Recognition of the 
propensity for humans to construct and deconstruct 
political scaffolding – in evidence today and certainly in 
the past – provides a strong starting place for examin-
ing the fragility of political experimentation. Such an 
approach lends itself to more productive analysis and 
moves archaeology beyond the rise-and-fall approach 
that V. Gordon Childe (1965, 4–5) critiqued over 50 
years ago.
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– the centralized state broke asunder and remained so 
for nearly a century and a half. Because the length of 
this interval between two successive Kings of Upper 
and Lower Egypt was so entirely unprecedented, the 
final argument here mounted is that there are indeed 
climates inimical to political stability.
Dangers skirted, bullets dodged
In contrast to the often-enduring material signatures of 
ancient states, most were unstable entities that rarely 
lasted long. This argument animates this volume 
as well as James Scott’s book Against the Grain. In a 
chapter titled ‘Fragility of the Early State: Collapse as 
Disassembly’, Scott discusses threats to the stability of 
ancient states (Scott 2017, 183–218). Reading through 
the chapter with an Egyptologist’s eye, however, one is 
struck by how many of these potential state-wrecking 
shoals Egypt evaded by virtue of its location in a fertile 
river valley at the edge of the Sahara (see Fig. 5.1). 
Salinization of the soil 
Death by declining yield due to the progressive salini-
zation of soil was not an issue for the Egyptian state. 
The annual inundation blanketed the Nile Valley with 
a fresh layer of nutrient-rich soil each year just prior 
to the sowing season, and thus fields did not need to 
be fertilized or left fallow. Satiric texts composed in 
Egypt’s Middle and New Kingdoms dwell at length 
on the supposed miseries of the Egyptian peasant 
(Caminos 1997). Visitors like Herodotus, who came 
from countries where the life of the farmer was indeed 
truly miserable, however, were impressed with the 
comparative ease of farming in Egypt (Herodotus II.14). 
This does not mean that erratic floods, passing pests, 
or highly exploitative social and fiscal policies didn’t 
cause misery. It simply means that the soil could not 
have been more fertile.
In comparison to other early states, Egypt cannot be 
considered fragile. From its first through its eighth 
dynasty, for instance, pharaoh followed pharaoh for 
nearly 800 years (c. 2900–2118 bc).1 Some runners in 
this relay stumbled, but others invariably picked up 
the sceptre and ascended the throne. Thus, the state 
endured as an essentially recognizable and functional 
entity for a seemingly unfathomable amount of time. 
This is especially notable given that multiple lines of 
evidence reveal points of stress and fracture that should 
have brought it to its knees many centuries before.
This meditation on the extraordinary longevity of 
the first iteration of Egypt’s pharaonic state has three 
main sections. It begins with a brief consideration of 
the factors that allowed Egypt to skirt dangers that 
laid low many comparable polities. This discussion 
draws heavily on James Scott’s Against the Grain: A 
Deep History of the Earliest States and concludes that 
while geopolitics may have saved the state from 
many dangers, it could not inoculate it against Scott’s 
category of politicide. The second section investigates 
three points in Egypt’s history in which the downfall 
of the pharaonic regime must have seemed immanent 
due to governmental abuses of power, infighting, and 
societal schism. This section concludes with a short 
discussion of factors that may have led to Egypt’s 
remarkable resiliency. 
All things – good or not – come to an end, and 
the essay concludes by tackling the question of just 
what it was that made the demise of the Old Kingdom 
different. After the last pharaoh of note died (c. 2153), 
the crown passed to the welter of obscure kinglets 
who together make up the Eighth Dynasty. Like the 
regime that came before them, these rulers did their 
best to maintain the unity of the nation by courting a 
powerful provincial family and lavishing benefits upon 
it. After the last of their number perished (c. 2118), 
however – and quite probably well before that point 
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Egypt’s population was not immune to communica-
ble diseases, as records from Roman Egypt and other 
earlier evidence indicates. Communal burial pits at 
Tell el-Dab’a, for instance, suggest that at least some 
residents of this city died from a fast-acting contagion 
during the Thirteenth Dynasty. Likewise, a well-attested 
plague that raged in the Near East and in Cyprus may 
also have surfaced in Egypt during the late Eighteenth 
Dynasty (Kozloff 2006; David 2017, 280–4). Both ancient 
and more modern discussions of pestilence in Egypt 
suggest that relatively muted episodes of contagion 
struck on an annual basis, often in conjunction with 
the khamāsīn winds, which occurred during the spring 
months before the Nile’s rise. Indeed, this sickness 
was known in ancient Egypt as ‘iAdt rnpt’, the ‘annual 
pestilence’ (Contardi 2015, 20–3; Mikhail 2011, 220–1). 
Deforestation
Deforestation, admittedly, may have posed far more 
of a threat. Certainly, it is notable that the conspicuous 
consumption of local woods in monumental architec-
ture largely ceased in the Fourth Dynasty, perhaps 
in an attempt to mitigate a growing crisis. Although 
the evidence is frustratingly piecemeal, both text and 
archaeology demonstrate a growing investment in the 
importation of boatloads of coniferous wood from the 
northern Levant as well as acacia wood from Nubia 
(Creasman 2015, 47–50). The designation of certain 
trees, and indeed groves, as sacred and/or as state or 
temple property may well have aided efforts at con-
servation. So too, it is likely, would a general reliance 
on the use of charcoal, dung, and other scavenged or 
harvested combustibles as fuel (Nicholson & Pelten-
burg 2000, 192).
Figure 5.1. Map of Egypt showing sites mentioned in the text.
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sands around the Nile’s many mouths, dangerous 
currents, unhelpful storms and wind patterns, and 
the logistical nightmare of the inundation combined 
to repel enemies and keep them out. Likewise, it is 
undoubtedly significant that prior to the domestication 
of the camel, ground invasions launched by sizeable 
non-nomadic forces simply never occurred (Kahn and 
Tammuz 2008).
This natural isolation, which served Egypt so 
well in the third millennium bc also greatly aided the 
rise and enduring strength of the state which, as Scott 
has pointed out, depended largely on its own ability to 
corral its subjects into effective ‘grain and manpower 
modules’ and, moreover, to hold them there, so as 
to maximize the surplus of the state (Scott 2017, 122, 
152–3). As Robert Carneiro (1970) argued long ago, 
many people who live under states and other hier-
archical systems that depend for their existence on 
institutionalized inequalities remain because they feel 
compelled to do so. If offered an option to leave that 
was not profoundly disadvantageous or dangerous, 
they would take it. 
Some old chestnuts are true: the pharaonic state was a 
gift of the Nile
By virtue of its setting, then, Egypt’s Old Kingdom 
state was immunized against many of the factors that 
often occasioned collapse. As a territorial state based 
on the banks of a river, the country could easily be 
protected and policed by government agents. The 
threat of contagious diseases was minimal, given a 
dispersed population, just as was the threat of an 
organized invasion. At the same time, however, the 
flood ensured that with enough hands to till the soil, 
the government could count on a robust surplus 
with which it could supply itself with all the manual 
labourers, bureaucrats, craftsmen, traders and soldiers 
necessary to enact is most ambitious agendas. 
Ample agricultural potential is worth next to 
nothing without the means to obtain it, and so it 
is important to note that the state acted early on to 
assert its rights to prime agricultural lands through 
the establishment of ‘domains’ and ‘estates’, which 
transferred ownership of land to living and dead kings 
as well as to gods. Making use of a coercive system that 
transformed farmers into serfs, the state concentrated 
labour near areas of prime agricultural productivity. 
Moreover, in order to ensure that this labour stayed 
where it had been gathered, domains may have been 
walled, and their administration – as well as that of 
‘royal colonists’ – could be paired with that of watch-
towers (Strudwick 2005, 423; Wilkinson 1999, 118–20; 
Moreno García 2010, 9–10, 13–14). In addition, just as 
Scott observes is entirely characteristic of states (ancient 
Deaths due to infectious diseases appear to have 
accelerated primarily at times when the pathogen 
was new to Egypt (as may have been the case at Tell 
el-Dab’a) or when an epidemic occurred in close con-
junction with a famine (Mikhail 2011, 217–18, 229). 
The fact that epidemics alone never proved fatal to 
the state, however, is likely due to the fact that Egypt 
was a territorial rather than a city-state. Communicable 
diseases and plagues thrive in the close quarters of 
urban settings and thus would indeed ravage a polity 
whose population clustered for the most part in a single 
centre (Duhig 2009, 50). From the First through the 
Sixth Dynasties in Egypt, however, dense populations 
outside of the city and pyramid-building projects of 
Memphis are difficult to identify. Disease, therefore, 
would likely have been localized. 
Overreliance on the core
Scott argues that many states failed because the logic 
of transportation caused them to place too much 
pressure on territory within a 50 km radius of their 
centre – the distance a draught animal can traverse 
with a full load of grain before the cargo is not worth 
its weight. As Scott recognizes, however, waterborne 
transport represents a crucial exception (Scott 2017, 
205). Linked for 1100 km or so from the First Cataract 
to the Mediterranean Sea by a navigable river, Egypt 
experienced little practical difficulty in transporting 
heavy loads of grain towards its political centre at 
Memphis. Throughout most of the Old Kingdom the 
monumental and material signatures of the state were 
indeed to be found in close proximity to the capital. 
This was not, however, because it was too expensive 
to build elsewhere. It was because both grain and 
manpower were gathered in from the provinces to 
the capital in an effort to help materialize the ideology 
that Egypt’s elite stood at the centre of the world and 
at the apex of its social pyramid.
Problems with porous borders
This category collapses two separate dangers to early 
states. The first is the danger of invasions, whether from 
predatory ‘barbarians’ or more organized armies. The 
other is from population seepage (or hemorrhage in the 
worst case scenario). Both of these threats were greatly 
alleviated by the fact that the Nile cut a swath through 
one of the world’s most formidable deserts. Equally 
important was the fact that neighbouring regions 
could not easily sustain robust populations and that 
the country offered very few points of entry and, con-
versely, escape. Indeed, even in the first millennium bc, 
when naval technology was far more advanced and 
at the service of aggressively expansionistic empires, 
very few seaborne invasions were successful. Shifting 
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such an ambitious ideological agenda, however, the 
combination can be deadly. In Egypt, as in numerous 
other early states – such as Shang China, Kerma, the 
First Dynasty of Ur, Dahomey, and Benin – the natural 
deaths of certain particularly important religio-political 
figures occasioned the untimely deaths of many oth-
ers. In some cases the deceased appear to have been 
cultural outsiders (such as prisoners of war), but almost 
always these executions were accompanied by the 
deaths of insiders – the loved ones and/or the servants 
of the deceased. In First Dynasty Egypt, so far as can 
be ascertained, the dead were primarily drawn from 
the latter category. Given that there is no evidence for 
institutionalized slavery at this time, each sacrificed 
retainer must be envisioned as firmly enmeshed within 
an extensive socioeconomic network of relatives and 
friends (Morris 2014). 
The First Dynasty began with an instance of 
retainer sacrifice the likes of which had not yet been 
seen. At his death king Hor-Aha seems to have arranged 
to take forty or so people with him to the grave – pro-
viding them with prebuilt tombs situated in the direct 
vicinity of his funerary enclosure and mortuary monu-
ment, both at Abydos (see Fig. 5.2). Intriguingly, the 
two graves closest to the king’s were larger than the 
rest, and one of these apparently belonged to a person 
whose name, ‘Pleasant (or Sweet)-of-heart’ (ImA-ib or 
bnr-ib), was inscribed on a comb and other cosmetic 
items. The presence, then, of two miniature funerary 
enclosures next to the king’s own – enclosures which 
also had been provisioned with sacrificed retainers – 
led Laurel Bestock to suggest that these belonged to 
the same two individuals that had been buried next 
to the king and served to compensate them for will-
ingly having sacrificed their own, particularly highly 
valued, lives. The rest of the retainers, archaeological 
remains indicate, consisted of young men of military 
age, arranged behind their sovereign as if in marching 
order (Bestock 2009, 26, 100–102).
This initial experiment with human sacrifice 
seems to have been deemed so successful that at the 
death of the second king of the First Dynasty the num-
ber of sacrifices increased exponentially. In preparation 
for the funeral of King Djer, graves for 587 retainers 
had been prepared ahead of time. Now – presumably 
to sweeten the pot for participants – the dead were pro-
vided not only with a grave that was provisioned from 
royal warehouses and was situated in close proximity 
to the king’s own but also with a stele engraved with 
their name, image, and occasionally their title (see Fig. 
5.3). Legible steles preserve the names and images of 
two court dwarves, 11 men and 76 women, each of 
whom received a memorialization that was unparal-
leled among their contemporaries (Bestock 2009, 33). 
or modern), the government created regular censuses 
to assess its resources and then imposed levies on 
produce, livestock and labour (Wilkinson 1999, 76, 
113–14, 220–1; Muhs 2016, 15–16, 29–30).
Politicide, state effects and near death experiences
While Egypt’s enviable geographic position buffered 
it from the dangers described above, its government 
would have been as vulnerable to Scott’s category 
of politicide as any ancient state. According to Scott, 
‘Crushing taxes in grain and labour, civil wars and wars 
of succession within the capital, intercity wars, oppres-
sive measures of corporal punishment and arbitrary 
abuse may be called state effects, and they can singly 
or in combination bring about a state’s collapse’ (Scott 
2017, 212–213). Throughout the nearly eight hundred 
or so years that the pharaonic state persisted in its first 
incarnation, it must have suffered innumerable brushes 
with death due to the backlash of such state effects. 
In discussions of collapse, dynasties add an extra 
element of confusion. In Egypt’s case this is certainly 
so. While some breaks in ancient king lists were occa-
sioned by the cessation of a family line or by changes 
of capital or in the extent of territory governed, others 
surely mask a bitter end. As Guy Middleton asserts, 
viewing history through the lens of dynastic king lists 
often obscures our view of ‘distinct political entities 
that were independent, rivalrous, and that effectively 
created new states or empires’ (Middleton 2017, 23–4). 
In the three case studies presented below, I argue that 
dynastic breaks mark points at which a severe crisis due 
to James Scott’s category of ‘state effects’ occasioned a 
radical shift in strategy – a shift deemed necessary, in 
fact, for the survival of the state. The issues underlying 
the three dynastic breaks are difficult to understand 
and were no doubt complex. What follows then are 
not necessarily correct reconstructions of each scenario. 
They are, however, interpretations of the evidence that 
are both plausible and, I hope, potentially generative 
of productive discussion.
Abuse of power: the break between the First and Second 
Dynasties
The seven kings and one queen regent of Egypt’s First 
Dynasty (c. 2900–2730) were involved in a radical 
experiment aimed at divinizing the office of kingship. 
Given the elaborate royal burials at Hierakonpolis 
in the late Nagada I and early Nagada II periods, 
such experiments may have had an early precedent 
(Friedman, van Neer, & Linseele 2011, 162, 1734). 
As numerous ethnohistories attest, rulers who claim 
kinship with the gods do not require the backing of a 
state. When the resources of a state are coupled with 
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Figure 5.2. First Dynasty Abydos (after Bestock 2009, figs. 1 & 10).
Figure 5.3. Steles belonging to the sacrificed retainers of Djer [a.-c.] and Den [d.-e.] (after Petrie 1901, plates: a. 26, no. 
70; b. 26, no. 58; c. 27, no. 96; d. 27, no. 128; e. 27, 129).
a. b. c. d. e.
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First Dynasty, King Qa’a, still included chambers for 
the internment of 26 individuals, one of whom, judging 
by the length of the titles on his funerary stela, appears 
to have been extremely important (Petrie 1900, 44–5, 
pl. 30; see Fig. 5.4). In Zhou Period China, a poem 
of mourning was written for three similarly socially 
significant sacrificial victims. About one it was said 
that he ‘was the pick of all our men; But as he drew 
near the tomb-hole his limbs shook with dread. That 
blue one, Heaven, takes all our good men’ (quoted in 
Chang 1974, 6–7). Grief and horror, one suspects, must 
have increasingly displaced awe as the predominant 
emotion that the custom of retainer sacrifice evoked 
among those subject to the state.
The apparent termination of human sacrifice at 
the start of the Second Dynasty (c. 2730) almost assur-
edly indicates that the custom had come to be seen as 
an unjustifiable abuse of power. Qa’a had constructed 
chambers for his sacrificed retainers within the sub-
structure of his own tomb, and his successor appears 
to have buried him according to his wishes (Wilkinson 
1999, 82–3). That Hotepsekhemwy himself desired to 
break with the past, however, is strongly suggested by 
the fact that he abandoned the ancestral royal cemetery 
at Abydos. Instead, he moved his burial monument 
north to Saqqara and, moreover, to a part of Saqqara 
Of all types of conspicuous consumption, that of 
the lives of loyal subjects provokes the most strenu-
ous societal discussions. It is also the most costly – as 
the state loses labour that might otherwise have been 
channelled in its service and often expends resources 
in compensating the families of those who willingly 
sacrificed their lives. Thus, in the face of rising costs 
and increased societal resentment, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the numbers of retainers sacrificed at 
the death of First Dynasty kings steadily decreased and 
that a corresponding emphasis was placed on the qual-
ity of royal retainers rather than their quantity (Morris 
2014, 85–6). That said, the grave of the last king of the 
Figure 5.4. (a) Tomb 
of Qa’a (Petrie 1900, pl. 
60); (b) stele of Qa’a’s 
sacrificed retainer Sabef 
(after Petrie 1900,  
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Hotepsekhemwy not only changed the location 
and style of his tomb, he also appears to have elimi-
nated, or virtually eliminated, the custom of retainer 
sacrifice. While the disturbed state of known and 
suspected Second Dynasty tombs at Saqqara precludes 
certainty on this matter, neither skeletal material nor 
other commemorative or otherwise indicative objects 
exist. Indeed, this is true not only with respect to the 
tombs of royals at Saqqara but also with respect to 
those of the highest elite, who had likewise indulged 
in retainer sacrifice in the First Dynasty, albeit to a 
much more modest extent. Thus, the physical relo-
cation of the royal tomb and its radical rethinking 
undoubtedly marked a movement more political 
that bore no associations with the monumental mastaba 
tombs of the First Dynasty’s innermost elite. The new 
tomb, which departed from its predecessors in structure 
as well as locale, however, may have consciously pre-
served royal resonances. As Colin Reader has argued 
persuasively, the positioning of Hotepsekhemwy’s 
tomb with respect to the Abusir wadi echoed the 
spatial relationship of the First Dynasty tombs to the 
processional wadi that led to the funerary enclosures 
at the valley’s edge (Reader 2017, 85–6; see Fig. 5.5). 
Thus, and not for the last time, a pharaoh might jettison 
aspects of royal tradition or ideology that he deemed 
tainted and yet seek to curate others that enhanced the 
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Figure 5.5. Major monuments of Saqqara 
and Abusir until the end of the Old 
Kingdom (after Reader 2017, 73, fig. 1).
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and were inscribed in eleven pyramids belonging to 
kings and queens from the late Fifth until the Eighth 
Dynasty, nearly 18 per cent of the spells reference the 
god Seth. In these texts, Seth appears as an enemy of 
Horus and, like him, to have been grievously wounded 
in their battles. In the end, however, the injuries of both 
gods healed, the two reconciled, and Seth utilized his 
strength to uphold the rightful order of the cosmos 
(Griffiths 1960, 1–27; Turner 2013, 16–17, 71–84). While 
it is dangerous to reverse-engineer religion into politics, 
this story of war and peace – in which ‘Seth dwelling in 
Nubet, Lord of Upper Egypt’ (Utterance 222) – played 
such a staring role likely had its origins in the armed 
encounters and alliances of prehistory. 
In the Nagada II period (c. 3500–3325), the towns 
of Hierakonpolis and Nagada possessed elite cemeter-
ies and graves that archaeologists have identified as 
royal. In ancient Nekhen (later designated Hierakon-
polis, or City of the Hawk, by the Greeks), it is surely 
significant that the earliest known (Nagada IIA–B) 
complete and unambiguous representation of a falcon 
in Egypt’s history was found in an enigmatic pillared 
hall situated within the funerary precinct of tomb 23, 
the resting place of a ruler. Fragments of three other 
falcon figurines were subsequently identified, one 
from the same complex and two others from subsidi-
ary graves associated with tomb 16, the very earliest 
royal burial at Hierakonpolis – or for that matter in 
Egypt as a whole (Nagada IC–IIA). It is worth noting 
that falcons are not known from Cemetery T at Nagada 
or Cemetery U at Abydos, the other two cemeteries at 
which elite graves in the Nagada IIC–D period suggest 
the presence of local aggrandizers (Hendrickx, Fried-
man 2007, & Eyckerman 2011, 130–2). 
Early images of Seth are difficult to identify with 
certainty. Canids that bear a resemblance to Seth’s cult 
than spatial. In occasioning this departure from past 
practice, Hotepsekhemwy may have succeeded in 
rescuing divine kingship from a dangerous decline in 
perceived legitimacy. In folk tales, after all, the creature 
that demands the sacrifice of noble youths is almost 
always a monster – and one destined, moreover, soon 
to be slain at the hands of a hero.
Religio-political schisms: the break between the Second 
and Third Dynasties
The Second Dynasty (c. 2730–2590) ended at some point 
following King Khasekhem’s brutal slaughter of close to 
50,000 of his Lower Egyptian subjects. Numbers of the 
slain and images of their distorted corpses decorate the 
bases of two statues in which the king is posed wearing 
a crown of Upper Egypt (see Fig. 5.6a). Fittingly, he 
dedicated these commemorations to an Upper Egyp-
tian shrine – that of the god Horus at Hierakonpolis 
(Quibell 1900, pl. 39, 40). What appears at first glance 
like a drastic response to a regional rebellion, however, 
may well have been the result of tensions that had both 
cosmic and terrestrial manifestations. These events are 
intriguing precisely – and frustratingly – due to the 
fact that only tantalizing hints remain. What is certain, 
however, is that the upheaval that marked the end of 
the Second Dynasty was traumatic enough to persuade 
the sovereign who followed to make a decisive break 
with the practices of his predecessor.
By way of background it is vital to understand 
the ideological importance of the god Horus and also 
that of his rival Seth. The tradition that Seth had fought 
Horus, the avatar of the rightful king, for the throne of 
Egypt but had eventually admitted defeat and worked 
to support him is a powerful and overarching theme 
in the Pyramid Texts, Egypt’s first corpus of religious 
literature. In these spells, which are of varying antiquity 
Figure 5.6. (a) The body count of slain northerners depicted on Khasekhem’s limestone statue, dedicated at the Horus 
temple at Hierakonpolis (after Quibell 1900, pl. 40; (b) Horus dominating the personification of the north from the 
Narmer palette, dedicated at the Horus temple at Hierakonpolis (after Quibell 1898, fig. 13).
a. b.b.a.a. b.
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The identification is far from iron clad, however, and 
at least two similar vessels are thought to have come 
from neighbouring polities (Hendrickx 2009, 207, fig. 
18, 2 and 4). Even more intriguing are two slightly 
creature – and would be contemporary in time with 
the falcons at Hierakonpolis – appear in conjunction 
with Barbary sheep in the imagery of White Cross-lined 
pottery excavated at Nagada (see Figs. 5.7a. and 5.7b). 
Figure 5.7. Probable early representations of Seth from Nagada and its environs. 7a. From a White Cross-lined vase, 
Nagada tomb 1644 (after Hendrickx et al. 2009, fig. 18.1); 7b. From a White Cross-lined bowl, Nagada tomb 1644 (after 
Hendrickx et al. 2009, fig. 18.3); 7c. Three views of a model Seth standard and a Horus figurine, Nagada tomb 721 (after 
Petrie 1896, pl. 60, nos. 13, 15 and Crowfoot Payne 1993, fig 4, no. 16); 7d. Seth and Horus on standards similar to 7c. 
Rock art from the mouth of the Wadi of the Horus Qa’a, west of Nagada. (after Darnell 2009, 97, fig. 19); 7e. Rock art 






If Nagada and Hierakonpolis appear to have 
been the two most powerful polities in the Nagada 
II period, whose elites likely competed for status and 
supremacy in Upper Egypt, the true beneficiary of 
their rivalry appears to have been the rulers of Abydos, 
who would appropriate the divine personage of the 
falcon and incorporate the god into their own royal 
titulary. These Abydene kings subdued both Nagada 
and Hierakonpolis by the start of the Nagada III period 
and disrupted their traditional power structures. At 
Hierakonpolis, the rulers of Abydos supported the 
establishment of a temple to the god Horus in his role 
as the as patron deity of the rightful king. The fate of 
Nagada is less certain, but the local elite seem to disap-
pear for a period rather than to have been reoriented 
and remunerated, as at Hierakonpolis (Bard 1989, 
240–5; Friedman 2008, 23–6; Hassan, van Wetering, 
Tassie 2017, 95–6, 120–2). 
By the period just prior to the First Dynasty, how-
ever, Nagada may have become a much more active 
and enthusiastic supporter of the new state. Certainly, 
on a large votive macehead donated to the temple at 
Hierakonpolis, Seth animals are depicted subduing 
rebels for the king alongside the cult fetishes of other 
polities (see Fig. 5.8). Likewise, a roughly contemporary 
rock inscription at Gebel Tjauty, west of Nagada, seems 
later (Nagada IIC–D) figurines excavated from tomb 
721 at Nagada. One of these depicted a falcon that may 
have been encased in lead (Ashmolean 1895.136 and 
1895.137). Alongside it, however, was an animal that 
looks a great deal like the Seth animal, especially if the 
missing ears and tail (signalled by drilled holes) had 
stood straight up. What is vitally important about this 
potential representation of the god, however, is that 
it was pierced, apparently to serve as the ornament 
on a model standard (see Fig. 5.7c). Similar standards 
appear in a contemporary rock carving discovered in 
the desert west of Nagada in conjunction with a scene 
involving boats and wild bovids (see Fig. 5.7d).
Standards in the late Nagada II–III periods seem 
to have done double duty, referencing both deities and 
the polities that claimed these deities as their patrons. 
In Dynastic times, the town of Nagada (a.k.a. Nubt or 
Gold Town) would be defined by its temple to Seth 
and its allegiance to a deity that was known to be as 
powerful as he was problematic. It is significant, then, 
that archaeological evidence demonstrates that the 
area around this temple in prehistory not only saw 
the town’s earliest urban occupation but remained its 
symbolic centre even when economic and administra-
tive activity shifted southward (Hassan, van Wetering, 
Tassie 2017, 91–2, 94).
Figure 5.8. Scorpion macehead, dedicated to the Horus temple at Hierakonpolis (after a drawing by K.M. Ciałowicz 
published in Adams and Ciałowicz 1997, 8, fig. 1).
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Dynasties strongly suggests (Turner 2013, 16), it is 
also worth noting that Seth’s hometown of Nagada 
may have furnished the First Dynasty with one of its 
earliest and most prominent queens, Neithhotep. If 
not, the massive mastaba erected at Nagada in which 
her name is frequently attested assuredly belonged to 
her son (Wilkinson 1999, 37–8, 70; van Wetering 2012, 
111–5). Regardless, relations between Nagada and 
Abydos were clearly intimate.
During the entirety of the First Dynasty, Horus 
far eclipsed his rival-turned-partner in visibility and 
importance, and no hint of discord is noted. Even 
the name of the first king of the Second Dynasty 
– Hotepsekhemwy (The-two-powers-are-satisfied) – 
appears unsettling only in retrospect. Much about the 
Second Dynasty remains obscure, and some speculate 
that a possible rebellion of two towns in Ninetjer’s 
thirteenth year heralded the fracturing of a unified 
pharaonic state, though the writing leaves it ambigu-
ous as to whether the apparently Egyptian towns 
were being founded or destroyed (Dodson 1996, 23)! 
A badly damaged section of the Cairo annals (see Fig. 
5.9) also shows two consecutive years, apparently 
to show the Seth animal in the entourage of the Horus 
king (Darnell 2002, 19; see Fig. 5.7e.). While Nagada 
would be the Upper Egyptian site most closely associ-
ated with Seth in Dynastic times, the presence of two 
Seth animals on the Scorpion macehead may suggest 
that his worship had already spread farther afield. In 
this context the repeated evocation and apposition of 
the ‘mounds of Horus’ and the ‘mounds of Seth’ in 
the pyramid texts is striking (Turner 2013, 74–5, 78, 
81–3, utterances 213, 224–225, 306, 308, 359, 424, 470, 
474–475, 477, 480, 572, 612, 665).
In seeking to unify the realm, the rulers of Abydos 
acknowledged Seth as a partner of Horus – one of the 
‘Two Lords’, occasionally depicted as two falcons, or 
even envisioned as a composite entity that could be 
embodied in the king himself. That this notion was 
present already in the First Dynasty is indicated by 
a title witnessed in the steles of three First Dynasty 
women interred in the posthumous retinue of Djer 
and Den, namely [She] ‘who sees Horus-Seth’ (See 
Fig. 5.3c–e; te Velde 1967, 68–71). If these women 
were subsidiary wives of the king, as the adoption of 
this same title by queens of the Fourth through Sixth 
Figure 5.9. Seth makes an 
appearance in the Cairo Annals, 
Main Cairo Fragment (CF1), reigns 
of Ninetjer and Peribsen (Wilkinson 
2000; fig 4).
(?) (?) (?) (?)
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Seven (all unfortunately obscured) years follow-
ing Seth’s debut in the annals, the ascension of King 
Peribsen is recorded.2 Unlike any ruler before or after, 
Peribsen replaced the falcon in his ‘Horus’-name with 
a Seth animal (Figs. 5.9 and 5.10a; Wilkinson 2000, 74). 
This king likewise promoted the message – expressed 
on a contemporary cylinder seal – that Seth of Nagada 
had ‘given the Two Lands to his son, Peribsen’. As if 
to clarify that this was no casual change of allegiance, 
Peribsen even dropped the name of Horus from his 
funerary domain, being the first king ever to do so. His 
decision to construct his tomb at Abydos – deep in the 
royal cemetery of the First Dynasty – must also have 
been ideologically loaded (Wilkinson 1999, 89–91, 121). 
The unrest that presumably prompted Peribsen’s 
abrupt shift in loyalties seems to have continued to 
percolate in the succeeding reign. Peribsen’s successor, 
King Khasekhem, assumed the name ‘The-power-
appears’ – surmounted, as was traditional, with a 
Horus falcon – and undertook military action against 
northern forces. Interestingly, most of what we know 
of these struggles comes from gifts that he dedicated 
to the temple of Horus at Hierakonpolis. Inscriptions 
on two votive stone vases read ‘Year of fighting the 
northern enemy in front of the city of Nekheb,’ a 
locale directly across the river from Hierakonpolis! 
Directly facing the king’s serekh and in front of the 
year name was a depiction of Nekheb’s chief deity, a 
vulture that grasped the hieroglyphs for ‘rebel’ with 
one claw and the symbol for a unified Egypt with the 
other (Fig. 5.10b).
If the fighting started in Nekheb against north-
erners or those acting on behalf of a northern rival, it 
eventually led to carnage. According to the inscrip-
tions on the king’s statues, Khasekhem slaughtered 
perhaps as many as 48,205 northern foes. Considering 
the findspot of his memorials, it is notable that the king 
seems to have indulged in some artistic intertextuality 
with the Narmer palette, which – given the fact that 
it was interred in the same deposit as Khasekhem’s 
statue – was likely on display at the time he donated 
his statues. On both monuments, the northern enemy 
who had to be defeated in order for the victorious king 
to (re)unify his country lay prostrate, hooked by the 
nose and sprouting the papyrus-plant ideograph for 
the north from his body (compare Fig. 5.6a with 5.6b).
At some point following his victory, Khasekhem 
added a dual to his name, so it read: ‘The-two-pow-
ers-appear’. Moreover, he topped the serekh of this 
modified ‘Horus’-name with a Seth animal in addition 
to the falcon, strongly implying that the ‘two powers’ 
were none other than Horus and Seth. Khasekhemwy 
also added the perhaps optimistic epithet: ‘The two 
lords are at peace in him’ (Fig. 5.10c; Wilkinson 1999, 
from Ninetjer’s reign, in which the god Seth was 
paired with walled enclosures, one crenellated and 
one rectangular (Wilkinson 2000, 203). If at the end of 
Ninetjer’s reign the god Seth was receiving an unusual 
amount of attention, the theory that the Horus of Gold 
throne name in fact referenced the king’s relationship 
to the god of ‘Gold-town’ is bolstered. Ninetjer, after 
all, is designated with a ‘gold name’ – thought to be 
a predecessor of the Horus of Gold name – on this 
very same monument (Griffiths 1959, 64–81; 1960; 
Wilkinson 2000, 119).
Figure 5.10. (a) Peribsen with Seth atop his serekh, 
seal impression from Abydos (after Petrie 1901, pl. 22, 
no. 179); (b) Inscription on a vase dedicated by Horus 
Khasekhem to the Horus temple at Hierakonpolis (after 
Quibell 1900, pl. 38); (c) Horus-Seth Khasekhemwy in 
whom the Two Lords are at peace, seal impression from 











Ancient Egyptian Exceptionalism: Fragility, Flexibility and the Art of Not Collapsing
active construction on the pyramid at any one time, 
behind these stone-haulers it is suggested that 23,000 
additional men were busy quarrying more blocks, 
providing water, baking bread, building ramps and 
slipways, sharpening tools, feeding, transporting, 
and butchering animals, preparing meat and meals, 
registering tools, repairing tools, and so on (Lehner 
1997, 224–5). 
This number takes into consideration only those 
working on the Giza Plateau – not the tens of thou-
sands of others who quarried stone elsewhere, mined 
copper and fashioned tools, herded cattle, etc. Indeed, 
the tireless journeys of a man named Merer and his 
levied team of workmen, as recorded in the earliest 
papyri yet found in Egypt, is a case in point. In the 
span of any given ten-day week, this man and his 
crew made two or three round trip journeys from the 
limestone quarries at Tura to harbours near the Giza 
Pyramids – loading stone, ferrying stone, unloading 
stone, and then beginning the cycle once more (Tallet 
2017, 160). It is difficult to imagine that any family 
would have been unaffected by the demands of the 
pyramid builders – which continued unabated for 
over a century. 
Egyptologists not infrequently compare the crea-
tion of the great Fourth Dynasty pyramids to a public 
works project in which an essentially beneficent state 
provided its citizens with income as well as a chance to 
participate in a collective enterprise that ‘would have 
developed a sense of identity and common purpose 
with the state’ (Tavares 2011, 277). Ethnoarchaeologi-
cal experiments and excavations in the barracks and 
cemeteries of the Workmen’s Village at Giza, however, 
tell a story of backbreaking labour, close quarters, and 
rigid surveillance that render Khufu’s reputation as a 
tyrant – attested in a Middle Kingdom story as well as 
in tales told to Herodotus – readily understandable. It 
would appear, then, that to many of those dragooned 
into building the great pyramids – whether as part of 
their labour tax or as the sum of their entire working 
life – such monuments provoked more resentment 
than pride (Fig. 5.11).
Disaffection with the state may not have been lim-
ited to the labouring classes. In seeking to materialize 
their power via the creation of massive and increas-
ingly technologically perfect feats of engineering, the 
Egyptian state had to radically increase its supply 
of literate officials. The creation of this bureaucracy 
interpolated an educated middle class into a system 
that prior to the pyramid-building endeavour had 
only accounted for two types of people: nobles (iri-pat) 
and commoners (rxyt). Men like Merer, however, who 
meticulously kept their records and served the state 
were neither one nor the other, and their numbers 
91–4). Given that in later times both Horus and Seth 
possessed cult centres and partisans in the Delta as 
well as Upper Egypt, the exact nature of the religio-
political conflict (and, indeed, even whether emphasis 
should best be placed on the religio or on the political) 
remains frustratingly difficult to determine. What is 
apparent, however, is that, following this slaughter, 
Khasekhemwy focused his energy on preparing his 
mortuary monuments at Abydos, in the same cemetery 
as his strongly Sethian predecessor.
The degree to which the two powers were indeed 
satisfied in the aftermath of this late Second Dynasty 
massacre is perhaps dubious. Certainly, the next king 
who came to power acted so as to distance himself 
from his predecessor. Available evidence suggests 
that Netjerikhet was a son of Khasekhemwy who 
buried his father with honour at Abydos, just as 
Hotepsekhemwy had done for Qa’a at the start of 
the Second Dynasty (Dreyer et al. 1996, 71–2; Dreyer 
1998). Like Hotepsekhemwy, however, Netjerikhet 
intentionally disassociated himself from his prede-
cessor by moving the site of the royal burial back to 
Saqqara.3 Moreover, as if to enshrine his message of 
unity in stone, he commissioned an entirely innovative 
funerary monument that stressed as a central message 
throughout its architectural programme the unity of 
both Upper and Lower Egypt and the king’s role in 
maintaining that unity. As a testament to the success of 
his mission, no king of the Old Kingdom would return 
to be buried at Abydos nor would any commission 
offerings, as Netjerikhet had, to Khasekemwy’s cult 
(O’Connor 2009, 176, 178). Moreover, this same king 
appears to have acted quickly – and perhaps quite 
literally – to bury old grievances, for the objects on 
which Khasekhem had memorialized his slaughter 
were quickly whisked out of sight. Seth too, had had 
his day and was never again destined to surmount a 
royal serekh. 
Abuse of power: the break between the Fourth and Fifth 
Dynasties 
In terms of the ability of a state to conspicuously con-
sume human lives, the Fourth Dynasty (c. 2543–2120) 
rivalled the First. At the time that Snefru began work 
on the first of the three full-sized pyramids completed 
in his reign, a fundamental restructuring of society 
had been mandated, for the demands of the state on 
its subjects had never been higher. In order to com-
plete the Great Pyramid, constructed by Snefru’s son 
at Giza, for example, it has been estimated that one 
2611 kg block of stone would have had to have been 
moved into place every two minutes of each daylight 
hour of Khufu’s reign. Likewise, while it seems that 
only 1360–2000 men could have been employed in 
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to the modest nature of his tomb, there are no signs 
that he had ever set his sights on a pyramid complex 
(Stadelmann 1998, 70). 
Why the Egyptians inserted a dynastic break 
between Userkaf and Sheseskaf – rather than Menkaure 
and Shepseskaf – is unclear, given that the former pair 
seem united both in the unusual formation of their 
names and also in their decision to situate their com-
paratively modest mortuary monuments at Saqqara. 
Indeed, the positioning of Userkaf’s pyramid, nestled in 
the shadow of Netjerikhet’s own, speaks volumes (see 
Fig. 5.5). In choosing this locale, Userkhaf positioned 
himself as heir to Netjerikhet’s legacy rather than that 
of the Fourth Dynasty pharaohs. In addition, Userkhaf 
scaled down the size of his pyramid from that of Men-
kaure, such that it was only 73.3 m to a side and 49 m 
high (as opposed to roughly 105 m to a side and 65 m. 
high). In an even more profound innovation, he allowed 
the interior to be made up of artfully stacked limestone 
rubble, which rendered the process of building it far 
less labour intensive. When finished with fine limestone 
blocks, the pyramid would have occasioned awe but 
without the accompanying aftertaste of exploitation. 
increased without any effort on the part of the state to 
enfold them in its ideology or its governing structure. 
Fourth Dynasty political power seems instead to have 
been jealously guarded by the royal family and those 
Memphite officials chosen to marry into it. From this 
nepotistic core orders were dispatched and obedience 
was expected. The imbalance of power must have been 
acutely obvious, however, for in return for the goods 
and services rendered, communities located outside 
the country’s capital enjoyed neither local autonomy 
nor any archaeologically observable signs of royal 
largess (Bárta 2013a, 162–5; Moreno García 2013a, 95).
While no documentation of contemporary unrest 
has survived, its existence can perhaps again be sur-
mised given the profound break with previous practice 
that took place in the last reign of the Fourth Dynasty 
and in a much more pronounced manner in the Fifth 
(c. 2435–2306). The last king of the Fourth Dynasty, 
Shepseskaf, made pious donations to Menkaure’s 
burial cult, however, he emphatically did not follow his 
predecessor’s example. After six or eight years of rule, 
the king was buried in a mastaba at South Saqqara, and 
while the brevity of his reign undoubtedly contributed 
Figure 5.11. Some of the millions of multi-ton blocks that make up Khufu’s pyramid (Photo published with permission 
of Franck Monnier).
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its essential characteristics and functions (Middleton 
2017, 42). So far, three instances have been examined 
in which abuses of power and dangerous divisions in 
society threatened the fabric of the Egyptian state. The 
fact that the state recovered its footing at each point 
of potential (or actual) rupture and persisted, without 
break, as a recognizable entity would indicate that 
the pharaonic state possessed an unusual capacity 
for resilience and reformation. Indeed, considering 
that each successive iteration of the state seems to 
have corrected abuses, one wonders whether the Old 
Kingdom’s governing structure might indeed fall into 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s category of the ‘antifragile’ – a 
concept he applies to entities that not only absorb shock 
but ultimately become better for it (Taleb 2014, 3).4
Early Egypt’s extraordinary capacity for resil-
ience is perhaps attributable to two main factors: one 
geopolitical and the other ideological. The first factor 
that aided the pharaonic state’s capacity for resilience 
is simply that the Nile Valley affords statehood for 
reasons already referenced, i.e., it is both extremely 
fertile and circumscribed. Thus, so long as the gov-
ernment can prove itself either powerful or beneficial 
(and especially if it is seen as both), dominance is 
relatively easily established. The second factor is that 
the ideological underpinning of pharaonic kingship 
seems to have allowed for the notion that while the 
office of kingship (nsw) was eternal and god given, its 
occupant was a discrete individual (Hm) (Goedicke 
1960, 17–37, 51–79). Thus, any failure in governance 
was not the fault of kingship per se but rather the failure 
of a particular king to rule in accordance with divinely 
inspired righteous order (ma’at). 
An apparently longstanding ‘law of the pharaoh’ 
commanded: ‘Let the possessions be given to him who 
buries’ (Kemp 2006, 310). Thus, adherence to their own 
law may well account for why transfers of power that 
one expects should have been fraught appear so orderly 
in the archaeological record. For example, with respect 
to the case studies presented above, mud sealings 
demonstrate the involvement both of Hotepsekhemwy 
in Qa’a’s burial and of Netjerikhet in Khasekehmwy’s 
(Wilkinson 1999, 83, 95). Nor did kings of the Fifth 
Dynasty repudiate their predecessors, though they 
made every effort to distinguish themselves from them. 
This royal ideal that privileged the peaceful transition 
of power lasted for millennia. Thus both Amasis and 
Octavian granted that royal funerary rites be performed 
for their bested rivals in a bid, presumably, to placate 
the partisans of their enemies and to increase the odds 
that their own assumption to power – irregular as it was 
– would be regarded as at least somewhat legitimate. 
Such rites were useful in that they promoted the notion 
that kingship was larger than any individual ruler or 
The rest of the Fifth Dynasty kings followed suit in the 
construction of their own monuments (Lehner 1997, 
140–54). While the modest scale of the Fifth Dynasty 
pyramids is commonly attributed to practical concerns 
rooted in the availability of state funds or quality bed-
rock (Bárta 2005, 186), the accompanying religious and 
governmental reforms issued by this regime suggest that 
these monuments were scaled back purposefully, and 
perhaps primarily, in order to signal the Fifth Dynasty’s 
commitment to ameliorating discontent.
The wholesale devotion of the Fifth Dynasty kings 
to the cult of Re is well known from their lavish royal 
donations to his cult at Heliopolis, the establishment of 
sun temples at Abu Sir, and the likely dissemination of 
propaganda that the Fifth Dynasty’s legitimacy came 
not from any tenuous genetic tie to the Fourth Dynasty 
sovereigns but rather from their direct descent from 
the Sun God. In the end, however, their governmental 
reforms were what likely did the most work towards 
rendering them legitimate in the eyes of their subjects. 
These sovereigns acted quickly to eliminate nepotism 
and to radically expand access to government offices 
among the class of officials that the pyramid-building 
project had created and yet failed to embrace. These 
new officials boasted of their roles and responsibilities 
in a bevy of biographical inscriptions, and it is perhaps 
no accident that Fifth Dynasty mastabas constitute the 
most impressive private monuments of Egypt’s Old 
Kingdom (Bárta 2013a, 165–72). 
Fifth Dynasty kings also made a concerted effort 
to expand their relevance to areas outside the Mem-
phite core. To this end, the kings donated land, labour 
and workshops to provincial temples and sponsored 
work at sites like Abydos, El-Bersheh, Tod, and Karnak. 
Important individuals were newly awarded oversight 
of state and temple property in their own hometowns 
and felt free to bequeath these positions to their heirs 
in documents that they inscribed in their own elabo-
rate provincial tombs (Moreno García 2007, 322–3; 
2013a, 196–7). In the words of Miroslav Bárta (2013a, 
166), the effects of the Fifth Dynasty reforms were to 
make kingship more ‘socially obliged’ such that state 
revenues were now far more open to mid and high 
level officials who, in turn, dispensed benefits to their 
own network of supporters. Such moves to lessen the 
abuses of power while expanding access to its benefits 
undoubtedly defused dangerous levels of tension 
among both upper and lower classes of society.
Resiliency
Resiliency in ecological or sociocultural spheres refers 
to the ability of a system to reorganize after suffering a 
disturbance such that, although altered, it still retains 
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have dimmed. It may have been, however, that issues 
of illegitimacy and instability long predated the Eighth 
Dynasty. The first king of the Sixth Dynasty (Teti), for 
instance, may well have been assassinated, the second 
(Userkara) a usurper, and the third (Pepy I) plotted 
against by his own wife (Kanawati 2003, 4). Thus, of 
Pepy II’s dynastic forebearers, his direct predecessor 
(Merenre) may have been the only king that was nei-
ther a conspirator nor one conspired against – at least 
so far as is known.
Only one possible attempt to unseat Pepy II is 
known, and this incident is only hinted at in a much 
later folktale that survived in at least three iterations. 
Known from the New Kingdom and the Twenty-Fifth 
Dynasty, the tale may have little bearing on the actual 
situation in the Sixth Dynasty, but – like many tales 
– one suspects it was indeed built around a kernel of 
truth. The story concerns the attempt of an individual, 
who had gained knowledge of a clandestine affair 
between Pepy II and one of his generals, to denounce 
the king in front of the court. Given that Egyptian 
religious texts condemned such relations – at least for 
the passive partner – and that the king was, before 
all else, mankind’s primary advocate before the gods, 
this revelation about Pepy’s sexual behaviour would 
indeed have been alarming. Each time the official 
attempted to reveal his sovereign’s secret, however, 
he found that the Overseer of the Court thwarted him. 
According to the text, ‘he made the singers sing, the 
musicians make music, the acclaimers, acclaim, and 
the whistlers whistle, until the Pleader of Memphis 
left without them hearing; (then) they stopped booing 
him’ (Parkinson 1991, 55). A humorous tale from a 
much later time, of course, is hardly a credible histori-
cal source, but if Pepi II’s proclivities were an open 
secret, this may also have led to a diminishment of 
the office of kingship in the eyes of those who might 
otherwise have held it in awe.
Some have suggested that if the figureheads at 
Egypt’s core were perceived to be increasingly inef-
fectual, people in positions of power elsewhere in 
the country might well have felt free to act in their 
own interests, however illicitly. Certainly, during or 
in the immediate aftermath of Pepi II’s reign, a high 
official from Elephantine was accused of embezzle-
ment (lit. ‘robbery’) with respect to state activity in 
Nubia (Manassa 2006). One must imagine, however, 
that corruption and graft occurred at all times among 
officials whose responsibilities placed them in charge of 
resources and under only loose oversight. To indict an 
entire reign for corruption on the basis of an accident 
of preservation, then, appears premature. 
In the end, it is unlikely that blame for the death 
of the Old Kingdom can be squarely attributed to a 
regime. Indeed, in the wake of deeply unpopular pre-
decessors, the impulse of new pharaohs was to erase 
all evidence of the offending monarch(s) and to align 
themselves – through artifice or archaism – with former 
kings of better repute.
An autopsy report on Egypt’s first failed state
Although the Egyptian state was far less fragile than 
the vast majority of its ancient equivalents, it was not 
invincible. It failed very shortly after the reign of the 
Sixth Dynasty king Pepi II from a combination of many 
of the same ailments that appear to have laid low its 
less long-lived equivalents. If scholars of failed states 
can be compared to coroners, the autopsy reports 
that have been filed for Egypt’s Old Kingdom state 
are typically equivocal. Below, however, a variety of 
different diagnoses are couched together within three 
broad categories in an admittedly speculative order of 
escalating importance: death by management failure 
and a corrosive loss of legitimacy, death by disaffec-
tion, and finally death by a drastic diminishment of 
spiritual and physical capital.
Death by management failure and a corrosive loss of 
legitimacy
There is considerable confusion as to the length of Pepi 
II’s reign. The Turin Cannon gives a figure exceeding 
ninety years, which would suggest that the king had 
come to the throne unfit to rule and – unless he were 
truly extraordinary – would have left it the same way. 
The lack of attested regnal years for the last quarter 
century of Pepi’s reign has often been blamed on 
the king’s increasing irrelevancy to regional rulers 
and to an ever more impoverished elite. A graffito 
in Pepy II’s pyramid, however, suggests that he died 
and was buried in his sixty-fourth regnal year. If so, 
his reign (c. 2216–2153) would have been comparable 
to Ramessses II’s in length, and no extended period 
of irrelevancy need be posited (Müller-Wollermann 
2014, 3). Sixty years, however, would still have been 
over twice the average lifespan of an ancient Egyptian, 
and so an increasingly fragile monarch may well have 
been viewed as an ominous avatar for the troubled 
state of the state.
Whatever the length of Pepi II’s enormously long 
rule, he must, like Ramesses II, have outlived scores 
of crown princes. Of the scramble of short-lived kings 
that made up the subsequent Eighth Dynasty, one 
was certainly a son of Pepi II and others aggressively 
asserted kinship with him – however tenuous or fictive 
it may have been – by virtue of their choice of throne 
name. If numerous claimants assumed the crown in 
rapid succession, the lustre of the office would quickly 
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Large estates belonging to the king, the gods, or 
deceased royals formed the backbone of the provincial 
economy. Depending on their purpose, these estates 
likely sent varying amounts of produce to Memphite 
institutions, but much was also stored locally in order 
to subsidize the travel expenses of court functionar-
ies or underwrite governmental expenses. Such had 
always been the case. What was different in the late 
Sixth Dynasty, however, was that the elites who now 
controlled these stores and increasingly appended titles 
such as ‘overseer of the granary’ and/or ‘overseer of 
the treasury’ to their vita, stood at the apex of local 
patronage systems (Kanawati 1980, 129–30; Strudwick 
1985, 292; Papazian 2013, 63–6). Such elites thus no 
doubt found themselves newly empowered to make 
decisions about how local wealth would be dispensed. 
Their increasing co-option of offices such as ‘overseer 
of priests’ – which might stay in the same family for as 
many as eight generations – for instance, allowed local 
potentates to distribute lucrative and prestigious posi-
tions to a network of supporters whose fortunes were 
now directly tied to their own (Moreno García 2013a, 
124–7; 2013b, 198–200, 202, 205; Bárta 2013a, 172–3).
Estates yielded soldiers as well as grain, and this 
too may have played a role in altering the balance of 
power. Little is known about the responsibility for 
mustering young men for war or work in the early Old 
Kingdom, although then, as later, it appears to have 
fallen to administrators bearing titles such as ‘overseer 
of works of the king’, ‘overseer of the phyles of Upper 
Egypt’, and ‘overseer of the missions of the young 
men’. By the late Fifth and Sixth Dynasties, however, 
these men likely lived in the regions from whence they 
drew labour. Certainly, other officials, such as Weni or 
Sabni of Elephantine, mustered troops directly from 
the towns and estates they administered (Eyre 1987, 
18–20; Moreno García 2010, 21–3, 25; Spalinger 2013, 
466–68). Should a late Old Kingdom ruler have wished 
to curtail the defacto hereditary authority of a local 
family and impose his own man from the outside, 
then, those sent to enact his orders would assuredly 
have encountered not only a community united against 
this interference but also a formidable cadre of local 
militia. Indeed, it is likely no coincidence that the title 
‘overseer of a troop’ is noted with relative frequency at 
the end of the Old Kingdom (Moreno García 2015, 5).
The likelihood of encountering resistance from 
local militias no doubt accounted for the pronounced 
preference of Sixth and Eighth Dynasty rulers for 
employing enticements rather than brute force to 
convince local rulers of their relevance. Thus, from 
the reign of Pepi I on, pharaohs often offered the sons 
and daughters of provincial families unprecedented 
power within the core of the kingdom as high officials 
failure of management on the part of its rulers or even 
to a progressive loss of legitimacy. Even if the lengthy 
rule of Pepi II indeed induced a feeling of stagnation, 
upwards of ten Memphite viziers are known from his 
reign (in addition to seven provincial counterparts), 
and each should have infused a renewed adminis-
trative energy to the realm (Strudwick 1985, 301–3). 
Hereditary monarchies, after all, are designed from 
the start to withstand a complete absence of govern-
ing from the king: whether that individual might be 
teething, mentally deficient, deemed deviant, or else 
increasingly infirm. In such cases, it is high officials 
who make important decisions, courtiers who meticu-
lously stage-manage official appearances, and palace 
musicians who do their very best to drown out any 
incoming complaints. 
Death by disaffection
One nearly universal suspect in the demise of the Old 
Kingdom is a restructuring of the government that 
ceded an unprecedented degree of power to regional 
authorities, who were typically members of power-
ful local families. The radical expansion of Egypt’s 
bureaucracy in the Fifth Dynasty, while no doubt 
popular among ambitious members of the educated 
classes, seems from repeated attempts at restructuring 
later in the dynasty to have placed an increasing strain 
on the central government. Fifth Dynasty experiments 
with allowing some provinces a greater degree of 
administrative autonomy must have been deemed 
predominantly successful, as by the Sixth Dynasty, 
the government had introduced the title, ‘great chief 
of the nome’ to most Middle and Upper Egyptian 
provinces. Such men shared power with – or were 
occasionally functionally equivalent to – other locals 
who also exercised control over large estates on behalf 
of the crown and/or who were promoted to positions 
of authority in the central government as overseers 
of Upper Egypt or even as viziers (Moreno García 
2013a, 124–46).
Prior to the Sixth Dynasty, the profoundly une-
qual distribution of monumental architecture and other 
archaeologically visible signifiers of wealth between 
the government’s centre and its provinces suggests that 
the former’s interest in the latter had resided almost 
solely in what it could requisition. While the crown 
likely intended its reform to increase efficiency and 
to lessen the drain on its coffers that the support of 
an overblown bureaucracy entailed, the advantages 
of this approach were counterbalanced by risks. In 
subcontracting oversight of provincial affairs to locals, 
for instance, the central government lessened its abil-
ity both to micromanage revenues and to coopt all 
significant sources of social power. 
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repeatedly assigned at least partial blame for this sad 
state of affairs. These tax exemptions – in evidence 
already at the beginning of the Sixth Dynasty but bet-
ter attested towards the end of it – generally forbade 
crown officials from charging their expenses to the 
protected estate. In addition, the crown promised 
not to requisition its property or personnel as part of 
routine corvée labour extractions or on an as-needed 
basis (Strudwick 2005, 102–15). 
While the crown would indeed have reduced 
its access to revenue by virtue of these decrees, espe-
cially if the surviving documents were only the tip 
of the iceberg, three factors suggest that this practice 
was more a symptom of weakness than a cause. First, 
in most cases the estate is exempt from only certain 
impositions and taxes – not necessarily all. Second, 
the vast majority of institutions were not exempt. 
Thus, donkeys that were not requisitioned from the 
funerary estate of one particular queen mother could 
presumably be requisitioned from those of all other 
queen mothers and their noble kin, not to mention 
the pyramid towns of all but the couple of exempted 
parties as well as the innumerable royal estates that 
littered the country and were especially prominent in 
the Delta (Moreno García 2013b, 190–2; 203–4). 
Finally, the crown seems often to have exempted 
sources of revenue that it could afford to exempt. The 
governors in Dakhleh, for instance, occupied an oasis 
hundreds of kilometres deep in the desert, and their 
mastabas were far grander than any others in Egypt 
during the reign of Pepi II. Thus, it would appear that 
if Egyptian armies had tried to requisition revenue by 
force, they would have failed. At the other extreme, 
however, the exemption granted to the community 
tending Menkaure’s funerary temple would appear 
far more impressive if this squalid tenement had never 
been excavated (Lehner 2002, 7; Kemp 2006, 207–9). 
Indeed, the exemption granted to this ‘sacred slum’ 
was most likely intended primarily to provide the 
priests with an incentive to stay put and to keep the 
derelict cult functional. 
The gradual impoverishment of elites at the end 
of the Old Kingdom is not in dispute. The role of an 
ecological downturn in occasioning this impoverish-
ment, however, is. Recent assessments of the period 
discount any role of the environment in occasioning 
the breakdown of the centralized state, although no 
compelling heuristic alternative is advanced (Moreno 
García 2015, 5; Gee 2015, 61–2; Contardi 2015, 14–8; 
Schneider 2017, 319).5 These authors tend to muster 
three main arguments. 1. The 28 firsthand narratives of 
individuals who claimed to successfully protect their 
people from dangerous food shortages were in fact 
opportunistically making a mountain out of a mole hill. 
and as queens. At the same time, they acted to assert 
their own presence in important regional temples via 
the donation of royal statues and the establishment of 
appended ka-chapels (Moreno García 2013a, 122, 137–8; 
2013b 199). Royal statues, such as those exhumed from 
Hierakonpolis, were not, however, likely maintained 
solely out of an enthusiasm for the cult of the divine 
king. Royal donations of land and property sweetened 
the pot for local powerbrokers and – no doubt – further 
fuelled the centrifugal forces already in motion.
The fact that officials in the late Fifth and Sixth 
Dynasties took charge of affairs in their own localities 
to a greater degree than ever before in the history of the 
pharaonic state, however, need not have occasioned 
the downfall of the central government. Indeed, the 
main problem with the disaffection hypothesis is 
that the state seems to have functioned perfectly well 
throughout the vast majority of the Sixth Dynasty. 
Limited local autonomy appears to have been ceded 
to provinces south of Memphis, yet there is no indi-
cation that regional rulers even remotely rivalled the 
king (Strudwick 1985, 346). In the north, meanwhile, 
the crown maintained its former hold over property 
in the fertile regions of the Nile Delta and the Fayum 
Oasis. Certainly, it is notable that for most of the Sixth 
Dynasty, kings seem to have had more than enough 
funds to procure resources from the northern Levant 
as well as from sub-Saharan Africa (Cooper 2012; 
Ward 1963, 23–7). So long as the crown possessed 
unparalleled wealth and a perceived religiopolitical 
potency – and so long as it shared some of this wealth 
and continued to refrain from the exploitative and 
divisive policies of the past – even those located at its 
margins seem to have been content to support it. What, 
then, changed at or shortly after the death of Pepy II?
Death by drastic diminishment of spiritual and physical 
capital
Toward the end of the Sixth Dynasty, state finances took 
a turn for the worse. This is perhaps most obviously 
reflected in the mortuary remains of its functionar-
ies. Pepi II, with his unusually long reign, managed 
to construct a perfectly respectable pyramid. What 
is notable, however, is that beginning in the reign 
of Merenre, the numbers of Memphite officials who 
could afford a high-status burial shrunk precipitously 
(Bárta 2013b, 269). Indeed, by the latter portion of 
Pepi II’s reign virtually no one in in the capital or the 
provinces could afford an imposing mastaba tomb, 
save the governors of Dakhleh Oasis. 
The practice of granting of tax exemptions to 
temples and associated funerary establishments (Aby-
dos and Coptos), pyramid towns (Dahshur and Giza), 
and royal and private ka-chapels (Coptos) has been 
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I will draw upon evidence for documented famines 
in later periods in Egypt’s history to highlight certain 
observations about famines that are not necessarily self 
evident but which are crucial for gaining perspective 
on the scattered sources of information pertinent to 
the First Intermediate Period. 
The case for re-considering the role of a climate 
hostile to the state
Most of the studies that discount climate as an agent 
for change in Egypt draw upon an article published by 
Nadine Moeller in 2005. In this valuable essay, Moeller 
reviewed all of the available scientific studies that had 
been used to argue that a series of droughts and low 
floods had occasioned the collapse of Egypt’s Old 
Kingdom. Some of these studies, she found, were more 
convincing than others. For example, a study of chang-
ing settlement patterns at the island of Elephantine, 
she concluded ‘provides firm evidence for relatively 
low flood levels during the 6th Dynasty’ (Moeller 2005, 
156). She cautioned, however, that scientists who took 
climatic change at the end of the third millennium 
as a given may well have been inclined to a certain 
amount of confirmation bias when interpreting their 
data (Moeller 2005, 158). Such studies, she suggested, 
might include investigations of Nile sediments from 
the Delta, dune encroachment into towns and formerly 
fertile fields, and variation in Fayum lake levels. 
After reviewing the various studies, she con-
cluded that climate change in Egypt was no doubt real, 
but appeared to be ‘a long-term, gradual development 
towards generally drier conditions’ (Moller 2005, 167), 
an assessment that agrees with evidence mustered by 
Miroslav Barta (2015) and colleagues at Abu Sir, re-
evaluations of the dating for the collapse of urbanism 
in the southern Levant (Höflmayer 2014, 132), evalua-
tions of evidence pertinent specifically to the eastern 
Mediterranean (Finné, Holmgren, Sundqvist et al. 
2011, 3169), and with the view that scenes of starving 
bedouin carved on the causeways of Fifth Dynasty 
kings were as relevant as they were self-serving (see 
Fig. 5.12; Morris 2017, 134–5). 
Moeller’s caution concerning the dangers of 
confirmation bias and circular arguments is important 
and well taken. Since Moeller’s article, debates about 
the so-called 4.2-kiloyear bp aridification event have 
continued. Given that there is at least as much (if not 
more) prestige in debunking a controversial theory 
as there is in confirming it, and given that most of the 
authors involved in subsequent studies are climate 
scientists and have no investment one way or another 
in the veracity of Egyptian texts, let me briefly refer to 
a selection of studies published after 2005 that have 
Famines were nothing unusual. These local grandees 
simply took advantage of the lack of a strong king in 
order to take credit for food distribution. 2. A rash of 
‘pessimistic literature’ set (or reasonably thought to 
be set) in the First Intermediate Period but penned 
(certainly or likely) during the Middle Kingdom should 
be viewed both as warnings regarding the danger of 
life without a strong king ruling a unified country and 
also as reflective of an interest in exploring the notion 
of theodicy. 3. Any ecological downturn that there 
might have been would have occurred gradually and 
so the state would have had time to adjust.
In his investigation of the epistemological per-
spective that has coloured the reconstruction of the 
end of the Old Kingdom and life during the First Inter-
mediate Period, Thomas Schneider (2017, 319) quotes 
Ailiezer Tucker’s definition of the benchmark for the 
veracity of historiography: namely that it is important 
to privilege hypotheses that increase the likelihood 
of the evidence more than others. I will thus end this 
essay by arguing that while privileging a monocausal 
explanation for the end of the First Intermediate Period 
is undoubtedly naïve and wrongheaded, ignoring 
testimonies from first-hand accounts, later medita-
tions on trauma, and a rash of scientific studies risks 
an unnecessarily defeatist approach. That the Old 
Kingdom monarchy was crippled by its inability to 
use its privileged position with the deities (on the 
one hand) and its unparalleled stores of grain (on the 
other) to help its people in their time of need is indeed 
a hypothesis that fits Tucker’s benchmark for approval. 
The hypothesis that deteriorating environmen-
tal conditions helped bring about the end of the Old 
Kingdom is also potentially useful for explaining why 
it would take almost a century and a half (c. 2118–1980) 
before another ruler could extend his dominion over 
the entirety of the country. It has been the aim of this 
paper thus far, after all, to argue that Egypt affords 
statehood and that even in the face of politicide, the 
pharaonic system was remarkably resilient. In all past 
periods of unrest, societal frustration seems to have 
been quelled by the installation of a new govern-
ment and by the righting of perceived wrongs. So the 
important question with respect to the Sixth Dynasty 
is perhaps less why it fell than why it took so long 
(by Egyptian standards) before anyone picked up its 
pieces and put it back together again. 
In order to make my case for bringing climate 
back into the equation, let me begin by marshalling 
an assemblage of recent and diverse scientific studies 
that demonstrate that the ecological downturn that 
coincided with the end of the Old Kingdom was not 
business as usual and that the reports of eyewitnesses 
should not be deemed histrionic. With this point made, 
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the climate change postulated by the 4.2 ka bp event 
that has been argued to have caused widespread suf-
fering throughout the eastern Mediterranean world. 
A team of scientists examining brine sediments in the 
northern Red Sea reached a similar conclusion. The 
results of their study led them to state that the tim-
ing and strength of the reconstructed environmental 
changes around 4200 cal yr bp are suggestive of ‘a major 
drought event’ that affected northern Africa as well as 
Mesopotamia (Arz, Lamy, Pätzold 2006, 432, 439–40).
Within Egypt proper, recent coring at Saqqara 
has revealed a metre thick layer of dune sands over 
areas that had previously been arable fields (Hassan, 
Hamdan, Flower et al. 2017, 62).6 At this site as well 
as Abusir, Giza, and Abu Rowash, other geomorpho-
logical studies revealed that the deposition of slope 
and aeolian deposits occurred at the same time as 
dramatically low floods. These low floods, in combina-
tion with unusually intense bursts of rain, triggered 
catastrophic flash floods that have left ample evidence 
of their destruction in the Memphite cemeteries and 
appear even have led to significant archaeological 
innovations in tomb design7 (Welc & Marks 2014, 
131; Kuraszkiewicz 2016). The effects of low floods 
and intense rain may also be seen in the fact that 
Lake Qarun was effectively cut off from the Nile and 
received a significant input of sand, likely the result of 
sheet-floods (Marks, Salem, Welc et al. 2018, 76). These 
two factors, Fabian Welc and Leszek Marks conclude, 
‘caused a rapid collapse of the Old Kingdom at about 
4200 cal bp’ (Welc & Marks 2014, 124). 
If adding heavy rains to the list of contributory 
factors leading to the breakdown of the state appears 
hyperbolic, a brief foray into more recent history may 
be illustrative. In his book Nature and Empire in Ottoman 
Egypt, Alan Mikhail writes that the torrential down-
pours of 1757–1758 and of 1790 set off a chain of events 
found additional evidence for adverse climatological 
events that are posited to have led to an aridification 
the like of which had not been seen since the dawn of 
the state and/or to catastrophically low floods. These 
studies employ a variety of different methods and have 
examined evidence from numerous locales.
Studies undertaken at the sources of the Nile are 
particularly important, given that the inundation was 
far more crucial to Egypt’s long-term health than any 
rain that fell within its borders. At Lake Tana, the source 
of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, magnetic and geochemical 
coring has revealed a drought event at roughly 2200 bc, 
i.e., during the reign of Pepy II. The effects of this dry 
spell were aggravated because they coincided with ‘a 
short period when outflow ceased from Lake Victoria, 
at the source of the White Nile,’ convincing the authors 
to support the position that reduced Nile flow was 
indeed a contributing factor in the collapse of the Old 
Kingdom state (Marshall, Lamb, Huws et al. 2011, 147, 
159). Even Karl Butzer, who had argued forcefully in 
the past against climate-driven explanations for the 
collapse of the Old Kingdom (Butzer 1997, 245, 261) 
argued in 2012 that the limnological record of Lake 
Turkana – which indicated that the Omo watershed 
in western Ethiopia that fed it generated only minimal 
influx around approximately 2100 bc – suggested that 
‘Nile failures probably unleashed a severe subsistence 
crisis that helped trigger an economic breakdown near 
the end of Pepi II’s reign’ (Butzer 2012, 3633–4). 
With reference to suffering to the north and east 
of Egypt, Sturt Manning and his colleagues utilized the 
technique of dendro-14C-wiggle-matching to examine 
the tree-ring sequences of a cedar coffin and funerary 
boat from the First Intermediate Period and Middle 
Kingdom respectively (Manning, Dee, Wild et al., 2014, 
401, 414). Their conclusion was that an off-set within 
the period of roughly 2200–1900 bc was consistent with 
Figure 5.12. Starving Bedouin from the causeways of Sahure (12a. after Hawass and Verner 1996, 185, fig. 2a) and 
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Syria, which caused some 30,000–50,000 individuals to 
immigrate into the Nile Valley in search of sustenance. 
Two successive insufficient inundations, however, 
meant that Egypt, too, was in a state of crisis. The price 
of grain rose to more than 13 times the standard rate, 
people began resorting to famine foods (including, 
according to the chroniclers, human flesh), plague 
spread throughout the country, and at the peak of 
its devastation it is estimated that as many as 3,000 
persons a day perished (al-Maqrīzī 1994, 43–7; Sabra 
2000, 141–3).
The fact that most of those that fled to Egypt were 
pastoralists from Cyrenaica recalls a statement from 
the record of a campaign that Merneptah undertook 
c. 1208 bc, right at the beginning of the chaotic half 
century or so that marked the end of the Late Bronze 
Age. The report states by way of prologue that Libyan 
tribesmen had emigrated en masse to the Nile Delta 
in order to ‘seek out the necessities (of life) for their 
mouth[s]’ and once there were ‘fighting to feed their 
stomachs daily’ (Kitchen 2003, 4). Notably, refer-
ences to famine abound in contemporary diplomatic 
correspondence, and Merneptah boasted that he had 
‘caused grain to be taken in ships, to keep alive this 
land of Hatti’ (Singer 1999, 716–9). Destruction levels 
and the abandonment of major population centres are 
evident throughout the Eastern Mediterranean at this 
time, bearing witness to mass population displace-
ment. While Merneptah kept his throne, Canaan and 
Nubia attempted to rebel against pharaonic rule, and 
political chaos soon brought down his dynasty. The 
succeeding regime (c. 1190–1077) is known for rampant 
tomb robbery, labour strikes, multiple instances of 
mob violence, hit and run attacks by desert dwellers, 
increasing regionalism, and finally for the breakdown 
of the central state. While the intermittent spikes in 
grain prices noted in late Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Dynasty sources may be related more to administrative 
inefficiency than to famine, it is notable that documents 
from this period provide more direct and indirect refer-
ences to hunger and to the extraordinary purchasing 
power of foodstuffs than those from any period since 
the advent of the Twelfth Dynasty (O’Connor 1982, 
875–6; Kemp 2006, 314, Contardi 2015, 17)
In the late Old Kingdom, evidence for large-scale 
population movements typical of those catalyzed by 
drought conditions can be seen in the reoccupation 
of the Nubian Nile Valley, the Sinai landbridge, and 
in Egypt’s increased confrontations with Bedouin, 
as the inhabitants of areas dependent on rainfall in 
North Africa and the southern Levant converged upon 
the Nile Valley and also threatened Egypt’s interests 
outside of it. Indeed, the pharaonic initiative to colo-
nize Dakhleh Oasis (a region whose water was not 
that led to a governmental crisis. These rains wrecked 
field systems, ruined crops, and destroyed supplies 
of stored grain. Further, the unexpected floods also 
sent thousands of rats to seek dry land together with 
humans, which led to a particularly devastating bout 
of plague. Not restricted to the poorer districts of Cairo, 
the pestilence of 1791 slew Egypt’s highest official as 
well as many in his administration (Mikhail 2011, 218, 
227–8). As Mikhail writes, ‘The plague indeed caused 
quite a crisis of leadership in Ottoman Egypt, as no 
appointed leader could stay alive long enough to rule 
effectively’ (Mikhail 2011, 222). It would appear, then, 
that the causes and effects of the combined calamity of 
1790–1791 may provide a gruesome, if fitting parallel 
to what archaeology has revealed concerning the end 
of the Old Kingdom. Mikhail concludes, ‘The flood of 
the fall of 1790, therefore, contributed to the ravages 
of plague in the spring of 1791. The combination of 
these forces with drought in the fall of 1791 resulted 
in widespread famine, severe price inflations, and 
massive death’ (Mikhail 2011, 229). Considering the 
magnitude of the crisis, it was useful to the survival 
of the Ottoman state that its sultan resided outside 
Egypt’s borders!
Lessons from the longue durée 
Numerous accounts of more modern famines in 
Egypt’s history, particularly those that occurred in 
the well-documented Mamluk and Ottoman periods, 
allow for the recognition of a few important patterns. 
Efficient governments, for example, could generally 
ameliorate the damage caused by Nile floods that 
were either dangerously high or dangerously low. In 
such cases, before inflation caused too much suffering 
among the poor, rulers and other grandees would step 
in and either sell grain at below the market rate or 
else simply distribute it. While occasional instances of 
rioting might occur – as in the famines of ad 1336 and 
1394 – the government that acted quickly and efficiently 
in the face of a short-lived ecological downturn could 
aid its people and avert disaster (Sabra 2000, 144–5, 
148–50; Raphael 2013, 99). 
Inadequate floods seem to have occurred at least 
once a generation. As Fekri Hassan has observed, 
however, Egypt’s most horrific experiences with fam-
ine and suffering occurred at much longer intervals 
– often depriving even the oldest sufferers of a parallel 
within the living memory of those they’d known. The 
effects were most acutely felt when inadequate floods 
persisted over two or more years, occurred within 
short intervals of one another, and/or coincided with 
extended region-wide droughts (Hassan 1997, 57–9). 
From 1294 to 1295, for instance, a serious drought 
struck the Eastern Mediterranean from Cyrenaica to 
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963–971, 1294–1296, 1694–1695, 1784 and 1790–1796, 
which provoked widespread anger and demonstra-
tions in response (al-Maqrīzī 1994, 29–30, 47; Mikhail 
2011, 217–218, 229–30). Whether the aftermath of mob 
violence may also be seen in the scorch marks left 
over from fires that destroyed the late Sixth Dynasty 
Governor’s palace at ‘Ain Asil in Dakhleh Oasis or in 
the disordered corpses of over 35 people recovered 
beneath burnt heaps of rubble outside a late Old King-
dom temple platform at Mendes is unclear, but ‘Let us 
drive out the strong among us!’ was remembered as a 
rallying cry characteristic of the time (Enmarch 2008, 
223, similarly 228–9 Simpson 2003, 153, 155; Soukias-
sian 1997, 17; Redford 2010, 46–50).
It is worth noting that in order to temper the 
effects of famine, Mamluk and Ottoman governments 
awarded tax breaks and fostered an economy of patron-
age among their highest elites – two tactics, discussed 
above, that Egypt’s late Old Kingdom administra-
tion also employed (Sabra 2000, 135–6; Mikhail 2011, 
2016–7; Raphael 2013, 99–100). In these latter periods, 
such economic interventions often staved off disaster 
– but it helped that Egypt was only one component 
of a much larger empire. These same strategies, while 
they may at first have decreased stress and increased 
the agility of the Old Kingdom government, would 
not have worked over a period of ever-increasing 
aridity. Regional granaries, by their very nature, run 
dry more quickly than centralized stores, and they 
do not allow the dearth of one region to be as easily 
complimented by the plenty of another. Thus, at the 
very end of the Old Kingdom the centre did not hold, 
and things fell apart. 
The Egyptian state had weathered destabilizing 
adversities before, including serious and systemic 
abuses of power, as well as regional unrest, and even 
regicide. While these adversities prompted abrupt 
changes of regime, they did not stop the state alto-
gether. Some other ruler had always stepped up to 
right wrongs and assume the reins. The question, then, 
is why this case was different. Accounts of historically 
attested famines may, again, aid our understanding 
of why Egypt – if it had suffered from a prolonged 
drought and intermittent low Niles – may have had 
a difficult time recovering. Adequate inundations, it 
seems, were no panacea unless arable land could be 
quickly cultivated. In the aftermath of serious famines 
in Egypt, finding the animal- and manpower to work 
the soil was difficult. In areas hardest hit by famine, 
people had generally consumed both unripe crops 
and draught animals. Moreover, villages were often 
almost entirely depopulated as peasants who did not 
die often left for cities so as to be closer to what aid 
there was and to escape increasingly lawless conditions 
dependent on the Nile) in the Sixth Dynasty may also 
have been undertaken both to increase Egypt’s food 
supply and to give its traders a means of bypassing 
the newly reoccupied and politically fractious Lower 
Nubian Nile Valley. Egypt’s emergence from isola-
tionism in the Late Old Kingdom, then, was probably 
to some degree defensive, and it is notable that once 
strong leadership re-emerged in the Delta during 
the late First Intermediate Period or the early Mid-
dle Kingdom, border security became a top priority 
(Jansen-Winkeln 2010; Morris 2018, 49–52). 
It is possible that an increase in urbanism and in 
the construction of town walls in the Sixth Dynasty 
may be taken as the material signatures of an elevated 
unease that existed within Egypt proper (Moeller 2016, 
186). Such a conclusion need not necessarily be drawn. 
As Juan Carlos Moreno García points out, a burgeon-
ing population might be read as a sign of health, and 
in the southern Levant, for example, the presence of 
town walls is often interpreted as an indication of civic 
pride (Philip 2003, 109–23; Moreno García 2015, 8). 
Thus, the increased provincial autonomy typical of the 
Sixth Dynasty could well have motivated local elites 
to invest in their towns. In the third century ad, for 
example, Egyptian provincial cities flourished during 
an extended period of crisis largely because wealthy 
citizens – newly empowered to act as city councillors 
– now saw the glory of their city as adding lustre to 
their own self-worth (Bagnall 1993, 55–9). 
Bearing the aforementioned caveats in mind, 
it may still be safely stated that in pharaonic Egypt 
nucleation and walls are especially characteristic of 
unsettled times. Moreover, multiple lines of evidence 
make it clear that any walls erected were put to good 
use during the ‘long First Intermediate Period’, which 
might be argued to extend up to the point at which 
Amenemhet I’s foes surrendered their arms. Violence 
– as witnessed in elevated death rates and signs of 
trauma, biographical inscriptions, and in the unprec-
edented visibility of soldiers as well as real, model, 
and depicted weapons – left its scars in the material 
and epigraphic record (O’Connor 1974; 27–9; Hayes 
1978, 277–80; Morris 2006; Duhig 2009, 60–1; Moeller 
2016, 244–5). 
Dry climates tend to be incendiary
When an efficient administration in Egypt’s history 
mitigated the effects of a short famine, the benefits 
of paying taxes were obvious. Inefficient, inattentive, 
or avaricious elites, however, could exacerbate (or 
even cause) crises and served as lightning rods for 
discontent during ecological downturns. Perceived 
abuses of the social contract that bound a government 
to its people occurred during the famines of 952–953, 
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in sight, aggrandizers increasingly took up the ques-
tion of just who should assume the righteous burden 
of safeguarding the nation’s stores. Within twenty 
years, strong men, based first at Herakleopolis in the 
fertile Fayum and slightly later in Thebes, carved out 
kingdoms that would eventually clash. Like a phoenix 
rising from the ashes (or like a B-grade horror film, 
depending on your perspective) the pharaonic state 
would be reborn. Whether this repeat performance was 
greeted with relief or depression no doubt depended 
on individual circumstances. The strength of Egypt’s 
state lay – almost equally, it seems – in its ability both 
to help and to harm.
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an outside invasion. Given the difficulties organized 
empires such as the Assyrians, Neo-Babylonians, and 
the Persians faced in their own efforts to penetrate the 
Delta with camels and warships, any organized invasion 
should be ruled out. That Egypt received numerous 
unwanted refuges in a time of drought, however, is 
quite likely. 
6 As the Egyptians would put it, ‘the desert is throughout 
the land’ (Ipuwer 3.1; trans. Enmarch 2008, 223). 
7 Ipuwer’s observation is perhaps pertinent: ‘O, yet the 
many dead are buried in the river; the flood is a grave, 
while the tomb had become a flood’ (Ipuwer 2.6–7, trans. 
Enmarch 2008, 222).
doubtful (Reader 2017, 80–2). Given that the king was 
certainly buried at Abydos, it is unlikely that he would 
have been the sole Early Dynastic king to provide him-
self with two tombs, though the notion that the Gisr 
el-Mudir was intended to serve as a heb sed court or as 
an arena to celebrate his reunification of the country is 
intriguing (Regulski 2009, 227–8). 
4 The fact that Taleb’s area of expertise lies in modern 
finance rather than ancient Egypt is apparent from 
his characterization of the pharaonic nation-state as 
ephemeral (Taleb 2014, 96).
5 The exception to this rule is Karl Jansen-Winkeln (2010, 
233–9), who argues that the Old Kingdom fell due to 
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regimes help to produce early urban phenomena? How 
– in material-relational and historical terms – did they 
or did they not attract human populations? Did they 
become stratified and how? What were the political and 
material histories of their demise?
In my own answers to these questions here, I 
will focus on the properties and histories of cultural 
order and infrastructure at Cahokia and Chaco, par-
ticularly as entangled through maize agriculture, 
ceramic production, monumental experience, and 
water management. I will locate very little of the his-
torical dynamism of the two complexes in communal, 
urban, ritual, or hierarchical structures per se, which 
have proven remarkably intractable to archaeologists 
(in part because they are artificial analytical constructs). 
Doubtless, both Cahokia and Chaco were variably 
communal, urban, ritual, and hierarchical – these are 
dimensions of most human social experience – in ways 
that were closely tethered to their order and infrastruc-
ture as these developed through time. 
Their fragility, in the end, was therefore depend-
ent in some ways on their material qualities, on their 
inclusive or exclusive and intensive or extensive pecu-
liarities, and on the extent to which their boundaries 
were either heavily incised on the landscape or, alterna-
tively, permeable and susceptible to being transgressed. 
In the following sections, I first outline and compare 
Cahokian and Chacoan social and material histories. 
Then, I stress those immanent qualities of maize, 
pottery production, monumental construction, and 
water management key to appreciating the fragility 
of Cahokia and Chaco.
Cahokian social and material history  
(ad 950 to 1250)
A millennium ago, a century after the beginning of the 
Medieval Climate Anomaly (c. ad 950) and the coeval 
Two sprawling early urban or proto-urban complexes 
– Cahokia and Chaco – developed at about the same 
time far apart from each other in pre-Columbian North 
America (Fig. 6.1). The construction of each was based 
to a significant extent on maize agriculture supple-
mented by other native plant foods, terrestrial game 
and, in the case of Cahokia, waterfowl, fish, and other 
aquatic animals (for overviews, see Dalan et al. 2003; 
Kantner 2004a; Lekson 2006; Noble 2004; Pauketat 2004; 
Pauketat & Alt 2015). Both were overbuilt complexes of 
(politicized) religious activity and, in that form, likely 
acted as magnets for pilgrims and immigrants, shap-
ing the histories of everyone and everything caught 
up in their webs (Pauketat 2013; Van Dyke 2007). Yet 
neither survived the end of the Medieval Climate 
Anomaly, about ad 950–1250, with major monumental 
constructions and human habitations dating to circa 
ad 1050–1250 for Cahokia and ad 850–1130 for Chaco. 
As a consequence of their relatively short dura-
tions, many researchers have asked why these great 
monumental complexes were organized in ways that 
could be undone after less than 15 human generations. 
Unfortunately, such ultimate questions have tended 
to encourage overgeneralizations, drawing on abstract 
models of society and overlooking the very real, local, 
material and infrastructural underpinnings of each 
case. They typically characterize entire societies as 
either populous or sparsely settled, hierarchical or 
communal, political or religious, and rational or ani-
mistic and then model the long-term implications of 
said societies, all while requiring little historical detail 
about the cases in question. 
Instead of such a model-heavy approach to ques-
tions of fragility, I would argue that we should be 
asking proximate, historical questions about specific 
human, other-than-human, and material relationships. 
How did maize and other non-human agencies, maize-
growing agriculturalists, and localized soil and climate 
Chapter 6





second largest of the precincts, East St. Louis, reveals 
clear neighbourhood patterning, among other things, 
with official (political or religious) buildings in one 
area laid out on a grid pattern amid numerous other 
pole-and-thatch domiciles (Betzenhauser & Pauketat 
2018; Brennan 2018; Emerson et al. 2018). 
Simultaneously, Cahokian emissaries or converts 
established shrine complexes and apparent support 
settlements up and down major waterways across 
the American Midwest and Mid-South – 1000 river 
addition of maize fields to Midwestern landscapes, 
a city of some 15,000 or more living souls covering 
15–20 sq. km – Greater Cahokia – coalesced along an 
extraordinary stretch of the Mississippi River (Fig. 6.2; 
Table 6.1). The process produced a cultural region of 
some 30,000-plus sq. km (Pauketat & Alt 2015). At the 
centre of it was a complex of three sprawling precincts 
planned and built around ad 1050 at a scale never 
before imagined in pre-Columbian North America 
(Fig. 6.3). Extensive new excavation data from the 
Figure 6.1. Location of the Greater Cahokia and Chaco regions (map by T. Pauketat).
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2002). Within an area of about 20 sq. km, each precinct 
(Cahokia, St. Louis, and East St. Louis) appears to have 
been built according to a slightly different orthogonal 
grid. A few buildings or monuments within each seem 
to reference still other celestial, terrestrial, and substan-
tial referents (Pauketat 2013). Besides water, prominent 
referents included the moon and the night (Alt 2018b, 
2019; Baires 2017; Pauketat 2013; Pauketat et al. 2017; 
Romain 2015). Sarah Baires (2017) has argued that a 
central causeway in the Cahokian precinct – part and 
parcel of its founding design – was a virtual avenue 
to the dead (built of earth, through standing water), 
while Susan Alt (2019) adds that this realm was both 
a nightly experience and an actual subterranean land-
scape south and west of the city, superimposed by and 
accessed via sinkholes built into the St. Louis precinct. 
and overland km to the north at places such as Trem-
pealeau, and 750 river-km to the south at places such 
as Carson – all as part of a short-lived but far-flung 
colonial moment during the second half of the elev-
enth century (e.g., Delaney-Rivera 2004; Douglas 1976; 
Emerson, Millhouse et al. 2008; Harn 1991; Johnson 
1987; Pauketat, Boszhardt et al. 2015). By the twelfth 
century, Cahokia was a clear presence in the middle 
Mississippi River valley, with locals in all directions 
disposed in some ways to adopt, acknowledge, or 
confront the political, religious, cultural and military 
challenges emanating from the American Bottom 
(Emerson 2007, 2012).
As a late eleventh and twelfth century city, Greater 
Cahokia was a ‘distanciated’ entity, with open water 
in between the major precincts (see Amin & Thrift 
Figure 6.2. The physiography of the Greater Cahokia region (map by T. Pauketat).
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phenomena (moonlight and darkness) are among the 
most ‘immanent’ (and thereby religious) of a host of 
celestial, terrestrial, and substantial referents (sensu 
Deleuze & Guattari 1987). They exist in multiple 
states and at multiple scales of experience. They have 
‘vibrant’ qualities that might affect people in spiritual 
ways (Bennett 2010; Ingold 2007). As incorporated into 
urban contexts via infrastructure, they have long-term 
historical implications (Pauketat 2019). 
In the Greater Cahokia region, lesser precincts 
and outlying religious shrines appear to have been 
established in the early to mid-eleventh century to 
position that city-under-construction at the centre of 
these various imminences (Alt 2018a; Emerson 1997a; 
Pauketat et al. 2017; Pauketat, Boszhardt et al. 2015). 
There were five ridge-top shaped ‘corporate-
elite’ mortuary mounds at the end of or around the 
causeway. One of these was the well-known Mound 
72, found to be the likely eleventh-century resting place 
both of Cahokia’s founding men and women and of 
a series of mass human graves and artefact offerings 
(Emerson et al. 2016; Fowler et al. 1999). Given the more 
than a dozen such mounds in the Greater Cahokia 
region, which date as late as the early 1200s, it seems 
plausible that several leading families may be impli-
cated in the social history of the city and its immediate 
environs (Baires 2017; Kelly 2005; Pauketat 2010).
As Greater Cahokia’s design and monumen-
tality suggest, fundamental experiences (life and 
death), pervasive substances (water), and experiential 
Table 6.1. A comparison of Cahokian and Chacoan histories. References: Cahokia (Alt 2018; Benson et al. 2009; Emerson 1989, 1997a, b; Pauketat 
1994; Pauketat and Alt 2017; Pauketat et al. 2015); Chaco (Lekson 2007; Lekson et al. 2006; Toll 2006; Van Dyke 2004; Vivian et al. 2006a, b; 
Wilshusen and Van Dyke 2006).














1220 Reduced scale; reorientation; palisade construction Remodelled Great Kivas
Burning and contraction of East St. Louis precinct Pueblo III reoccupation of Chaco Canyon
1180
Upland farming district depopulation
1140 Depopulation and emigration
Ramey pottery and carved figurines; oversized posts




1100 Pueblo Bonito termination deposit
Standardization of pottery and craft production
1060 Long-distance outreach and shrine establishment Chaco Wash aggradation; water-control features
Massive constructions; immigration; theatrical mortuaries Regional expansion; maize and deer dietary focus






Development of Terminal Late Woodland villages Great House construction pulses
940 Adoption of maize (and nixtalamization)
900 Chaco Wash channel degradation
Pueblo Bonito room 33 burial
860
Mixed Late Woodland horticultural villages
Earliest Great Houses and BMIII-PI pueblos; 
population concentration in northern San Juan
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the wall-foundation style and retained traditional 
architectural features (Alt 2002; Alt & Pauketat 2011).
Significant numbers of locals were likely relocated 
within the region, now incorporating the moderately 
dissected ‘Richland Complex’ uplands both east and 
west of the ‘American Bottom’ – the stretch of black, 
humic Mississippi River floodplain that sat at the heart 
of the region (cf. Pauketat 2003; Pauketat et al. 1998; 
Schroeder 2004). In the uplands, as in the American 
Bottom proper, maize agriculture depended on rainfall, 
and the wetter, warmer conditions of the early 1000s 
(Benson, Pauketat et al. 2009). Across the reorganized 
agricultural landscape of both uplands and bottom-
lands, people grew subsistence goods necessary to 
fund the great ceremonial events of the bustling new 
city (Alt 1999, 2018a; Pauketat et al. 2002).
Maize and the medieval warming
The construction of Greater Cahokia had been pre-
ceded by a series of large, pre-urban, Late Woodland 
mounded complexes hundreds of km away in the 
Maize, water, the moon, and feminine lifeforces seem 
implicated at key ceremonial locations (Alt 2018c). The 
largest of these was a 10-m-high ‘water-hill’ in the open 
prairie uplands 24 km east of the Cahokia precinct. 
Known as the Emerald Acropolis, a few dozen ‘shrine’ 
houses likely sat atop the hill in the early days. It would 
be expanded after ad 1050 by levelling the summit 
and adding a dozen earthen platforms. Afterwards, 
individual ceremonials witnessed the construction 
of hundreds of temporary pole-and-thatch buildings 
covering an area of up to 60 ha (Pauketat et al. 2017). 
People came to see the events here and across 
the region. Immigrants, who had been trickling into 
the American Bottom early in the eleventh century, 
poured into the city and its expanding cultural region 
around the year 1050. The regional population that 
identified with Greater Cahokia may have reached 
upwards of 40,000 to 50,000 people in relatively short 
order (Milner 1998). Many would have moved into one 
of the ‘wall-trench’ domiciles constructed, probably by 
work crews, around Greater Cahokia. Others emulated 




the tenth and early eleventh century. Out of these 
were born a regional phenomenon: limestone- and 
shell-tempered pottery-making, mound-building, and 
maize-agricultural peoples who would become the 
first ‘Mississippians’ (Alt 2018a; Baires 2016; Pauketat 
& Alt 2017).
With the 1050 construction of the new city, such 
relationships were firmly emplaced in the form of this 
planned, monumentalized, multi-precinct complex 
(Alt et al. 2010; Baires 2017; Pauketat, Alt et al. 2015; 
Pauketat et al. 2017; Pauketat, Emerson et al. 2015). 
The three principal contiguous precincts noted ear-
lier crisscrossed marsh and river. Indeed, the inner 
pyramid-and-plaza core of the largest precinct may 
have been quite intentionally sited between marshes 
in the wide, central portion of the American Bottom 
such that it might be regularly bathed in mists, a com-
mon morning and evening feature of humid low-lying 
lands in the Midwest during warm summer months 
(June–September). Certainly, a kilometre-long earthen 
causeway was built at the precinct’s foundation to 
connect its central monumental core to a prominent 
corporate-elite burial mound at the south end of the 
Cahokia precinct (a.k.a. the Rattlesnake Mound [66]). 
In reaching the location, the causeway traversed black 
backswamp clays and murky standing water (Fig. 6.4).
Interestingly, if one adds burned and crushed 
mussel shells to the clayey and watery mix, one has 
the recipe for early Mississippian pottery (Pauketat & 
Alt 2017; Porter 1964). Thus, the watery relations link-
ing people and other-than-human powers were also 
assembled in the hands of people via the manufacture 
of the city’s pottery wares. Not everyone was making 
the readily identifiable ‘Red-Rim’ and ‘Powell Plain’ 
cooking jars (e.g., Holley 1989). Ample macroscopic 
and microscopic evidence exists in the form of multiple 
assemblages of broken Cahokian pottery to argue that 
the production of cooking jars made from backswamp 
clays at the beginning of the urban-construction phase 
of Greater Cahokia around ad 1050 was restricted to 
certain times and people (Brennan et al. 2018; Pauketat 
2018; Stoltman 2014; Stoltman et al. 2008). Basket loads 
and sod blocks of the same black, soggy sediment 
served as the construction materials for earthen pyra-
mids and causeways, and were likely mined from the 
same waterlogged locations as one might dig pottery 
clay (Baires 2015, 2017). 
Near or overlooking these same wet areas were 
circular rotundas and steam baths or, simply, water 
shrines. These pole-and-thatch buildings included both 
large and small varieties (with floor areas from 5 to 
500 sq. m), some apparently occupying the summits 
of circular platforms, unknown before the Lohmann 
phase, c. ad 1050–1100. Such platforms were built in 
Mid-South, the largest being the unfortunately named 
Toltec site at the centre of the Arkansas River valley’s 
Plum Bayou culture (c. ad 700–1050, see Fig. 6.1). 
Toltec’s impressive concentration of 18 four-sided, 
flat-topped earthen pyramids sat astride an oxbow 
lake, surrounded by a semi-circular embankment, and 
aligned to a once-in-a-generation southern maximum 
moonrise (Nassaney 2001; Rolingson 1998; Romain 
2015). The Plum Bayou people may have begun farming 
maize as early as the eighth century, perhaps adapt-
ing imported strains of the plant from the American 
Southwest/Northwest Mexico (Rolingson 1998). 
Based on limited data, it seems possible that small 
contingents of Plum Bayou and Coles Creek culture 
peoples from Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana, 
along with larger numbers of Varney culture people 
from southeastern Missouri and Yankeetown people 
from southwestern Indiana, migrated northward 
during the tenth and eleventh centuries (Alt 2018a; 
Pauketat & Alt 2003). By then, after ad 900, maize 
agriculture had taken root in the American Bottom 
(Simon 2014, 2017). 
Maize grows well under the humid, moist con-
ditions of the central Mississippi valley, and maize 
agriculture likely rearranged Late Woodland village 
life into a regional social-territorial order dubbed 
‘Terminal Late Woodland’ by archaeologists (Fortier 
& McElrath 2002). Terminal Late Woodland maize 
farmers, c. ad 900–1050, were becoming thoroughly 
entangled with backswamp, bottomland, Mississippi 
River biomes characterized even today by periodic 
inundation, organic detritus, mussel shells and smells, 
and aquatic life generally (Pauketat & Alt 2017). They 
were also engaged in increasingly intensive intervillage 
relationships seen archaeologically as assemblages 
of pots or contingents of potters from one locality in 
other localities.
Understanding the impacts of maize agriculture in 
the pre-urban region between ad 900–1050 requires us 
to recognize the assemblage potential not of the maize 
plant alone but of the process of nixtamalization. That 
is, the adoption of this Mesoamerican cultigen seems to 
have arrived along with knowledge of how to process 
maize kernels in lye produced from burned limestone 
and ash (Kelly 1980; McElrath et al. 2000; Pauketat 
2018). This linked process – growing and processing 
maize – is that which likely reconfigured the social 
relationships between people and landscape. This is 
because limestone outcrops only along the margins of 
the American Bottom proper. Maize-growing villagers 
would have necessarily altered everyday routines and 
relationships in order to acquire a steady supply of 
the rock and, as a consequence, complex supra-village 
networks of people-maize-limestone emerged during 
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were also aligned to major moonrises, as were some 
at Cahokia proper, tethering the 18.6-year cycle of the 
moon to the earth, as Cahokia’s Plum Bayou precursors 
had done before them (Romain 2015, 2018). 
a series of rows overlooking seeps or bodies of water 
both at Cahokia’s outlying Emerald Acropolis and at 
its St. Louis precinct (Alt 2019; Pauketat et al. 2017). 
Emerald’s platforms and pole-and-thatch buildings 
Figure 6.4. LiDAR plan map of the Cahokia precinct, highlighting monumental features that date to the Lohmann  





Tree-ring (PDSI) data from across the midcontinent 
reveal that the decades leading up to and immedi-
ately following Cahokia’s founding, around ad 1050, 
saw ample precipitation. Under these conditions, 
maize crops could have been grown using dry farm-
ing techniques in both traditional floodplain settings 
and upland zones (Benson, Pauketat et al. 2009). That 
changed, however, after ad 1100, by what may have 
been periods of drought and downward-trending PDSI 
values over time (see also Comstock & Cook 2017). An 
even more severe droughty period followed ad 1150, 
minimally indicating insufficient rainfall events to 
sustain upland farming. And, indeed, the second 
major development in the greater Cahokia region is 
recognizable in regional survey and excavation data: 
many upland settlements – which had encompassed 
thousands of farmers – were abandoned by ad 1150 
(Alt 2018a; Benson, Pauketat et al. 2009; Pauketat 2003). 
The human population density of the city itself 
may not have been directly affected until the later 1100s. 
Then, as early as the 1160s and as late as about ad 1200, 
the third major development occurred, quite possibly 
a single event or series of closely related events. A 
portion of the ritual-residential complex at Cahokia’s 
East St. Louis precinct was incinerated, likely quite 
intentionally and in conjunction with the closure of a 
large corporate-elite mortuary mound. 
Generally speaking, this development correlates 
with the aforementioned disappearance of Cahokia’s 
official twelfth-century politico-religious architecture – 
those steam baths, shrine houses, council buildings, and 
medicine lodges. Seemingly, an entire religious com-
plex was terminated as, perhaps, one or more orders 
of priests vacated the region. One might presume that 
a new politico-religious order filled the void, centred 
on the big rectangular ‘great temple’ atop Cahokia’s 
principal pyramid, Monks Mound (Reed 2009). Melissa 
Baltus (2014) has characterized this period, the Moore-
head phase, as yet another revitalization, one that may 
have stabilized the region’s political economy for a 
few human generations. However, human population 
concentrations in the Greater Cahokia region never 
again attained pre-1200 levels. Instead, they slid stead-
ily downward; only a few thousand people would call 
Greater Cahokia home in the thirteenth century, and 
only a few hundred at most remained through the first 
half of the fourteenth century ad.
Chacoan social and material history  
(ad 800s to 1130)
The ninth century ad witnessed significant social and 
demographic changes in the San Juan Basin of the 
There were other official Cahokian buildings and 
features as well, dating to the period ad 1050–1200, 
including large square council houses or temples, T- 
and L-shaped residences (or medicine lodges), and 
great free-standing posts (Alt 2018a; Emerson 1997a; 
Emerson, Alt et al. 2008; Pauketat 2013; Skousen 2012). 
Of these, the latter were cypress logs up to a metre in 
diameter, probably standing more than 10 m tall. It is 
unclear whether such great posts were floated upriver 
from cypress-swamp forests in southern Illinois and 
Missouri, where they grow today; if so, the labour 
expenditures involved in hauling many hundreds of 
such posts in the twelfth century would have been 
significant (see Lopinot 1992). 
When set in rural locations, such special archi-
tecture and marker posts define ‘nodal’ farmsteads 
of various sorts (Emerson 1997a). In larger group-
ings, these nodal sites appear to define a kind of 
Cahokian architectural ‘module’ (Alt 2018a). In the 
central Cahokian precincts, the building module is a 
defining characteristic of neighbourhoods and other 
‘core’ zones (Betzenhauser & Pauketat 2018; Brennan 
2018; Emerson et al. 2018). They were also built atop 
the Emerald Acropolis (Pauketat et al. 2017).
The spatial and temporal correlation between the 
special architecture and Cahokian urbanity, if you will, 
is tight and robust, suggesting a causal relationship (Alt 
2018a; Emerson 1997a, 1997b; Pauketat, Boszhardt et 
al. 2015; Pauketat et al. 2013). This causal relationship 
seems affirmed by two singular region-wide shifts: (1) 
the introduction of a suite of ritual goods and craft 
products at the beginning of the so-called Stirling phase 
(ad 1100–1200); and (2) a political-ritual-demographic 
contraction and reorientation at the beginning of the 
Moorehead phase (ad 1200–1275). The former is known 
for its elaborate carved-stone figures and smoking pipe 
bowls, along with the introduction of ‘Ramey’ iconog-
raphy, rich in curvilinear motifs interpreted today as 
wind, water, and thunder/rain imagery (Cummings 
2015; Emerson 1989). 
The latter pulse, around ad 1200, brought with 
it a pervasive downsizing and reorientation of organ-
ized social life. Pottery production was simplified, 
and thirteenth-century corporate feasts were smaller 
or less often tethered to Cahokia (Baltus 2014). More 
importantly, the official architecture and associated 
practices of Greater Cahokia’s steam baths, medicine 
lodges, and council buildings ceased to be built after 
ad 1200. These had comprised 17 per cent of the pole-
and-thatch buildings in twelfth-century Cahokian 
precincts (Betzenhauser & Pauketat 2018; Brennan 
2018). At the end of the 1200s, however, they were 
replaced virtually overnight by a class of simple, 
oversized rectangular houses (Pauketat et al. 2013). 
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Blanco, and Una Vida (Van Dyke 2007; Windes 2003, 
2007). 
In one early interior room (33) of Pueblo Bonito 
was buried a male who died in his 40s in the ninth 
century from a ‘lethal blow to the head’ (Kennett et al. 
2017; Pepper 1920). A most unusual setting for a burial, 
the man (Burial 14) was interred with turquoise and 
shell jewellery, among other things, atop a prepared 
surface. Covered with clean earth, another individual 
was placed atop that fill. Then, a dozen more human 
interments were added to the room up until ad 1130. 
All appear to have been members of the original man’s 
matriline (Kennett et al. 2017; Plog & Heitman 2010). 
Such a matriline likely articulated the powers embodied 
Four Corners region in modern-day northwestern 
New Mexico (Fig. 6.5). Always susceptible to climatic 
and environmental perturbations, maize-growing late 
Basketmaker III and early Pueblo I farmers from the 
southern San Juan basin relocated northward in the 
ad 700–800s (Van Dyke 2007:table 4.2; Wilshusen & 
Van Dyke 2006). Living in scattered pithouse, adobe 
and jacal homes, the mid-ad 800s witnessed ‘some-
thing dramatic … throughout the San Juan Basin’ 
(Windes 2007:45). At that time, or within a few years, 
the first masonry great houses in the region were 
under construction. Three such ‘proto-great houses’ 
were built along the 13-km stretch of the high-desert 
Chaco Canyon (Fig. 6.6): Pueblo Bonito, Peñasco 
Figure 6.5. San Juan Basin physiography and the location of Chaco Canyon (map by T. Pauketat).
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inferred to have been overbuilt and underused (Stein 
et al. 2007). Thus, it is apparent that Chacoan great 
houses were more than mere domestic or communal 
facilities. The same is at least as apparent at a series 
of Chacoan outliers (see below).
Agricultural production, infrastructure and population
Chaco’s great house design and monumentality lies at 
the heart of the present evaluation of its proto-urban 
fragility. These overbuilt masonry constructions, both 
in the central canyon and as part of outlier great 
house communities, were intimately entangled with 
the region’s agricultural development (Kantner & 
Mahoney 2000; Lekson 1999). However, the proto-
urban dynamics of the Chacoan phenomenon likely 
cannot be adequately understood only as an in situ 
communal, agricultural development (cf. Tankersley 
et al. 2016). Then again, this likelihood is the crux of 
an intellectual disagreement between two scholarly 
camps today, with some adhering to an in-situ devel-
opmental model in opposition to what they perceive 
as ‘fashionable’ interpretations ‘based on vacant cities, 
festive pilgrims, and… brief but periodic events at 
canyon great houses’ (Vivian 1991:75; cf. Benson 2017; 
Benson, Stein et al. 2009; McCool et al. 2018).
by Pueblo Bonito and Chaco Canyon generally from 
the beginning.
Some argue that the geological and biological 
features of the canyon afforded it magnetic qualities 
even before great house construction and this man’s 
death (Stein et al. 2007; Van Dyke 2007; Weiner 2015; 
Windes 2004:15). Fossil-bearing rock strata, precariously 
balanced hanging rocks, and a serendipitously lunar-
aligned canyon floor are among the possible attractors. 
Indeed, the three early great houses are aligned and 
spaced out in such a way as to suggest a central if not 
celestially based plan (Fritz 1978; Sofaer 2007). 
The alignment and design of the overall canyon 
aside, each construction iteration of any particular 
great house is suggestive of some degree of central 
planning and theatrical or ritualized construction, 
which is to say monumentality (see Scarre 2011). The 
evidence of great construction pulses, beginning with 
a mid-ninth century pulse and continuing through 
the late Bonito-phase McElmo pulse(s), supports the 
argument that monumentality was an integral com-
ponent of Chaco Canyon’s social history (Table 6.1). 
Pueblo Bonito in particular was heavily remodelled 
through time, with the D-shaped core (Fig. 6.7) and its 
contiguous Hillside Ruin (not seen in Fig. 6.7) easily 
Figure 6.6. Schematic view of Chaco Canyon’s great house locations (map by T. Pauketat).
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Few scholars in either camp would today infer 
that 10,000 people lived in Chaco Canyon year round. 
Rather, a permanent human population of 2000–3000 
people is a common estimate. Gwinn Vivian’s (1991:74) 
projection that 5500 residents lived in the canyon is 
viewed as ‘too high’ by Stephen Lekson and colleagues 
(2006:82). Whatever the figure, in situ advocates defi-
nitely see the Canyon’s past environment, including its 
soils, as capable of sustaining more than 2000 people 
throughout the year (McCool et al. 2018; Tankersley 
et al. 2016). These researchers imagine the evidence 
of water management infrastructure – which includes 
check dams, retention basins, and water supply and 
drainage ditches – to indicate a larger year-round 
population attached to the Canyon’s great houses, 
which they consider less as monuments and more as 
residential pueblos (Crown & Wills 2018; Scarborough 
et al. 2018). 
The two schools of thought both begin with 
a reconstruction of Chaco Canyon’s environment. 
Today, Chaco Canyon’s desert environment has been 
described as ‘bleak’ by Frances Mathien (2005:21) and 
water, she says, ‘remains the key variable’. The Chaco 
Wash, an ephemeral source of water, runs through the 
canyon. In the past, it has alternately degraded and 
aggraded its channel, probably in conjunction with the 
construction of human water management features 
(Table 6.1). According to one hydrological study, ‘[d]
owncutting seemed to be associated with an increase 
in discharge and stream power on readily erodible 
[canyon rock and sediment] material, and it seemed 
to end when the discharge was adequately handled’ 
by human intervention (Mathien 2005:26). According 
to another such study, the amount of water flowing 
through Chaco Canyon might have supported up to 
10,000 people (Mathien 2005:34, citing Fisher 1934).
Figure 6.7. Aerial view of the Pueblo Bonito, by Bob Adams, Albuquerque, NM; view to northwest. Creative Commons 
Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pueblo_Bonito_Aerial.JPG.
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necessary to transport the ‘200,000 trees … needed to 
provide ceiling beams for only 10 of Chaco Canyon’s 
great houses’ (Mathien 2003:133–4). Thomas Windes & 
Peter McKenna (2001) found that local wood sources 
were more regularly used through the ad 900s, but by 
the eleventh-century Classic Bonito phase, Ponderosa 
pines imported from the Chuska Mountains’ slopes 
were the building material of choice. 
Classic Bonito expansion and Chacoan outliers
Around the year 1040, Chacoan construction and 
rituality inside and outside the Canyon experienced 
a marked intensification and expansion. In the six 
decades of the Classic Bonito phase that followed, new 
great houses were built and old ones were enlarged 
horizontally and vertically. In addition, novel, highly 
standardized, or exotic objects were manufactured and 
moved into such complexes (Nelson 2006; Toll 2004). 
Among these were cylinder jars, used in drinking 
rituals involving imported cacao and yaupon holly 
(Crown et al. 2015; Crown & Hurst 2009). These jars 
were originally manufactured in a variety of sizes 
and shapes around the Chaco world. However, after 
ad 1040, these vessels became standardized, probably 
manufactured under the aegis of a leading kin group 
or sodality. Moreover, they were restricted in their 
To be sure, there are both early historical accounts 
and archaeological evidence of significant water-
management infrastructure. A rock-lined sand-dune 
dam and, perhaps, flood gate occupy the mouth of 
the Chaco Wash just northeast of the northernmost 
great house, Peñasco Blanco (Scarborough et al. 2018; 
Vivian et al. 2006a). In addition, at least one gridded 
agricultural field exists, likely fed by diverted rain-
water and yet visible adjacent to the Chetro Ketl great 
house (Fig. 6.8). Neither of these necessarily indicates 
a substantial residential population, though they do 
point to Chacoan attempts to produce crop yields suf-
ficient to feed sizeable gatherings (probably of both 
locals and pilgrims). 
There are multiple lines of evidence that signifi-
cant quantities of maize, along with ceramic vessels 
and other materials, were imported into Chaco Canyon 
(Benson et al. 2003; Benson, Stein et al. 2009; Grimstead 
et al. 2015; Mathien 2003; Toll 2004, 2006). Larry Ben-
son (2017) and others argue that much of this maize 
was grown on the slopes of the Chuska Mountains, 
more than 60 km (two days walk) to the west of the 
Canyon. This was the same region from which many 
of the pots and wooden timbers used in great house 
ceremonies and constructions originated. Of these, an 
impressive outlay of public labour would have been 
Figure 6.8. Schematic map of original Chetro Ketl field system (adapted from public domain image, National Park 
Service, via Wikimedia Commons, see https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Chetro_Ketl_fields.png. 
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All such novel or expanded architectural constructions 
happened in pulses, with notable ‘waves of great house 
construction’ taking place in the Canyon at ‘1040 and 
1050, and 1070 and 1080, with smaller building and 
remodelling episodes in intermittent decades’ (Van 
Dyke 2007:111). Additional insight into the dating of 
such pulses may be found at other great houses across 
the San Juan basin and beyond. Presently, there are 
more than 225 known outlier great houses (Kantner 
2004b). At several, such as Salmon Ruins and Chim-
ney Rock, in northern New Mexico and southwestern 
Colorado, respectively, dendrochronological evidence 
indicates celestial reasons for major construction pulses 
(Malville 2004b). This is especially clear at the compact 
Chacoan great house atop the high, narrow mesa of 
Chimney Rock. The Chimney Rock great house was 
positioned to observe the generational appearance of 
a maximum full moonrise between two great pillars 
usage, with 175 of the 200 known examples associ-
ated in some way with Pueblo Bonito (Crown 2018). 
At the same time, a ‘highly standardized type’ of 
subterranean ceremonial building, a ‘great kiva’, was 
spreading across the Chacoan world (Fig. 6.9).
At least fourteen of the seventeen known 
canyon great kivas date from the Clas-
sic Bonito phase. … Classic Bonito great 
kivas are lined with banded masonry, and 
aboveground portions of the walls are of 
core-and-veneer construction. Great kiva 
diameters can range from 10 to 20 m … 
[and] are oriented on either a cardinal or a 
northwest/southeast-trending axis. Entry is 
often by means of an antechamber…. (Van 
Dyke 2007:122–125).
Figure 6.9. Aerial view of the Peñasco Blanco showing four unexcavated great kivas and a Chacoan road segment, by 




Chacoan sodality or matriline as individuals buried 
in Room 33 at Pueblo Bonito. Apparently, upon his 
death, his ritual materials – an assortment of inlaid 
wands, prayer sticks, and pots – were buried with him, 
likely because the living were unable or perhaps had 
decided not to continue the Chacoan practices. Still 
other Chacoan people became targets: in the early 
1200s, a prominent Chacoan descendant appears to 
have been singled out during an enemy raid on the 
Sand Canyon Pueblo (Kuckelman 2008). 
However Chacoan governance had been consti-
tuted before, during, and after the Classic Bonito phase, 
it seems clear that leaders were always simultaneously 
religious, hereditary, and powerful. Chacoan hierarchy, 
suggests Patricia Crown (2018), might have ended with 
the burial of the cylinder jars (and the last matrilineal 
descendants) in Pueblo Bonito. As at Ridge Ruin, it 
was closely tethered to particular persons. It might 
also have been based on political gamesmanship, given 
the descendant oral histories and material evidence of 
gambling, if not a ‘Gambler’, at Chaco (Weiner 2018). 
Those same oral histories speak to the intentionality 
of the descendant decisions not to repeat Chaco in the 
future (Kuwanwisiwma 2004).
Discussion
If we start the clock of Cahokian and Chacoan urban-
ism or proto-urbanism with the Lohmann-phase and 
Classic Bonito-phase transformations at about 1050 
and ad 1040, respectively, then we are left with two 
clear impressions. First, the historical synchronicity of 
Cahokia and Chaco is remarkable. These two trans-
regional phenomena – dissimilar is some ways and 
surprisingly alike in other ways (Table 6.1) – happened 
within a decade or two of each other. Second, both 
urbanizing phenomena ended or were significantly 
downsized within just a century and a half of their 
initial expansions. Cahokia’s upland Richland Complex 
ended around ad 1150, and its East St. Louis precinct 
was partially burned and downsized in the late 1100s 
as official Cahokian architecture was discontinued; 
Cahokia continued in a reduced, reconfigured form. 
Chaco Canyon experienced an even more dramatic 
termination, though its legacy lasted, and yet lasts, 
among its descendants.
Order and infrastructure
On the one hand, founders and builders in both 
instances appear to have assembled cultural order by 
aligning, arranging, superimposing, and emplacing 
fundamental, cosmic and animate powers on earth 
amid the most ordinary movements and experiences of 
people. On the other hand, the cultural order appears to 
of rock not unlike that known at Cahokia’s Emerald 
Acropolis. A series of dendrochronological dates on 
wooden rafters in the Chimney Rock building additions 
correlate closely to known dates of the lunar events 
(Malville 2004a; Todd 2012). 
Such outlying territories and non-human powers 
were enmeshed with the central Canyon via a web 
of roads. The roads leading out from Chaco Canyon 
might also have celestial alignments in some cases, in 
addition to alignments to more general terrestrial or 
directional referents (Van Dyke 2007). In the Canyon 
proper, stone and wooden staircases climbed rocky 
escarpments and connected cleared avenues, some 
sprinkled with small pottery sherds. Some such roads 
seem to lead to outlier great houses, but others lead 
nowhere, or were positioned to afford the traveller a 
visual or phenomenal experience of, or historical con-
nection to, some active or abandoned great house or 
other landmark. The so-called Great North Road, for 
instance, is probably a road through time and space 
to a badlands area thought by Puebloan descendants 
of Chaco to be a portal to the realm of the dead (Van 
Dyke 2007). Roads, whether or not intended for the 
actual physical movements of living people, were also 
avenues into the spirit world. 
Contraction
As the celestial alignments and construction perio-
dicities attest, the infrastructure of the Classic Bonito 
world was extensive but tightly bound to organized 
spiritual practices that may have paid few, immediately 
tangible, material dividends to farmers. This might 
have been especially noticeable to Puebloan farm-
ers in times of agricultural stress, such as the cooler 
years and prolonged droughts that followed ad 1100 
(Benson & Berry 2009; Vivian et al. 2006a; Vivian et al. 
2006b). A major contraction in the social life of Chaco 
Canyon and many of its outliers happened between 
about ad 1100 and 1130. 
Among other things, certain ritual practices 
appear to have been removed or ceremoniously ter-
minated at about (or subsequent to) this time. Some 
kivas were burned and doors and kiva niches sealed 
(see Mills 2008). Likewise, most of the cylinder jars in 
existence were buried in a backroom at Pueblo Bonito 
at about ad 1100, the vessel form itself never to be used 
again (Crown 2018). The non-Chacoan inhabitants of 
Chimney Rock left that site in the early 1100s, taking 
care to avoid Chacoans and their religious practices 
thereafter (Fowles 2013). Chacoan priests left too, the 
burial of one found at the site of Ridge Ruin in north-
western Arizona dating to the decades after the 1130 
depopulation of Chaco (see Fig. 6.1). Erina Gruner 
(2015, 2018) argues that he was a member of the same 
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cases of priestly or high status lineages or sodalities 
persisting in some managerial capacities up to the point 
of official termination rituals (the cessation of ridge-top 
mound constructions in the case of Cahokia and the 
end of Pueblo Bonito’s room 33 in the case of Chaco). 
Conclusion: fragility is a web
As a source of fragility, one might normally lay the 
blame on agricultural risk and the management by 
farmers of their own production, as some researchers 
do, or on the failures of political administrations, as 
Chaco’s gambler narratives seem to do. However, to 
do either in the absence of a fuller consideration of 
historical details would be to ignore what and how lead-
ers administered in each case. In the cases of Cahokia 
and Chaco, the what was cosmic, and the how involved 
a recognizably expansive articulation of the relation-
ships of people and immanent substances, materials, 
and phenomena. 
In evaluating the differences between early Cha-
coan and later Puebloan artistic traditions, Elizabeth 
Newsome & Kelley Hays-Gilpin (2011) described the 
former as outward-looking and uncircumscribed, as 
opposed to the latter’s inwardly turned, plaza-centric, 
social and political gaze. The same describes the 
trans-regional relations of Cahokia, at the beginning 
of the Mississippian world, in contrast to those of later 
Mississippian peoples (Pauketat 2013). If we combine 
such relational orientations with the immanent bases 
of Cahokian and Chacoan order, we may come close to 
understanding the essence of Cahokian and Chacoan 
fragility. To wit, the hierarchical and infrastructural 
strata of both phenomena were simply insufficiently 
incised into the landscape to protect them from the 
external human and non-human perturbations to 
their wider relational webs. That is, if Cahokia’s and 
Chaco’s foundations and agricultural economies rested 
on rain, on the experience of water vapour inside water 
shrines, on the routine lived relationships between 
earth and water and life and death, and on the rising 
and setting of the moon, then how fragile might be 
the bodies-politic that effloresced around them? At 
what point might people feel at liberty to walk away? 
These questions might be answered with refer-
ence to the striking synchronicity of Cahokian and 
Chacoan histories. Perhaps Cahokians and Chacoans, 
living in alternately wet and dry environments and 
located some 1600 km from each other, might have 
been aware of each other. Regardless, there is cur-
rently little archaeological reason to believe that one 
caused the other to happen in any direct sense. That 
said, however, it is conceivable that Cahokian and 
Chacoan histories could have been synchronized by 
the localized weather patterns of the Medieval Climate 
have remained relatively open and permeable, perhaps 
by necessity. Religious shrines or colonial settlements 
seemingly intended to gather the cosmic or immanent 
powers of the wider world were likely essential com-
ponents of Cahokian and Chacoan formations. Perhaps 
these shored up the positions of both Cahokia and 
Chaco as legitimate centres of the world in the eyes of 
people (e.g., Pauketat, Boszhardt et al. 2015). 
Whatever the details of the processes whereby 
Cahokians and Chacoans established themselves at 
the centre of things, it took time – roughly a century 
and a half in both cases. At Cahokia, the Terminal 
Late Woodland juxtaposing of farmers, maize pro-
duction and processing, terrain and climate affects, 
and celestial bodies set the stage. At Chaco, the late 
ninth and tenth centuries witnessed the establishment 
of the great-house pattern and its personification by 
a small group of matrilineal kin. In both cases, the 
principles of cultural order that appealed to people 
were fundamentally immanent and pervasive, able 
to be experienced and related in a wide range and at 
multiple scales: water in its various forms, earth and 
clay as pots and monuments, the sky and its light and 
dark objects against the backdrop of the terrain. 
Cultural order at both Cahokia and Chaco was 
literally and figuratively order – linear or stacked 
alignments and processional, monumentalized 
arrangements of substances, phenomena, things and 
people. Cultural order was also infrastructure, although 
the degree to which the built facilities and materials 
at Cahokia and Chaco constituted a distinct stratum 
that might perpetuate itself without constant human 
intervention (which is part of the definition of infra-
structure) – and hence impart resilience – remains 
unclear. Cahokia’s water management infrastructure 
may have done little more than position people to 
move through bodies of water or relate to water in its 
various liquid and vapour forms. Chaco’s retention 
basins, dams, gridded fields, and ditches may have 
been responsible for the aggradation of the Chaco 
Wash in the eleventh century, possible evidence of 
their positive effects on the Canyon’s agricultural pro-
duction. Then again, the presence of imported maize 
and other products from the Chuska Mountains casts 
doubt on the extent to which Chaco’s infrastructural 
potential was realized.
Lacking such unambiguous infrastructural effects, 
the degree to which governing bodies might have 
deviated from their religious dedication to the manage-
ment of cosmic, immanent order also remains unclear. 
Leaders of some form existed in both cases, evident 
as high-status women and men buried in highly com-
memorative or theatrical fashion. Such persons are 
apparent at the beginning, with some evidence in both 
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Anomaly. This seems plausible given the immanent 
significance of water and maize to both, never mind 
the likely Cahokian and Chacoan perceptions of water 
and maize as potentially animate or intimately related 
to animate and ancestral forces.
Such a suggestion is not the same as inferring that 
climate change caused the rise and fall of these two 
North American cultural orders. But it is to recognize 
that the immanence of water and maize, under the 
historical, infrastructural, and trans-regional circum-
stances of Cahokia and Chaco from the ninth to the 
thirteenth centuries, did afford a restricted set of pos-
sible outcomes for both. This means that their fragility 
was not necessarily or simply an internal structural or 
organizational property, but a potentiality that might 
be attributed to the open and permeable configurations 
of both Cahokia and Chaco. 
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ramifications for the degree of local-scale ecological 
variation, and the ways that Indus populations were 
adapted to those ecological regimes. It also has signifi-
cance for understanding whether the social, economic 
and political configurations that were manifested in 
urban and rural contexts were resilient and/or sustain-
able in the face of environmental change (Petrie 2017; 
Petrie et al. 2017, 2018). 
The Indus cities (and the Indus Civilization as a 
whole), present many of the hallmarks of state-level 
entities, but they frustrate easy categorization, and many 
fundamental aspects of Indus socio-political organiza-
tion and economy are debated. Part of the challenge 
lies in the fact that Indus cities and elites do not present 
themselves in ways that draw simple parallels to other 
contemporary complex societies, particularly those of 
the ancient Near East. This is most evident in the oft-
noted lack of monumental religious edifices, obvious 
palatial structures or portraiture, all of which suggest 
a lack of rulers (cf. Possehl 1998). The reinterpretation 
of a number of buildings is, however, encouraging 
re-evaluation of various factors. What can be stated 
definitively is that there are fundamental differences 
between the socio-economic and political organization 
of the Indus Civilization and its Old World neighbours. 
The polycentric nature of Indus cities is suggested by the 
use of walls and platforms to formally demarcate distinct 
zones within cities and other settlements where what 
appear to be large- and small-scale public and private 
buildings were present, and economic and productive 
activities took place. Indus populations do not display 
overt hierarchical differentiation, but were characterized 
by heterarchical social structures, and there are strong 
indications they engaged in both communal activities 
and collective action (cf. Blanton & Faragher 2008, 2016; 
DeMarrais & Earle 2017). Furthermore, the distribution 
of Indus settlements indicates that there were distinct 
relationships between individual cities and between 
Fragile and/or robust? (Re-)Introducing the Indus 
Civilization
South Asia’s Indus Civilization was a major Old World 
civilization, though it is not always included in com-
parative syntheses (e.g. Trigger 2003; see Wright 2010).1 
The settlements of the Indus urban phase (c. 2600/2500–
1900 bc) were distributed across an extensive area of 
the plains, piedmonts and hills of the Indus River basin 
and adjacent areas in modern Pakistan and India, and 
were contemporaneous with the late Early Dynastic, 
Akkadian, and Ur III periods in Mesopotamia and the 
Old Kingdom and First Intermediate period in Egypt 
(Yoffee this volume; Morris this volume). This contri-
bution will demonstrate that the Indus Civilization 
provides a rich yet somewhat restricted cultural data set 
that is well suited for exploring the dynamics of fragility 
as well as robustness, resilience and sustainability in a 
distinctive Old World cultural context.
Part of the distinctiveness of the Indus Civili-
zation derives from the fact that a relatively small 
number of Indus settlements grew to a substantial size 
(80+ ha), and they thrived for 600 to 700 years. Typi-
cally regarded as cities, these large settlements were 
polycentric and underwent repeated and potentially 
constant phases of rebuilding and remodelling. They 
also appear to have been the exception rather than 
the norm within the overarching Indus settlement 
system, as the majority of contemporaneous settle-
ments were town or village sized. This pattern suggests 
that the Indus Civilization was predominantly rural, 
which has implications for its social, economic and 
political structures. Furthermore, it has long been 
recognized that the extensive area occupied by Indus 
populations was marked by considerable diversity in 
climate, hydrology, and ecology, though the nuances 
of this variability are still being characterized (Petrie 
et al. 2017). This overarching diversity has important 
Chapter 7
Diversity, variability, adaptation and ‘fragility’  




the Indus evidence therefore encourages reflection on 
how successful we can be at characterizing and dis-
cussing politics, states and fragility in the absence of 
texts.2 Furthermore, given the importance of longevity 
and chronology for understanding fragility, the Indus 
case makes it possible to reflect on the appropriate 
time-scale for considering robustness, resilience and 
sustainability. Yoffee (2015, 2016) has previously 
suggested that some early cities only lasted one to 
two centuries, but with the Indus urban period being 
notably longer. The Indus case also encourages us to 
discuss whether there is a difference between fragile 
cities and fragile states. There has been much considera-
tion of the fragility or robustness of the city-state (e.g. 
Yoffee 2015, 552–7, 2016; Scott 2017), but ‘the city’ and 
‘the state’ each have different socio-political trajectories, 
and it is worth disentangling nuances – particularly in 
situations where the nature of political control remains 
unclear. The Indus case emphasizes the importance of 
the rural component of society, and there appear to be 
different trajectories for resilience and sustainability 
in urban and rural contexts. 
This contribution assesses the dynamics of fra-
gility, robustness, resilience and sustainability in the 
Indus Civilization. It provides an overview of urban 
and rural Indus settlements, then outlines the envi-
ronmental contexts within which Indus urbanism 
developed, and reviews the evidence for how Indus 
populations were adapted to those environments. 
Debates about Indus social, economic and political 
structures within and between cities are reviewed, 
and the decline of Indus urbanism is considered. All of 
this evidence has implications for our understanding 
of fragility, robustness, resilience and sustainability in 
the Indus Civilization, particularly in terms of the way 
these concepts relate to urban and rural contexts. The 
contribution will conclude by outlining how the Indus 
context appears to be marked by contrasting urban 
and rural dynamics, where the ostensibly robust urban 
entities were ultimately fragile and unsustainable in 
the face of major and long-lasting socio-economic and 
environmental stresses, while adaptable and constantly 
transforming rural lifeways appears to have been both 
resilient and sustainable.
Indus settlements: from village to city (and back?)
Indus cities were the culmination of protracted indig-
enous processes that began in village-sized settlements 
dispersed across a variable and diverse environmental 
milieu, which were characterized by considerable 
variation in life-ways. The cities appear to have grown 
to a substantial size over a short period between 
c. 2600–2500 bc, implying that the shift from small 
cities and smaller settlements, all of which have implica-
tions for our understanding of Indus social, economic 
and political structures.
Inscribed objects, seals and sealings were used 
during the urban period, but the texts cannot yet be 
translated, and there is a lack of unequivocal refer-
ences to Indus cities in later historical, mythological 
or religious texts. This means that compared to ancient 
Egypt and Mesopotamia, there is much that we cannot 
comment on with textual support. It is clear, however, 
that the use of Indus signs diminished and ultimately 
ceased by the end of the first century of the second 
millennium bc, and this coincided with the decline and 
abandonment of all but one of the large-scale Indus 
urban centres, the cessation of a range of elaborate craft 
processes, and the reduction of the range and scale 
of economic interaction (e.g. Possehl 1997a; 1997b). 
This evidence leaves no doubt that Indus popula-
tions witnessed major socio-economic change in the 
late third/early second millennium bc, and there is at 
least some validity in describing Indus urbanism as 
an ‘experiment’ (Petrie 2013). Numerous causes for 
this process of transformation have been proposed, 
including climate change, but definitive evidence and 
consensus remain elusive (Petrie 2017).
Given the evidence for socio-economic change 
and its potential relationship to climate, it is perhaps no 
surprise that the urban phase of the Indus Civilization 
(c. 2600–1900 bc) has been mentioned in discussions of 
the fragility of early cities and states (e.g. Yoffee 2015, 
2016; Middleton 2017; Scott 2017). Importantly, Yoffee 
(2016, 1062) has previously put the Indus Civilization 
forward as a case that has potential to disrupt aspects 
of the developing ‘fragility’ narrative, and explicitly 
groups Indus cities and Teotihuacan as ‘anomalies 
in my scheme of the extreme fragility of early cities’. 
This anomalous status largely appears to derive from 
the likelihood that Indus cities ‘flourished’ for many 
centuries and were thus relatively long-lived (i.e. 
they were ‘robust’), but it is also influenced by our 
inability to read Indus texts, and the apparent lack of 
monumentality, obvious palaces and images of rulers. 
Middleton (2017, 93) has pointed out that for the Indus 
Civilization, political changes ‘are not visible to us as 
they are in some other societies’, which is reflected by 
the fact that Yoffee (2016, 1062) has only been able to 
note that Indus cities will have had ‘ups and downs’. 
Does this mean that they were fragile? It is arguable 
that the relative longevity of the Indus cities, combined 
with a lack of evidence that would provide detailed 
insight into their political organization, actually cre-
ates a fundamental impediment to understanding the 
nature and impact of short-term political change that 
lies at the core of the fragility narrative. The nature of 
111
Diversity, variability, adaptation and ‘fragility’ in the Indus Civilisation
certainly smaller. These cities were considerable dis-
tances apart (between 280 to 835 km as the crow flies; 
Kenoyer 1997, Table 4.2; 1998, Table 3.1; 2008, 188), and 
situated in different parts of the greater region occu-
pied by Indus populations (Wright 2010, 333; Petrie 
2013, 87, 91, 93). The intervening areas were inhabited 
by populations living in medium and small sized 
settlements, with the majority of these being village-
sized, suggesting that most of the Indus population 
were rural rather than urban (Wright 2010; Petrie 2013; 
Petrie et al. 2017; Parikh & Petrie in press). With the 
exception of Dholavira, which was on an island in the 
Rann of Kutch, the Indus cities were each located far 
out on the alluvial plains and in different ecological 
zones (Petrie 2017). Their number and distribution 
clearly contrasts with that of the urban settlements in 
the late Early Dynastic, Akkadian and Ur III periods in 
Mesopotamia (Petrie 2013; cf. Adams 1981, Figs 29–31).
The Indus cities (and also a number of smaller 
sites) are each distinctive, but are also broadly similar 
and medium sized settlements to large-scale urbanism 
was relatively swift. The vicissitudes of excavation 
mean that we know little about the formative stages of 
most of the urban centres, but accepted chronologies 
(e.g. Kenoyer 1991, 1997; Possehl 1999, 2002) suggest 
that most Indus cities were occupied for 600–700 
years – until c. 1900 bc. Importantly, villages and 
rural lifeways continued being an essential element 
of Indus settlement systems during the urban period, 
and villages may well have housed the majority of 
the settled population (Madella & Fuller 2006, Fig. 9; 
Parikh & Petrie in press). To understand Indus society, 
it is imperative to consider both the urban and rural 
aspects of Indus life.
Urbanism in the Indus context
As far as we are aware, there were four to five large-
scale (80+ha) Indus settlements (i.e. cities; Fig. 7.1): 
Mohenjo-Daro, Harappa, Rakhigarhi, Dholavira and 
also potentially Ganweriwala, though it was almost 
Figure 7.1. Plans of Indus cities and smaller settlements, including a. Mohenjo-daro, b. Harappa, c. Dholavira, d. 
Kalibangan, e. Banawali, f. Lothal, and g. Surkotada. All plans are oriented to north, and are shown in the same scale 
(image C.A. Petrie; after Petrie 2013: Fig. 5.1).
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in the 1980s (Marshall 1931; Mackay 1938; Wheeler 
1968; Dales & Kenoyer 1986; Jansen & Urban 1984, 
1987; Jansen & Tosi 1988; Possehl 2002). It has been 
argued that Mohenjo-Daro developed quickly (Jansen 
1993), but the date of its foundation and the rate and 
nature of its growth is debated (Dales & Kenoyer 1986; 
Kenoyer 2008). Harappa was the first Indus site to be 
recorded and has been subject to extensive excavations 
over several phases (Vats 1940; Wheeler 1947; Meadow 
1991; Possehl 1991). In contrast to Mohenjo-Daro, the 
most recent surface surveys and targeted excavations 
at Harappa have provided evidence for the incremental 
growth of the city (Kenoyer 2008; Wright 2010). To 
develop arguments about fragility and robustness, it 
is important to reiterate some of the salient evidence 
from each of these two city sites.
Harappa (Fig. 7.1) was a large settlement made 
up of multiple mounds with enclosure walls, which 
has a relative sequence of development that indicates 
progressive urban growth and continual change across 
three sub-periods (Periods 3A–3C; Kenoyer 1991). 
Kenoyer (1991, 2007) has suggested that Period 3A 
saw the establishment of dominant elites on Mound 
E, Period 3B saw dominance shift to Mound AB at 
the west of the settlement, and the construction of a 
’Granary’/‘Great Hall’ on Mound F, which is the only 
large-scale non-residential building that has been 
exposed. The city reached its maximum extent in 
Period 3C after 2200 bc (e.g. Kenoyer 2008, 194–7), but 
this period also shows evidence for dumping in streets 
and structures (e.g. Meadow & Kenoyer 2005, 221–2), 
which may indicate overpopulation and erosion of 
civic control, though we have no idea about political 
perturbations that might have affected the city. A 
diverse range of craft activities were carried out at 
Harappa throughout this sequence, including extrac-
tive/reductive crafts such as shell working, stone tool 
production, seal carving and stone bead manufacture, 
and transformative crafts such as bangle, figurine and 
pottery production and copper-based metallurgy (see 
Wright 2010). There is evidence that extractive/reduc-
tive crafts were practised together in distinct locations 
in each mounded area in the city, while transformative 
crafts and crafts that bridge these approaches were 
undertaken in relative isolation, though still within 
the walled area of the urban settlement (Miller 2007). 
Mohenjo-Daro (Fig. 7.1) was primarily comprised 
of brick platforms topped by fired-brick structures 
and traces of enclosure walls. The highest mound 
(Fig. 7.2), which is often referred to as the Mound of 
the Great Bath, was the locus of a number of unusual 
buildings that Wright (2010, 117–22) has referred to as 
non-residential structures. These include the so-called 
‘Great Bath’, the ‘Granary’/‘Great Hall’, the ‘College 
in being made up of multiple mounded areas that 
incorporate major platforms and/or substantial enclo-
sure walls, as well as houses, drains and wells made 
of mud-brick and/or fired-brick, with stone also being 
used to varying degrees (Fig. 7.1; Possehl 2002; Kenoyer 
2008; Wright 2010; Petrie 2013; Sinopoli 2015). The 
inhabitants of these cities (and many smaller settle-
ments) produced, used, and exchanged distinctive 
types of material culture at least some of which is often 
described as being uniform (e.g. Kenoyer 2006, 55, 62; 
Wright 2010, 23, 326–30). This material assemblage 
included black-painted red-slipped pottery, carved ste-
atite seals, cubical weights, ceramic figurines, bangles 
made of various materials (clay, shell, copper, faience, 
and stoneware), and beads made from semi-precious 
or precious stones, and beyond the cities themselves, 
it is this material that epitomizes the Indus Civiliza-
tion. Vidale & Miller (2000, 143ff; Vidale 2000, 127ff.) 
have suggested that the elaborate nature of many of 
the Indus craft products should be regarded as an 
explicit display of technical virtuosity. 
The painted pottery, clay bangles and figurines 
are likely to have been made from locally available raw 
materials, while the jewellery, standardized weights, 
and stamp seals were made from raw materials often 
obtained from distant sources (see Wright 2010, 148–66, 
182–203; Law 2011). Raw materials and finished prod-
ucts were both redistributed across a broad region, 
including settlements outside of the main area occupied 
by Indus populations, in areas including Central Asia, 
Pakistani Makran, the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia 
(Possehl 2002; Wright 2010, 225–32). This broad distribu-
tion is indicative of long-range exchange or trade, but it 
is unclear how the concomitant network of interaction 
operated and whether access to particular categories of 
material was restricted. This last factor resonates with 
the fact that there is no overt evidence from burials, 
sculptural traditions, or elite structures for prominent 
individuals (Possehl 2002, 157–76; Wright 2010, 262–71). 
It also overlaps with unresolved questions about the 
nature of Indus elites, whether a ruling class dominated 
Indus cities, whether there was significant monumental/
public architecture in the form of major religious build-
ings and/or palaces, and whether Indus populations 
engaged in warfare (e.g. Possehl 1998; Cork 2011; Petrie 
2013, 2017; Petrie et al. 2017; see below). 
Excavations have been carried out at four of the 
city sites, and although the work at Dholavira (Bisht 
2015) and Rakhigarhi (Nath 2015; Shinde et al. 2013, 
2018) has been extensive, only limited information 
about each of these sites has been published, so they 
will not be discussed in detail here. Mohenjo-Daro was 
subject to various periods of large-scale excavation 
from the 1920s to the 1960s, and detailed reassessment 
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of each is distinct (e.g. Wheeler 1968, 33–5, 43–4; see 
Fig. 7.3). A mud-brick fortification or enclosure wall 
with at least one gateway surrounded at least part of 
this mound (Fig. 7.2; Wheeler 1968, 40, Pl. VIb, VII, 
VIIIa–b; Alcock 1986, 500–1). Many of the apparently 
non-residential buildings on the high mound may 
of Priests’, the ‘Assembly Hall’/‘Pillared Hall’, and a 
structure traditionally described as a Buddhist stupa 
that has long been presumed to date to the Early His-
toric period (Possehl 2002). The ‘Granary’/‘Great Hall’ 
at Mohenjo-Daro is often compared to the similarly 
named structure at Harappa, though the architecture 
Figure 7.2. Plan of Mohenjo-daro and expanded views of three areas, including: a. Mound of the Great Bath, b. DK-
Area, and c. HR-Area. Each of these areas has distinctive large buildings, and all are shown in the same scale (image 
C.A. Petrie; after Petrie 2013: Fig. 5.1; Possehl 2002: Figs 5.1–5.2).
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finds has indicated they may be the remains of substan-
tial Indus period structures that stood at the highest 
and most visible part of the city (Verardi 1987; Verardi 
& Barba 2010, 2013; also Wright 2010; Petrie 2013). 
Other structures are likely to underlie this building 
(e.g. Kenoyer 1998, 62; though see Possehl 2002, 149), 
indicating earlier phases of construction. The precise 
function of this building remains unclear, but Verardi 
& Barba (2010, 2013) have suggested that it may have 
been a sacred building with repositories containing 
discarded votive offerings. The close proximity of the 
non-‘stupa’ to the Great Bath and the ‘Granary’/‘Great 
Hall’ suggests that the northern end of this mound may 
have been public and/or elite structures (e.g. Kenoyer 
1998, 62–5, 100; Possehl 2002, 193), though it is notable 
that several contained evidence for craft activities in 
later phases, including lapidary, shell and leather 
working (Marshall 1931; Possehl 2002; Vidale 2010, 62). 
There has been a speculative reassessment of the 
so-called Buddhist stupa and associated monastery 
on the highest mound at Mohenjo-Daro that suggests 
evidence for Indus religious architecture may not be 
as elusive as previously thought. The placement and 
layout of these structures align with the neighbouring 
Indus period structures, and a reassessment of their 
architecture, construction techniques, and associated 
Figure 7.3. Plan of the ‘Great Hall’ at Mohenjo-daro and isometric view of the ‘Great Hall’ at Harappa  
(image C.A. Petrie; after Wheeler 1963: 9, Plate V). 
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however, it appears that some form of civic awareness 
was operating. This view is reinforced by the fact that 
while many houses at Mohenjo-Daro had their own 
wells, latrines and bathing facilities, there was an elabo-
rate system that linked houses with drains running 
along or below lanes and main streets and ultimately 
off each platform (e.g. Marshall 1931, II.278–82). Sev-
eral scholars contend that these features indicate that 
water and its management were critical to the Indus 
ideology, which Jansen (1989, 1993) has referred to as 
wasserluxus (also Possehl 2002; Agrawal 2007, 139–44). 
Wright (2010, 122–4) has expanded this line of inter-
pretation by suggesting that these hydraulic structures 
are evidence of public works, produced by corporate 
and/or communal activity. 
Rural life in the Indus context
There has been a protracted history of arguments 
asserting that rural life was a critical element for 
understanding Indus society, particularly in the work 
of Fairservis (1967, 1971, 1986) and Possehl (1998; see 
Petrie et al. 2017; Parikh & Petrie in press). Importantly, 
these arguments have particular ramifications for our 
understanding of socio-economic and political organi-
zation within and between Indus cities. This is in part 
because the small-, medium- and large-sized villages 
and towns that lie in the immediate hinterlands of the 
large Indus settlements and throughout the extensive 
intervening regions appear to dominate in terms of the 
distribution of population (Fairservis 1961; Mughal 
1997; Wright 2010; Cork 2011; Petrie 2013, 2017; Sin-
opoli 2015; Petrie et al. 2017; Parikh & Petrie in press).
A number of what might be described as ‘smaller-
than-city’ (<40 ha) Indus settlements were undoubtedly 
‘urban’ within their local context, and potentially played 
a crucial role in local administrative and power struc-
tures (Petrie 2013; Sinopoli 2015). The site of Kalibangan 
(c. 11.5 ha), for example, is situated on the southern 
edge of a dried and probably ephemeral river chan-
nel in northern Rajasthan, and was several hundred 
kilometres from the nearest city-sized settlements at 
Rakhigarhi and Harappa. During the urban phase, 
Kalibangan comprised two walled mounds, with the 
westernmost having two distinctive areas separated 
by a wall (one being an ‘elite residential area’, and the 
other having several brick platforms, which the excava-
tors argued had a ritual function), whereas the eastern 
mound appears to have been largely residential (Lal et 
al. 2015). Importantly, Kalibangan presents much of the 
well-known Indus cultural material, though the local 
style ceramic types used by the pre-urban population 
continued to be used for at least part of the later period 
of occupation, suggesting both continuity alongside the 
importation, and/or progressive emulation, of non-local 
have been topped by a cluster of important buildings. 
These buildings appear to have included two structures 
related to ritual activities, separated by what may have 
been an elite residence (College of Priests) and flanked 
by some type of Great Hall. The degree to which any 
of these ostensibly non-residential structures were 
public or had access to them was restricted, however, 
remains unknown. 
While the Mound of the Great Bath has long 
been the locus of suspected non-residential or elite 
structures, there were unusual buildings on the lower 
mounds as well. The lower town at Mohenjo-Daro is 
made up of several distinct sectors and at least two 
different platforms that were topped with houses of 
various sizes, workshop areas, and a number of unu-
sual buildings (Fig. 7.2). These structures are enigmatic, 
but include at least one building that was identified by 
the original excavator as a palace (DK area, G section, 
Block 1; Mackay 1938, 46), a building with a unique 
double staircase that has been described as a possible 
ritual structure (HR-A, House I; Wheeler 1968, 52–3), 
and several other buildings that have been proposed as 
possible temples (Possehl 2002, 149–52; Fig. 2), though 
these interpretations lack consensus. In addition, Vidale 
(2010, 64–65, 69–71) has tentatively proposed that Block 
2 in HR B area was not comprised of multiple dwell-
ings but was actually a palace or elite residence with 
an entrance marked by massive columns made from 
cream or grey limestone ‘ring-stones’, and also that a 
small-scale emulation of the Great Bath, a Little Bath, 
was situated behind it (Fig. 7.2). None of these struc-
tures are particularly monumental when compared to 
the major structures in Mesopotamia and Egypt, and 
they lack design elements and contents that make their 
function obvious. The use of the term ‘palace’ is also 
loaded, but these new interpretations do suggest that 
non-residential and substantial residential structures 
might have been situated in spatially distinct areas of 
Mohenjo-Daro, which has important implications for 
our interpretation of Indus civic, socio-economic, and 
political organization.
The large-scale exposures at Mohenjo-Daro set the 
model for understanding Indus urban layout by reveal-
ing houses arranged in coherent blocks separated by 
wide main streets, narrow side streets, and alleyways 
(Possehl 2002), which appear to have persisted over 
time (Jansen 2010). M.E. Smith (2007) has noted that the 
structures in the different areas on the lower mounds 
are arranged in semi-orthogonal blocks that may not 
have been a result of centralized planning, but were 
rather the product of the actions of individual builders 
who made additions to an existing rectangular house 
or built new houses adjacent to standing structures. 
Despite the continual rebuilding of the urban fabric, 
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straddle an environmental threshold where winter 
and summer rainfall systems overlap. Both rainfall 
systems have steep gradients and this contributes to 
diverse and variable climate and hydrology, which 
in turn impact on environments and ecologies across 
the entire Indus zone (Agrawal & Sood 1982; Possehl 
1982; 1992; Joshi 1984; Chakrabarti 1999, 153–60; Miller 
2006; Shinde et al. 2006; Singh & Petrie 2009; Weber et 
al. 2010; Wright 2010, 166–70; Petrie 2017; Petrie et al. 
2017). Comparison of the distribution of known Indus 
settlements to modern climate zones and season rainfall 
patterns, suggests that Indus populations inhabited 
areas of arid hot desert, areas of arid hot steppe, and 
areas that are warm and temperate with dry winters 
and hot summers (Petrie et al. 2017; Petrie 2017), 
though the precise limits of these zones have probably 
changed since the mid-Holocene (Figs 7.4–7.5). Within 
this enormous expanse, there are some regions that 
today receive water via winter rain, summer rain and 
perennial rivers (e.g. northwest India), while others 
benefit from only one of these elements, and are thus 
relatively marginal (e.g. Thomas 2003; Petrie 2017; 
see Figs 7.4–7.5). While direct rainfall was no doubt 
important, across the Indus zone there is considerable 
variation in the timing of rainfall within any year and 
variation in rainfall intensity between years, and there 
are sizable areas that today receive less than 300mm of 
direct winter or also summer rain (Petrie et al. 2017). 
Heather M-L. Miller (2006, 104–12) has argued that 
Indus populations likely exploited a diverse range of 
water sources that were variable in terms of supply, 
and involved a degree of inherent risk for food security. 
It is thus probable that hydrological unpredictability 
was the norm. Miller (2006, 106) also noted that ‘rela-
tively minor changes in the climate system might have 
a large effect on the amount, timing, and duration of 
the two rain systems’. Within such a diverse and vari-
able environment, too much or too little rainfall within 
and between years can have major ramifications, and 
material (Petrie 2013). Similar evidence for the growth 
of small settlements during the urban period and the 
use of a mix of the pre-existing local material culture 
and Indus material is seen at other town and village 
sites throughout northwest India. For instance, at Far-
mana, Lohari Ragho I, Masudpur I and Masudpur VII, 
local cultural material – particularly distinctive pottery 
and bangles – is numerically dominant, and if ‘Classic’ 
Indus-style pottery is present, in only occurs in limited 
quantities (Uesugi 2011; Petrie 2013, 2017; Parikh & 
Petrie 2016, in press; Petrie et al. 2017, 2018; Ceccarelli 
& Petrie 2018). Many small sites are likely to have been 
occupied by farmers (e.g. Lohari Ragho I, Masudpur I 
and Masudpur VII), but there are also small sites that 
have clear evidence for specialized production (e.g. 
beads at Chanhu-Daro, bangles at Ghola Doro/Bagasra; 
summaried in Parikh & Petrie in press).
The numerous small sites across the Indus Civi-
lization typically have evidence of being occupied in 
single and occasionally multiple periods (Joshi et al. 
1984; Possehl 1999; Kumar 2009; see Petrie et al. 2017). 
These sites are usually low mounds (e.g. Fairservis 
1986), which suggests that occupation was relatively 
short-lived. Excavations in northwest India have 
shown that occupation was often discontinuous and 
not protracted (Petrie et al. 2009, 2016), suggesting 
that individual settlements may have been abandoned 
and reoccupied within periods and between periods 
(Petrie et al. 2017). This type of settlement instability 
was also characteristic of Pakistani Cholistan, where 
it is likely that settlement was discontinuous at many 
individual locations, potentially due to the presence of 
a braided river system that was susceptible to frequent 
small-scale avulsions when flooding occurred during 
monsoon rains (Petrie et al. 2017; Petrie & Lynam in 
press). Such an environment may have required settled 
populations to be relatively mobile in order to survive 
a constantly shifting hydrology. Individual families or 
kin groups may have needed to spread their members 
between multiple settlements, and people may have 
moved between those settlements to access available 
water in times of shortage or stress. Such practices 
clearly have implications for our understanding of the 
sustainability and resilience of rural Indus populations 
to a diverse and changing environment (Petrie et al. 
2017; Petrie 2017; see below).
Diversity, variability and adaptation in the Indus 
context
The Indus Civilization has long been described as river-
ine (e.g. Marshall 1931), but today there is considerable 
variation in water supply and availability across the 
extensive areas occupied by Indus populations, which 
Figure 7.4. (opposite above) Maps of the Indus River 
Basin showing the distribution of modern winter (left) 
and summer (right) across the area occupied by the Indus 
Civilization, in relation to the distribution of urban 
period settlements (orange circles), and urban centres 
(black circles) (image C.A. Petrie).
Figure 7.5. (opposite below) Maps of the Indus River 
Basin showing the distribution of modern winter (left) 
and summer (right) across the area occupied by the Indus 
Civilization, in relation to the distribution of post-urban 
period settlements (orange circles), and urban centres 
(black circles) (image C.A. Petrie).
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out before, during, and after the urban period, and that 
a diverse range of crops were being exploited before 
an urban centre developed at Rakhigarhi and while it 
was occupied (Petrie et al. 2016; Petrie 2017; Petrie & 
Bates 2017). The variation in the cropping strategies 
between different regions, and at different settlements 
within specific regions indicates a lack of centralized 
control over farming practices and potentially also 
over the type of surplus that was being generated 
(Petrie & Bates 2017).
We still lack information about the generation, 
storage and administration of Indus agricultural 
surpluses, but the diversity and variation in climate, 
environment, ecology and rainfall must have affected 
provisioning and storage practices in different parts 
of the greater Indus zone (Petrie 2017). Although a 
large proportion of the overall Indus population are 
likely to have lived in self-sufficient agricultural vil-
lages, specific strategies would have been required to 
feed the urban (and village) inhabitants who were not 
food producers. It has been assumed that Indus cities 
were provisioned using a surplus generated by farm-
ers living in their immediate hinterland (e.g. Wright 
2010, 127), but this has not yet been demonstrated 
though co-ordinated investigation of archaebotanical 
material from a city and the neighbouring settle-
ments (Petrie 2017). Wright (2010, 205; 2017, 23) has 
suggested that there is evidence at Harappa for crop 
processing before storage, which is possibly indica-
tive of communal or even centralized production, 
but the primary data remains unpublished. Wright 
(2010, 127) has also argued that the products of farm-
ers and herders were necessary to sustain city-based 
specialists, but the degree to which cities might have 
been fed by surpluses generated by city-based farm-
ers as opposed to those generated by village-based 
farmers in the rural hinterland remains unknown. 
It was initially argued that granaries existed at both 
Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa (e.g. Marshall 1926/1927; 
Fig. 3), but the structures concerned have produced 
no overt evidence for grain storage, and they are now 
typically described as Warehouses or Great Halls of 
unknown function (e.g. Possehl 2002, 66–7, 103–4, 
191–2; Meadow & Kenoyer 2005, 96–101). In contrast 
to the lack of large or more formal storage facilities, 
pits are common at Indus settlements and some also 
have evidence for stone lined bins (e.g. Rojdi; Possehl 
& Raval 1989; Weber 1991). Petrie et al. (2016) have 
suggested that populations living in areas where 
winter or summer monsoonal rain was not available 
are more likely to have needed more substantial and 
perhaps more centrally organized storage facilities 
to ensure the availability of cereals year-round. In 
contrast, populations living in regions that received 
borrowing a phrase from Naomi Miller (2011), Petrie 
et al. (2017) have described the water supply available 
to Indus populations as being ‘predictably unpredict-
able’ during the Indus urban period.
Indus farmers were adapted to exploit the diverse 
environments that they inhabited, making use of 
varied subsistence practices, involving cattle-, sheep- 
and goat-based pastoralism and a diverse range of 
both winter and summer crops (Fairservis 1967, 10, 
42; 1971, 169–72, 228–32; Possehl 1982; 1992; Vishnu-
Mittre & Savithri 1982; Joshi 1984; Chakrabarti 1988; 
Weber 1999; Singh et al. 2008; Weber et al. 2010; 
Petrie et al. 2017; Petrie & Bates 2017). The diversity 
in Indus agricultural systems reflects the influence 
of early farming populations from different areas in 
South Asia who exploited different cultivars (Petrie 
et al. 2016; Petrie & Bates 2017; see also Fuller 2011; 
Kingwell-Banham et al. 2015).
Scholars have argued that Indus farmers prac-
tised multi-cropping, and that crop diversification 
increased over time, as suggested by the increased use 
of summer and or drought tolerant crops (e.g. Vishnu-
Mitre & Savithri 1982, 215; Chakrabarti 1988, 96; 
1995, 50; Weber 1999; 2003, 181; Madella & Fuller 
2006, 1298; Wright 2010, 321). Indus approaches to risk 
mitigation might thus have included the growing of 
multiple crops simultaneously on one plot, or using 
the same land in multiple seasons (Miller 2006, 114), 
though there are a very broad range of possibilities 
within the framework of multi-cropping (Petrie & 
Bates 2017). High-resolution archaeobotanical data 
from Harappa (Pakistani Punjab; Weber 1999; 2003) 
and various small village-sized sites in Gujarat (Weber 
1991; 1999; Reddy 1997; 2003) suggest that winter 
crop-dominated and summer crop-dominated strate-
gies were practised in those areas, respectively. The 
assemblage from Harappa suggests that over time, 
the major agricultural products of the city were the 
winter crops wheat and barley, though there is also 
clear evidence for use of summer millets, and diver-
sification over time, with increased focus on summer 
and drought-tolerant crops (Weber 1999; 2003; Weber 
& Kashyap 2016). Data that enable characterizations of 
the true diversity of practices and the degree to which 
Indus populations adapted their farming practices 
to the specific nuances of the local environments are 
being revealed in northwest India where there is now 
well-dated evidence from sites in areas that receive 
markedly different amounts of direct rainfall (e.g. 
Masudpur VII, Masudpur I, Dabli-vas Chugta, Burj 
and Bahola) (Bates 2015; Bates et al. 2017a, 2017b, 
2017c; Petrie et al. 2016, 2017, 2018; Petrie & Bates 
2017). The data from these sites shows that winter or 
rabi and summer or kharif cropping were being carried 
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Mediation of politics and power within Indus 
settlements: hierarchy, heterarchy and collective 
action
Trigger (2003, 73) argued that it ‘seems reasonable 
to conclude that all early civilizations probably had 
monarchs, even if kingship was defined somewhat 
differently and the actual political power exercised by 
such rulers varied considerably from one to another’. 
As the Indus Civilization presents no obvious evidence 
for one or even multiple rulers, it may have been an 
exception. Indus cities and larger settlements appear 
to have been polycentric, being made up of multiple 
mounded areas raised on mud-brick platforms and/
or surrounded by walls; and having large buildings 
(residential and non-residential) in multiple locations, 
which may each have been foci of wealth and/or power 
(Petrie 2013). This concept fits with suggestions that 
access to different areas within cities was restricted 
through walls and gates (Kenoyer 1994; Eltsov 2008) 
and the delineation of space was important (cf. Eltsov 
2008). It is also reinforced by the clear spatial distri-
bution of different craft activities at Mohenjo-Daro 
(Bondioli et al. 1984; Pracchia et al. 1985; Vidale 1990, 
2010) and Harappa (Miller 2007, 40–4). The evidence 
for the constriction of movement and the distribution 
of large structures in various sectors has led to the 
suggestion that Indus urban populations were largely 
heterarchical, and dominated by groups that were 
broadly equal in terms of socio-economic status, com-
peted with one another, but lived in socio-economically 
segregated areas (Kenoyer 1991; 1994; 2006; Possehl 
2002, 57; Eltsov 2008; Petrie 2013). Whether these 
dominant groups were elites, and precisely how they 
wielded power is, however, debated, and there is not 
a consensus about Indus socio-economic and political 
structure. A number of scholars have, however, written 
along similar lines. 
Possehl (2002, 57) suggested that the Indus Civili-
zation showed signs of heterarchical structures through 
evidence of corporate action, perhaps under a series 
of ‘councils’ or gatherings of leaders. Kenoyer (2006, 
2008) has proposed that the formal division of space 
and the distribution of workshops at Harappa indicate 
that there was competition between elites, merchants, 
landowners or religious leaders within each sector, and 
between sectors. He has described this as a decentral-
ized system of corporate rule similar to that seen in 
the Early Historic period in the subcontinent (Kenoyer 
2008, 195; also 1997, 2006), though clearly advocates the 
existence of an overarching hierarchy of wealth and 
legitimacy (Kenoyer 2000, 2006). For Eltsov (2008), the 
creation of three-dimensional and segregated worlds 
with restricted access and hidden monumentality 
water from both rainfall systems are likely to have had 
access to a more regular food supply, and potentially 
had different storage requirements (Petrie et al. 2016), 
though some storage throughout the year remains 
likely. Furthermore, there is likely to have been con-
siderable variation in what crops were grown and how 
they were grown within these areas, as farmers may 
have been in a position to make responsive choices (cf. 
Miller 2015), unless of course there were restrictions 
on choice, as suggested by Madella (2014, 227–29; also 
Miller 2015). The potential for flexibility may explain 
why particular crops or combinations of crops appear 
to be dominant in some settlements, but not in others 
(Petrie & Bates 2017). It is also important to consider 
the possibility that surplus food products might 
have been exchanged between populations living in 
different regions (Madella 2014; Miller 2015; Petrie et 
al. 2016), which may be demonstrated in the future 
through strontium isotope analysis (Petrie 2017). The 
diversity of the environments in which Indus popula-
tions lived, and the discussion of surplus generation, 
provisioning and storage all have implications for our 
understanding of socio-economic control structures 
both within cities, between cities and their hinterlands, 
and between populations across the Indus Civilization.
There is more to diversity of practices than 
farming and agriculture of course. The Indus urban 
period was characterized by the appearance of specific 
categories of cultural material at each of the urban 
sites and many of the settlements in the intervening 
regions (e.g. carved steatite seals, cubical weights, 
bangles, and beads). Finished goods were also widely 
exchanged and traded within the Indus zone, and 
while this material is found distributed in the sur-
rounding areas, there are only relatively limited 
quantities of ‘foreign’ finished goods being found in 
the Indus region (Possehl 2002; also Ratnagar 2001), 
and the uniformity of Indus material has been used 
to support arguments for long distance integration 
across the Indus Civilization (e.g. Kenoyer 2006, 55, 
62; Wright 2010, 23, 326–30). While the populations 
living in the various regions were clearly interacting 
with each other, and sharing aspects of technology, 
material, ideas and ideology, it is becoming increas-
ingly clear, however, that the indications of material 
uniformity across the Indus Civilization mask the 
degree of regional diversity in material and practices 
(Wright 2010; Petrie et al. 2017). Several scholars have 
suggested that the widespread attestation of certain 
categories of material is potentially a ‘veneer’ spread 
by a network of interaction that overlies considerable 
regional diversity (Meadow & Kenoyer 1997; Clark 




most obvious example is the ‘Assembly Hall’/’Pillared 
Hall’ in L-area on the Mound of the Great Bath (Mar-
shall 1931, 21–2; Wheeler 1968, 46), which has been 
described as a market (Mackay 1948), though this 
suggestion is based entirely on architectural form 
(Possehl 2002, 194–5). Mackay (1938, 76) also suggested 
that the structures at an intersection DK-G area - Block 
8A and Block 6A - were administrative buildings, and 
may have had spaces for ‘public letter-writers’ (Fig. 
2). Green (2018) has noted that these structures have 
a high density of stamp seals, and argued that they 
were a unified complex providing specialized spaces 
facilitating community or civic level interaction. He 
has referred to this particular building as a small 
public structure and suggests that in such contexts, 
interaction could take place across social boundaries, 
and between households, kinship groups, etc., and 
argued that such buildings were necessitated by the 
heterarchical urban context (Green 2018). The prospect 
that there were both small and large public buildings 
distributed in different parts of Mohenjo-Daro opens 
up a range of possibilities for speculating about who 
had access to each structure, and whether both types of 
buildings made it possible for individuals and groups 
to interact across social boundaries, as Green (2018) 
surmises for his small public structure in DK-G. Some 
non-residential structures may have been exclusive in 
terms of function and access, while others may have 
been truly public, and the differentiation of such will 
be fruitful for further research.
There are other factors that provide indications 
about the nature of Indus social structures and social 
interaction. From the construction of platforms, walls, 
buildings and elaborate waste management and drain-
age systems, down to the manufacture of pottery and 
the use of seals for individual transactions, it is likely 
that there was corporate/communal activities and also 
collective action in operation. As noted above, Wright 
(2010, 122, 124) has described the elaborate water 
supply, washing and drainage infrastructure seen at 
Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa as ‘public works’, with 
the implication that they are the product of corporate 
action for community benefit. Analysis of several of 
the major walls at Harappa has shown that bricks were 
made using different coloured clay, implying that they 
came from different sources, but also that bricks of dif-
ferent colours are present in the same wall (Meadow & 
Kenoyer 1994, 457–8; 2005, 221). This pattern suggests 
that there was not a simple correspondence between 
the bricks produced using one source of materials and 
the destination where they were used, and Meadow 
& Kenoyer (1994, 458) have suggested that individual 
groups were not responsible for the materials and 
labour required to complete individual segments of 
was an ideological choice that served to demarcate 
groupings, be they social, religious or professional. 
Wright (2010, 332; 2016, 234–7) has written of vertical 
integration and local councils, but also of evidence 
of heterarchy and collective action. Vidale (2010) has 
argued that the presence of a palace and associated 
Little Bath in the HR area at Mohenjo-Daro signals the 
existence of a social structure where each sector of the 
lower town was the preserve of a group or groups of 
elites that were socially, economically, and politically 
capable of building palaces and ritual structures that 
emulated and competed with those seen on the Mound 
of the Great Bath. Sinopoli et al. (2015, 388) have made 
the nuanced suggestion that power in Indus cities may 
have been variously distributed among competing 
and fluid social or economic groups rather than being 
highly centralized under a single ruling dynasty. They 
also suggest that political and religious ideologies 
might have discouraged the materialization of extant 
hierarchies, thereby maintaining a non-hierarchical 
political structure (Sinopoli et al. 2015, 388–9). Yoffee 
(2016, 1062) has built on this interpretation to suggest 
that Indus cities were ruled by oligarchies.
Taken together, these views suggest that no one 
elite group dominated any of the Indus cities in a 
strictly hierarchical fashion. Rather, the polycentric 
Indus cities may have been dominated by several 
groups that were potentially elite and broadly equal in 
term of socio-economic status, but who competed with 
each other and used mechanisms to limit concentrated 
power. This pattern may well hold for the smaller 
centres and towns as well, where segregation within 
individual settlements is often evident (Petrie 2013). 
There almost certainly were other social and economic 
groups within any individual Indus population that 
were also organized heterarchically, including various 
types of crafts people, labourers and farmers. Wright 
(2016, 235–6) has argued that pottery production 
required a cooperative network of craft workers, who 
engaged in consensus building and collective action. 
Thus, while heterarchical structures appear to have 
been predominant at various levels of Indus society, 
they likely co-existed with various types of vertical 
structures (Wright 2016, 226; cf. Crumley 1995).
In seeming contrast to the arguments about social 
and physical structures of spatial differentiation and 
exclusion lie suggestions that many of the large struc-
tures at Mohenjo-Daro that are cognate with Wright’s 
(2010, 117–22) non-residential structures, may have 
served some sort of ‘public’ function (e.g. Ratnagar 
1991; Kenoyer 1998, 62–5, 100; Possehl 2002, 193; Shinde 
2016). The ways in which many of these buildings were 
used remains unclear, but in some instances, specific 
functions of ‘public’ buildings have been discussed. The 
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2013). These findings suggest that there may actually 
have been regional variation and the delineation of 
elites through differences in burial style and grave 
objects in some areas (Kenoyer & Meadow 2016, 164). 
We are thus left with an interpretative tension 
between the desire to identify socio-economic hierar-
chies at Indus settlements, and the manifest evidence 
for various heterarchical arrangements. The nature 
of many of the large non-residential buildings, for 
example, may indicate the existence of some form of 
socio-economic hierarchy within Indus settlements, but 
it was not manifested in the way seen in Mesopotamia 
and Egypt. It is also likely that there were various 
types of heterarchy within Indus socio-political life, 
be it between competing elites, religious specialists, 
merchants, traders, and/or landowners, or between 
crafts people, labourers, farmers and others pursuing 
more quotidian trades. Wright (2016) and Green (2018) 
have both referred to the evidence for more horizontal 
socio-economic organization seen at Jenne-jeno in the 
ancient Middle Niger (cf. McIntosh 2005) as a potential 
parallel to the Indus example, highlighting the impor-
tance of considering the resistance to centralization. 
Ratnagar (2016, 113–29) has drawn attention to the 
example of the Yoruba, which is further down the 
Niger, and highlighted the potential importance of 
the types of dynamics that occur when kin groups, 
clans, lineages or tribes live together. While these pro-
posals contain considerable potential, we do not yet 
know enough about the specific distribution of social 
groups within Indus settlements, and are at present 
largely assuming that distinct groups were all living 
in what appear to be segregated areas within urban 
centres. It thus remains unclear whether the physical 
separation was driven by socio-economics, ideology 
or other factors. 
Mediation of politics and power between Indus 
settlements: the Indus state debate
The lack of clear consensus about the nature of socio-
economic and political organization within urban 
centres carries over into interpretation of the socio-
economic and political relationships between cities and 
across the Indus Civilization as a whole. Scholars have 
advocated a range of suggestions about the nature of 
large-scale control structures, including the argument 
that the Indus Civilization was a non-state (Fairservis 
1961, 1967; Malik 1968; Shaffer 1982; Possehl 1998), 
that it comprised ‘city-states’ (Kenoyer 1994, 1997, 
2006; Chakrabarti 1999; Wright 2010; also Sinopoli 
2015; Yoffee 2015, 5), and even that it was some form of 
empire (Ratnagar 1991, 170; Dhavalikar 1995; Allchin 
& Allchin 1997). 
wall. It is not clear whether each enclosure wall or 
platform was the product of the communal activity 
of the population of that particular area of the settle-
ment, or whether cooperation took place at a broader 
city wide or supra-city scale. Similar questions could 
be asked about the construction and maintenance of 
other buildings, including the speculated palaces and 
religious buildings, as such structures might have been 
constructed under central management, under the aegis 
of individual sectors, or by specialists in construction 
able to work across the social and physical boundaries 
of the city. Some of these activities may have been tak-
ing place exclusive of influence from elites.
Despite the existence of separate walled areas 
and putative religious and palatial structures, other 
evidence for socio-economic differentiation is limited 
in the Indus context, and this poses interpretative chal-
lenges. There are indications of some variation in the 
size and degrees of elaboration in houses (Marshall 
1931; Possehl 2002; Wright 2010, 117; Cork 2011, 38–47), 
which has been enhanced by the reinterpretation of 
the HR-A building (cf. Vidale 2010). Kenoyer (1989, 
2000) has suggested that bangles provide evidence for 
socio-economic differentiation, as they were produced 
using a range of raw materials (e.g. clay, shell) using 
technologies that show various degrees of elaboration 
(e.g. faience, stone ware). There also appears to have 
been some differential access to finished products, 
including beads and metal artefacts (e.g. Vidale 2000; 
Vidale & Miller 2000; Wright 2010, 246–62). Impor-
tantly, however, disparity is not clearly reflected in 
the relatively limited number of burials excavated at 
sites including Harappa, Rakhigarhi, Lothal, Rupar, 
Kalibangan and Farmana. In each instance, individual 
graves are broadly similar in containing distinctive 
types of pottery vessels and small numbers of personal 
ornaments, such as bangles and beads (Shinde et al. 
2009; Wright 2010, 263–70; Valentine et al. 2015; Lal 
et al. 2015; Kenoyer & Meadow 2016; Valentine 2016; 
Shinde et al. 2018). Being cognisant of the similari-
ties in burial form, Kenoyer (2006, 67; Valentine et al. 
2013) has suggested that the small size of the known 
cemeteries indicate that only certain social groups 
practised burial. Wright (2010, 270) has noted that 
only two burials have evidence for higher status, one 
at Harappa (Kenoyer 1998, 124), and one at Kalibangan 
(Sharma 1999, 87), and speculated that each might have 
contained the head of lineages interred in the related 
cemeteries. In contrast to the other evidence, there are 
six or more large tumuli at Dholavira, one of which had 
a chamber containing unusual pottery and gold objects 
(Bisht 2015, 658), and a range of elaborate grave goods 
have been revealed in the post-urban/Late Harappan 
cemetery at Sanauli (Sharma et al. 2007; Prabharkar 
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been emulating each other both within and between 
settlements (Petrie 2013). Although it was created to 
explain a very different cultural context, at a certain 
level, these factors all conform to Renfrew’s (1986) 
model of peer-polity interaction, where the interac-
tion between autonomous socio-political units is 
more significant than external links with other areas, 
and processes of transformation are brought about 
as a result of interaction between peer-polities in the 
form of competition (including warfare), competitive 
emulation, symbolic entrainment, the transmission 
of innovation, and increased flow in the exchange of 
goods (Petrie 2013). The element of this definition that 
does not accord neatly with common perceptions of the 
Indus cities is the role of warfare, but Cork (2011) has 
pointed out that evidence for warfare is particularly 
rare in ancient societies, and a range of Indus material 
may actually have been weaponry (Cork 2005). I have 
suggested that a major difference between the Indus 
Civilization and other contemporaneous societies is in 
the representation of violence, which could be related 
to both ideology and the distance between centres 
(Petrie 2013, 95). Although workable, the model of 
peer polity interaction is not neatly suited to the Indus 
case, and the suggestion that there were heterarchical 
relationships between the Indus urban centres may be 
more fruitful (Petrie 2013). 
‘Crisis, what crisis?’; the 4.2 kya event and the 
Indus
The beginnings of a change in the Indus urban sphere 
began at the end of the third millennium bc, such that 
by c. 1900 bc different social, economic and political 
structures were in place (Petrie 2017). Analysis of the 
networks of raw material acquisition and redistribution 
suggest that the final phase of the urban period (late 
Mature Harappan/Harappa 3C phase; c. 2200–1900 bc) 
was one of more intensive interaction (Law 2011, 466–7, 
Fig. 13.6). It was also apparently the period when 
Harappa was most densely occupied (Kenoyer 1991, 57; 
2008), and the ‘Later’ phase of its Great Hall appears 
to have been (re-)built around 2200 bc (late Period 3B/
early Period 3C) (Meadow & Kenoyer 2005, 99–101). 
However, it is notable that starting perhaps as early as 
c. 2200 bc, major structures at Mohenjo-Daro, including 
the Great Bath, fell out of use, and the settlement became 
progressively depopulated (Possehl 1997a, 215–17; 
1997b, 458; Wright 2010). It is possible that the phase 
of intensive interaction, increased urban density and 
construction activity is indicative of population stress 
that put pressures on food production and supply 
chains (cf. Pande & Ersten 2014, 1753). The likelihood 
that changes were taking place is emphasized by the fact 
Following Fairservis (1961, 1967, 1992; Malik 1968, 
Shaffer 1982), Possehl (1998, 282–3) argued that the 
Indus Civilization was a hegemony of chiefdoms, and 
that the cities were the seats of the chiefs that ‘had the 
character of super villages, more complex than villages 
but not like Ur, Uruk or Nippur, which were centres 
of vast political power with large temple complexes 
dedicated to their civic deity’. Such interpretations 
obviously have implications for the nature of control 
structures within cities, and the extent to which control 
extended into the surrounding hinterland. Possehl 
(2002, 6) noted that ‘kings are hard to find in the Indus 
Valley cities; nor are there palaces, bureaucracies, or 
‘other trappings of “stateness”’, but Yoffee (2005, 228–9) 
noted that Possehl describes ‘Indus cities, social and 
economic differentiation, large public ceremonial areas 
with very large buildings and monuments, record 
keeping of various sorts, and the restructuring of the 
countryside around politically independent cities that 
share a common ideology.’ The key point that Yoffee 
(2005, 229) makes in relation to Indus control is in fact 
the key point of his book Myths of the Archaic State –
there was no one form of archaic state. He explicitly 
notes that ‘Indus Valley city-states look different from 
Mesopotamian city-states. They were ruled differently 
and seem to have had different rules about how power 
was to be exhibited in them and, presumably, about 
how power was to be contested’ (Yoffee 2005, 229), 
and this is still valid. 
Jacobsen (1986) and others have suggested 
that the Indus Civilization presents the political and 
administrative framework of a state (e.g. Chakrabarti 
1995, 122–3, 1999, 199–200; Lal 1997, 236–8). Kenoyer 
(1994, 1997, 54; Wright 2010, 333), has previously 
speculated that the geographical extent of putative 
Indus city-states – whose capitals were the large-scale 
urban centres – ranged from 100,000 to 170,000 sq. km 
in area, implying that individual cities controlled vast 
hinterlands. However, these areas are far larger than 
the site sustaining areas needed to support a city, and 
areas of direct control are likely to have been much 
smaller. This likelihood makes it possible that medium 
and large sized town settlements operated as independ-
ent centres of regional power and administration (Petrie 
2013; Sinopoli 2015; Petrie et al. 2017; Petrie 2017). In 
the absence of evidence that there was a hierarchy of 
cities, it appears that each of the Indus cities was an 
independent polity, and the smaller urban centres 
might have been subordinate to the larger cities or 
polities in their own right. 
The production, exchange, and use of similar 
material in the cities and smaller urban centres and the 
similar spatial delineation of settlements into separate 
enclaves suggests that urban populations may have 
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the cessation of long-range trading with the Persian 
Gulf and Mesopotamia (Cleuziou & Tosi 2007; Wright 
2010, 314). After the depopulation of the Indus cities, 
there appears to have been no large-scale settlements 
within the regions occupied by Indus populations for 
up to one thousand years. 
A range of natural and human-induced causes 
have been put forward to explain this overarching 
process of change and transformation, with the former 
including factors like declining rainfall, desiccation, 
and river shift, and the latter including factors like 
invasion, reorientation of long-range trade, resource 
exhaustion, social evolution, population increases and 
responses to natural change (Allchin 1995; Possehl 
1997a; 1997b; Wright 2010, 312–14). While invasion 
theories are now largely discounted, the new poten-
tials of human genetic analysis have meant that they 
are still being explored (e.g. Narasimhan et al. 2018). 
More fruitfully, the investigation of the environments 
inhabited by Indus populations, and changes to those 
environments has seen ongoing research by a range of 
projects (reviewed in Petrie et al. 2017). There is also 
only limited proxy evidence for ancient climate that 
is proximate to the Indus zone and can thus be keyed 
into the available archaeological datasets (Petrie et al. 
2017). Inferences that assume climate was a driver of 
culture change tend to look from the ‘top-down’, and 
end up in ‘correlation equals causation’ circularity. It is 
arguable that an understanding of the transformation 
of the Indus Civilization can only come from ‘bottom-
up’ consideration of evidence of local climatic and 
environmental conditions, and human adaptation, 
sustainability and resilience to both those conditions 
and changes in those conditions (e.g. Madella & Fuller 
2006; Miller et al. eds. 2011; Dixit et al. 2014; Petrie et 
al. 2017; cf. Aimers & Hodell 2011). Furthermore, to 
ensure that the impact of climate and climate change 
on human behaviour is not over-emphasized, it is 
also essential to consider if and how the interactions 
between human and the environment intersect with 
other social, economic and political dynamics. 
The theme of water-related crisis has long been 
core to many narratives of Indus ‘collapse’, and argu-
ments have been made for (and against) the impact 
of both flooding and river shift/drying, with the latter 
potentially being caused either by neo-tectonic pro-
cesses, or climate change (Ghose et al. 1979; Yashpal et 
al. 1980; Mughal 1997; Lal 2002; Valdiya 2002; Shinde 
et al. 2006; Danino 2010; reviewed in Petrie 2017). 
There have now been several attempts to date the flow 
of perennial water through various paleochannels 
within the Indus River basin, and to link this process 
to urban transformation. There is growing consensus 
that at least one major paleochannel ceased to be a 
that by c. 1900 bc, there appears to have been a reduc-
tion and reorientation of settlement in the entire Indus 
region. The largest settlements in Sindh and Cholistan 
had been abandoned or reduced in size and almost all 
others were displaced, whereas in Gujarat, Haryana 
and Indian Punjab it appears that several large-scale 
settlements were abandoned, and there was an increase 
in the number of small-scale settlements (Joshi et al. 
1984; Mughal 1997, 51–2; Possehl 1997b, 460, Table VII; 
2002, 212, 241, Table 13.2; Petrie et al. 2017; Green & 
Petrie 2018). The networks of raw material acquisition 
and the range of material being moved also reduced in 
this post-urban phase (Law 2011, 468, Fig. 13.7).
There is consensus that there was an increase in 
settlement numbers and density in northwest India 
in the posturban/Late Harappan period. However, 
reassessment of older data and new surveys and by 
the Land, Water and Settlement and TwoRains projects 
have shown no increase in the number of village-sized 
settlements in the central part of the plains during 
the post-urban phase, implying that there was no 
substantial increase in the local population in some 
areas (Singh et al. 2010, 2011; Petrie et al. 2017; Green 
& Petrie 2018). This observation suggests that the 
perceived intensification of village settlement post-
urban/Late Harappan period in northwest India was 
concentrated in the areas that are warm and temperate, 
with dry winters and hot summers that lie along the 
Himalayan front and at the eastern edge of the plains 
(Petrie et al. 2017; Green & Petrie 2018).
The one large-scale settlement that continued to be 
occupied throughout the later Mature Harappan and 
into the Late Harappan period was Harappa (Petrie 
2017). However, analysis of pathologies visible on 
skeletons from Cemeteries R37 and H, which span this 
protracted period of transition, has revealed evidence 
for increasing physical and social stress. Leprosy is 
attested in the urban period, but the Late Harappan 
skeletal remains have evidence for increased violence 
and disease, including cranial and post-cranial trauma, 
and various infections and diseases, including leprosy 
and tuberculosis (Lovell 1994; 1997; Robbins Schug et 
al. 2013a; 2013b; Robbins Schug & Blevins 2016). 
Reduction in the density and scale of urban popu-
lations appears to be accompanied by the loss of many 
of the elaborate crafts and their concomitant techni-
cal virtuosity (Vidale & Miller 2000, 151–3; Wright 
2010, 312–24). The distinctively decorated pottery and 
bangles of various types continued to be produced 
during the post-urban period, but the production 
of items such as long carnelian beads, standardized 
weights, and inscribed and decorated seals all ceased, 
as did the use of Indus signs (Possehl 1997b, 460–4; 
Kenoyer 2006; Wright 2010, 322). This phase also saw 
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that effected regions differentially. The impact on both 
the ISM and IWM c. 4.3/4.2 ka bp potentially had a 
profound effect on the Indus Civilization.
Weakening monsoon strength (winter and sum-
mer) after c. 2300–2200 bc does correlate broadly with 
both the maximum extent of occupation at Mohenjo-
Daro and Harappa and the onset of Indus urban 
decline, though it is clear that this was a variable 
process (e.g. Wright 2010, 43; Petrie 2017). The chrono-
logical correlation between the data sets is, however, 
imprecise due to the limitations of radiocarbon dat-
ing techniques in terms of precision (Dixit et al. 2014; 
Staubwasser & Weiss 2006). Monsoon weakening in 
some areas is only part of the story, and consideration 
of human responses is critical. For example, it has been 
suggested that decline in monsoon strength led to the 
diversification of the Indus crop assemblage through 
the adoption or intensified use of more summer and 
drought resistant crops such as millet and also rice 
(Madella & Fuller 2006, 1298; Giosan et al. 2012; Wright 
2010:321ff.). Madella & Fuller (2006, 1298; also Fuller 
2003; Madella 2014, 229) have hypothesized that the 
shift toward drought-tolerant rain-fed crop species that 
produce lower yield per unit area would have resulted 
in there being less surplus available to provision larger 
centres. They also suggested that the cultivation of 
such crops may have encouraged larger numbers of 
smaller communities, and that ‘the strategic shifts by 
farmers to other crops may have contributed to the 
decline of the economic foundations of Harappan 
urbanism’ (Madella & Fuller 2006, 1298). The evidence 
for the exploitation of a diverse range of crops before, 
during and after the urban phase from Masudpur VII 
and Masudpur I encourages a recalibration of these 
hypotheses (Petrie et al. 2016, 2017; Bates et al. 2017a, 
2017b, 2017c; Petrie & Bates 2017). Wholesale changes 
in the efficiency of yield production may not have been 
an integral part of the de-urbanization trajectory, which 
has important implications for discussions of fragility 
and resilience. However, until we have archaeobot-
anical evidence from the neighbouring urban site of 
Rakhigarhi itself, or material from settlements in the 
hinterland of Harappa, it won’t be possible to fully 
reconstruct the structure of provisioning in urban sites 
and their hinterlands (Petrie 2017).
Petrie et al. (2017; Petrie 2017) have suggested 
that the weakening of the ISM around c. 2200–2100 bc 
meant that the climate in the subsequent period became 
‘unpredictably unpredictable’. By this we meant that 
before and during the Indus urban phase, popula-
tions were familiar with ‘predictable unpredictable’ 
conditions and their farming strategies were tailored 
to make use of water supplied by combinations of 
rainfall, inundation, small-scale irrigation and/or 
perennial watercourse before the Holocene (Saini et 
al. 2009; Lawler 2011, 23; Clift et al. 2012; Giosan et al. 
2012; A. Singh et al. 2017), but there is some evidence 
of ephemeral water flow through some channels at 
different points during the mid-Holocene (Clift et al. 
2012; Giosan et al. 2012; Maemoku et al. 2012; Saini et 
al. 2009; Shitaoka et al. 2012; Durcan et al. 2017). It is 
extremely likely, however, that many if not all of the 
explanations that have been put forward to explain 
the processes of hydrological evolution and change 
in northwest India, and their relationship to Indus 
populations, are either not complex enough, or do not 
consider the full hydrological complexity of the region 
(Orengo & Petrie 2017, 2018). 
Across greater Western and South Asia there is 
relatively limited climate evidence that relates spe-
cifically to the period in which the Indus cities were 
occupied (c. 2500–1900 bc). There is, however, a range 
of evidence for a major climate ‘event’ at c. 4.2–4.1 
ky bp or c. 2200–2100 bc, which appears to be related 
to a cooling event in the North Atlantic (Bond Event 
3; Bond et al. 1997), shifts in the Inter-Tropical Con-
vergence Zone, and marked weakening of the Indian 
Summer Monsoon (Weiss et al. 1993; deMenocal 2001; 
Staubwasser et al. 2003; Clift & Plumb 2008, 196–216; 
Cronin 2010, 235–6). It has been argued that this par-
ticular event had a major socio-economic impact in 
Mesopotamia and Egypt (Weiss et al. 1993; deMenocal 
2001; Staubwasser & Weiss 2006; Weiss 2017), and its 
broad chronological correlation with the onset of Indus 
de-urbanization has also been noted (Staubwasser et 
al. 2003; Staubwasser & Weiss 2006; Dixit et al. 2014). 
It is evident, however, that there was variation in its 
timing, duration, and impact, with some areas showing 
acute effect (e.g. Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Red 
Sea), while others apparently were little affected (e.g. 
northern Europe) (e.g. Roland et al. 2014). There is evi-
dence for climate and climate change from within the 
Indus zone from Lake Kotla Dahar in Haryana, India, 
which shows that the marked weakening of the ISM 
affected NW India at c. 4.1±100 ky bp/c. 2100±100 bc 
(Dixit et al. 2014). While this record demonstrates that 
the weakened ISM had a direct impact upon one of the 
regions occupied by Indus populations, it is not yet 
clear how this shift affected other regions, and more 
climate records that increase spatial resolution are 
needed (Petrie et al. 2017). New analysis of samples 
from a sediment core close to the mouth of the Indus 
(63KA) has shown that the weakening of the ISM was 
preceded by a weakening of the Indian Winter Mon-
soon (IWM) after a period of peak strength (Giesche et 
al. 2019). This finding supports the suggestion that the 
so-called 4.2 ka bp event was a complex phenomenon 
that potentially involved a range of weather dynamics 
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example at least, it is arguable that it is the state-level 
structures and the power of individual kings and their 
courts (Yoffee’s ‘infrastructural power’) that is the 
most fragile component, and not the city itself (Yoffee 
this volume). While there are examples of cities that 
disappear with their ruler and or dynasty (e.g. Agade, 
Ur III period Ur, Dur Sharrukkin), there are many 
other cities that were occupied for thousands of years 
(e.g. Uruk), and cities may continue to exist without 
political power (Yoffee 2016, 1060, this volume). This 
distinction between the political fragility of the state 
and capital cities, and the relative longevity of ‘other’ 
cities is important when it comes to the Indus case, 
with its lack evidence for kings, queens and courts. 
Although a range of political changes across a 
period of up to 700 years is inevitable, Middleton’s 
(2017, 93) point that for the Indus Civilization these 
changes ‘are not visible to us as they are in some 
other societies’ continues to hold. Without clearer 
understanding of Indus socio-economic and political 
structures, and the information documented in the 
Indus sign system and its associated administrative 
systems of stamp seals and standardized weights, 
we can only speculate about political dynamics. It 
is arguable that the lack of evidence for political 
change may indicate that Indus cities were robust 
rather than fragile.
In his paper prepared for the workshop, Rob-
ertshaw asked, ‘Is apparent “stability” (for several 
centuries) in some early states a result of constant 
adjustments and accommodations with internal and 
external forces?’ (see Yoffee this volume; Stark this 
volume). In the Indus context, the lack of hierarchical 
political leaders may have facilitated constant adjust-
ments and accommodations taking place via civic 
councils and/or Green’s (2018) specialized spaces for 
community or civic level interaction. This factor is 
potentially very important for discussions of fragility 
in the Indus context. Early interpretations suggested 
that the Indus Civilization was unchanging and, in 
many ways, dull (e.g. Wheeler 1950, 28–9), and there 
is an ongoing narrative that argues that the Indus 
Civilization is part of a grand and long-term Indus 
Tradition that is fundamentally linked to the later 
Early Historic phase of urbanism (e.g. Kenoyer 2006). 
However, I argue that the Indus Civilization was 
marked by relatively constant adaptation, change and 
transformation at various scales, with the Indus cities 
seeing repeated phases of expansion and develop-
ment, and the building, rebuilding and remodelling 
of walls, platforms, non-residential and residential 
buildings. Across periods and also within the urban 
period, there appears to have been instances of set-
tlement displacement, which implies the need for 
lifted water (cf. Miller 2006). Populations in specific 
areas across the Indus zone might have been able to 
survive one, two, or even more years of drought, either 
through reliance on their own resources, or through 
support from other regions. However, when this 
range was exceeded, such as when populations were 
faced with protracted periods of drought, the local 
and medium-to-long range provisioning and support 
networks may not have been able to sustain the status 
quo. I have suggested that in such a situation, farmers 
may have had to engage in constant risk mitigation, 
thereby reducing opportunities to produce surpluses, 
and in such situations it is possible that living in large 
groups (i.e. urban centres) was not an option (Petrie 
2017; see below). 
A prolonged weakening of the Indian Summer 
Monsoon would almost certainly have had a dramatic 
impact upon water availability in the Indus River 
basin, but this impact would not have been consistent 
across this environmentally diverse zone. There are, 
however, clearly significant limitations in the core 
body of evidence that inform understanding of Indus 
de-urbanization, particularly in terms of spatial and 
chronological coverage, and the impact of environ-
mental and climatic factors. Nonetheless, we should 
speculate about how changes to the climate system of 
anything more than short duration are likely to have 
had an impact upon food security and resilience of 
urban and other populations across this diverse region.
Urban ‘stability and fragility’ and rural ‘resilience’
The Indus Civilization does not fit neatly into a nar-
rative of extreme fragility (cf. Yoffee, 552ff; 2016, 1061; 
also Scott 2017), primarily because of the longevity of 
its urban centres, which have to cope with environ-
mental variability and chance, and resist ‘collapse’ 
for an extended period. I have attempted to highlight 
how the relative invisibility of prominent leaders, the 
lack of translatable texts that might provide some 
succour, and the lack of consensus about how urban 
centres and the Indus Civilization as a whole were 
socio-economically and politically organized create 
practical and interpretive challenges. However, I have 
also argued that the exploration of the dynamics of 
fragility, robustness, resilience and sustainability in 
the Indus context as outlined here provide a way of 
exploring fragility in a distinctive fashion.
It is important to consider whether we are dis-
cussing fragile states or fragile cities. Yoffee (2015, 552; 
2016, 1056, 1061; this volume) has made it clear that 
there was a contrast between infrastructural (state) 
power and the heterarchically structured underpin-
nings of Mesopotamian society. In the Mesopotamian 
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resilience and continuity may have been possible by 
resorting to embracing rural lifeways that saw the 
maintenance and dispersal of diverse approaches to 
substance.’ It is arguable that Indus cities were inher-
ently robust because of the nature of long-term resource 
and cultural investment, and the supply chains that 
were needed to provision them. They may also have 
been resilient in the short term, and capable of serv-
ing as centres of refuge in times of stress. However, 
in the face of major hydroclimatic stress they may 
well have been neither resilient nor sustainable in the 
longer-term. Nonetheless, while they could ultimately 
be seen as fragile, Indus cities do not appear to have 
been fragile in the acute sense. 
What we see in the Indus cities contrasts with the 
Indus rural populations. Indus populations appear to 
have been resilient, sustainable and capable of con-
tinuity through simplification and embracing rural 
lifeways, with farmers having a range of crops to 
choose from to suit their local environment and water 
supply (Petrie 2017; Petrie et al. 2017). 
Given the diversity and complexity of the envi-
ronment across the Indus Civilization, it is unlikely 
that the weakening of the ISM will have had the same 
impact everywhere (Wright 2010; Petrie 2017). Petrie 
et al. (2017) have suggested that climate change may 
have introduced a degree of entropy into what had 
become a very complex and interactive urbanized 
system. Risks to food security will have had a range 
of economic impacts, and large cities and high local 
population densities may have become unsustainable. 
Indus populations certainly appear to have embraced 
economic simplification in the Late Harappan period 
through the reduction in the scale of settlements and 
their interaction networks. Sustainability, resilience 
and a degree of cultural continuity thus appear to have 
been possible as a result of more fully embracing rural 
life-ways that saw the maintenance and dispersal of 
diverse approaches to substance, including a balance 
of summer and winter crops. Smaller populations 
would have been far better suited to a situation where 
risk mitigation was essential, and smaller groups were 
also presumably social environments where choices 
about crops, farming practices and cultural behaviour 
could be the most flexible. I have suggested that the 
Late Harappan phase of the Indus Civilization might 
be a feasible example of sustainability through sys-
tematic simplification, following Tainter’s (1988, 151–2; 
2006, 98; 2011, 29–31) hypothesis that the Byzantine 
Empire was sustainable because it systematically sim-
plified, and thereby reduced its consumption. 
In the context of trying to draw some robust 
conclusions in considering the place of the Indus 
Civilization in the fragility narrative, I contend that 
and facility with adaptability. This is in keeping with 
the suggestion that Indus populations were adapted 
to living in a predictably unpredictable diverse and 
variable environmental context. Their ability to be 
adaptive appears to have made them robust. However, 
from c. 2100 bc, there is clear evidence for the beginning 
of more profound processes of transformation that 
appear to have contributed to Indus de-urbanization, 
with the environmental context potentially entering 
an extended period of unpredictable unpredictability 
(Petrie et al. 2017; Petrie 2017).
That the processes of transformation were pro-
found is indicated by the abandonment of major 
structures at Mohenjo-Daro and other sites by c. 1900 bc, 
as well as ultimate abandonment of all of the cities, bar 
Harappa. We also see the loss of technical virtuosity, 
and have evidence for violence, infection and disease 
at Harappa. In addition to these acute changes, we also 
see large-scale displacement of settlement concentra-
tions towards the areas of the east that today receive 
more abundant monsoon rainfall. Significantly, the 
evidence from Cholistan indicates that mobility and 
relocation had potentially been common even in the 
urban period, but the level of settlement displacement 
between the urban and post-urban periods appears 
to have been more substantial, and there is similar 
displacement seen in other regions (Petrie & Lynam 
in prep). The pattern of the shift is inconsistent, how-
ever, and does not just appear to be ‘to the east’, but 
to particular parts of the eastern regions – possibly 
to areas that received the most summer rainfall. The 
degree to which this process was precipitated by the 
weakening of the Indian Summer Monsoon remains 
unclear, though we now know that the climate in the 
Indus region underwent change significant enough to 
have plausibly had an impact on human populations.
It is important to consider the limits of adaptabil-
ity in such a context. What happened to the ostensibly 
robust Indus cities in the face of these changes? Did 
the climate became too dry? What if choices made 
by farmers were too diverse? Did urban fragility in 
the Indus context result from the climate changing 
beyond the ability of populations to adapt? Such ques-
tions encourage consideration of the degree to which 
Indus populations were fragile and/or resilient in the 
face of crisis. 
Discussions of resilience in the Indus context have 
been relatively limited. Zerboni et al. (2016, 61) have 
suggested that centrally controlled Indus socio-eco-
nomical structures combined with hydroclimatic stress 
decreased the resilience of Indus populations. In con-
trast, Petrie et al. (2017; Petrie 2017) have suggested that 
while: ‘Large cities and high local population densities 
may have become unsustainable, but sustainability, 
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the absence of unequivocal evidence for ‘infrastruc-
tural power’ makes it challenging to properly discuss 
the fragility of Indus states or political control. Indus 
cities appear to have been fundamentally stable as 
urban entities, and the fact that the production and 
redistribution economy appears to have been extensive, 
and Indus urban populations engaged in emulation, 
suggests that there were layers of socio-economic 
integration across the Indus Civilization. However, 
this ‘veneer’ of socio-economic and cultural uniformity 
and integration overlay considerable variability and 
diversity of cultural practices (Petrie et al. 2018). It may 
have been this veneer that was vulnerable to ‘shocks’ to 
parts of the overarching system. Weakened winter and 
summer monsoons from c. 4.3–4.2 ka bp may have had 
acute and more long-term effects, including ground 
water depletion, deforestation, and water stress on 
plants, animals and people. Each of these factors will 
have invoked responses from Indus populations, and 
population displacement may have been imperative. 
We inevitably come back around to debating the nature 
of ‘collapse’ and the ways in which it occurs, and it 
is interesting that Yoffee (2015, 556) has speculated 
about Indus ‘collapse as emigration’. There is some 
likelihood that Indus populations were always engag-
ing in regular displacement, so we need to refine our 
understanding of the scale and locus of this process, 
and the degree to which it entailed changes in social 
and economic behaviour. Although Indus cities were 
stable for a protracted period, they appear to have had 
the potential to be fragile. This fragility is unlikely to 
have been acute, however, and urban decline appears 
to have been protracted. It is arguable that the relative 
robustness of the Indus cities derives from the fact that 
they were ‘built’ upon a rural socio-economic under-
pinning that was inherently resilient and sustainable, 
which derives from the need to adapt to a variable and 
diverse environmental context.
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Secondary states formed in two basic man-
ners: as remnants of larger entities that 
broke up after an initial fluorescence or as 
competing polities that developed at the 
edge of more mature complex societies. Both 
processes involved competition between 
like-sized, similarly organized social units 
[peer polities], and therefore both resulted in 
the adoption of older organizational strate-
gies by new, or emergent, corporate groups. 
(Parkinson & Galaty 2007, 125) 
However, many states in sub-Saharan Africa do not 
fit easily into the binary classification of ‘primary’ (or 
‘pristine’) and ‘secondary’ states and their formation 
also does not always align with the two explanations 
proposed by Parkinson & Galaty. For example, the 
first states in the Great Lakes (or Interlacustrine) 
region of Africa were to all intents and purposes pri-
mary states, but they did receive small quantities of 
exotic goods from much larger states that were part 
of the Indian Ocean world system in the first half of 
the second millennium ad. In the jargon of world-
systems theory, this would condemn these central 
African states to the status of ‘peripheries’ whose 
primary purpose was supposedly to supply ‘cores’ 
with raw materials in unequal systems of exchange 
that fostered dependency (see Killick 2009). Such 
a view courts the danger of overlooking the value 
of studying these states as functioning entities in 
their own right. In similar vein, Trigger’s distinction 
between ‘city-states’ and ‘territorial states’ is also not 
readily applicable to much of sub-Saharan Africa, 
not least because many of the states in this region 
lacked cities (see also Marcus & Feinman 1998, 8–10). 
Typologies often have heuristic value, but they must 
not become straitjackets that hamper rather than heed 
investigation.
Although many college textbooks on world prehistory 
seem to regard only three episodes of the African past 
as relevant to the human story – the earliest hominins 
and tools, the advent of modern humans, and ancient 
Egyptian civilization, a good portion of sub-Saharan 
Africa was occupied at one time or another by states, 
albeit mostly dating to well within the last 3000 years 
(Fig. 8.1).1 These states varied enormously in size, 
duration, monumental architecture (or lack thereof), 
and in hierarchical and heterarchical complexity: con-
trast, for example, Pharaonic Egypt (see, e.g., Morris 
this volume) with the Luba kingdom of central Africa 
(Reefe 1981). There is of course no reason that all these 
states should share traits simply because they happen 
to be located on the African continent.
The kingdoms, as they are frequently called, of 
sub-Saharan Africa are often considered as ‘second-
ary’ states that have little to contribute to debates 
about the evolution and collapse of complex societies. 
This is unfortunate because many of these African 
societies have rich archaeological, historical, linguistic, 
and ethnographic records that permit detailed scru-
tiny of their political, economic, religious, social, and 
cultural histories. For this reason, they are arguably 
ideal case studies for a conference on the evolution 
of fragility in states. But is it acceptable to focus on 
‘secondary’ states? Parkinson & Galaty (2007, 114) 
note that, ‘confusion about the meaning of the term 
secondary has led to a general presumption that if 
states were ‘secondary’, their formation did not need 
to be explained’. However, mere recognition of the 
fact that a state either emerged as the successor of 
a pre-existing state or had some connections to a 
primary state elsewhere is clearly insufficient as an 
explanation of the state’s development and history. 
Nevertheless, comparative study of secondary state 
formation indicates some shared features of inter-
est, viz.: 
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(1998, 254) also define a ‘state’ in political terms: ‘the 
central, governing institution and social form in a dif-
ferentiated stratified society in which rank and status 
are only partly determined through kinship’ (see also 
Yoffee 2005, 17), a definition that is more forgiving in 
terms of my African examples. Marcus & Feinman 
(1998, 6) offer a list of seven traits that characterize 
‘archaic states’ without requiring that a state must 
necessarily check all seven boxes, a fuzziness of defi-
nition for which Yoffee (2005, 15–16) has sympathy. 
Certainly, many archaic states in central and southern 
Africa probably do not always meet the expectation 
of ‘a change in the settlement hierarchy from three to 
four levels’ (Yoffee (2005, 16).
One might also ask whether the societies that 
I intend to examine here can really be described as 
‘states’ rather than ‘chiefdoms’, ‘intermediate-level 
societies’ or some other term. This depends of course 
on one’s definition of a ‘state’. Connah, in his survey 
volume of ‘African civilizations’ (2016, 7), claims to 
follow Haas (1982, 172): ‘a stratified society in which a 
governing body exercises control over the production 
or procurement of basic resources, and thus neces-
sarily exercises coercive power over the remainder of 
the population’, but this definition not only begs the 
question of how many strata but it is also not a good 
fit for many African states where there seems to be lit-
tle or no evidence of coercive power. Baines & Yoffee 
Figure 8.1. A sampling of the precolonial states of sub-Saharan Africa, thereby giving an indication of their 










































































Fragile States in Sub-Saharan Africa
poor was less marked than in early ‘civilizations’ (Trig-
ger 2003, 47). Regardless of the merits or demerits of 
Trigger’s classifications, ancient Bunyoro, in its scale 
and organization, resembles many precolonial African 
states. Moreover, its rich corpus of oral traditions and 
ethnographies, combined with abundant historical 
information gleaned from linguistic studies, as well as 
some archaeological evidence, permits more in-depth 
analysis than is often possible for some larger ancient 
civilizations. Furthermore, this is the early state with 
which I am most familiar from my own archaeologi-
cal endeavours. The choice of three states, rather than 
fewer or more, was based on logistical concerns.
I begin with brief culture historical notes on each 
of the states in my case studies to provide a context for 
readers unfamiliar with the past of sub-Saharan Africa.
Great Zimbabwe
Great Zimbabwe (Fig. 8.2) was the capital of a state 
known to academics by the same name. Great Zim-
babwe, the state, was at its zenith between roughly 
the late thirteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries ad, 
though settlement at the capital both preceded and 
outlived this highwater mark. Distinguished by at least 
a four-level, possibly a five-level site-size hierarchy, 
Zimbabwe period sites are located across most of the 
modern southern African country of the same name, 
as well as in adjacent areas of Botswana, South Africa, 
and Mozambique (Garlake 1973; Pikirayi 2001). While 
most popular accounts and textbooks posit that the 
gold mined in the region and traded to the East Afri-
can ports of the Indian Ocean world was the source 
of Great Zimbabwe’s wealth, the importance of cattle 
(e.g. Garlake 1978) or both cattle and agriculture (e.g. 
Pikirayi 2001) to the economic basis of the state should 
not be underestimated. Ritual and religion, kinship 
connections to founding ancestors, ownership of land, 
as well as possession of other metals and ivory, and 
the materialization of power in drystone walling all 
contributed to the acquisition and maintenance of 
authority among Great Zimbabwe’s leadership.
There are two competing models for the emer-
gence of Great Zimbabwe: 1) the state was the successor 
to an earlier, primary state centred on Mapungubwe 
(e.g. Huffman 1986, 2000, 2009); 2) the state emerged 
as primus inter pares because of multiple causes, 
including competition among several peer polities, 
a view based in part upon new fieldwork (Chirikure 
et al. 2013, 2014, 2016; Van Waarden 2011; cf. Huff-
man 2015a, 2015b). Bound up with these competing 
models is disagreement about the importance of 
exotic (prestige) trade goods in the development and 
institutionalization of wealth disparities between elites 
and commoners (e.g. Huffman 1972, 2009; Calabrese 
Despite the frequent absence of typical traits of 
states like cities, monumental architecture, and writ-
ing, early European travellers in central Africa had no 
qualms about using terms, such as ‘kings’, ‘courts’, 
and ‘armies’, to describe the workings of complex 
African societies that they encountered. They clearly 
believed that their European models of states were 
readily applicable to African contexts, a precedent 
that I intend to follow here in as much as I assume 
that I am dealing with states that may have lessons to 
impart about fragility and resilience.
Three African states
The study of African political formations, both state and 
stateless, represented the birth of political anthropol-
ogy (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940; Lewellen 1983, 7). 
However, the colonial-era context in which much of 
the first archaeological explorations of the traces of 
early African states took place fostered the view that 
the development and success of these states should 
be credited to civilizing influences from outside the 
continent. This perspective in turn encouraged later 
researchers to focus on countering colonialist narratives 
with ones that emphasized the indigenous origins, 
bolstered sometimes by early radiocarbon dates, and 
achievements of African kingdoms, often at the expense 
of overlooking the tremendous variety of African 
political and social systems (Monroe 2013). Only in 
the last couple of decades has the emphasis shifted 
from universalist narratives of cultural development 
to the exploration of the rich diversity of pre-colonial 
African complex societies (S. McIntosh 1999; R. McI-
ntosh 2005; Stahl 1999, 2005; Fleisher & Wynne-Jones 
2010; Monroe 2013).
I explore three states in detail in this chapter 
chosen from the cornucopia of African examples of 
precolonial states. I chose three states with whose 
archaeology and history I am relatively familiar. They 
are certainly not a random sample, but they do differ 
considerably from each other, allowing exploration of 
variability as well as shared features. Great Zimbabwe 
in southern Africa is generally considered to have 
been a ‘territorial state’, while Swahili ‘civilization’ 
comprised several ‘city-states’ (in Trigger’s (2003, 92–4) 
terminology; see also Charlton & Nichols 1997) distrib-
uted along the length of the East African coast (Sinclair 
& Hakansson 2000; LaViolette & Fleisher 2005). The 
kingdom of Bunyoro in the Great Lakes region of cen-
tral Africa was a much smaller entity than my other two 
case studies, warranting the label of ‘early state’ rather 
than ‘civilization’ because, in Trigger’s view, kinship 
remained the underlying principle of socio-political 
organization and the gap in wealth between rich and 
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the Indian Ocean and the eastern edge of the African 
continent (Pearson 1998; Chaudhuri 1985; Beaujard 
2018). Wealth derived primarily from brokering the 
trade between these two great regions of what has 
been called the Indian Ocean (e.g. LaViolette 2008, 24) 
or Afro-Eurasian World System (Beaujard 2018).
As has been noted many times (for an excellent 
summary see Horton & Middleton 2000, 2), early 
archaeo logical work that focused on stone-walled towns 
(e.g. Fig. 8.5) and imported goods from across the Indian 
Ocean combined with colonial-era historiography and 
colonialist mindsets to suggest that the Swahili were an 
urban elite who colonized the East African coast from 
the Middle East, primarily Arabia, bringing with them 
Islam and its associated cultural refinements, and who 
then intermingled with indigenous Africans to create 
a Creole society. The Swahili themselves embraced 
this reconstruction of their origins because not only 
did it jell with their own historical traditions, but it 
also served to enhance their status with their English 
and earlier Omani and Portuguese colonial overlords 
(cf. Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983). Independence in the 
1960s and 1970s gradually encouraged a revision of the 
consensus academic view of Swahili origins to one that 
emphasized indigenous African roots. Excavations at 
the town site of Shanga on Manda Island in the Lamu 
archipelago of Kenya, where Mark Horton (1996) traced 
2000, 2007; cf. Chirikure 2014; Moffett & Chirikure 
2016). Similar disagreements revolve around Great 
Zimbabwe’s decline: 1) Great Zimbabwe itself was 
largely abandoned and succeeded by two daughter 
states, the Mutapa state in far northern Zimbabwe and 
the Torwa-Changamire (Rozvi) state with its capital at 
Khami (Fig. 8.3) and later at Danangombe (Fig. 8.4), 
about 250 km west of Great Zimbabwe (Huffman 
1982, 2007); 2) there was considerable chronological 
overlap between Great Zimbabwe and the Mutapa 
and Torwa-Changamire states, with frequent changes 
in the location of capital sites (Chirikure et al. 2012). 
I explore these competing visions of culture history 
below, which have implications for our understanding 
of fragility and resilience in these states.
Swahili
The East African coast and adjacent islands from south-
ern Somalia to central Mozambique were and still are 
home to the Swahili, speakers of a Bantu language, 
ki-Swahili, and possessors of a shared culture that 
Connah (2016, 222) notes was ‘partly urban, mercantile, 
literate, and Islamic’. Swahili civilization (sensu Yoffee 
2005, 17) developed politically into competing city-
states whose individual fortunes rose and fell through 
time because of the complex interplay of dynamic 
economic and political forces at the western edge of 
Figure 8.2. The Great Enclosure and adjacent stone walling at Great Zimbabwe (image courtesy of Wikimedia 
Commons).
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Figure 8.3. Khami – restored elite stone walling (image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons).
Figure 8.4. Danangombe – a later Rozvi capital (image courtesy of the Archaeology Division, School of 
Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg).
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by the late first millennium. Around ad 1000, a suite 
of major changes in settlement patterns, architecture, 
and ceramic traditions signalled a reorientation of 
Swahili society into one that has been characterized 
as maritime, cosmopolitan, urbanized, and Islamized 
(Fleisher et al. 2015). This society has endured to the 
present, albeit one that has survived the vicissitudes 
of Portuguese, Omani, and British interventions from 
the end of the fifteenth century onwards (Pearson 1998; 
Horton & Middleton 2000). 
Bunyoro
Bunyoro, also known sometimes as the Bunyoro-Kitara 
or Kitara kingdom, was one of many pre-colonial 
states in the Great Lakes region of East Africa. First 
encountered by European explorers searching for the 
source of the Nile, the last independent omukama (king) 
of Bunyoro, Kabarega (variously spelled, including 
‘Kabaleega’), fought a fierce but unsuccessful guerrilla 
war against the British at the end of the nineteenth 
century that resulted in his exile to the Seychelles 
and the establishment of indirect British rule. A suc-
cession of abakama (plural of omukama) occupied the 
the settlement’s founding to several small, probably 
circular houses of perishable materials surrounding 
a well and dated to about ad 760, tipped the scales 
irrevocably in favour of an African origin (see also 
Horton 1986; Nurse & Spear 1985). He also discovered a 
small, probably timber-framed building at the site, also 
dating to the late eighth century, that he interpreted as 
a mosque, indicative of the early introduction of Islam 
to the East African coast (Horton 1996, 2018). Subse-
quent research, primarily by Tanzanian archaeologists 
(Chami 1998; Chami & Msemwa 1997; Juma 1996), 
demonstrated a longer, developmental sequence for 
settlement on the coast that involved some maritime 
trade with the Roman world. 
Swahili settlements along the coast in the first 
millennium ad were mostly villages combining agri-
culture, the keeping of livestock, with some fishing 
and involvement in maritime trade. Some settle-
ments, notably Manda in northern Kenya, Tumbe 
and Unguja Ukuu on Pemba and Zanzibar Islands 
respectively, Kilwa in southern Tanzania, and Chibuene 
in Mozambique, however, were more successful and 
grew in size and in the number of imported goods 
Figure 8.5. Kilwa – audience court of the Husuni Kubwa palace (image courtesy of Stephanie Wynne-Jones).
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State formation
While there is no a priori reason the same factors and 
processes should have been operative in state formation 
across Africa, Connah (2016) nevertheless attempted to 
identify some ‘common denominators’. This exercise 
led him to conclude that control of highly produc-
tive land within the context of increasing population 
pressures was the ‘crucial common factor underlying 
the emergence of African elites’ (2016, 351; see also 
Johnson & Earle 1987). Added to this basic ingredient 
was external long-distance trade, itself an ‘intensifier’ 
of social changes that had begun with elite control of 
limited resources, such as copper, salt, iron, and ivory, 
which already circulated in ‘extensive internal trad-
ing networks’ (p.350, emphasis in original). A further 
important ingredient was ‘religious ideology’ that 
‘legitimized and reinforced’ the social hierarchy (p.352). 
Connah himself bemoans this ‘somewhat mechanis-
tic’ explanation for the origins of social complexity, 
remarking that ‘surely the reality is more complex 
than that’ (p.353).
The hypothesis of increasing population pressure 
and concomitant elite control of productive arable 
land is problematic for at least some African cases, 
particularly the states of the Great Lakes and perhaps 
also Great Zimbabwe and its antecedents. Control of 
internal trading networks and productive land are 
indeed mechanisms by which elites may seek power. 
However, the emergence of an elite and the forma-
tion of a state are not the same thing. Thus, Connah 
fails to distinguish between those factors that might 
lead to the establishment of a chiefdom and those 
that might bring a state into existence. Other than the 
brief mention of ideological legitimation, there is no 
discussion of how group fission would be prevented 
in the process of state formation. Moreover, exigencies 
of the archaeological data, particularly the paucity of 
regional site surveys, often preclude a firm conclusion 
about whether population pressure preceded or suc-
ceeded state formation. On present evidence, the latter 
seems likely, except perhaps in very circumscribed 
areas such as Nubia. 
If population densities were low in the earlier 
stages of state formation, then early elites may still 
have competed for control of internal exchange net-
works, but would there also have been a shortage 
of fertile agricultural land over which competition 
might take place? This is a difficult question that 
brings into focus two competing stereotypes of Afri-
can agriculture. On the one hand, Africa has often 
been portrayed as possessing poor, easily exhausted, 
and eroded soils on which rain falls erratically and 
often so heavily that essential nutrients are washed 
throne during the colonial period, but the institution 
of kingship was abolished by the independent Ugan-
dan government in 1967. However, it was reinstated 
in 1993, primarily as a cultural institution.
Wikipedia (2018) lists 24 kingdoms in the Great 
Lakes region in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, though some of these were small and often 
short-lived polities. The more substantial states 
included Buganda, Rwanda, Bunyoro, Nkore, and 
Burundi. Knowledge of the history of these states 
began with the collection of king-lists, each of which 
became longer with time as individual states sought 
to enhance their status with their colonial overlords 
by using British standards of worth (Henige 1974). 
Oral traditions of the history of Bunyoro began to 
be recorded early in the twentieth century (notably 
Fisher 1911), while the spread of literacy among the 
Banyoro eventually led to indigenous histories (nota-
bly Nyakatura 1973). These traditional histories divide 
the past into events associated with three successive 
dynasties, the last of which is the Bito, among whose 
rulers were Kabarega and the current omukama. Bito 
dynasty rulers presided over a state with three main 
social strata, the Bito elite, Bahuma nobles who special-
ized in cattle-keeping, and Bairu agricultural peasants. 
Capital sites were peripatetic, with each new omukama 
building a new capital supposedly laid out according 
to an established pattern that included several large 
buildings, all built of perishable materials (Roscoe 
1923, 73–86). Wars of succession were common, which 
reinforced the importance of the kingship as the 
‘indispensable conditions of security and national 
well-being’ (Beattie 1971, 111). The ancient kingdom 
of Bunyoro-Kitara also plays a role in the history of 
political anthropology; the concept of the ‘segmentary 
state’ was proposed by Aidan Southall (1956) based 
on his ethnographic work among the Alur, Ugandan 
neighbours of Bunyoro. Casting around for other 
and perhaps better examples of this political system, 
Southall (1988, 81) pointed to the historical kingdom 
of Bunyoro-Kitara as a ‘very large, loose, segmentary 
state,’ which he considered to have been ‘held together 
by ritual suzerainty, with a centralized core’ (Southall 
1999, 33; see Robertshaw 2010).
Archaeological evidence for Bunyoro history has 
focused on two types of sites, earthworks and shrines, 
excavations at some of which, in concert with historical 
linguistic research and analysis of oral traditions, have 
led to attempted explanations of the development of 
the state and its subsequent history (e.g. Robertshaw 
1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Robertshaw & Taylor 2000; 
Schoenbrun 1998). It is, however, fair to state that the 




and of exchange networks represents too narrow an 
analytical focus for understanding of state formation 
in tropical Africa. We are better served by looking at 
the individual case studies.
Great Zimbabwe
A fascinating, if sometimes acrimonious (e.g. Chiri-
kure et al. 2016), debate has been waged recently over 
the explanation of state formation in what is often 
called southern Zambesia, a region comprising the 
modern state of Zimbabwe and adjacent parts of Bot-
swana, South Africa, and Mozambique that includes 
Great Zimbabwe and all the sites that may have been 
incorporated into the Great Zimbabwe state and its 
antecedents. The model of state formation champi-
oned by Tom Huffman (e.g. 1986, 2000, 2009, 2010, 
2015a, 2015b) argues that there was only one state at 
a time for much of the region’s pre-European past, 
with a pristine state, with its capital at Mapungubwe 
(Fig. 8.6), eventually succeeded by that of Great 
Zimbabwe. The genesis of the Mapungubwe state 
could be traced to three major factors: (1) successful 
control of the accumulation and distribution of exotic 
trade goods, notably glass beads and probably cloth, 
acquired in exchange for gold and ivory, elephants 
being abundant in the Mapungubwe area in the cen-
turies leading up to Mapungubwe’s florescence in the 
thirteenth century; (2) population growth supported 
by extensive cultivation of fertile agricultural land in 
the vicinity of Mapungubwe during a period of higher 
rainfall; (3) rain-making and from it the emergence 
of sacred kingship that served to provide ideological 
legitimacy. In this model prestige goods are a more 
dependable form of wealth than cattle because cows 
are harder to look after than beads; thus, inequali-
ties of wealth that may have originally been based 
on the size of one’s cattle herd could be materialized 
and entrenched through the acquisition of prestige 
trade goods. It should, however, be noted that glass 
beads are found in the Shashe-Limpopo region, where 
Mapungubwe is located, from about the eighth cen-
tury onwards, so Huffman is not arguing that glass 
beads alone beget states. The third component of the 
model, the emphasis on rain-making, derives from 
ethnographic data on the role of rain-making among 
south-eastern Bantu-speaking peoples, together with 
structuralist interpretations of their worldview and 
use of space, as reflected in settlement layouts that 
could, via ethnographic analogy, be read into the 
archaeological record of Mapungubwe and other 
sites. In this model there was a shift in this worldview, 
epitomized by the emergence of sacred kingship, 
when the leaders moved their homes (and graves and 
rain-making activities) to the hilltop at Mapungubwe 
away. On the other hand, Africa and particularly its 
tropical rainforests have been viewed as veritable 
Gardens of Eden where almost anything will grow. 
In this context, some scholars have drawn attention 
to the tremendous productivity of some introduced 
Southeast Asian crops, especially bananas. Reality 
probably lies between these two extremes; each part 
of Africa must be examined separately in terms of its 
agricultural potential. In the Great Lakes region of 
East Africa, fertile land appears to be plentiful and in 
Rwanda supports the highest rural population den-
sities in modern Africa. Historical and ethnographic 
data reveal that many pre-colonial African chiefdoms 
and states had very low population densities whereas 
the opposite was true of acephalous societies (Shipton 
1984; see also Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940). In the 
Great Lakes region in earlier periods it was not fertile 
land that was in short supply, at least in the centuries 
prior to state formation; it was agricultural labour 
(Robertshaw 1999a). Therefore, elites are likely to have 
pursued wealth-in-people rather than wealth-in-things 
(Vansina 1990, 251; Guyer 1993; Guyer & Belinga 1995; 
Nyerges 1992). 
Control of internal exchange networks is also 
possible but the evidence for it is far from overwhelm-
ing, as perhaps one might have predicted based on 
Africa’s diversity. Examples of control of such networks 
include the likelihood that Ile-Ife’s emergence as a 
centre of kingship in West Africa was at least in part 
attributable to its near-monopoly in the production and 
distribution of beads (Ogundiran 2002, 434), while the 
monopoly of valuable local products, such as copper 
and salt, in the Kongo kingdom of central Africa to 
exchange for exotic items was critical for the acquisi-
tion and retention of power (Ekholm 1977). However, 
in both these cases the society in question was already 
enmeshed in external trade relations, including a trade 
in slaves, so control of internal trading networks may 
have been a product of the desire for external trade 
goods. Thus, contra Connah (2016, 350), external long-
distance trade may have led to attempts at control of 
internal exchange networks rather than vice versa. 
Furthermore, Chirikure (2014, citing Mudenge 1974, 
1988) has recently drawn attention to the fact that, 
by the time of Portuguese contact in the sixteenth 
century, the rulers of the Mutapa state, the successor 
to that of Great Zimbabwe, did not monopolize the 
trade with the coast that brought glass beads, cowrie 
shells, and cloth into the interior, though they did tax 
that trade, with glass beads being one acceptable form 
of payment. Under these circumstances, Chirikure 
(2014, 721) argues for the enduring importance of 
ancestors, cattle, and land as the bases of royal power. 
Thus, in summary, discussion of the control of land 
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New archaeological research, particularly at 
the site of Mapela (Chirikure et al. 2013, 2014) and 
in north-eastern Botswana (Van Waarden 2011), in 
combination with a re-examination of other sites 
suggests that ‘Mapungubwe’s hegemony amongst 
the ruined stone-walled sites has likely been exag-
gerated, suggesting that it is more likely that there 
were ‘several semi-autonomous, autonomous or 
competing centres (Garlake 1978, 490)’ (Moffett & 
Chirikure 2016, 346; see also Kim & Kusimba 2008; 
but see Huffman 2015a, 2015b for rebuttals of these 
claims and the evidence on which they are based). The 
source of the wealth of these emerging polities is most 
commonly mooted as having been cattle (e.g. Garlake 
1978 for Great Zimbabwe itself), though agriculture 
has also been mentioned (e.g. Pikirayi 2001). Cattle 
certainly formed the basis of economic power in the 
Toutswe polity of eastern Botswana that emerged in 
the late first millennium ad (Denbow 1986; Denbow 
away from both their cattle kraal and the houses of 
the commoners.
The alternative to the Huffman model is, as men-
tioned earlier, a more multi-pronged approach in terms 
of both the number of incipient complex societies in 
the early second millennium ad and their pathways 
to complexity. Those who champion this alternative 
do so based on both new and old archaeological data, 
as well as the anthropology and history of the Shona 
(the descendants of Great Zimbabwe’s inhabitants) 
and upon ‘our own worldview and lived experiences 
as Africans’ (Chirikure et al. 2016, 76). In addition to 
resurrecting earlier views of state formation in the 
region, the new perspective also includes a critique 
of the applicability to southern Africa of the theory 
that control over the distribution of exotic, prestige 
goods was a form of economic control facilitating the 
emergence of differential wealth and power (Chirikure 
2014; Moffett & Chirikure 2016).
Figure 8.6. Mapungubwe Hill (image courtesy of the Archaeology Division, School of Geography, Archaeology and 
Environmental Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg).
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separation of powers between chiefs who were politi-
cal leaders and mhondoro [spirit mediums of deceased 
kings or chiefs] who presided over spiritual issues’ 
(Chirikure et al. 2016, 90). These mhondoro did not 
always live at the royal capital and ‘tend to be associ-
ated with the interests of particular houses/families 
involved in succession rivalries’ (Mudenge 1988, 123), 
suggesting that they could act as a check on the power 
of the king and influence political rivalries. I return 
to the question of succession disputes and the role of 
ritual authorities later in this chapter.
The debates over the rise of states in southern 
Zambezia indicate that we tend to lack detailed archae-
ological data, particularly from regional surveys, to 
reach definitive answers. States may have arisen from 
a context of interacting peer polities (see Denbow et 
al. 2008 for a sense of these interactions). Within this 
framework, Chirikure and colleagues (2016; Moffett 
& Chirikure 2016) not only urge consideration of reli-
gion and ritual in this region in broader terms than 
rain-making, but also suggest that the basis of power 
and authority rested on ownership of land, itself 
derived from ancestral ties, ancestry more broadly, 
and individual entrepreneurship. All these factors were 
inextricably intertwined with the concept of wealth-in-
people, a concept both developed and widely applied in 
tropical Africa, in part as an alternative to the common 
notion of wealth as the accumulation of material goods, 
and one that may explain why African kings have so 
little ‘stuff’ compared to their counterparts elsewhere. 
This concept has been applied previously to the Great 
Lakes kingdoms (see below; see also Stephens 2016 for 
a more nuanced discussion of ‘wealth’ and ‘poverty’ 
in Great Lakes Africa).
Swahili
Much energy has been expended on the question of 
whether these city-states were founded by foreign-
ers (Arabs or Persians) or indigenes, a polarized 
and political debate in which protagonists often felt 
uncomfortable in occupying some more sensible mid-
dle ground (Robertshaw 1990; Horton & Chami 2018). 
Allied with this was a focus on excavations of the larger 
and presumably more glamorous stone-walled ‘towns’, 
with a concomitant neglect of village sites and regional 
settlement patterns that might have shed light on top-
ics like population growth and agricultural potential. 
Things have changed over the last couple of decades 
with some valuable survey projects (e.g. Fleisher 2003, 
2010; Helm 2000; Helm et al. 2012; Pawlowicz 2011, 
2012; Wynne-Jones 2007) that permit some considera-
tion of the place of towns within their regional context 
rather than simply thinking of them as urban outposts 
on the edge of the Indian Ocean, there simply to take 
et al. 2008). Gold and imported goods are considered 
to have been much less important.
Criticism of the prestige-goods theory is founded 
upon several lines of evidence. Historians of the Shona 
and of the Mutapa state that followed that of Great 
Zimbabwe have shown that the leaders of this and 
other polities did not monopolize imported goods 
nor did their capitals act as centres of redistribution 
of such goods (Mudenge 1974). Instead, itinerant trad-
ers bought and sold such goods wherever they could, 
leading polity rulers to levy taxes on the trade in the 
form of tribute, which could be paid in goods like 
glass beads but also in the form of grain. Tribute in the 
form of labour was probably more common and this 
would, of course, have been vital both to the construc-
tion of monumental dry stone-walling and perhaps to 
agricultural production. Ownership of exotic items 
was not restricted to elites (see Mudenge 1988; Bhila 
1982). Rather than enhancing their status through the 
display of prestige goods, ‘For their part, Manyika 
kings maintained their prestige by hospitality; they 
killed cattle and held beer-drinking parties…’ (Bhila 
1982, 14). Craft specialists and the goods they produced 
were also not controlled by rulers (Bhila 1982, 37–42), 
while gold mines were so dispersed that elite control 
would have been impossible (Swan 1994). However, 
these historical observations were made after the Por-
tuguese had severely disrupted the trading networks 
connecting the interior with the eastern African coast 
(Newitt 2002). Thus, we must be cautious in attempting 
to project this historical reconstruction back in time to 
the florescence of Great Zimbabwe and its antecedents. 
Nevertheless, archaeological evidence provides some 
support for such an extrapolation: crafts, such as metal 
production, were not preferentially associated with 
major centres, while craft production at these centres 
seems to have been based in individual homesteads 
rather than centrally organized on a more industrial 
scale (Moffett & Chirikure 2016, 366). Exotic trade 
goods, particularly glass beads, are found in consid-
erable quantities in commoner sites (e.g. Antonites 
2014) and these beads were probably incorporated 
into clothing worn by both elites and commoners of 
all ages and sexes, as evidenced from burials, though 
it is certainly the case that some royal burials, notably 
at Mapungubwe, contained many thousands of beads 
(Chirikure 2014; Moffett & Chirikure 2016; cf. Huffman 
2007, 2015).
In addition to the critique of the prestige-goods 
theory, Chirikure and colleagues (2016, 90–1) also take 
aim at the idea that the ritual aspect of royal authority 
at Great Zimbabwe was derived from the ruler’s rain-
making activities. Citing Mudenge’s (1988) history of 
the later Mutapa state, they note that ‘there was a clear 
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suggest may be linked to ‘nascent elites’ and ‘emerging 
notions of prestige’ (ibid., 275).
Although there is a paucity of good archaeological 
data, scholars assume slow population growth during 
the late first millennium ad and look to growth in trade 
as the foundation for the development of social com-
plexity (e.g. Kusimba 1999, 101; Horton & Middleton 
2000, 27; Horton & Chami 2018). Kusimba (1999, 201–3) 
emphasizes interregional and international trade in 
iron as a catalyst for this development, but the scale of 
iron production at Tana Tradition sites and its impor-
tance as an African export in the Indian Ocean trade 
may have been exaggerated (Killick 2009). More widely 
embraced is the idea that towns developed along the 
coast, as entrepots for the Indian Ocean trade that 
took advantage of their favourable locations within 
the Indian Ocean trading system and their ability to 
supply the main African products that trade coveted, 
namely gold, ivory, slaves, and mangrove poles for 
construction in the Middle East (Horton & Middleton 
2000, 99). Within this framework, the early adoption 
of Islam at the coast by perhaps only small numbers 
of converts, judging by the size of the early mosques 
at Shanga (Horton 1996, 2018), is viewed both as an 
entrepreneurial adaptation to partake in the religion 
that facilitated Indian Ocean trade and a means to 
avoid the risk of enslavement, since Islam forbade 
the enslavement of believers (Horton & Middleton 
2000, 51). As the more successful of these entrepots 
grew, it is assumed that the countryside filled in with 
settlers and a settlement hierarchy was established to 
facilitate trade with the interior and a supply of food to 
the coastal towns (Kusimba 1999, 101). Along the coast 
itself, competition between towns for export products 
from the interior that would supply the transoceanic 
trade led to independent city-states, within a wider 
Swahili civilization that developed in the first half of 
the second millennium (e.g. Wright 1993).
Recent research has predictably shown that this 
model assumes too much homogeneity along the 2000 
miles or so of the Swahili coast. Instead, different parts 
of the coast may have undergone different trajectories 
regarding the establishment of towns and their rela-
tionship to regional settlement patterns. The Kenyan 
coast may have seen the development of integrated 
settlement and economic hierarchies connecting the 
coast with the hinterland (Kusimba & Kusimba 2005; 
Kusimba et al. 2013; Shipton et al. 2013). However, the 
demand for African slaves in the Middle East in the 
late first millennium, at least until the Zanj Revolt in 
Iraq in ad 868 (Horton & Middleton 2000, 75), indi-
cates that coast-hinterland relations may have been 
varied and not always peaceful. Further south, on 
the island of Pemba, the establishment of towns was 
advantage of trading opportunities. These survey 
projects also served to direct attention away from 
discussion of the ethnic and linguistic identity of the 
first coastal settlers towards more processual concerns 
with the development of settlement hierarchies.
Although there are mostly ephemeral traces of 
Later Stone Age settlement by hunter-foragers in the 
coastal regions of East Africa, the advent of farming 
communities in about the late first millennium bc and 
early centuries ad may be said to have initiated the 
process of state formation. These communities com-
bined subsistence activities with iron-working and 
probably engaged in widespread exchange networks, 
commonly perhaps in perishable goods that leave no 
archaeological traces, such as salt, leather, and cloth 
(Abungu & Mutoro 1993). Settlements were located on 
the coastal hinterland, with a few right on the coast 
that were always adjacent to protected beaches where 
small boats could be hauled out of the ocean (Horton 
& Middleton 2000, 43). They were also preferentially 
located on nutrient-rich soils (e.g. Pawlowicz 2012). 
Very rare sherds of exotic pottery and glass beads 
have been discovered at both the beach-adjacent and 
inland sites. 
The locally made pottery on these early sites 
has clear historical ties to ceramics from the Great 
Lakes region and is commonly attributed to Bantu 
speakers (M’Mbogori 2015), a connection supported 
by the classification of ki-Swahili within the Bantu 
grouping (Nurse & Spear 1985). This early coastal 
pottery develops into a well-studied ceramic entity 
known as either ‘Triangular Incised Ware’ (TIW) or 
the ‘Tana Tradition’ (Chami 1994; see Chami 1998; 
Fleisher & Wynne-Jones 2011; and Horton & Chami 
2018, 140 for discussion of nomenclature). Early Tana 
Tradition pottery, dated about ad 600–900, is found 
both at early ‘stonetowns’ on the coast and at farm-
ing settlements in the interior, thereby corroborating 
the indigenous roots of Swahili urbanism (Fleisher & 
Wynne-Jones 2011, 247). Distributed along the coast 
from northern Kenya to Mozambique, as well as on 
the Comoro Islands, and up to several hundred kilo-
metres into the interior, the Tana Tradition tended to 
be viewed as a monolithic entity but recent analysis 
has demonstrated considerable variation that does 
not fall neatly into a geographical or chronological 
pattern and has been interpreted as evidence of ‘a vast 
interaction sphere in which communities were most 
in contact with those nearest to them, while cognizant 
of a larger sphere that included them all’ (Fleisher 
& Wynne-Jones 2011, 274). Beyond this, Fleisher & 
Wynne-Jones (2011) also note the presence of more 
vessels of bowl form at some larger coastal settlements 
that were involved in Indian Ocean trade, which they 
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coast itself, and very few imported goods prior to the 
eighteenth century (Pawlowicz 2012).
Looking ahead to the discussion of fragility within 
the Swahili civilization, it may be noted that ad 1000 
or thereabouts marks a major disjunction in Swahili 
history with some larger settlements flourishing as 
others were abandoned. This also marks the end of 
the Tana ceramic tradition that tied the coast firmly to 
the hinterland. From a review of the evidence, Fleisher 
and colleagues (2015) posit that the first centuries of 
the second millennium ad was the period when the 
Swahili became ‘maritime’, an idea that encompasses 
a new Swahili worldview and the development of 
‘cosmopolitanism’ as a defining characteristic of Swa-
hili society (LaViolette 2008; Fleisher et al. 2015, 108).
Bunyoro
The explanation of state formation in Bunyoro involves 
the successful integration of three types of evidence: 
archaeology, historical linguistics, and oral tradi-
tions. In addition (and this may be true of all regions 
the result of the depopulation of the countryside in 
the eleventh century, a process termed ‘synoecism’ 
(Fleisher 2010). The stimulus for this process may 
have been defence, but Fleisher (2010) argues for 
religion, noting an ‘enormous investment in religious 
architecture’ at the new town of Chwaka. Thus, people 
moved into towns to enjoy a fulfilling religious life 
that involved community worship at a Friday mosque, 
public baths, and permanent markets. This emphasis 
on the importance of Islam and Islamic ritual practice 
has also been seen more generally as crucial to the 
development of stonetowns (Wright 1993, 671–2). 
Further south again, Kilwa (Fig. 8.7) became perhaps 
the richest port-city in the Swahili world, but during 
the period of its growth, the regional settlement pat-
tern remained basically unchanged and unintegrated 
(Wynne-Jones 2007). Finally, it should be noted that 
state formation did not characterize the entire Swahili 
coast: in the Mikindani region of southern Tanzania 
near the Mozambican border, there was no settlement 
hierarchy, no concentration of population along the 
Figure 8.7. Kilwa – the Great Mosque (image courtesy of Stephanie Wynne-Jones).
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conditions for collective prosperity’ while the ‘dis-
persed shrines constituted ritual networks that shaped 
the framework within which communities sought their 
collective health’ (Kodesh 2008, 204). Analysis of the 
clan histories also indicates that gatherings at shrines 
brought together not only people but also knowledge, 
assembling people with varied skills into communities 
who could thereby improve a community’s economic 
and spiritual well-being (ibid., p.208). Thus, these 
shrines, tied to ancestral spirits, served as centres 
where local leaders could assemble the wealth-in-
people that marks many successful African polities 
(Guyer & Belinga 1995). These community networks 
of public health and healing could also have served as 
defensive networks in the face of raiding, most likely 
aimed at the capture of cattle and women (Robertshaw 
1999a). However, these shrines and the spirits they 
served were territorially based for they were situated 
on the lands of the ancestors, and the leaders of these 
communities drew their authority from claiming their 
primacy on the land and, therefore, a direct link to the 
ancestral spirits. Thus, opportunities for the expansion 
of political power, founded upon these communities, 
was very limited since it was tied to specific clan lands 
(Schoenbrun 2006, 1424, 1426). This account, based 
on work in Buganda, applies almost equally well to 
Bunyoro. As Schoenbrun (2006, 1430) remarked, ‘the 
era of ancient state-building had opened with public 
healing central to its unfolding.’
A new era was ushered in when territorial spirits 
were transformed into portable spirits capable of caring 
for the health of people over much larger regions by 
embracing spirit-possession. Of course, the process of 
state formation was far from straightforward; while 
spirits and their mediums were themselves powerful, 
they had to cope with changing climatic and economic 
contexts. The portability of these spirits, linked by 
kinship and known as Cwezi, and their decoupling 
from a territorial identity allowed successful leaders, 
who combined ritual, political, economic, and perhaps 
military skills, to construct larger, multi-clan polities. 
Several of the Cwezi spirits, despite the portability 
of their cults, are linked with shrines, identified in 
oral traditions, at each of which there was a resident 
spirit-medium. Excavations at two of these shrine 
sites have revealed occupation dating back to about 
ad 1300, though traces of earlier occupation suggest 
that their thirteenth- to fourteenth-century inhabitants 
selected sites with deeper roots, perhaps identified 
with territorial ancestral ghosts (Robertshaw 1994). It 
is tempting then, albeit speculative, to correlate these 
thirteenth- to fourteenth-century occupations as the 
centres of two of these nascent polities. This coincides 
broadly also with a period of somewhat drier climate. 
of the world), we must be sensitive to the dangers of 
teleology; we know much about the Nyoro state in 
the nineteenth century, so it is tempting to develop a 
just-so story to link farming settlements of the late first 
millennium ad to that later kingdom in a seamless, but 
perhaps fictitious, narrative.
To the best of my knowledge I may be the only 
archaeologist in recent years to have proposed narra-
tives of state formation in Bunyoro, though this is not 
to deny or belittle the important contributions to the 
archaeology of the region made by several colleagues 
(e.g. Posnansky 1966, 1969; Sutton 1993; Reid 1991, 1996; 
Connah 1991). My narratives began with a relatively 
straightforward processual model (Robertshaw 1994) 
that was modified and expanded to discuss gender 
issues (Robertshaw 1999), then examined within the 
context of climatic and environmental changes (Robert-
shaw & Taylor 2000), and then somewhat shoehorned 
into Blanton et al.’s (1996) dual-processual model 
(Robertshaw 2003). Recently, in a journal article (Rob-
ertshaw 2010), book chapter (Robertshaw 2016) and a 
couple of conference papers, I have stepped away from 
processual accounts to emphasize the roles of creative 
power, ritual, and healing networks in the develop-
ment and history of the Nyoro state. In this endeavour 
I have relied heavily on the work of historians, notably 
David Schoenbrun (1998, 2006) and Neil Kodesh (2008, 
2010), as well as on colonial ethnographies (Beattie 
1971; Roscoe 1923). A summary of my current view 
of state formation follows.
Much of Bunyoro seems to have been sparsely 
settled by farming communities prior to about ad 1000, 
with much of the region under forest cover. Pioneer-
ing farmers in this ‘internal African frontier’ (Kopytoff 
1987) probably comprised small, lineage-based com-
munities who, I surmise, would have been anxious 
to attract followers to assist in clearing forest for 
cultivation, to manage their small herds of livestock, 
particularly cattle, to provide craft specializations, such 
as iron-working, and for defence. Women, as farmers 
and as reproducers of labour, would have been needed 
as much as men. In Buganda, adjacent to Bunyoro, Neil 
Kodesh has examined the early history of clanship, 
roughly around the early second millennium ad, to 
reveal ‘how the domains of public healing and politics 
were intimately entwined in practical ways’ (Kodesh 
2008, 200; see also Kodesh 2010). The basis for this 
in early history was the existence of shrines, located 
on each clan’s primary estate, where ancestors were 
remembered and individuals sought help with their 
personal problems, such as infertility and poverty. 
Gatherings at these sites of relatively egalitarian clan 
members ‘…drew upon the idea that the public rec-
ognition of common spiritual entities generated the 
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strategies seem better supported by the archaeological 
evidence of earthworks, involving large labour inputs 
supported by elite control of surplus agricultural 
production (Robertshaw 2003, 161).
Fragile African states
Norm Yoffee (2015) and James Scott (2017) have 
recently drawn attention to the vulnerability and fra-
gility of ancient states, the theme of this volume and 
the workshop from which it stemmed, drawing their 
examples predominantly from Asia. Looking south of 
the Sahara most states seem to have barely survived 
for longer than a couple of centuries, during which 
turbulent times were common, particularly during 
interregna. Looking at two of our examples, Zimba-
bwe and Bunyoro, we can discern what may have 
been almost constant tension between the need for 
manpower (see also Scott 2017, 203) and womanpower 
(for reproduction) and the inherent risks (disease, 
‘ecocide’, ‘politicide’) that came with population aggre-
gation, making these states ripe for ‘disassembly’ (Scott 
2017, Chapter 6). Tension also probably existed between 
state-making strategies for population growth that, on 
the one hand, emphasized such things as healing net-
works, wealth-in-people, and voluntary aggregation, 
and those, on the other hand, that resorted to raiding 
and slavery. It is tempting, but perhaps fallacious, to 
assume that the latter, heavy-handed methods were 
a later development when polity population size had 
reached some critical threshold.
Great Zimbabwe
Continuing the previous paragraph’s emphasis on 
population size and its effects, estimates of the popu-
lation of what is sometimes referred to as the city of 
Great Zimbabwe have varied. While Garlake (1973) 
estimated the population as between 1000 and 2500, 
Huffman (1986, 323), using different assumptions 
and more site survey data, suggested that at its peak 
Great Zimbabwe may have been a city of at least 
18,000 people, most of whom lived outside the elite, 
stone-walled areas. In the media and textbooks, this 
figure is commonly rounded up to 20,000. However, 
a new study, using multiple lines of evidence includ-
ing newer fieldwork at the site, concludes that at its 
peak (Period IV: ad 1200–1700), Great Zimbabwe 
may have been home to as few as 228 or as many as 
2009 people (Chirikure et al. 2017a), numbers that 
certainly give pause to the notion that this was a city. 
The history of stone-walling at Great Zimbabwe spans 
almost a thousand years so the new, lower population 
estimates make the settlement’s sustainability more 
comprehensible.
The later construction of earthworks at some locations 
in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries (Robertshaw 
2001, 2002) probably indicates competition between 
these polities. 
Whether these Cwezi polities can be labelled 
‘states’ is moot, though an earlier generation of 
historians interpreted the Cwezi oral traditions as 
evidence of a vast, short-lived, and ‘loosely organized 
empire’ (Nyakatura 1947; Oliver 1953; quote from 
Ogot 1984, 503–4). Nevertheless, the sixteenth century 
witnessed the collapse of the Cwezi polities and the 
immigration of a new dynasty of rulers who established 
a new kingdom (Bunyoro) which they ruled until the 
arrival of the British near the close of the nineteenth 
century (Schoenbrun 2013).
Healing networks, portable spirits, ancestral ghosts, 
etc. represent an unusual array of factors responsible 
for state formation, at least when viewed by archae-
ologists. Taken together they serve to emphasize 
the importance of creative power in state formation 
rather than the instrumental power with which most 
archaeologists of a Western bent feel far more com-
fortable (Robertshaw 2010). Earlier archaeologists 
in search of an explanation for state formation in 
this region tended to latch onto the accumulation of 
wealth in cattle and control of prime grazing lands 
(e.g. Posnansky 1966; Sutton 1993), as well as control 
over regional trading networks, particularly in salt 
(Connah 1987, 225–6), ideas that were materialist and 
grounded in ethnography, but not well supported by 
the evidence (Robertshaw 2003, 152–3). These earlier 
explanations also ignored agency and ideology and 
overlooked variation in polity scale and complexity. 
While marrying the narrative of creative power to 
the archaeological evidence from Bunyoro may be 
difficult, despite the existence of shrine sites and later 
earthworks, at least it offers a novel perspective. In 
applying the dual-processual model to this evidence, 
I argued that the harnessing of creative power early in 
the process of state formation was one of several exclu-
sionary (network) strategies employed by emergent 
elites, the others being control over the production 
and distribution of iron and ivory, and participation 
in a prestige-goods network (Robertshaw 2003, 160). 
However, in retrospect, evidence for elite control 
over iron and ivory is slim, while the prestige goods, 
glass beads in this case, are not only rare but found 
in the burials of children and adolescents as well as 
those of adults. Even if we set aside the recent critique 
of the applicability of the prestige-goods model to 
Africa (Moffett & Chirikure 2016), we still need to 
understand the cultural context of these goods in 
Bunyoro. If the case for exclusionary power strategies 
is weak in Bunyoro, the succeeding corporate power 
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said that they were not the first to criticize the structur-
alist interpretation of Great Zimbabwe (see Beach 1998 
and commentators thereon). In place of the synchronic 
model, Chirikure & Pikirayi (2008; Pikirayi & Chirikure 
2011; cf. Huffman 2010) argued that different areas of 
the site, notably the hill (or ‘acropolis’ as it used to be 
known) and the Great Enclosure were the locations of 
the residences of successive kings. They also argued, 
reliant heavily on excavations in one part of the site 
(Collett et al. 1992), that Great Zimbabwe was not 
almost completely abandoned in the mid-fifteenth 
century, when Khami became the capital of the later 
Rozvi state and the Mutapa state was founded to the 
north, but that it continued to be a major centre.
If Great Zimbabwe itself held far fewer people 
than previously surmised, what about the state of which 
it was the capital? We are not only a long way from 
having any reliable estimates of the state’s population, 
but we also may question previous assumptions of the 
A small population at Great Zimbabwe may also 
be relevant to discussion over the settlement’s history 
in terms of the dating and functions of different parts 
of the site. Huffman developed a cognitive model of 
Great Zimbabwe at its peak that used ethnography, 
history, and the available archaeological evidence to 
argue that the core, stone-walled areas of the settle-
ment were laid out according to structuralist principles 
that reflected and reinforced the worldviews of its 
inhabitants. Different parts of the site were assigned 
different functions: for example, the king’s residential 
area (Fig. 8.8), the court, the residences of royal wives, 
the treasury, and, most controversially, the hypothesis 
that the Great Enclosure served as an initiation school 
for girls (Huffman 1996). While cognizant of Great 
Zimbabwe’s long history, this model treated the site 
synchronically. As readers will have realized by now, 
that which Huffman has built is ripe for reinterpreta-
tion by Chirikure and colleagues, though it should be 
Figure 8.8. Great Zimbabwe – the Great Enclosure viewed from a royal residential area on the hilltop formerly known as 
the ‘Acropolis’. The red deposits in the foreground derive from a series of elite structures excavated by the Public Works 
Department in 1915 to release the pressure from ‘African’ houses on what was at that time regarded as the ‘Phoenician’ 
stone walls (image courtesy of the Archaeology Division, School of Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg).
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centres (Killick, pers. comm.) also casts a shadow over 
their identification as possible capitals, the new, much 
smaller estimate of Great Zimbabwe’s population 
provides a scalar context that would seem to allow 
for such small capitals. 
Competition, as well as diplomacy and alliances, 
between numerous peer polities in the centuries fol-
lowing the demise of Great Zimbabwe’s state raises 
questions about the availability of military forces and 
the economic foundations of these polities. Historical 
sources indicate that states did not possess standing 
armies but mobilized the peasantry in the event of 
emergency or a decision to take the offensive. A Mutapa 
ruler could mobilize 3000–5000 warriors within 24 
hours, though peasants were probably very reluctant to 
leave their agricultural labours during the rainy season. 
Any campaign also had to be short-lived because of the 
difficulty of keeping the troops fed (Mudenge 1988, 137, 
141). Booty in the form of livestock and women was a 
strong incentive for military service (ibid., 142).
In addition to succession disputes and external 
threats, rulers were also concerned with the economic 
foundations of their polities. Agriculture and pastoral-
ism were the mainstays of the economy. Striking here 
is the importance of corvée labour for agriculture, with 
peasants spending 7 out of every 30 days cultivating 
the fields of their kings, provincial governors, chiefs or 
sub-chiefs (Mudenge 1988, 19, 164). Tribute, particu-
larly from those living far from the capital, was also 
paid in cattle, grain, gold, iron hoes, slaves, and ivory 
(ibid, 19). The capital was economically supported 
by its hinterlands, in part perhaps because capitals 
were not necessarily sited with agriculture as the first 
consideration but rather with a view to the control of 
grazing lands, goldfields or trade routes (ibid., 26-7). 
Mudenge (1988, 78) even suggests that the supply 
of drinking water constrained the population size of 
the capital. Thus, maintenance of the food and water 
supply for the capital, as well as conscripting labour 
for agriculture and defence, including the building 
of the monumental stone walling, must have been 
an ongoing challenge for the king and his ministers. 
With such a high demand for labour and tribute, 
vigilance was needed to avert or suppress revolts and 
defection, i.e. voting with one’s feet. Loyalty could be 
bought with booty and gifts of glass beads and cloth 
(Mudenge 1988, 142, 186). Loyalty, however, was not 
simply an economic transaction; shared language, 
identity, and religious beliefs served to integrate each 
polity, though kinship may have been particularly 
important. Royal polygamy – kings commonly had 
hundreds of wives – ‘was primarily designed to foster 
loyalty’ (Mudenge 1988, 110), though the flip side of 
this was the problem of numerous contenders for the 
state’s geographical extent. While Great Zimbabwe is 
the largest archaeological site in the modern country 
that shares its name and stood perhaps at the apex of 
a four- or five-level site-size hierarchy, there are more 
than 150 other elite stone-walled centres in the region 
(Chirikure et al. 2012). Also, in the sixteenth century, 
following the decline of the Great Zimbabwe state and 
Portuguese contact, there were ten ‘major Shona king-
doms’ (Mudenge 1988, Map 3), as well as numerous 
smaller polities. From an archaeological perspective, 
AMS dating often indicates the contemporaneity of 
many of these sites, but the historical reality, as revealed 
by contemporary Portuguese accounts, oral traditions, 
and Shona ethnography, was probably much more 
complicated. Each new ruler of a polity established a 
new capital, different from that of his predecessor. This 
was often his existing residence, so a settlement could 
have a long history during which it may have served 
as a capital on one or more occasions. Royal succession 
was also complicated; Mudenge (1988, 81) terms it ‘col-
lateral adelphic succession’, but this masks a reality in 
which warfare usually determined the outcome. At least 
16 of 28 successions in the Mutapa state between 1692 
and 1902 involved military force (Mudenge 1988, 79; 
see also Bhila 1982, 20, who recounts that all eight 
Rozvi rulers, spanning a period of less than a century, 
were killed in internal political upheavals), with the 
average length of reign being about 14 years (Chirikure 
et al. 2012, 365). It may also be borne in mind that, as 
mentioned earlier, the settlements of royal spirit medi-
ums (mhondoro) represented additional, alternative 
centres of power (Mudenge 1988, 123; Chirikure et al. 
2016, 90; Chirikure et al. 2017b, 4). Thus, from about 
1450 onwards, with the establishment of the successor 
states to Great Zimbabwe, there were numerous peer 
polities, characterized by shifting capital sites, as well 
as shifting cattle camps (Lane 2004, 809, cited by Chiri-
kure et al. 2012, 365) since the royal herds were usually 
too large to be kept at the capital (Mudenge 1988, 162). 
Questions remain, however, about whether the 
post-1450 pattern of numerous polities with shifting 
centres can be imposed on earlier times. In particular, 
the early sixteenth-century disruptions caused by 
the arrival of the Portuguese along the coast, includ-
ing their sack of Kilwa in 1505 (Freeman-Grenville 
1962, 80–104), and their botched efforts to seize all 
facets of the gold trade may have destabilized the 
political and economic order, undercutting possible 
elite control of gold mining and the prestige-goods 
trade that it financed. Nevertheless, Chirikure et al. 
(2012, 365–6) cite evidence from much later periods in 
other parts of southern Africa to bolster their general 
case for short-lived peripatetic capitals. While, the 
very small size of many of the 150 plus stone-walled 
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et al. 2015), strong cultural, cosmological, and economic 
ties to the Indian Ocean, and ‘cosmopolitanism’ (LaVio-
lette 2008), two overarching traits that both defined 
the Swahili and differentiated them from their inland 
African neighbours. Both traits were materialized in 
the ‘stonetowns’ (Fig. 8.9) that developed where natural 
harbours enticed traders to come ashore.2 Here were 
built port facilities, mosques, and the stone-houses of 
the waungwana (‘patricians’), which served as a visual 
guarantee of the creditworthiness of their owners and 
as accommodations for visiting international traders.3 
Forms of dress and the display of exotic goods, such 
as Chinese porcelain in houses and on pillar tombs, 
reinforced this cosmopolitan Swahili worldview. Rice, 
as well as coconuts, both Asian imports, began to be 
grown at the coast and rice became the staple grain 
of the elite, served in imported vessels during feasts 
(Walshaw 2005; Fleisher 2010).
When we turn our attention to the resilience and 
fragility of the Swahili city-states, we can look first at 
throne. A ruler also chose his own council of advisors, 
though with some offices prescribed as the prerogative 
of particular families (ibid., 85). If nothing else, a suc-
cessful ruler had to be an entrepreneurial politician.
If Great Zimbabwe was the capital of a large state, 
that state was at its zenith for less than two centuries. 
The successor states were smaller; the Mutapa state 
contracted significantly in each century of its existence 
(Mudenge 1988, 76). Individually the states of southern 
Zambesia, from the late first millennium to well after 
Portuguese contact at the end of the fifteenth century, 
were, it seems, often small and fragile, albeit with 
exceptions like that of Great Zimbabwe. Collectively 
the statecraft that pitted those peer polities against 
each other lasted for about a millennium, a notable 
case of resilience.
Swahili
The Swahili civilization of the early to mid-second mil-
lennium ad was characterized by ‘maritimity’ (Fleisher 
Figure 8.9. Gedi on the Kenyan coast (image courtesy of Michal Golos).
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relations between the stonetowns and neighbouring 
hinterland groups that were more important where 
the stonetowns were located on the mainland, rather 
than islands, and thus prone to attacks.
However, it would be a mistake to focus too nar-
rowly on the notion of ‘African kings’ because some 
rulers were indeed Islamic sultans, as in the case of the 
rulers of the towns of Mogadishu and Kilwa visited 
by the great world traveller, Ibn Battuta, in 1331, who 
noted their piety and generosity (Freeman-Grenville 
1962, 27–32). Many of these rulers traced their line-
ages back to a merchant ancestor (Pearson 1998, 43). 
Moreover, beneath or instead of kings in the political 
hierarchy of each city-state was a council of elders, 
commonly comprised of the heads of the patrician 
lineages (Prestholdt 2018, 519). Patricians, who were 
an exclusive minority in the city-states, were the 
cosmopolitan traders whose economic power was 
masked by their moral superiority, itself founded 
upon their urbanity, adherence to Islamic tenets, 
perceived Arabian origins, knowledge, and purity 
of behaviour (Horton & Middleton 2000). In some 
city-states there were numerous public offices held 
by patricians, elevation to which required the wealth 
to sponsor large public feasts (ibid., 168). Beneath the 
patricians were a host of commoners, from specialist 
craftsmen down to slaves. This strongly hierarchical 
system was balanced by binary oppositions that, in 
Horton & Middleton’s (2000, 130) estimation pro-
moted unity by drawing attention to the equality of 
those in either half of the binary system and often 
by the regular rotation of power between the halves. 
Towns were divided into spatially and socially sepa-
rated moieties who fought each other in ritualized 
contests, nowadays often soccer matches, on formal 
occasions. The moieties were often crosscut by other 
heterarchical divisions; for example, in Lamu town 
in northern Kenya, the patricians were divided into 
two ‘demes’, members of each of which lived in both 
moieties. Demes took turns to choose a town leader 
to serve a four-year term (ibid., 159).
The success of these Swahili hierarchical and 
heterarchical modes of organization can perhaps be 
measured by the longevity of the city-states, some 
lasting half a millennium or more, during which time 
they were characterized by complex histories. Ruling 
dynasties were sometimes replaced either violently 
or when they died out and patrician families might 
fall on hard times, but states endured. If they fell into 
irredeemable decline, with the eventual abandonment 
of the stonetown, the currents of international trade 
may have been the ultimate cause, though warfare 
between city-states in a region in the context of declin-
ing trade may have been a proximate cause, as might 
competition between the city-states and second at the 
internal politics of the stonetowns. Relatively little is 
known about the military capabilities of the city-states, 
but they appear to have been generally weak, with the 
inhabitants of the stonetowns reliant upon their hin-
terland counterparts for defensive support (Horton & 
Middleton 2000, 177). Instead, my reading of secondary 
sources suggests that Swahili city-states engaged, like 
good Americans, in competitive, free-market capital-
ism. City-states competed, on the whole peacefully it 
would appear, to host foreign traders and for access to 
the routes, markets, and goods of the African interior 
(Wright 1993). Thus, ‘entrepreneurial activity was 
encouraged and, in fact, became the cornerstone of 
political authority’ (Kusimba 1999, 134). A Swahili 
proverb expresses this a little differently: ‘Biashara ni 
vita’ – ‘Trade is war’ (Horton & Middleton 2000, 106). 
The resilience of the trading system was probably 
sustained by the fact that much of the commerce was 
rooted in individual partnerships and patron-client 
relationships, so that if one merchant failed, another 
succeeded. Fragility lay, as elsewhere in world systems, 
in the perturbations of foreign and inland markets that 
Swahili merchants could not control. It was perturba-
tions in such things as the prices of gold and ivory and 
the availability and cost of imports, themselves often 
tied to political upheavals thousands of miles away, 
that might signal a change in the economic fortunes 
of individual city-states.
Within city-states resilience and fragility were 
bound up with governance and relations with adja-
cent commoner towns and villages that supplied 
subsistence and other necessities to the stonetowns 
of the patrician traders (Fleisher 2018). There was no 
single political system shared by all the city-states 
prior to European contact, but all seem to have been 
characterized by a complex interplay of internal rank-
ing and binary systems of social and political order. 
Our knowledge of these systems is constrained by 
the available evidence – a mixture of ethnography, 
Portuguese documents, the accounts of occasional 
Muslim travellers such as Ibn Battuta in the fourteenth 
century, and Swahili chronicles that were often as 
much propaganda as history. As parsed by Horton & 
Middleton (2000), it seems that many but not all towns 
had kings and occasional queens, who ‘rarely if ever 
reigned over more than a single town’ (ibid., 157) and 
whose political power and authority tended to be weak 
(see also Prestholdt 2018, 519). Their functions seem to 
have been primarily ritual and spiritual, as well as cer-
emonial. They were ‘essentially African kings’ (ibid.), 
not Islamic sultans. This African quality of kingship, 
in Horton & Middleton’s view, with its emphasis on 
ritual and ancestor veneration served as a bridge in 
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Once settled in Bunyoro, Bito rulers had not only 
to defend the realm against neighbouring polities but 
also were required to satisfy their own needs for labour 
and tribute without entirely alienating a pastoral nobil-
ity and an agricultural peasantry who could choose 
to vote with their feet (Roscoe 1923, 9) or join forces 
with one of Bunyoro’s enemies or a renegade prince of 
the kingdom. Kings then maintained their balancing 
act in numerous ways, as is evident, for example, at 
the coronation ceremonies where the king was both 
admonished by his subjects to rule justly but also 
handed artefacts symbolizing coercion, as when he 
struck a smith’s hammer on an anvil to demonstrate 
that he was both the head of all the blacksmiths and 
himself like a hammer (Beattie 1971, 112; KW 1937, 296). 
The king was not divine, but he maintained a state of 
ritual purity, involving both pastoral and agricultural 
rites, because his personage symbolized the state 
(Roscoe 1923). 
The king assembled loyal followers at the capi-
tal by appointing numerous office holders, many of 
whose offices belonged in some sense to individual 
clans (Beattie 1971, 124–5). Moreover, the king was the 
source of all political authority in the kingdom which 
he delegated to provincial chiefs and other officials 
(ibid., 147). Included in this delegation of political 
authority was ritual potency (ibid., 117–8). The king 
also regularly toured the country, both collecting 
tribute and providing feasts. During these tours, he 
also frequently availed himself of the opportunity to 
acquire ‘wives’. Although he never officially married, 
a king had innumerable wives; Kabarega is reputed to 
have fathered 140 children (ibid., 143). Thus, the king 
bound his subjects to himself in various ways. How-
ever, there were a few areas within his kingdom that 
the king rarely, if ever, visited. These were religious 
centres affiliated to the ancient Cwezi cults and they 
seem to have served as tolerated nodes of resistance 
to state power, outlets perhaps for the safe exercise of 
disaffection that the state could monitor with relative 
ease (Robertshaw 2010).
Loyalty to the king came with a price: the pay-
ment of tribute – food, beer, ivory, iron, animals, and 
labour. Royal tax collectors also took the king’s due 
at every market. Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that 
the term for ‘government’ in Bunyoro incorporates 
the idea of ‘oppressive weight’. Yet, the desire of the 
populace to exert its autonomy by fleeing the state 
and its demands was offset by the fact that the state 
provided security, not only militarily but also in terms 
of economic security, notably famine relief (Doyle 
2006, 31–2). Indeed, the famed historian, Jan Vansina 
(1990, 232), has argued that this tension between the 
populace’s desire for autonomy and their need for 
local environmental changes (Lane & Breen 2018). In 
the case of Shanga, conquest by the rival city-state of 
Pate during an economic boom has been mooted as 
one of two possible causes for Shanga’s abandonment, 
the other being failure of the supply of freshwater 
(Horton 1996, 427–8). 
Bunyoro
Earlier in this paper I argued that healing networks and 
creative power were key ingredients in the rise of the 
Bunyoro kingdom because they provided the means 
for leaders to attract followers, both men and women, 
whose labour and reproductive capabilities were 
needed to carve out and sustain polities in wet tropical 
Africa. The need for labour was constant throughout 
the history of the kingdom, though as Bunyoro and 
neighbouring kingdoms like Buganda grew in size 
and in their degree of centralization, warfare and 
raiding, mostly for cattle and women, often took the 
place of attempts to attract followers by more peaceful 
means. Kabarega, the king who fought the British at 
the end of the nineteenth century, earlier established a 
standing army with companies stationed throughout 
the kingdom, often under the leadership of foreign 
mercenaries, that engaged in plunder and expanded 
the kingdom through conquest (Steinhart 1977, 21–2). 
However, the nineteenth-century kingdom probably 
differed significantly from that of earlier times because 
of newfound wealth in the king’s hands derived from 
his control of the large-scale export of slaves and ivory, 
external markets for which were booming during this 
period (Robertshaw 2016).
Earlier and perhaps less gifted abakama (kings) 
than Kabaraga had to negotiate a more delicate game 
with their subjects. Some of our knowledge of this is 
derived from oral traditions and historical linguistics 
but it is primarily based on extrapolation from ethnog-
raphy and thus needs to be treated cautiously. It seems 
that the Bito dynasty, of which Kabarega was the most 
illustrious member, arrived as a group of intruders 
into Bunyoro in the sixteenth century following the 
country’s devastation by drought-induced famine. 
However, this was not simply a conquest because 
it also involved a negotiation with pre-existing cen-
tres of creative power and a new commitment to a 
separation of powers between spirit-mediums and 
royal authority (Schoenbrun 2013). The presence of 
substantial earthworks at some sites indicates that 
there may also have been warfare, though an oral 
tradition recounting the slaying of a ruler of one of 
these earthworks by his disgruntled peasantry sug-
gests internal strife rather than conquest, perhaps in 




status quo that may have been in existence. Thus, 
for example, in Bunyoro the oral traditions that have 
been central to the reconstruction of the kingdom’s 
history were recorded and interpreted by historians 
after the forces of the last independent ruler, Kabarega, 
were defeated by the British when the kingdom was 
coming to terms with both its new colonial overlords 
and its diminished status vis-à-vis the neighbouring 
kingdom of Buganda. Similarly, we need to be cautious 
about assuming that the apparent lack of elite control 
of prestige goods in the Mutapa and later states of 
Zambesia can be extrapolated to earlier times, given 
that the disruptions to international trade caused by 
Portuguese interventions at the turn of the sixteenth 
century may have undermined earlier trading patterns 
and regulations.
Both similarities and differences exist between 
Great Zimbabwe, the Swahili and Bunyoro states. 
From the perspective of state formation, it is easy 
to point to the fact that the prosperity of both Great 
Zimbabwe and the Swahili city-states was intimately 
connected to the Indian Ocean world system, whereas 
Bunyoro developed in relative isolation from this 
trading system. Bunyoro’s state arose from complex 
negotiations interweaving economic, demographic, 
religious, and environmental factors. Nevertheless, 
similarities existed between Great Zimbabwe and 
its successor states on the one hand and Bunyoro on 
the other. Crucial to their success was not so much 
access to prime agricultural land, but their ability 
to accumulate wealth-in-people, a project for which 
creative power was more frequently exercised than 
instrumental power. Once established, these states 
engaged in raiding and warfare to acquire both people 
and cattle. The people acquired by force may have 
started life in their new societies as slaves, but there 
were paths to integration (see Robertshaw & Duncan 
2008). Kings took numerous wives and established 
political and ritual offices at their courts that provided 
different families and clans with a stake in the states’ 
success. However, religion also offered checks, albeit 
mild, on state power in the form of the independent 
spirit-mediums (mhondoro) of Zimbabwe and the 
Cwezi cult centres of Bunyoro. Wars of succession 
were frequent, and the most successful leaders were 
clearly highly entrepreneurial, navigating threats from 
numerous competing peer-polities while maintaining 
order at home. Individual polities were often small and 
fragile but the larger system in which they operated 
was resilient.
At first glance, the Swahili city-states seem very 
different from the states of the Great Lakes and south-
ern Zambezia. Indeed, literacy, adherence to a world 
religion, and the overarching economic importance of 
state-sponsored security lies at the heart of all poli-
tics in equatorial Africa (see also Doyle 2006, 15). The 
populace was reminded of the value of this security 
with each interregnum because bloody succession 
wars were the norm.
Success in maintenance of the loyalty of the king’s 
subjects, while also extracting tribute and their help 
in defending the realm, may have presented another 
challenge: how to feed those who congregated at the 
capital. Finger millet (Eleusine coracana) was the staple 
grain and its importance is reflected in rituals when 
the king was required to drink millet-beer rather than 
milk (Roscoe 1923, 107–12); there were also royal daily 
ceremonies involving cattle and milking. Famines 
were frequent in Bunyoro (Robertshaw et al. 2004) 
despite perhaps relatively low population densities. 
Moreover, grain stores were often looted or destroyed 
during wars. Nevertheless, one of the expectations 
imposed on the king by his subjects was the provision 
of famine relief, so the acquisition of adequate food 
supplies must have been a continual goal. Each king 
constructed a new capital on his accession, sited on a 
flat hilltop with adequate supplies of water for both 
people and cattle. He could also move his capital during 
his reign on the advice of a ‘medicine-man’. Most of 
the royal cattle herds were dispersed in prime grazing 
areas often several days distant from the capital. The 
king also frequently travelled around his kingdom 
collecting tribute in various forms, including grain 
(Roscoe 1923). All these observations suggest that every 
opportunity was taken to mitigate demands upon the 
capital’s food supply.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored three precolonial Afri-
can states, chosen because I was somewhat familiar 
with their archaeology and history. They were not 
chosen as representative of particular types of states 
nor do they encompass, by any means, the range of 
variation present among African states. At the outset 
I did not regard them as either particularly fragile or 
stable complex societies. Now, almost at the end of 
the chapter, we may consider their similarities and 
differences as they relate to the larger project of this 
volume. First, however, some remarks on the historical 
context of these three states as it pertains to the quality 
of the information presented above. In every case, I 
have made extensive use of historical and ethnographic 
evidence which I and others have projected further 
back into the past to allow integration with archaeo-
logical data. This is potentially problematic because 
in each case the historical and ethnographic evidence 
was collected after European contact disrupted any 
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timescale of decades, the statecraft that characterized 
the larger system to which these dynasties and city-
states belonged proved much more resilient.
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that reproduced the Angkorian polity. Occasional 
public practices supplemented regular face-to-face 
patron-client transactions that circulated capital and 
royal favour within ‘galactic polities’ (sensu Tambiah 
1977) whose Indic scaffolding provided identities and 
guided political practice (Mus 1937). 
This chapter synthesizes conventional (historically 
driven) and recent (largely archaeological) findings to 
explore the anatomy of power in the Angkorian state. 
Internal documentary data (Khmer and Sanskrit inscrip-
tions) provide models of power that archaeologists are 
now starting to study in the urban Angkorian core and 
in its provinces. Three premises structure this discus-
sion. The first is that the state apparatus was intrinsically 
fragile through nearly 600 years of reign by at least 35 
named rulers. Particular historical events challenge 
the apparent stability that long reigns (median of 22 
years) suggests. Some rulers held the throne for 5–6 
years, and others as much as half a century. Even the 
most powerful eleventh- to twelfth-century Angkorian 
rulers, however, confronted frequent internal revolt 
and wars with western neighbours (e.g. Hendrickson 
2010, 482; Table 1). Some succumbed to the turmoil, and 
others transformed their polity into a true expansionist 
empire. A second premise is that Angkorian state fragil-
ity was rooted in the patronage structure that was its 
foundation. Each ruler’s charismatic authority stemmed 
from his ability to nurture far-flung ‘circles of kings’ 
(Wolters 1999, 106 et passim) to integrate the state. The 
Angkorian state’s ability to penetrate its civil society 
through collective action channelled revenues through 
patronage networks that supported its urban epicentre 
and its elite; large-scale public rituals also reproduced 
conditions of sovereignty (Smith 2011; 2015, 186–7; 
Yoffee 2016; see also Ando 2017 and Richardson 2012 
for comparative examples). 
This paper’s third and final premise focuses on 
local responses to state efforts to control and asserts that 
The urban configuration we call Angkor (now in 
northwest Cambodia) was the epicentre of a polity that 
dominated mainland Southeast Asia’s patchwork of 
Hindicized states by the early second millennium ad 
in both geographic and demographic scale. Perched 
at the northern edge of the great Tonle Sap lake, 
Khmer inhabitants expanded the state’s capital to a 
1000 sq. km area. Its massive state temples and royal 
reservoirs, built sequentially from the ninth through 
fifteenth centuries, reflect a physical durability that 
was rarely matched in Angkor’s political sphere. Yet its 
monumentality belies the fragile web of patronage and 
factionalism that underwrote its operations. Successful 
kings integrated agrarian provinces into the broader 
Sanskrit cosmopolis through alliance-building and 
negotiation. They depended on religious institutions 
and the priestly elite who managed them; state and 
local temples required capital and labour from com-
munities throughout the Angkorian world. So did the 
administrative apparatus whose residents populated 
its urban capital. 
Like ‘collapse’ narratives elsewhere in the ancient 
world (e.g., Yoffee & Cowgill 1991), the capital’s fif-
teenth-century ‘collapse’ has drawn more attention 
than has long-term pattern of cultural resilience, and 
archaeological research is key to understanding long-
term cyclical patterning in the Khmer civilization. 
Angkorian state power was far-reaching: distributional 
patterning in both Angkorian monuments and artefacts 
suggest the polity intermittently controlled most of the 
lower Mekong Basin. Public display, monumentality, 
and collective ritual practice bound its population to 
their leaders and fuelled production to feed the state. 
Such pageantry and display was not empty theatre 
(contra Geertz 1980): Angkorian rulers had sovereign 
authority, and were considered semi-divine. They 
engaged large communities of subjects for oath-taking, 
military parades, and participation annual festivals 
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‘civilizations’ elsewhere (Schwartz 2006; Schwartz & 
Nichols 2006; Baines & Yoffee 1998, 2000). The Lower 
Mekong Basin, where the Angkorian state rose and 
fell in the first and second millennia ad, provides a 
particularly effective case study because of the recent 
burst in research activity since the mid-1990s. The 
first Angkorian ruler, Jayavarman II, declared him-
self as çakravartin (universal ruler, Sanskrit) to begin 
the Angkorian state. Epigraphic, archaeological, and 
external documentary sources provide complementary 
perspectives on what this universal rule entailed – for 
individual leaders and for the polity they adminis-
trated – from the ninth through fifteenth centuries ad.
Universal rule and the Angkorian state
Angkor is an exemplar of state fragility. Nearly three 
dozen rulers ascended the throne through its 600-year 
rural settlement systems formed stable, basal elements 
of Khmer ‘civilization’ for more than a millennium (see 
also Sedov 1978, 118; Stark 2006a). Angkor exerted cen-
tripetal social force on its populace: rural populations 
visited the capital regularly to participate in seasonal 
religious festivals and political events. Local communi-
ties and their leaders engaged with, and perpetuated, 
political authority through economic and ritual activity. 
Yet rulers were deeply dependent upon their subjects, 
who collectively could and did resist state mandates as 
a form of infrastructural power (Mann 1984, 113; Yoffee 
2016). Alliance formation and regular pilgrimages to 
rural temples to honour their resident gods were also 
part of each Angkorian ruler’s contract with his subjects. 
Archaeological research on Angkorian fragility 
is now in its nascent stage, and could benefit from 
comparative insights on fragile state superstructures 
vis-à-vis resilient cultural foundations that undergirded 
Figure 9.1. One view of twelfth-century Angkor in its broader Southeast Asian World 
(modified from Multzer-O’Naghten 2014, with permission).
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provision the capital with rice and subsistence goods, 
and interlocking and nested levels of patronage from 
the king to the countryside were key to this system 
(e.g., Mabbett 1978). A growing archaeological litera-
ture on Cambodia’s archaeology supports a cyclical 
model of collapse and regeneration which began in 
the late fourteenth century ad and continued beyond 
the putative ad 1431 Thai sack of Angkor Thom (e.g., 
Penny et al. 2019).
Specific details of these systemic death throes 
still elide historical explanation, but archaeologi-
cal approaches shed light on what collapsed, and 
how the population reorganized, at the twilight of 
the Angkorian state. Here I marshal epigraphic and 
archaeological evidence to argue that the Angkor-
centred state collapsed when negotiations with the 
periphery failed, and that Middle period Khmers 
re-located key cultural institutions that depended on 
knowledgeable religious specialists and highly charged 
rituals. Archaeologists are particularly well-equipped 
to document settlement continuity (and discontinui-
ties); what seems clear from our work to date is that 
fragility in particular polities was counterbalanced by 
resilience in the local systems, based on an ideology of 
family. Nearly thirty years of archaeological research 
illustrated that collapse and regeneration characterized 
much of the premodern Khmer historical trajectory 
(Stark 2006b). Like other Old World examples (Baines 
and Yoffee 1998, 2000; but see Blackmore 2016 and 
Inomata 2016, 41–3), what made Angkor the Khmer 
civilization was a shared cultural web that revolved 
around an Indic ideology of gods and a god-king, a 
political structure that privileged a nobility with a 
priestly elite, and a reliance on patronage to link and 
fuel social relations. 
Until recently, historiographic approaches char-
acterized Angkorian research, and inscriptional (rather 
than archaeological) sources dominated, drawing 
from slightly more than 1,300 published Khmer and 
Sanskrit inscriptions. This corpus is modest in contrast 
to sources available for Mesopotamia: for example, 
Richardson (2017, 3) analyses 2,800 Old Babylonian 
texts, and at least 22,000 tablets from Kanesh alone 
deal with Old Assyrian trade (N. Yoffee, p.c., 2018). 
Even in the neighbouring and contemporary Chola 
state of South India, Talbot (1991) used 895 twelfth- to 
fourteenth-century inscriptions from Andhra Pradesh, 
and Stein (1960) drew from 1,000 inscriptions from 
the single shrine of Srī Vēnkatēśvara (Triupati Chit-
toor district, Andhra Pradesh state). Yet previous 
epigraphic research on the Angkorian documents has 
produced a complete dynastic history, and insights on 
topics from land tenure to slavery (e.g., Coedès 1968; 
Mabbett 1983; Stern 1951), and more recent research 
long history. Angkor was monumental: the largest pol-
ity across Southeast Asia, with a vast capital covered by 
nearly 1400 brick and stone temples, and an elaborate 
urban water management network that took centuries 
to construct and untold populations to maintain. Ample 
evidence now exists for the four logistical techniques 
that states use to develop infrastructural power (Mann 
1984), and which archaeologists view as hallmarks of 
a competent state, namely: a well-developed bureau-
cracy, literacy, standardized exchange rates, and 
transportation route (see also Mackil 2017; Scott 2016; 
Yoffee 2016, 1058). But how this was done, and why 
Angkorian Khmers chose to participate in this state 
system remain a matter of debate. So, too, does the 
geographic reach of this polity (Fig. 9.1). From its sixth- 
to eighth-century origins, the Angkorian state lived on 
and through ideological power that naturalized social 
stratification, semi-divine rulership, and – within a few 
centuries – the notion of a unified polity that persisted 
for centuries.
Angkor’s conventional collapse narrative (Groslier 
1979) involves fifteenth-century catastrophe in the face 
of environmental duress: pieces of Angkor’s hydraulic 
infrastructure caved in under massive floods, some 
buildings buckled and others burned Buckley et al. 
2010; Day et al. 2012; Penny et al. 2014, 2019). Con-
ventional wisdom maintains that Thai military forces 
sacked the great city of Angkor Thom and hauled 
away the city’s valuables, artisans and Angkorian elite 
to their capital of Ayutthaya (summarized in Coedès 
1968, 236–7; see also Polkinghorne et al. 2013 for recent 
interpretation). Woven largely from documentary 
accounts, it’s difficult to imagine a timelier story of 
political overshoot, ecological mismanagement, and 
climatic stress, and scholars have grappled with the 
relationship between climatic stress and political 
overshoot (e.g., Buckley et al. 2010; Fletcher and Evans 
2012; Lucero et al. 2015). Archaeological work in the last 
two decades challenges most tenets underlying such 
unidirectional views of climate change and human 
action (e.g., Butzer 2012; Faulseit 2016; McAnany and 
Yoffee 2010; Middleton 2017). 
The case for climate-driven Angkorian overshoot 
rests on a slim archaeological base, and requires 
more field-based empirical research. For one thing, 
Angkorian researchers are only now beginning to 
understand the nature of Angkorian urbanism. A 
growing archaeological record suggests both continuity 
in occupation in Greater Angkor and long-term set-
tlement at localities to the south that became capitals 
after Angkor collapsed. Suppose what collapsed was 
as much social as it was environmental or physical? 
Angkorian statecraft centred on its complex hydraulic 
urban centre but depended on its rural hinterland to 
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doorways to mark royal and/or elite donations and 
record dynastic history, but these sources also inform 
on Angkorian economy, sociopolitical organization, 
ecology, and territory (e.g., Jacob 1993; Lustig 2011; 
Lustig et al. 2007; Lustig & Lustig 2013; Mabbett 1978; 
Wyatt 2001). Art and architecture (and particularly 
bas-reliefs, of which the Angkor Wat temple’s Third 
Gallery alone has more than 1200 sq. m) offer insights 
on particular historical events and offer stylistic strate-
gies for chronology-building. Chinese sources (both 
tribute-trade records and a thirteenth-century Chinese 
account) offer information on trade goods and Angko-
rian urban live. Middle Khmer (fifteenth–eighteenth 
century) chbap texts, a genre of moral didactic poetry, 
also offer insights on Angkorian culture (Ebihara 1984). 
Archaeological data, late to the Angkorian scholarship 
table for largely geopolitical reasons, are key to under-
standing Angkor’s emergence and political collapse, 
and complement current understandings of this polity. 
Angkor and its preceding states emerged in the 
Lower Mekong river basin (in current-day Cambodia, 
southern Vietnam, northeast Thailand, and southern 
on of c. 628 Angkorian period Khmer and Sanskrit 
language inscriptions (Lustig 2009, 129) offers insights 
on economy, social status, and power (e.g., Lowman 
2016; Lustig 2011; Lustig et al. 2007; Lustig & Lustig 
2013). Archaeologists working at Angkor are now docu-
menting an equally compelling and complementary 
history of Angkor: of both protracted and episodic 
urban landscape collapse, of substantial continued 
settlement across the Angkorian plain after the court 
moved south, and peaks and valleys in the nature of 
centralized control through time.
Context: place, structure and scale
The Angkorian state housed most of its ninth- to 
fifteenth-century capitals on the Tonle Sap plain in 
northwestern Cambodia (Fig. 9.2) (Evans et al. 2007, 
2013; Fletcher et al. 2008). Documentary sources shape 
current understandings of Angkorian state, in the 
form of local inscriptions (in Khmer and Sanskrit) 
and Chinese dynastic histories (Coedès 1968). Dedi-
catory stelae in sandstone were lodged in temple 
Figure 9.2. Greater Angkor region (NW Cambodia) (courtesy of Christophe Pottier, Damian 
Evans, Pelle Wijker, Sarah Klassen and Kong Leaksmy).
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iconography closely mirrored contemporary temples in 
the capital. Administrative divisions included the pramān 
(Khmer)/visaya (Sanskrit) (province) or deśa (region or 
district) in Sanskrit, and srok (Lewitz 1967, 405–7), and 
phum or grama (village/hamlet). Meanings of these 
administrative units may have shifted from the earlier 
to the later Angkorian periods (Sahai 1977b, 36–7), and 
the geographic reach of the Khmer state varied by ruler, 
and influence, rather than direct control, likely charac-
terized provincial relations with the centre.
Angkor and its secondary centres experienced 
a high degree of network integration and interde-
pendence in what some have called a form of ‘system 
stability’ for much of the ninth through thirteenth 
centuries (Hall 2017, 191; Hendrickson 2012). The 
relative degree of localized power in provincial cen-
tres varied considerably, from provincial capitals that 
were resource extraction zones to others like Phimai 
that were sources of dynastic lineages and exercised 
more independence. Beyond these provincial centres 
were more distant areas which sent missions to the 
Song Chinese court; they may have been viewed as 
outlying districts (e.g., Wyatt 2001, 13). 
Laos) as pulses in a 2,000-year period of state forma-
tion, collapse and regeneration. The Lower Mekong 
basin comprises a single analytical unit through its 
topography of alluvial lowlands and fringing moun-
tain ranges that restrict settlement and through its 
hydrology (the Mekong and its tributaries, including 
the Mun and Chi River valleys on the Khorat Plateau) 
that facilitated movement from one end of the basin to 
the other. Chinese documentary accounts and archaeo-
logical research describes first millennium ad states, 
tinged with Indic traditions, that arose in this region. 
The Angkorian period, conventionally begun in ad 802, 
marked the Lower Mekong’s third iteration of urban-
ism and coalesced statehood.
The Angkorian state was a largely rural world, 
but its political life revolved around a megalopolis that 
depended on rural largesse (or at least compliance) 
for economic support. Angkorian scholarship conven-
tionally distinguishes between the urban epicentre 
(Angkor or Greater Angkor), periurban/suburban 
areas surrounding the city, and a provincial and largely 
rural hinterland that held multiple secondary centres, 
each marked by a state temple whose structure and 
Figure 9.3. Mapped roads in the 




resilience of the Angkorian capital and its surrounding 
provinces. Angkor’s grand epicentre (called variously 
Greater Angkor or Angkor) required huge labour 
inputs for its construction and maintenance, but was 
rarely hegemonic in economic or political (Lustig 
2009, 180). Figure 9.4 uses 683 Angkorian period 
texts to illustrate the kind of foundation inscription, 
found in religious structures, relative to the structure’s 
straight-line distance from Greater Angkor. Royal 
inscriptions (blue) include the ruler’s name; rājakāryya 
inscriptions (green) represent royal service inspectors 
who administered ‘royal service’, which included state 
taxation and/or corvée labour (Sahai 1977a, 124–9). As 
extensions of the state, these inscriptions are another 
indicator of the state’s economic and political reach. 
The (red) non-royal inscriptions were made by Ang-
korian elites. This data set includes almost the same 
number of royal as non-royal texts, and suggests that 
effective royal power may have been concentrated 
within 50 km of the capital: and perhaps even closer 
(see also Lustig 2011, 42–3).
Two periods in Angkorian history (the early 
tenth century and later twelfth century) are distinc-
tive for their high numbers of inscriptions, suggesting 
competition between the ruler and powerful elite 
families to consolidate power through by establish-
ing religious foundations with non-royal inscriptions, 
Roads and waterways wove rural and urban 
communities into Angkor’s social cartography, and 
mediated social relations between the capital and its 
provinces (see Ando 2017, 129 for Roman parallel). 
Formal Angkorian roads connected the capital to its 
secondary centres (Fig. 9.3), facilitating tax collection 
(as did the French colonial constructions some centu-
ries later: Edwards 2006, 427–32) and contact between 
the capital and its hinterland. Jayavarman VII was the 
last Angkorian king to inscribe the state through large 
public works projects within and beyond his capital. 
He founded and supported monastic universities at 
several state temples to instruct young elites in Bud-
dhist religion and medicine (e.g., Chhem 2007). He 
upgraded extant roads with bridges and resthouses 
to facilitate regular movement between provincial and 
urban spaces, sponsored annual Buddhist festivals 
that required rural-urban pilgrimage, and patronized 
temples in the four corners of his realm. That Khmers 
envisioned themselves as part of a polity was clear by 
the tenth century, when an inscription used the term 
‘world of Kambu’ (Lowman 2016, 96–8). The transpor-
tation systems made this state legible to its inhabitants 
and neighbours in a characteristic state strategy that 
ensured some modicum of control (Scott 2017).
Social and political integration throughout the 
Angkorian state was generally fragile, despite the 
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might continue in both directions. Two areas beyond 
this urban core also housed capitals briefly and popu-
lations for longer periods: an area on Phnom Kulen 
known as Mahendraparvata that served as a ninth-
century royal palace, and the site Koh Ker (120 km 
northeast of the capital), where tenth-century kings 
Jayavarman IV and Harshavarman II ruled for years; 
Harshavarman II had only three years on the throne. 
As the polity’s undisputed primate centre, Greater 
Angkor housed three capitals through time (Groslier 
1979): (1) ninth-century Hariharâlaya, which Jayavar-
man II founded and two successive rulers inhabited; 
(2) Yaśodhapura, which Yasovarman I established in 
ad 889 with Phnom Bakheng as his new capital and 
which remained important until the city’s fifteenth-
century collapse; and (3) Angkor Thom, the crown 
jewel of Jayavarman VII’s reign that he consolidated 
after his ascension to power in ad 1181. 
Khmer was likely the prevailing ethnicity in the 
capital and throughout the Cambodian lowlands, but 
other ethnic groups also inhabited Angkorian space. 
Mon, Karen, Pearic- and Kuay-speaking peoples and 
Kuay inhabited uplands that fringed the Khmer-speak-
ing plains (Pryce et al. 2014; Tambiah 1976, 79; Wyatt 
2001, 4–7). A Khmer cultural package – architectural, 
iconographic, and artefactual – united these peoples. 
So did myriad dyads of patron-client relationships 
which, in aggregate, produced the dense social web 
that inhabitants recognized as the land of Kambuja 
[kamvujadeśa] (Coedes and Dupont 1943, 109) or the 
land of the Khmer (K. 1158 Sab Bak inscription; Chi-
rapat 1990, 12). 
Khmers generally did not have a formalized car-
tographic tradition until the mid-nineteenth century 
(Lewitz 1967, 367), and the Angkorian state lacked 
precise geographical edges for most of its 600-year 
long existence (Lowman 2016, 103, 109). By the tenth 
century ad, what Smith (2015) describes as ‘state 
assemblages’ filled the Angkorian polity: architecture 
and accoutrements in village-level shrines (prasats), 
at state-sponsored hermitages (Estève and Soutif 
2010–2011), and in temples at secondary centres. 
Four sanctuaries (to the north, west, and south of 
the capital) were founded to house the sacred linga 
(Sūryavarmeśvara) during the early years of the reign of 
eleventh-century Suryavarman I (du Bourg 1970, 305–6; 
Vickery 1985, 239–40, Footnote 60).
 By the twelfth century, at least 40 brief Sanskrit 
and Khmer inscriptions, carved doorframes and pil-
lars of the Bayon temple list divinities associated with 
localities across the Angkorian polity, from the capital 
itself to points south in the Mekong Delta (like Phnom 
Chisor), west into the Khorat Plateau, and east along 
the Mekong River (Maxwell 2007, 128–30). These gods 
thereby challenging centralized royal power (Lustig 
et al. 2007, 16, 22; Vickery 1985). Angkorian rulers 
used patronage to forge alliances with the landed 
elite throughout the historical trajectory, culminat-
ing in Jayavarman VII’s embrace of Buddhism as a 
state religion to unify his state. His attempts to make 
twelfth- to early thirteenth-century Angkor legible – by 
adopting a new state religion, undertaking monumen-
tal construction programmes, and implementing new 
civic responsibilities – may well have led to the gradual 
disintegration of the Angkorian state.
As premodern Southeast Asia’s largest inland 
agrarian state, Angkor’s location on the Tonle Sap plain 
was ideal for a complex mix of rice farming strate-
gies that Khmers employed until the mid-twentieth 
century ad to make Cambodia a rice granary for the 
region: at least three kinds of rice (rain-fed, recession, 
floating) for year-round cultivation. No convincing 
evidence exists for intensified agricultural strategies 
(like canal-fed irrigation systems) in Angkor’s capital, 
although its plentiful ponds and massive reservoirs 
(baray) provided drinking water during annual mon-
soon season droughts. The thirteenth-century Chinese 
visitor Zhou Daguan described daily markets in the 
capital (Zhou 2007, 70–1). No formal market areas 
have been identified archaeologically, although Bayon 
temple bas-reliefs illustrate markets and their vendors. 
Angkorian records, moreover, contain no references 
to a common currency (Lustig 2009, 172), although 
Angkorian Khmers valued Chinese goods (from porce-
lains, lacquerwares and silks to copper dishes and glass 
balls [Zhou 2007, 71]) and may have colonized several 
provinces to improve their access to trade routes. 
The structure of sovereignty: Angkorian 
landscapes 
Scholars since Henri Parmentier (1916) have recognized 
that the Angkorian polity’s geographic boundaries 
varied through time. At its peak, the ‘Khmer Empire’ 
covered the entire Cambodian lowlands, much of 
central and all of NE Thailand and southern Laos 
(Hendrickson 2010, Figure 5; 2012; Figure 6.3). Its 
maximal scale, in the late twelfth – early thirteenth 
centuries, exceeded c. 70,000 sq. km, during the reign 
of Jayavarman VII. Too little archaeological research 
has been done to estimate the population of the Ang-
korian state, but Greater Angkor Project work on 
the capital has proposed a carrying capacity of up to 
750,000 people at its peak (Fletcher et al. 2015, 1398). 
Scholars are still working to chart the geographic 
extent of its urban epicentre that is glossed as Greater 
Angkor (Fig. 9.2). Inspection of this map indicates the 
arbitrariness of two edges (NW, SE), and patterning 
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‘omnaich does more work for Cambodian leaders than 
does komlang (forced compliance). This is not to suggest 
historical stasis: fourteenth- to fifteenth-century Khmers 
replaced their Hindu/Buddhist pluralistic religious 
systems with a full-fledged embrace of Theravada Bud-
dhism, and the earliest documented written reference to 
omnaich appears in eighteenth-century Middle Khmer 
inscriptions (Pou 1974, 187). Yet Old Khmer inscriptions 
and bas relief imagery suggest more continuity than 
rupture in Khmer cultural traditions.
Patronage
Angkorian rulers dealt with factions, ethnic groups, 
and religious leaders through elaborate structures of 
patronage, from the court to the countryside. Histo-
rians have long suggested that patron-client relations 
characterized Angkorian rulers in a kind of patrimonial 
bureaucracy (e.g., Mabbett 1978; Wolters 1999, 29–31) 
whose roots extend into the first centuries ad and reso-
nates in cultures across the region (e.g., Davis 1973; 
Jacobsen and Stuart Fox 2013; Scott 1972). Patronage 
could, however, also be an institutional vulnerability. 
This was particularly true in the capital, and during 
times of severe environmental and political stress. Iden-
tifying who comprised Angkorian rulers’ ‘clientele’ is 
the first step to understanding how the system worked 
within an Indic-tinged cultural tradition. 
Angkorian rulers were primus inter pares (fewer 
than a third followed a parent or sibling to the throne 
[de Bernon 1997, 346]) whose elite royal entourages 
were fundamental to effect rule.1 At the centre of the 
entourage was a hereditary priestly class (priests/ 
teachers/ministers/counsellors) who instructed young 
royalty, provided ritual support for state-sponsored 
Vaisnavite and Saivite ritual state ceremonies, and 
founded religious establishments like hermitages 
(asramas). Some priestly elite were also royal descend-
ants: as one example, Yajñavarāha (Jayavarman V’s 
first guru) and his brother established the temple of 
Banteay Srei. Figure 9.5 illustrates one portion of a 
Banteay Srei inscription.
Also in the entourage was a range of nobility, 
including the ruler’s extended royal families (préas 
vongsa) & officials related by marriage. We know 
several titles for chief ministers (or mratān khloñ), 
including the prime minister, the minister of justice, 
the minister of the palace and finances, the minister 
of transport by land and for war, and the minister of 
waterborne transport. Additional counselors/advisors 
safeguarded the royal foundations, coronated new rul-
ers, and served as envoys with neighbouring polities. 
Below this ‘inner circle’ was an outer-inner circle of 
junior officials (du Bourg 1970, 294 et passim; Sahai 
1978, 30-32; Zhou 2007, 51).
required royal patronage and pilgrimages on a pre-
scribed cycle (Groslier 1973, 369). Continuous inputs 
of labour and resources from local communities pro-
duced and sustained sovereign spaces (following Payne 
2017, 181–4; Smith 2003). The engine that fuelled this 
process was power as patronage, and intricate social 
webs of relationship that bound elites together across 
the political landscape that was Angkor.
The structure of sovereignty: Angkorian power 
and patronage
Power – its manifestations and its origins – is a recur-
rent theme in the study of state societies (e.g., Ando 
and Richardson 2017; Mann 2008; Richardson 2012; 
Routledge 2013; Yoffee 2005, 22–41), and has occupied 
Southeast Asian anthropologists (Durrenberger 1996; 
Ebihara 1984; Geertz 1980; Hanks 1972; Leach 1964; 
O’Connor 1997; Tambiah 1976, 1985) and historians 
(e.g., Anderson 1972; Aung-Thwin 1991; O’Connor 
1996; Reid 1988; Reynold 1995; von Heine-Geldern 
1941; Wolters 1999) for a very long time. Three key 
elements undergird such understandings of the Indic-
influenced states: (1) power accrued differentially to 
individuals, giving some individuals moral superior-
ity over others; (2) power was not absolute; and (3) 
authority was contingent. Leaders (or ‘men of prow-
ess’ following Wolters 1999) cajoled more than they 
coerced, and used display as much as military might to 
legitimize their rule. Their polities had centrifugalizing 
tendencies, and boundaries shifted with the fortunes 
of neighbouring polities. Acquiring labour, rather than 
land, was the impetus for most military action (Andaya 
1992; O’Connor 1997; Reid 1988). 
Archaeologists working outside Southeast Asia 
have embraced Southeast Asian models of power 
that link leadership with the sacred, and emphasize 
transformative qualities of public display and ritual 
(following Demarest 1992), and increasingly challenge 
Geertz’ (1980) model of ritual display as weak state 
power. Their explorations of ways in which public and 
ritual performance in states (e.g., Inomata and Coben 
2006; Ristvet 2015; Smith 2003, 2015) have revised the 
model, but few Southeast Asian archaeologists studying 
the region’s Classical states cite this literature. Power in 
Angkorian power was an immanent quality that rulers 
possessed or lost, depending on both fate (and spirits) 
and charisma. Khmers today recognize this ‘trans-
cendent sovereignty’ (Lowman 2016, 99) as ‘omnaich 
(influence or authority over others), and it is required 
for effective leaders (neak thom or neak mean omnaich) to 
remain in power (Jacobsen and Stuart-Fox 2013; Ledger-
wood and Vijghen 2002). Charisma generates networks 
of social relationships called khsae (strings, connections); 
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for central government (Lustig and Lustig 2013, 67; 
Sahai 1977b, 45-47). Figure 9.6 presents a schematic 
hierarchy of the Khmer sociopolitical world.
Most Angkorian Khmers, however were not elites. 
Commoners and slaves built and maintained the state: 
farmers and artisans, and other workers contributed 
corvée labour, occasional military service, and tribute 
as part of their daily lives. Most did not own land; many 
likely worked on estates of elite landholders; and almost 
none their names are not recorded. Dedicatory inscrip-
tions in temple foundations concentrate instead on the 
many varieties of slaves (khñum or khñom) who were 
donated to temples for royal service. The term khñum (or 
khñom) encompasses many roles: indentured servants, 
Just beyond this core elite was the greater network, 
including provincial elite. Village-level administration 
was headed by a village chief or headman (khloñ srok), 
who was responsible for collecting revenue, manag-
ing economic affairs of temples (which needed both 
supplies and labour). A council of village elders 
(grāma-vŗdda) also adjudicated disputes, and these vil-
lages may have been aggregated into districts. At least 
two categories of mostly male civil servants operated 
at the local level: (1) the khloñ víșaya, who managed 
property and represented central government in all 
villages except those that provided certain commod-
ity directly to the state; and (2) the tamrvāc, inspectors 
were also in charge of various administrative affairs 
Figure 9.5. Banteay Srei 
inscription, a tenth-century 
temple constructed by  
the guru of Prince 




against periodic droughts. Angkorian rulers had several 
physical means of establishing their political control 
(Stern 1951). In ad 889 or 890, Yasovarman I commis-
sioned the construction of 100 asramas (hermitages) 
throughout his domain to house, feed, and care for 
priests and needy commoners: the aged, the infirm, 
and the neglected (Coedès 1932, 99). Three of these 
hermitages were established close to the capital and 
flanking the baray: one each for followers of Śiva, 
Vișnu, and Buddha. The twelfth- to thirteenth-century 
ruler Jayavarman VII took this responsibility just as 
seriously, and he founded 102 hospitals across his 
kingdom and provisioned them with medicine (e.g., 
Chhem 2007, 106–14). Rulers were broadly responsible 
to commoners, and (from the late thirteenth century, at 
least) also engaged with them face-to-face to adjudicate 
disputes (Zhou 2007, 83–4), a practice that continued 
into the sixteenth century (Groslier 1958, 155). Subjects, 
in turn, were responsible to their ruler.
But how did this work? At the highest level, the 
Angkorian monarch was a client to his deity patrons: 
the gods required regular rituals, care, and capital 
in their spirit homes (in the form of statuary) lodged 
in massive state temples. The twelfth-century ad 
Ta Prohm temple, for example, was the centre for a 
two-week annual Bhagavatī spring festival, in which 
processions made offerings to three guru and 1000 
divinities, 619 of which were housed at Ta Prohm 
(Coedes 1906, 77–8). Such temple complexes housed 
permanent slaves (some from ethnic minorities, and oth-
ers descended from criminals), prisoner of war slaves, 
and ‘temple slaves’ who worked half-time for temples, 
and may have been peasant farmers (e.g., Lustig and 
Lustig 2013; Mabbett 1983, 44–54; Sahai 2012, 233–9).
Angkorian Khmers, from high nobility to provin-
cial commoner, viewed their ruler both their universal 
sovereign (çakravartin, Sanskrit) and the mouthpiece of 
dharma (Mabbett 1978, 41). Like contemporary rulers 
elsewhere in mainland Southeast Asia, the Khmer mon-
arch as ultimate father and benefactor, was responsible 
for the kingdom’s welfare (Tambiah 1976, 30–1). Khmer 
rulers were mortal, not divine: they had sovereignty 
of the earth, while the gods ruled the universe or cos-
mos. Brahman elite, working with their rulers, made 
offerings to the gods and managed the royal cult of the 
kamraten. jagat ta rāja and its sacred objects to ensure 
the future of their kingdom. The Khmer ruler was the 
most sacred of humans, but only became divine upon 
his death (Pou 1998).
All Angkorian rulers were responsible for the wel-
fare of their subjects, which included making freshwater 
available year-round. Suryavarman II, for example, 
was metaphorically portrayed as the god Indra on the 
walls of Angkor Wat (Figure 9.7). Angkorian rulers 
were even responsible for the rain. Upon ascension to 
the throne, each ruler sponsored the construction of a 
giant reservoir (baray) whose waters simultaneously 
reflected the Indic universe and buffered the capital 
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of mid-twelfth-century Angkor Wat temple (Figure 
9.8). Here we find eight lists of oath-takers with c. 400 
names, and one scene of the king and his entourage 
atop Mount Sivapada, as his followers swear an oath 
to their sovereign (Brown 2004, 359–63).
Three Angkorian rulers were responsible for the 
polity’s greatest pulses of territorial expansion, and 
sponsored a disproportionate amount of monumental 
construction. The first, Suryavarman I (ad 1002–1049), 
first consolidated the Angkorian polity from the 
Mekong Delta to southern Laos. A second, Suryavarman 
II (ad 1113–1150), whose ancestry from NE Thailand 
represented a dynastic shift to what some scholars 
have called the Mahīdharapura dynasty (e.g., Briggs 
1951, 178–80). He reunited the empire, bringing what 
is now central and NE Thailand even more firmly 
under Angkorian control and expanded eastward 
toward Champa (in central Vietnam). Suryavarman 
II not only constructed Angkor Wat; he consolidated 
royal authority at the expense of royal officials through 
pageantry and monumentalism (like the oath-swearing 
ceremonies mentioned previously).
Jayavarman VII (ad 1180–1218) fashioned the deep-
est local entourage and the broadest bonds of patronage 
ever experienced in Angkor by formalizing transpor-
tation systems to facilitate state-directed movement: 
from the capital to provincial areas to battle outside 
invaders (Cham, Dai Viet), to quell internal rebellions 
(Hendrickson 2010, 485, Table 1), and to knit the polity 
huge numbers of support staff (from religious special-
ists to dance troops, musicians, and gardeners), goods, 
and cultivable land for fields and temple gardens. 
By the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, 
inscriptions list 12-14,000 residents at Preah Khan 
and Ta Prohm. Rulers were the temple’s patrons, and 
hereditary Brahman specialists in their court directed 
temple and public ceremonies (Mabbett 1969, 204–6]). 
Angkorian rulers depended on their entourage 
of royal elite in the capital, a dense web of social rela-
tions that they built and maintained assiduously. They 
married their sons and daughters to provincial elites 
(who in turn sent daughters to the court to serve as 
concubines). Kings made land-grants to elites in the 
capital, who founded villages of serfs to farm agricul-
tural lands whose products ultimately served the state. 
Kings granted titles and ceremonial positions in the 
court (even sinecures), like fan-bearing, barber, and 
wardrobe keeper (Mabbett 1978, 28; Sahai 1978; Wolters 
1973, 24). In turn, the ruler required loyalty from his 
subjects, occasionally through public performance. 
The east gate of Phimeanakas, in Angkor Thom, 
includes an inscription that records an oath-swearing 
by 4,000 members of the tamrvāc corps from 200 differ-
ent districts in service of their king Suryavarman I in 
ad 1011. Violation of their allegiance was punishable 
by rebirth in thirty-two hells (du Bourg 1970, 299–300; 
Sahai 1978, 25–6; Vickery 1985). Suryavarman II also 
memorialized oath-taking in the southern gallery 
Figure 9.7. Image of Sūryavarman II from South gallery of Angkor Wat (courtesy of Marie L. A. Sioco).
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Founding multiple state temples in and near 
Angkor Thom, all to the elite cult of Mahāyana Bud-
dhism (devoted to the Lokeśvara Bodhisattva), enlarged 
the notion of state. Jayavarman’s capital was a cen-
tripetal force that pulled clients inward annually to 
collectively celebrate the state. At the capital’s centre 
was the Bayon temple, whose 439 niches were designed 
to hold individual statues. Scholars suspect these 
statues were Jayabuddhamahānātha images (statues of 
the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara), distributed by the king 
at least 23 provincial centres named in inscriptions; 
their caretakers were required to bring the images to 
Angkor for annual consecration (Coedès 1941, 264–6). 
Patronage, bound up in an Indic ideology of 
rulership, was thus key to cohering the Angkorian 
state: but it was insufficient without force. Successful 
Angkorian rulers forged compliance through a com-
bination of patronage and public display of might, 
and who negotiated near-constant tensions within 
and beyond the court. Only a few outright rebel-
lions were recorded in stone (though one occurred in 
Malyang, the rice basket of Battambang). Angkor as 
a state, however, was commonly fragile. Within 150 
years of its founding on the banks of the Tonle Sap, 
King Jayavarman IV felt it necessary to relocate the 
capital c. 80 km to the northeast, in Koh Ker (Ghok 
Gargyar), for 16 years before the next Angkorian ruler 
(Rājendravarman) returned the seat of royal power to 
Angkor. Managing Angkor required the king and his 
entourage to engage in continuous adjustments and 
accommodations within the capital and with provincial 
centres to the west and south.
more tightly into an integrated whole. All Angkorian 
Khmers relied on the major river networks (Tonle Sap 
and Mekong) to move people and goods through parts 
of the kingdom. But Jayavarman VII also renovated, 
consolidated and – where necessary – constructed new 
road segments that radiated out from Angkor (Hendrick-
son 2010, 2011, 2012). These renovated routes facilitated 
communication between the centre and its periphery, 
which encouraged closer relations between the king and 
his provincial clients. Funnelling goods and services to 
clients (and requiring their presence and tribute in the 
capital) was made easier, so was stripping provinces of 
political and economic autonomy.
Jayavarman VII’s walled city of Angkor Thom 
(9 sq. km) enabled him to support a super-entourage: 
its walls offered protection against potential outsid-
ers, and its interior area held abundant public space, 
replete with viewing terraces for ritual and pageantry. 
One north-south swath of open space from the Bayon 
to the North Gate was ideal for such activity: the Ter-
races of the Elephants and of the Leper King face east 
into an open area free of grid lines that could have 
accommodated either onlookers, performers, or both. 
Large and small temples housed deities who required 
daily and seasonal care: sacrifices, baths, food and flo-
ral offerings, song, and dance. Rituals performed on 
the Bayon’s upper platform were clearly visible to an 
audience surrounding the temple. Pageantry involved 
in annual pilgrimages, like that in public processions, 
reproduced the Angkorian polity and celebrated the 
ruler under whose patronage these displays took place 
(Groslier 1973; Stark 2015).
Figure 9.8. Oath-swearing 
to Sūryavarman II on 
Mount Sivapada, southern 
Gallery of Angkor Wat 
(courtesy of Noel Tan).
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possible here. What matters, for the purpose of this 
volume, is that the Angkor-anchored political system 
(with its extraordinarily high demands for labour and 
resources) collapsed by the mid-fifteenth century ad. 
Our understanding of the environmental history sur-
rounding collapse is coming into focus through the 
efforts of many colleagues (e.g., Buckley et al. 2010; 
Day et al. 2012; Penny et al. 2014, 2019). Droughts and 
floods are intrinsic to Monsoon Southeast Asia, but the 
intensity and length of both increased at a point when 
Angkorians reached the technological limits of their 
hydraulic engineering experiments: canals, embank-
ments, and re-routed rivers modified their water sheds 
and demanded too much maintenance and repair. Not 
even the most charismatic ruler could persuade enough 
people to fix this system. 
One might consider King Paramaraja’s historically 
documented ‘sack’ of Angkor, allegedly in 1431, as the 
crowning blow. His forces burned Angkor Thom and 
took Angkorian literati and artists back to his ascendant 
capital of Ayutthaya (from Tambiah 1976, 132). Ayut-
thaya, once a Khmer-speaking city, was now on the 
rise (Baker 2003). Most scholars agree, however, that 
the same public works that made Angkor’s twelfth-to 
thirteenth-century king (Jayavarman VII) so great may 
have stimulated the decline by overtaxing the polity’s 
resources and bolstering local power networks that 
ultimately challenged political centralization (see also 
De Bernon 1997).
Documentary sources provide evidence used 
in the foregoing summary of Angkorian structure, 
scale and function, and underscore the essential value 
of epigraphic and external historical documents for 
interpreting the history of the Angkorian state. Ang-
korian research is perhaps unusual in its fundamental 
interdisciplinary nature: archaeologists read and talk 
with historians, and art historians read and debate ideas 
with archaeologists (e.g., Green 2007; Polkinghorne et 
al. 2013). Still, historiographical approaches dominate 
Angkor narratives, building on more than a century of 
primarily French scholarship and using a very small 
sample of Khmer and Sanskrit inscriptions (c. 9 per 
cent of those found in contemporary Chola India, for 
example [Lustig 2009, 129]). Problem-driven archaeo-
logical research (i.e., not conducted in conjunction with 
architectural conservation work) is still young in the 
Angkorian world, but progress has been made. 
Fragility, resilience and regeneration
Examining fault lines and cleavage planes in Angkorian 
society requires a richer documentary record than is 
available; archaeological approaches ofer insights on 
both short-term fragility and long-term resilience. What 
Few rulers succeeded in their militaristic expan-
sionist efforts. Suryavarman I was Angkor’s first 
expansionist king, and his military expeditions 
expanded the polity into modern-day Thailand. Other 
clashes, like Sūryavarman II’s 13-year war with both 
Dai Viet and Champa, ended badly. Other rulers were 
decidedly weaker (or in Dillehay’s and Wernke’s ter-
minology, vulnerable). One, Tribhuvanādtayavarman, 
ruled the Angkorian capital of Yaśodharapura until 
neighbouring Cham forces sacked the city and killed 
him in ad 1177. Four years of anarchy followed, and 
then the last strong Angkorian ruler, Jayavarman VII 
assumed the throne. Approximately sixteen rulers 
after Jayavarman VII’s death in ad 1220 presided 
over a slowly disintegrating Angkorian state. The late 
thirteenth-century Chinese emissary Zhou Daguan 
(2007, 79) listed 90 ‘prefectures’ in the Angkorian state, 
suggesting post-mortem continuity (with political frag-
mentation) in the state that Jayavarman VII had built. 
Webs of patronage endured for centuries after 
Angkor collapsed, and into the Middle Khmer period. 
By the sixteenth century, all free Cambodians ‘had to be 
registered as clients of a particular patron who might 
be an official with jurisdiction over a certain region, a 
member of royalty, or a person with local prestige and 
power’ (Ebihara 1984, 288). What collapsed in mid-fif-
teenth-century Cambodia was a hyper-urban hydraulic 
capital and a god-kingship, sustained through webs 
of patronage. What continued, through settlement 
shifts and a political movement south, was the cultural 
institution of patronage and understanding of an Indic 
king: in slightly modified forms.
Collapse, resilience and patronage
khlaeň hoer tpit khyal’ nây thkoeň tpit bal
raksa oy sukh draby gaň’ tpit srï
ceh samcai duk man phdah sranuk
tpit bhariyâ já
The kite flies away thanks to the wind
The officer is successful if his soldiers surround him 
safely.
The goods are well guarded if the woman is economical
The entire house is happy if the wife is endowed with 
virtue.
Cpâp Rajaneti or Cpàp’ Brah Râjasambhâr (Pou-Lewitz & 
Jenner 1978, 370 [Khmer], 379 [Khmer transliteration], 
387 [French translation]; see also Chandler 1984, 273))
Colleagues continue to debate the causes and timing 
of the Angkorian capital’s collapse (e.g., Lucero et 
al. 2015; cf. Evans 2016, 172–3) in more detail than is 
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al. 2013, 597–600). Most non-elite Khmers, organized 
at the local level, never left Angkor.
Pan-Khmer beliefs drawn from both indigenous 
and Indic sources cohered populations into collectives, 
and patron-client relationships offered linkages. The 
Theravadā Buddhism that fifteenth- to eighteenth-cen-
tury ad Khmers embraced after the ‘collapse’ of Angkor 
provided a different kind of social and political anchor 
at the local and state levels than characterized the 
Brahmanic-driven Angkorian period. Post-Angkorian 
populations throughout the Khmer polity reconfig-
ured communities around Buddhist pagodas, as did 
populations in neighbouring Thailand and Burma/
Myanmar. Hierarchy still structured social relations, 
as the emergent Buddhist monastic order or san.gha 
(with monks, nuns, and laypersons) drew from local 
sources to structure political and economic lives. Even 
as the san.gha gained influence in subsequent centuries 
(e.g., Harris 2005, 44–5, 228), its organizational apex 
lay in the Khmer state. 
Recent archaeological work supports a model of 
systemic resilience in the face of state collapse, as one 
point along a trajectory of collapse and regeneration 
whose earliest polity arose in the mid-first millen-
nium ad (Stark 2006b). The Angkorian capital’s slow 
but inexorable collapse spelled the end of a particular 
political regime: the kind of political collapse and 
cultural transition that may have characterized many 
ancient states (see Middleton 2017 for review). The 
demographic consequences of this process are cur-
rently under study, although archaeological research 
has already demonstrated that Angkorian ‘collapse’ 
was also not end of Angkor as an urban centre (e.g., 
Penny et al. 2007; Stark et al. 2015). How can we better 
understand the meaning of ‘collapse’ in the Angkorian 
example? What archaeological approaches strengthen 
the case that patronage mattered as much as prolonged 
drought? Basic archaeological research is needed on 
Angkor’s scope, scale, and historical sequence. The 
urban epicentre called Greater Angkor reflects heritage 
management decisions, not archaeological bounda-
ries (occupation continues beyond its 1000 sq. km 
area to the NW and SE). Angkorian land-use needs 
study across Greater Angkor, and temple catchments 
(identified in Hawken’s [2013] dissertation) should 
be circumscribed.
Building chronologies of linkages between the 
capital and its peripheries is necessary, and Hall’s 
(2017) research at Koh Ker and Preah Khan of Kampong 
Svay offers an ideal methodology. Almost nothing is 
known about previously identified provincial capi-
tals (like in NE Thailand/Buriram and Surin) and in 
non-core areas that likely housed large Angkorian 
populations because of their agricultural productive 
collapsed was the political and urban core for a political 
elite, whose labour-intensive state system crumbled 
under repeated droughts and floods that strained 
the capital’s water management system (Buckley et 
al. 2010, 6750). As the elite network disintegrated, 
so did linkages between Angkor and its secondary 
centres of Koh Ker and Preah Khan of Kompong Svay 
where land-use around temples halted (Hall et al. 
2016). State-sponsored activities, from monumental 
construction to water management, disappeared from 
the material record by the time Thai forces entered the 
gates of Angkor Thom in ad 1431. Perhaps most elites 
had moved south to the new capital of Longvek by 
then to participate in Southeast Asia’s early modern 
maritime trade network. Analysis of airborne laser 
scanning (lidar)data from Longvek suggests it lacked 
the dispersion and population density that character-
ized ninth- to fifteenth-century Angkor, and may have 
housed little more than c. 50,000 inhabitants (Evans 
2016, 172): less than a tenth Angkor’s projected peak 
population. 
We increasingly suspect, however, what did not 
collapse at Angkor – or in fact, in most places through-
out the Lower Mekong Basin – was the rural agrarian 
system of hamlets and small towns whose farmers 
and artisans continued to pursue their livelihoods: 
perhaps with less direct state intervention. Archaeo-
logical evidence exists for continued occupation across 
Greater Angkor, from the walled enclosures of Angkor 
Wat (Brotherson 2015; Penny et al. 2007, 391; Stark et 
al. 2015), Preah Khan (Penny et al. 2007, 391–2) and 
points eastward as far as Chau Srei Vibol (Penny et al. 
2007, 391–3). Acknowledging the role of rural resilience 
as a counterbalance to urban fragility is not to suggest 
that rural-based bottom-up collective action provided 
checks on, and resistance to, top-down power (sensu 
Carballo 2013, 16). No empirical evidence supports 
such a model, whose roots in rational choice theory 
run counter to anthropological understandings of 
power in Southeast Asian cultures (Anderson 1972; 
Errington 1989, 5–9).
Traces of this post-Angkorian Buddhism are 
found across Greater Angkor (and clustered in Angkor 
Thom) as broad stone terraces that served as founda-
tions for pagoda complexes built of wood and housing 
great Buddha images (Desbat 2009, 45; Penny et al. 
2007, 391–3; Polkinghorne, in press). Some Khmers 
moved south to build a series of pagoda communities 
along the re-routed Siem Reap river (Vitou 2012). A 
sixteenth-century royal-sponsored renaissance brought 
the court briefly back to Angkor for ‘restorative’ 
programmes at temples across the core: at Angkor 
Wat, Preah Khan, Phnom Bakheng, and at several 
monuments within Angkor Thom (Polkinghorne et 
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locations throughout the polity and distributed to 
smaller consumer populations (Grave et al. 2015). 
Others, like twelfth- to thirteenth-century Bayon style 
statuary, used Triassic sandstone which may have 
originated near the secondary Angkorian centre of 
Preah Khan of Kompong Svay (Carò & Douglas 2013).
 Tracking the types and timing of commodity 
movement between the capital and its peripheries is 
also central to determining the physical extent of state 
control. Hendrickson’s (2012) work on ‘communication 
corridors’ (i.e., the maximal area linked by state temples 
and transportation routes) illustrates the utility of this 
approach. By presenting ‘communication corridors’ by 
potential like the western Tonle Sap basin (especially 
Banteay Meanchey and Battambang) and the Mekong 
Delta [particularly Takeo, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng). 
Epigraphic accounts suggest that provincial Angkorian 
administrators likely funnelled agricultural produce 
and other goods from these areas to the core; it is 
also possible that Greater Angkor’s growth was the 
product of eleventh- to twelfth-century emigration 
from provincial areas to the burgeoning capital (Mitch 
Hendrickson, p.c.). Developing occupational histories 
(through sediment coring or excavation) is critical to 
building a polity-wide history. Some commodities, 
like stoneware ceramics, were produced in multiple 
Figure 9.9. Control as 
‘communication corridor’ 
(areas linked to capital via 
roads and waterways) by 
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production (e.g., Hendrickson et al. 2017; Grave et al. 
2015) are establishing baseline information for future 
comparative work. Developing distributional maps of 
Chinese ‘tradewares’ in the Angkorian capital, work 
now underway, will yield insights on about the relative 
importance of international trade at different points 
from the ninth to fifteenth centuries. 
Angkorian rule was brittle, but Khmer civiliza-
tion has been remarkably resilient across much of 
the Lower Mekong. Cultural practices and traditions 
that made ninth- to fifteenth-century people Khmer 
required detailed ritual knowledge, a shared language, 
and particular paraphernalia. Recent archaeologi-
cal study of these materials deepens and extends 
knowledge of the Khmer polity that epigraphic data 
reported, and some Angkorian practices and beliefs, 
like kinship, remain structuring metaphors today. 
Angkorian archaeologists, perhaps like their Chinese 
colleagues (von Falkenhausen 1993), are constrained by 
a historiographical tradition that both enriches inquiry 
and stifles research. Finding archaeological proxies to 
study alliances has never been easy. Nor has talking 
sensibly about collective action and coercive enterprise, 
both of which require better control of the time-space 
systematics than is currently available. 
Such discussions also demand more nuanced 
understandings of collective action that do not stem 
ruler, Figure 9.9 illustrates changing scales of political 
control through time. These corridors do not reflect 
the full Angkorian cultural reach at any given point in 
time; archaeologists find stonewares throughout the 
Lower Mekong that span the ninth- to fifteenth-century 
Angkorian period, and suggest continued use of state 
temples after their dedication for centuries. 
In quantifying the total area included in each 
ruler’s ‘communication corridor’ (except the one-year 
rule by Udayadityavarman from ad 1001–1002), Figure 
9.10 suggests two interesting trends. One is that the first 
great kings of Angkor controlled very little territory 
relative to the eleventh- to thirteenth-century rulers. 
The fact that Jayavarman II, founder of Angkor, had at 
least eight wives whom hailed from ruling families of 
neighbouring polities to the south and east (Jacobsen 
2008, 28–31), underscores the importance of linkages 
rather than control. The second is that centralized 
power at any size, transcended individual rulers but 
occurred in pulses that were interrupted by foreign 
invasion and political upheaval. 
Lexicostatistical analysis of epigraphic termi-
nology indicates that the Angkorian economy was 
not monetized (Lustig 2009), yet the evidence for 
sophisticated economic interactions within the polity 
and with China is growing. Current characteriza-
tion studies that target iron and stoneware ceramic 
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from ‘evolutionary’ assumptions of self-interest, in 
which cooperation reflects more than competitive 
advantage (following Stanish 2013, 85). In providing 
an increasingly rich archaeological resouce, Angkorian 
archaeology offers a critical counter-balance to elite 
claims to power, control and stability. Local groups 
ignored in the documentary records may be visible 
in archaeological space, and cleavage planes that 
inscriptions mask may materialize in chronologies 
and settlement patterns. Deciphering these processes 
is fundamental to grasping how personal relations, 
writ large, built and sustained the Khmer civilization 
for two millennia. Such knowledge will also deepen 
our archaeological understandings of global change.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Norman Yoffee, the Getty Institute and 
the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research 
hosting the stimulating conference that produced this 
volume, and to the late Professor Alice Dewey for 
discussions regarding ideas of power in Southeast 
Asia. Her intellectual reach was greater than she likely 
imagined. This particular paper’s genesis lay in a 2001 
session that Dr. Laura Levi and I co-organized on ‘The 
Idea of Power in Archaeological Interpretations and 
the Role of Models from Southeast Asia,’ in which 
Norman Yoffee served as discussant. Those presen-
tations, and multi-year dialogue with Heng Piphal, 
Eileen Lustig, Jim Bayman, and Mitch Hendrickson 
have been invaluable. Such discussions emanate out 
of, and are enriched by, ongoing field-based Cambo-
dian research in collaboration with APSARA National 
Authority and the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts. 
I thank these organizations and Roland Fletcher for 
supporting my fieldwork through the Greater Angkor 
Project. Great appreciation also goes to my field crews 
for their enthusiasm, hard work, and good cheer; I 
include some of their photographs in this chapter to 
recognize their contributions. Any errors in this paper 
are my own.
References
Andaya, B. 1992. Political development between the sixteenth 
and eighteenth centuries. In The Cambridge History 
of Southeast Asia, Volume One (From Early Times to c. 
1800), ed. N. Tarling, pp. 402-459. Cambridge (UK): 
Cambridge University Press.
Anderson, B. O’G. 1972. The idea of power in Javanese 
culture. In Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. C. 
Holt. Ithaca (NY) & London (UK): Cornell University 
Press, 1-69.
Ando, C. 2017. The ambitions of government: territoriality 
and infrastructural power in ancient Rome. In Ancient 
178
Chapter 9
outcome. In Old Myths and New Approaches: Interpreting 
Ancient Religious Sites in Southeast Asia, ed. A. Haendel. 
Melbourne (AU): Monash University Publishing, 49-62.
Fletcher, R., D. Evans, C. Potter, & R. Chhay. 2015. Angkor 
Wat: an introduction. Antiquity 89, 1388-1401.
Fletcher, R., D. Penny, D. Evans, C. Pottier, M. Barbetti, M. 
Kummu, T. Lustig & Authority for the Protection & 
Management of Angkor & the Region of Siem Reap 
(APSARA) Department of Monuments & Archaeol-
ogy Team. 2008. The water management network 
of Angkor, Cambodia. Antiquity 82/317, pp. 658–70.
Geertz, C. 1980. Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century 
Bali. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
Grave, P., M. T. Stark, D. Ea, L. Kealhofer, B. S. Tan & T. Tin. 
2015. Differentiating Khmer stoneware production: an 
NAA pilot study from Siem Reap Province, Cambodia. 
Archaeometry https://doi.org/10.1111/arcm.12220
Green, G. 2007. Angkor vogue: sculpted evidence of 
imported luxury textiles in the courts of king and 
temples. Journal of the Economic and Social History of 
the Orient 50, 424-51.
Groslier, B.-P. 1958. Angkor et le Cambodge au XVIe siècle 
d’aprés les sources portugaises et espagnoles. Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris, 1958.
Groslier, B.-P. 1973. Pour une Géographie historique du 
Cambodge. Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer 104/26, 337-79.
Groslier, B.-P. 1979. La cité hydraulique Angkorienne: 
exploitation ou surexploitation du sol? Bulletin de I’ 
École Française d’Extrême-Orient 66/1, 161–202.
Hall, T. 2018. A broader view of collapse: Using palaeo-eco-
logical techniques to reconstruct occupation dynamics 
across a networked society undergoing transforma-
tion. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, School of Geosciences, 
Faculty of Science, University of Sydney.
Hall, T., D. Penny, M. Hendrickson, C. Cooke & H. Quan. 
2016. Iron and fire: geoarchaeological history of a 
Khmer peripheral centre during the decline of the 
Angkorian Empire, Cambodia. Journal of Archaeological 
Science: Reports 6, 53-64.
Hanks, L. M. 1962. Merit and power in the Thai social order. 
American Anthropologist 64, 1247-61.
Heine-Geldern, R. 1942. Conceptions of state and kingship 
in Southeast Asia. The Far Eastern Quarterly 2, 15-30.
Hendrickson, M. 2010. Historic routes to Angkor: develop-
ment of the Khmer road system (ninth to thirteenth 
centuries ad) in mainland Southeast Asia. Antiquity 
84, 480–96.
Hendrickson, M. 2011. A transport geographic perspective 
on travel and communication in Angkorian Southeast 
Asia (ninth to fifteenth centuries ad). World Archaeol-
ogy, 43, 444–57.
Hendrickson, M. 2012. Connecting the dots: Investigating 
transportation between the temple complexes of the 
medieval Khmer (9th–14th centuries ce). In Old Myths 
and New Approaches: Interpreting Ancient Religious Sites 
in Southeast Asia, ed. A. Haendel. Melbourne: Monash 
University Publishing, 70-88.
Hendrickson, M., S. Leroy, H. Quan, K. Phon, and V. Voeun. 
2017. Smelting in the shadow of the Iron Moun-
tain: preliminary field investigation of the industrial 
Coedès, G. 1906. La stèle de Ta-Prohm. Bulletin de l’École 
Française d’Extrême Orient 6, 44-86.
Coedès, G. 1932. IV. Etudes cambodgiennes. XXX, A la 
recherche du Yaçodharaçrama. Bulletin de l’École Fran-
çaise d’Extrême Orient 32, 84-112.
Coedès, G. 1941. IV. La stèle de Práh Khan d’Ankor. Bulletin 
de l’École Française d’Extrême Orient 41, 255-302.
Coedès, G. 1968. The Indianized States of Southeast Asia (ed. 
W. F. Vella; transl S. B. Cowing). Honolulu: East-West 
Center Press.
Coedès, G. & P. Dupont. 1943. Les stèles de Sdŏk Kăk Thom 
Phnom Sandak et Práah Vihār. Bulletin de l’École Fran-
çaise d’Extrême Orient 43, 56-154.
Davis, W. G. 1973. Social Relations in a Philippine Market: 
Self-Interest and Subjectivity. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Day, M. B., D. A. Hodell, M. Brenner, H. J. Chapman, J. H. 
Curtis, W. F. Kenny, A. L. Kolata, & L. C. Peterson. 
2012. Paleoenvironmental history of the West Baray, 
Angkor (Cambodia). Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 109, 1046-51.
De Bernon, O. 1997. Note sur l’hyrdaulique théocratique 
angkorienne. Bulletin de l’Ecole française d’Extrême-
Orient 84, 340-348.
Demarest, A. A. 1992. Ideology in ancient Maya cultural 
evolution: the dynamics of galactic polities. In Ideology 
and Pre-Columbian Civilizations, eds. A. A. Demarest 
& G. W. Conrad, pp. 137-157. Albuquerque (NM): 
University of New Mexico Press.
Du Bourg, H. de Mestier. 1970. La première moitié du 
XIe siècle au Cambodge: Suryavarman Ier, sa vie et 
quelques aspects des institutions à son époque. Journal 
Asiatique 258, 281-314.
Durrenberger, E. P. 1996. The power of culture and the cul-
ture of states in Thailand. In State Power and Culture in 
Thailand, ed. E. P. Durrenberger. Monograph 44. Yale 
Southeast Asia Studies, New Haven, 1-21.
Ebihara, M. 1984. Societal organization in sixteenth and 
seventeenth century Cambodia. Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 15, 280-95.
Edwards, P. 2006. The tryanny of proximity: power and 
mobility in colonial Cambodia, 1863-1954. Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 37, 421-43.
Errington, S. 1989. Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian 
Realm. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
Estève, J. & D. Soutif. 2010-11. Les Yaśodharāśrama, mar-
queurs d’empire et bornes sacrées. Conformité et 
spécificité des stèles digraphiques khmères de la région 
de Vat Phu. Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême Orient 
97-98, 331-55.
Evans, D. 2016. Airborne laser scanning as a method for 
exploring long-term socio-ecological dynamics in 
Cambodia. Journal of Archaeological Science 74, 164-75.
Evans, D., C. Pottier, R. Fletcher, S. Hensley, I. Tapley, A. 
Milne, & M. Barbetti. 2007. A comprehensive archae-
ological map of the world’s largest preindustrial 
settlement complex at Angkor, Cambodia. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 104, 14277-82.
Fletcher, R. & D. Evans. 2012. The dynamics of Angkor and 
its landscape. Issues of scale, non-correspondence and 
179
Universal Rule and Precarious Empire: Power and Fragility in the Angkorian State
Mabbett, I. W. 1969. Devarāja. Journal of Southeast Asian His-
tory 10, 202-23.
Mabbett, I. W. 1978. Kingship in Angkor. Journal of the Siam 
Society 66, 1-58.
Mabbett, I. W. 1983. Some remarks on the present state of 
knowledge about slavery in Angkor. In Slavery, Bond-
age and Dependency in Southeast Asia, ed. A. Reid. New 
York (NY): St. Martin’s Press, 44-63.
Mackil, E. 2017. Property claims and state formation in the 
Archaic Greek world. In Ancient States and Infrastruc-
tural Power: Europe, Asia, and America, eds. C. Ando & 
S. Richardson. Philadelphia (PA): University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 63-90.
Mann, M. 1984. The autonomous power of the state: its 
origins, mechanisms and results. European Journal of 
Sociology 25, 185-213.
Marchal, H. 1918. Monuments secondaires et terrasses boud-
dhiques d’Ańkor Thom. Bulletin de l’Ecole française 
d’Extrême-Orient 18, 1-40.
Maxwell, T. S. 2007. The short inscriptions of the Bayon and 
contemporary temples. In Bayon: New Perspectives, ed. 
J. Clark. Bangkok (TH): River Books, 122-35.
McAnany, P. A. & N. Yoffee. 2010. Questioning Collapse: Human 
Resilience, Ecological Vulnerability, and the Aftermath of 
Empire. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Middleton, G. D. 2017. The show must go on: collapse, resil-
ience, and transformation in 21st century archaeology. 
Reviews in Anthropology 46, 78-105.
Multzer-O’Naghten, H. 2014. The organisation of space in 
pre-modern Thailand under
Jayavarman VII. In Before Siam: Essays in Art and Archaeol-
ogy, eds. N. Revire & S. Murphy. Bangkok (TH): River 
Books, 397-419.
Mus, P. 1937. Angkor in the Time of Jayavarman VII. Indian 
Art and Letters XI, 65–75.
O’Connor, R. A. 1996. Rice, rule, and the Tai state. In State 
Power and Culture in Thailand, ed. E. P. Durrenberger. 
Monograph 44. New Haven (CT): Yale Southeast Asia 
Studies, 68-99.
O’Connor, R. 1997. Review of Siam Mapped: A History of the 
Geo-Body of a Nation, by Thongchai Winichakul. Journal 
of Asian Studies 56, 279-81.
Parmentier, H. 1916. Cartes de l’Empire Khmèr: d’après la 
situation des inscriptions datées. Bulletin de l’École 
française d’Extrême-Orient 16, 69-73.
Payne, R. 2017. Territorializing Iran in late antiquity: autoc-
racy, aristocracy, and the infrastructure of empire. In 
Ancient States and Infrastructural Power: Europe, Asia, and 
America, eds. C. Ando & S. Richardson. Philadelphia 
(PA): University of Pennsylvania Press, 179-217.
Penny, D., J.-B. Chevance, D. Tang, & S. De Greef. 2014. The 
environmental impact of Cambodia’s ancient city of 
Mahendraparvata (Phnom Kulen). PLOS ONE 9, e84252.
Penny, D., T. Hall, D. Evans & M. Polkinghorne. 2019. Geoar-
chaeological evidence from Angkor, Cambodia, reveals 
a gradual decline rather than a catastrophic 15th-century 
collapse. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
116, 4871-6.
Penny, D., Q. Hua, C. Pottier, R. Fletcher, & M. Barbetti. 
2007. The use of AMS 14C dating to explore issues of 
landscape around Phnom Dek, Cambodia (ninth to 
twentieth centuries ad). Asian Perspectives 56, 55-91.
Inomata, T. 2016. Theories of power and legitimacy in archae-
ological contexts: the emergent regime of power at the 
Formative Maya community of Ceibal, Guatemala. In 
Political Strategies in Pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, eds. 
S. Kurnick & J. Baron. Boulder (CO): University Press 
of Colorado, 37-60.
Inomata, T. & L. S. Coben. (eds), 2006. Archaeology of Per-
formance: Theaters of Power, Community, and Politics. 
Lanham (MD): AltaMira Press.
Jacob, J. J. 1993. Ecology of Angkor: evidence from the Khmer 
inscriptions. In Nature and Man in South East Asia, ed. 
P. A. Stott. London: School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London, 109-127.
Jacobsen, T. 2008. Lost Goddesses: The Denial of Female Power 
in Cambodian History. Copenhagen (DK): NIAS Press.
Jacobsen, T. & M. Stuart-Fox. 2014. Power and Political Culture 
in Cambodia. Working Paper Series No. 200. Singa-
pore: Asia Research Institute, National University of 
Singapore.
Leach, E. 1964. Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study 
of Kachin Social Structure. London: The Athlone Press.
Ledgerwood, J. & J. Vijghen. 2002. Decision-making in 
rural Khmer villages. In Cambodia Emerges from the 
Past: Eight Essays, ed. Judy Ledgerwood. DeKalb (IL): 
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois 
University, 109–150.
Lewitz, S. 1967. La toponymie khmère. Bulletin de l’Ecole 
française d’Extrême Orient 53, 375-451.
Lewitz, S. & P. Jenner. 1978. Les cpâp’ ou «Codes de conduite» 
khmers. IV. Cpâp Rajaneti ou Cpàp’ Brah Râjasambhâr. 
Bulletin de l’Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient 65, 361-402.
Lowman, I. 2016. The land of the Kambu: political space and 
myth in Angkorian Cambodia, in Le passé des Khmers: 
langues, textes, rites, eds. N. Abdoul-Carime, G. Mikae-
lian, & J. Thach. Bern, Gerlin, Bruxelles, Franfork, New 
York, Oxford & Wien: Peter Lang, 95-114.
Lucero, L. J., R. Fletcher & R. Coningham. 2015. From 
‘collapse’ to urban diaspora: the transformation fo 
low-density, dispersed agrarian urbanism. Antiquity 
89, 1139-1154.
Lustig, E. 2009. Power and pragmatism in the political 
economy of Angkor. PhD thesis, University of Sydney.
Lustig, E. 2009. Money doesn’t make the world go round: 
Angkor’s non-monetisation. In Economic Development, 
Integration and Morality in Asia and the Americas, ed. D. 
C. Wood. Research in Economic Anthropology Vol-
ume 29. Bingley, West Yorkshire (UK): JAI Emerald 
Publishing, 165-199.
Lustig, E. 2011. Using inscription data to investigate power 
in Angkor’s empire. Aséanie 27, 35-66.
Lustig, E., D. Evans & N. Richards. 2007. Words across 
space and time: An analysis of lexical items in Khmer 
inscriptions, sixth–fourteenth centuries ce. Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 38, 1-26.
Lustig, E. & T. Lustig. 2013. New insights into “les intermi-
nables listes Nominatives d’Esclaves” from numerical 




Schwartz, G. M. 2006. From collapse to regeneration. In After 
Collapse: The Regeneration of Complex Societies, eds. G. 
Schwartz & J. Nichols. Tucson (AZ): University of 
Arizona Press, 3-17.
Scott, J. C. 1972. Patron-client politics and political change 
in Southeast Asia. The American Political Science Review 
66, 91-113.
Scott, J. C. Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest 
States. New Haven (CT) & London, Yale University 
Press, 2017.
Sedov, L. 1978. Angkor: society and state. In The Early State, 
eds. Henri J. M. Claessen & Peter Skalnik. The Hague: 
Mouton Publishers, 111-30. 
Smith, A. T. 2003. The Political Landscape: Constellations of 
Authority in Early Complex Polities. Berkeley (CA): 
University of California Press, 2003.
Smith, A. T. 2011. Archaeologies of sovereignty. Annual 
Reviews in Anthropology 40, 415-32.
Smith, A. T. 2015. The Political Machine: Assembling Sovereignty 
in the Bronze Age Caucasus. Princeton (NJ): Princeton 
University Press.
Stanish, C. 2013. The ritualized economy and cooperative 
labor in intermediate societies. in Cooperation and Col-
lective Action: Archaeological Perspectives, ed. David M. 
Carballo. Boulder (CO): University Press of Colorado, 
83–92.
Stark, M. T. 2006a. Early mainland Southeast Asian land-
scapes in the first millennium ad. Annual Review of 
Anthropology 35, 407–32.
Stark, M. T. 2006b. From Funan to Angkor: collapse and 
regeneration in ancient Cambodia. In After Collapse: The 
Regeneration of Complex Societies, eds. Glenn Schwartz 
& John Nichols. Tucson (AZ): University of Arizona 
Press, 144-67.
Stark, M. T. 2015. Southeast Asian urbanism: from early city to 
classical state. In Early Cities in Comparative Perspective, 
4000 bce–1200 ce. The Cambridge World History, Volume 
III, ed. Norman Yoffee. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge 
University Press,74-93. 
Stein, B. 1960. The economic function of a medieval South 
Indian temple. The Journal of Asian Studies 19, 163-76.
Stern, P. 1951. Diversité et rythme des fondations royales 
khmères. Bulletin de L’Ecole française d’Éxtreme Orient 
(XLIV), 649-55.
Talbot, C. 1991. Temples, donors, and gifts: patterns of patron-
age in thirteenth-century South India. The Journal of 
Asian Studies 50. 308-40.
Tambiah, S. 1976. World Conqueror and World Renouncer: 
A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a 
Historical Background. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge 
University Press.
Tambiah, S. 1985. The galactic polity in Southeast Asia. In 
Culture, Thought, and Social Action: An Anthropological 
Perspective. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University 
Press, 252-286.
Vickery, M. 1985. The reign of Sūryavarman I and royal 
factionalism at Angkor. Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies 16, 226-44.
Vitou, P. 2012. The Study of Archaeological Sites South of 
Angkor: Observation on Archaeological Features and 
occupation and demise at the medieval city of Angkor, 
Cambodia. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics 
Research B 259, 388-94.
Polkinghorne, M. In press. Seventeenth and eighteenth century 
images of the Buddha from Ayutthaya and Lan Xang at 
Angkor Wat. In The Emergence of Theravāda Buddhism in 
Cambodia: Southeast Asian Perspectives, eds. A. Thompson 
& H. W. Woodward. Singapore: National University of 
Singapore Press.
Polkinghorne, M., C. Pottier & C. Fischer. 2013. One Buddha 
can hide another. Journal Asiatique 301, 575-624.
Pou, S. 1974. The word ĀC in Khmer: a semantic overview. 
In South-East Asian Linguistic Studies, ed. D. L. Nguyen. 
Canberra, Australia: Linguistic Circle of Canberra, 
175-91.
Pou, S. 1979. Subhāsit and Cpāp’ in Khmer literature. In 
Ludwick Sternbach Felicitation Volume, Part One, ed. J. 
P. Sinha. Lucknow, India: Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit 
Parishad, 331-348.
Pou, S. 1998. Dieux et rois dans la pensée Khmère ancienne. 
Journal Asiatique 286, 653-69.
Pou-Lewitz, S. & P. N. Jenner. 1978. VIII. Les cpâp’ ou «Codes 
de conduite» khmers. IV. Cpâp Rajaneti ou Cpàp’ Brah 
Râjasambhâr. Bulletin de l’Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient 
65, 361-402.
Pryce, T. O., M. Hendrickson, P. Kaseka, S. Chan, M. F. 
Charlton, S. Leroy, P. Dillmann & Q. Hua. 2014. The 
Iron Kuay of Cambodia: tracing the role of peripheral 
populations in Angkorian to colonial Cambodia via a 
1200-year old industrial landscape. Journal of Archaeo-
logical Science 47, 142-63.
Reid, A. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, Vol-
ume One: The Lands below the Winds, 1988. New Haven 
(CT) & London: Yale University Press.
Reynolds, C. 1995. A new look at Old Southeast Asia. Journal 
of Asian Studies 54, 419-46.
Richardson, S. 2012. Early Mesopotamia: the presumptive 
state. Past & Present 215, 3-49.
Richardson, S. 2017. Before things worked: a ‘low-power’ 
model of early Mesopotamia. In Ancient States and 
Infrastructural Power: Europe, Asia, and America, eds. C. 
Ando & S. Richardson. Philadelphia (PA): University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 17-52.
Ricklefs, M. C. 1967. Land and the law in the epigraphy of 
tenth-century Cambodia. The Journal of Asian Studies 
26, 411-20.
Ristvet, L. 2015. Ritual, Performance and Politics in the Ancient 
Near East. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Routledge, B. 2014. Archaeology and State Theory: Subjects 
and Objects of Power. New York, London, New Delhi & 
Sydney (AU): Bloomsbury. 
Sahai, S. 1977a. Fiscal administration in ancient Cambodia. 
The South East Asian Review I, 123-38.
Sahai, S. 1977b. Territorial administration in ancient Cambodia. 
The South East Asian Review II, 35-50.
Sahai, S. 1978. Central administration in ancient Cambodia. 
The South East Asian Review III, 17-40.
Sahai, S. The Hindu Temples in South East Asia: Their Role in 
Social Economic and Political Formations. New Delhi: 
Aryan Books.
181
Universal Rule and Precarious Empire: Power and Fragility in the Angkorian State
Notes
1 Interestingly, it is the ‘post-Angkorian’ inscriptions that 
best inform on the structure of Cambodian bureaucracy. 
King Jayajetthadhiraj, who returned to Angkor Wat in 
1579 (then called Bisnulok) to restore the temple’s roof 
and its enclosure walls, and to consecrate relics (Pou 
1970, 106), left an inscription that listed his immedi-
ate entourage which included: his women (‘harem’), 
his rajaguru or teacher, Brahmin advisors ministers 
of his council of 4 ministers, functionaries, poets and 
sages and the royal court (Pou 1970, 117–18). Whether 
Cambodia’s embrace of Theravada Buddhism as a state 
religion altered its fundamental political organization 
remains unclear, but the Khmer portion of an early 
fourteenth-century inscription suggests continuity (see 
also Polkinghorne 2018; Pou 1979).
Surface Artifacts. BA Thesis. Faculty of Archeology, 
Royal University of Fine Arts: Phnom Penh.
von Falkenhausen, L. 1993. On the historiographical orien-
tation of Chinese archaeology. Antiquity 67, 839-49.
Wolters, O. W. 1999. History, Culture and Region in Southeast 
Asian Perspectives. Southeast Asia Program Publications. 
Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1999.
Woodward, H. H. & J. G. Douglas. 1994/1995. The 
Jayabuddhamahānātha images of Cambodia. The Journal 
of the Walters Art Gallery, 52/53, 105-11.
Wyatt, D. K. 2001. Relics, oaths and politics in thirteenth-
century Siam. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 32, 3-66.
Yoffee, N. Myths of the Archaic State. Cambridge (UK): Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005.
Yoffee, N. 2016. The power of infrastructures: a counternarra-
tive and a speculation. Journal of Archaeological Method 
and Theory 23, 1053-65.
Yoffee, N. & G. L. Cowgill. Eds. 1991. The Collapse of Ancient 
States and Civilizations. Tucson (AZ): University of 
Arizona Press.
Zhou, D. 2007. A Record of Cambodia: The land and its people, 




of their unusual deeds and of anecdotal information 
about them.’ He compares this situation in Mesopo-
tamia to historiographic traditions in Europe before 
the work of the ‘Annales group’ that wrote history of 
the world outside of royalty. Disconcertingly, perhaps, 
Michalowski’s essay is then devoted to kings: how 
Mesopotamian kings were strangers in their own 
land, and how this advantaged their achievements in 
seizing power.
In another excellent essay, the archaeologist, 
Marcella Frangipane (2017), contrasts state formation 
in three regions of Mesopotamia. She discusses differ-
ent forms of ‘integration’ in the first cities in the south, 
in northern Syria, and southern Turkey, ‘control and 
coordination’ of urban economies, and how rulers and 
their bureaucracies ‘resolved conflicts’. Her eloquent 
analysis, however, doesn’t extend to how political 
systems in all the cities in these areas teetered, why 
districts were burned or abandoned, and how the 
politics and the economy changed in their various 
geo-political circumstances. Frangipane writes of an 
‘amalgamation (our italics) of social groups’ in cities and 
early states but refrains from identifying those groups 
and their likely different social and political orienta-
tions. She quotes Richard Blanton that in states there 
was a ‘monopoly of control of power by a supreme 
authority’ (following Weber’s dictum).
This essay ventures another perspective on the 
nature of Mesopotamian cities and states. By citing 
two recent papers, both of which critically analyse 
available data on the nature of kings and early states 
in valuable ways, we establish a point of entry into 
the biases of many historians and archaeologists. For 
example, most written tablets from Mesopotamia are 
not about kings and their heroic deeds. They are eco-
nomic texts, ritual texts, letters, legal documents, and 
other non-literary materials. Most archaeological pro-
jects have quite naturally concentrated on magnificent 
Ancient states – or at least many ancient states – were 
ironies. That is, many ancient states weren’t states 
at all, at least not as we think of states as territorial 
entities that included much land, many cities, towns, 
villages, farmsteads, agricultural fields and orchards. 
Mesopotamia, for example was a land of city-states 
(Fig. 10.1). There was no Mesopotamian territorial 
state, and those cities and their rulers who conquered 
other cities and controlled much land and access to 
water didn’t last long. There was no Mesopotamia, in 
effect, in the political sense of the term. What made 
Mesopotamia Mesopotamia was an overarching cul-
tural web: a shared belief in the same gods, a school 
curriculum in which the same literature was learned, 
even a common ideology that there should be a ter-
ritorial Mesopotamian state.
Furthermore, the most brutal and most success-
ful warrior kings who were celebrated by their scribes 
as favoured by the gods and who declared they were 
providing justice for the cities they conquered and the 
people they ruled set the stage for their own (often 
rapid) demise. 
How do we explain the resistance to forming a 
long-lasting territorial state in Mesopotamia (especially 
in early Mesopotamia, the era of the formation of 
Mesopotamian cities, social and economic differen-
tiation and stratification, and cultural achievements 
in literature and ritual)? How can we explain why 
dynasts and dynasties were regularly toppled? And 
how do we account for the resilience of certain cul-
tural institutions, those things that continued to make 
Mesopotamia Mesopotamia?
In a recent and glorious essay, Piotr Michalowski 
(forthcoming) writes how kings who picked up the 
shreds of fallen or defeated rulers and established 
new dynasties were ‘domesticated’ in native histo-
riographic tradition. Michalowski notes despairingly 
that ‘Mesopotamian history [is] the history of kings, 
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Chapter 10
Are there patterns of resistance to the goals of rulers in 
Mesopotamia? How do these instances of contestation 
and resistance play out? Where do the institutions of 
resistance come from? We examine whether ancient 
cities and states in Mesopotamia were ‘integrated’, 
as many authors put it, and whether there is there a 
monopoly of legal authority in cities and states that 
provides ‘benefits’ (Frangipane, p. 14).
A history of academic resistance to views of the 
totalitarian nature of political and economic power 
in Mesopotamia
The understanding of Mesopotamian states as polit-
ically centralized, totalitarian, and administering 
redistributive/command economies with a monopoly 
on law has pervaded the archaeological and sociologi-
cal literature on early states in general. This analysis 
of Mesopotamian states was formed in the early part 
of the twentieth century as Assyriologists considered 
the earliest Mesopotamian states in the late fourth and 
early third millenniums to be, first, temple-states and 
then palace-states. The first states were regarded as 
buildings, temples and palaces. Domestic quarters 
have been excavated in a few but significant examples, 
and settlement pattern studies have identified smaller 
sites that were connected to very much larger ones, 
and so reconstructed the network of regional sites. 
Less attention has been paid to the destruction levels 
in these sites.
In this essay we do not simply point to the obvious 
biases in documentation in the Mesopotamian textual 
and archaeological record. Also, we do not claim that 
we have discovered new information from tablets or 
from material culture that complement or supplement 
or alter the understanding of Mesopotamian politics 
and economies and societies. Rather, we attempt to 
delineate, on the basis of disparate sources, and to 
synthesize these sources (by way of selected examples), 
how societies were organized beneath the level of rul-
ers and how social systems interacted with the ruling 
stratum. Indeed, we question some analyses that are 
predicated on the distinction between the political 
system and those groups and individuals who were 
not bound within that system but were also critical 
actors in the implementation of the ruler’s policies. 
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1960s, and her book, completed by 1971, was eventu-
ally published in 1975. Harris provided information 
on the city, the city elders, the mayor, the assembly, 
the merchants, judges, craftsmen, and especially the 
nadītu women who lived in a ‘cloister’ and were active 
in the real-estate market.
In 1969 and 1971 articles appeared that, in ret-
rospect, marked a change in how Mesopotamianists 
conceived of the study of Mesopotamian history. These 
studies, by I.M D’jakonov (Diakonoff) and I.J. Gelb, 
inspired graduate students to think they could write 
Mesopotamian history as the history of social groups 
and social institutions and that political and economic 
change could be studied, indeed had to be studied, as 
result of interactions in society. Temples and palaces 
were part of the story, but they were not the whole story 
and might even be minor chapters in the story. The two 
articles are related since D’jakonov visited Chicago 
in 1962-3 and was interested to learn how American 
scholars were studying Mesopotamian economy and 
society. I.J. Gelb, who previously had not concerned 
himself with such questions, at least as a major part of 
his research, began studying social organizations, and 
these studies dominated the rest of his career.
D’jakonov’s article, appearing in a book of essays 
by Soviet scholars, was actually written in 1956 or 1957 
and was also drawn from his book of 1959 (according 
to the confused dates at the start of his essay). In ‘The 
Rise of the Despotic State in Ancient Mesopotamia,’ 
he forcefully refuted the entrenched notion (of Deimel 
1931, Schneider 1920, Falkenstein 1954, and others) 
that held that ‘temple estates … encompass[ed] prac-
tically the whole of Sumerian society [which was] a 
theocratic polity.’ By Sumerian society he meant the 
earliest city-states in Mesopotamia. He mainly referred 
to the city-state of Lagash in the period before Sargon 
of Akkade, that is, before about 2334 bc. He calculated 
that the land held by temples in Lagash was far less 
than the total amount of land in Lagash, and more 
importantly cited references to communal land that 
was sold to kings and notables (which Gelb, Steinkeller, 
and Whiting later documented fully), to patriarchal 
extended communities, and to councils of elders. He 
also discussed popular ‘elections’ of leaders, coups, and 
rebellions. The effect of this article was to galvanize 
scholars to re-think the structure of Mesopotamian 
society and the course of history.
I.J. Gelb, who wrote in 1967, ‘Approaches to the 
Study of Ancient Society’, contributed (in an obscure 
Festschrift) an article that was widely circulated, ‘On 
the Alleged Temple and State Economies in Ancient 
Mesopotamia’ in 1971 (written in 1965, as Gelb notes). 
What Gelb argued, in essence and convincingly, 
was that historians had committed a sampling error. 
temple/theocratic organizations, and the first rulers 
held priestly ranks. ‘Palace-states’ was the term used 
to describe the absolutist royal power of the kings of 
the Third Dynasty of Ur (Ur III) at the end of the third 
millennium (which followed the first territorial state 
of Sargon of Akkade – see below). We present here a 
digest of the critique of these views by Mesopotamian 
scholars. We then return to our main subject of how 
the organization of society cannot be confined to the 
centralizing and ‘integrating’ function of rulers (whose 
great power and wealth we certainly do not contest).
In 1960 A.L. Oppenheim wrote in the first volume 
of the new journal, Current Anthropology, an essay titled 
‘Assyriology – Why and How’. It was reprinted in his 
book, Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civiliza-
tion (1964). Oppenheim concluded his essay with a 
famous and provocative call: ‘If the new directions 
here surveyed mean that Assyriology will eventually 
move away from the humanities and nearer to cultural 
anthropology, I shall shed no tear.’ By ‘new directions’ 
Oppenheim meant many things, signalled by his sec-
tions on ‘why a “Mesopotamian” religion should not 
be written’ and ‘historical sources or literature?’ For 
him, the humanistic approach to religion and his-
tory, at least by Assyriologists (and Mesopotamian 
archaeologists – see the fantastic illustration from an 
eighteenth-century German bible of a Mesopotamian 
city on the cover of his book – were fantasies of Western 
scholars who were ‘never successful in treating alien 
civilizations with that tender care and deep respect’ 
that anthropologists were trained to provide. Oppen-
heim’s book still reads as a vademecum to the structure 
of Mesopotamian society. It interweaves studies on 
geography, ecology, zoology, ethno-linguistic iden-
tity, agriculture, wealth, ownership of structures and 
land, cities and their parts, markets, and much else. 
We are content, for the purposes of this essay, only to 
note that Oppenheim considered that ‘Mesopotamian 
kings were anything but Oriental despots’ and that the 
Great Organizations (as he termed them) of temples 
and palaces were each internal ‘circulation systems’. 
A foremost by-product of Oppenheim’s perspec-
tive (in our view) was his sponsorship of a young 
scholar at the Oriental Institute of the University of 
Chicago, Rivkah Harris, who with the critical support 
of Robert McCormick Adams (who held positions both 
in the OI and in the Department of Anthropology in 
the University of Chicago) undertook to study the city 
of Sippar in the Old Babylonian period (1894–1595 bc). 
She (and her sponsors) chose this city because it was not 
the seat of any powerful king and because several thou-
sand private documents (that is, non-administrative 
texts) had been recovered from the site (mostly from 
illegal excavations). This project began in the early 
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from the study of royal inscriptions and the specious 
claims of kings, to work on the fundamentals of how 
land was cultivated, houses were built, rented, sold, 
and how legal disputes were resolved. These studies 
resumed some work on these matters that scholars in 
the early twentieth century had undertaken, mainly as 
philological enterprises. However, the goal now was 
to relate the study of economic and legal documents to 
questions of the legitimacy and governance of cities and 
states and especially why and how rulers and dynasties 
came and went and how new rulers and dynasties came 
to power after the times of collapse. Some historians 
still wrote in the traditional way: they judged rulers 
as successful or not, often based on their personal 
qualities, by amount of territory they conquered, and 
they attributed collapse to invaders putting an end to 
weak kings and their dynasties. One Mesopotamian 
historian denied that any early states (such as that of 
the Hittites or Persians) were ‘ramshackle’ (as she put 
it) (Kuhrt 1995, 281, 701). In the next sections we shall 
show that the most ‘successful’ kings sowed the seeds 
of dynastic failure. We shall also point to the fault lines 
and cleavage planes that made early Mesopotamian 
states fragile.
Fragility in literature
A literary text from the seventeenth century bc known 
as the Atra-hasis (‘The exceedingly wise man’) Epic 
explains in detail how a mob of minor deities, protest-
ing their work for the elite gods, took up their spades 
and torches and marched to the palace of Enlil, the 
traditional head of the third millennium pantheon 
(Lambert 1969, Foster 2005, 227–80). Afraid of the 
possible outcome of the rebellion, Enlil follows the 
advice of Enki, god of wisdom, and ordered the god-
dess Belet-ili to create humankind to do labour for the 
gods, thus relieving the labour of the minor gods. The 
uprising was successful. 
Human insurgents struggled against their over-
lords with mixed results. Copies of a literary text 
narrate revolts against king Naram-Sin of Akkade 
(grandson of Sargon) who ruled in the twenty-fourth 
century. In this case not only did the ruler smash the 
rebels but, according to another inscription found at 
Bassetki in Kurdistan, he was further declared a god 
against whom rebels were insolent and powerless. In 
Mesopotamian official histories (as well as histories 
elsewhere) winners get the privilege of immortalizing 
their victories in writing. Because the mutiny in the 
Atra-hasis epic occurred in an imaginary world, rebels 
could be successful in a way in which, in the literary-
historical tradition, kings would steadfastly deny. In 
the ‘lamentations’ over the destruction of cities (Agade 
Temples and palaces, what Oppenheim had called 
‘Great Households’, employed scribes to document in 
detail activities of these organizations. The data that 
led to conclusions of an all-inclusive temple-economy 
came from one temple in one city-state, Lagash. How-
ever, there were other documents, land-sale documents 
from a variety of cities, also discussed by D’jakonov, 
in which ‘private’ sellers, heads of kinship groups, 
alienated land to kings and notables. Witnesses in 
these documents received token amounts of silver as 
acknowledgements of their membership in the land-
owning group. Presumably, the sellers never moved 
from their land, which was ultimately owned by the 
purchaser, but worked the land and paid ‘taxes’ to 
the new owner. Although these documents were 
few, it was an error to assume that the quantity of the 
documentation – thousands of texts from the temple 
bureaucracy – should lead to the conclusion that the 
temples owned all land in early city-states.
Gelb also argued that there was a sampling error 
in the view that there was ‘state socialism’ (what 
Landsberger 1943 called ‘Stadtstaatentum’) in the Ur 
III period, c. 2100–2000 bc. Such a conclusion was based 
on the tens of thousands of texts that came from the 
clearly massive bureaucracy that administered taxes 
and tribute in the sites of Drehem and Umma. How-
ever, Gelb noted that in Nippur there were significant 
numbers of texts that attested private landholdings. 
In recent research on legal cases in the Ur III period, 
Laura Culbertson (2009 and 2015) shows that deci-
sions of the courts were made by local authorities, 
not state judicial officers, even though the decisions 
were collected by the state’s bureaucrats. In fact, the 
army of bureaucrats, officials and scribes, as well as 
the military machine of the Ur III kings, was resisted 
by subject cities and territories and lasted less than a 
century, its effective control less than 50 years. 
Aside from the specific analyses of D’jakonov and 
Gelb, the major contribution of the articles was method-
ological. In order to study social history, one must collect 
dozens or hundreds of documents that formed real or 
artificial archives (that is, archives of tablets that were 
not found together but reported on similar activities, 
ideally with the same persons mentioned in the texts). 
The goal was to delineate the history of officials or of 
sales or of legal proceedings (or other activities) and so 
to understand how people interacted with one another 
in order to collect, circulate, or otherwise manipulate 
goods and services. Some senior Assyriologists just 
didn’t get it (Kraus 1977) and severely criticized young 
scholars who were – under the inspiration of Gelb and 
D’jakonov – attempting to study aspects of social organi-
zation and by so doing inferring the nature of social 
change. The tide of historical research, however, moved 
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Historical examples of fragility and resistance
The earliest city-states
The first city in Mesopotamia that we know much about 
is Uruk in the southern part of the land. Its history 
in the fourth millennium bc is known from German 
excavations in two areas, the Eanna precinct, home of 
temples to Inanna (and in the last stages, levels V, IV a, 
b, and c ceremonial plazas and a hypothetical admin-
istrative building) and the so-called Anu Ziggurat. In 
the last stages of level IV (Fig. 10.2) the first tablets 
were found, first pictographic and then cuneiform, 
cylinder seals, sculptures, and ration bowls in their 
thousands. There was a city administration, known 
from tables of officials on cuneiform tablets found in 
the Eanna precinct, and municipal leaders, as well as 
a clear division of labour from elites to unfree workers 
and slaves (which can be inferred from the material 
record as well as from the titles on tablets) (Green 
and Nissen 1987, Civil 2013). The area of the city is 
and Ur), the gods decide on the collapse of cities for 
reasons of their own.
In the historical examples that follow, we shall 
explore the ways in which the fragility of strong 
regimes can be perceived through the actions of resist-
ance by various local and regional powers (see Van De 
Mieroop 2015 for a history of Mesopotamia). Resistance 
takes a variety of forms. It can appear as palace and 
priestly opposition within city-states (as in the time 
of Urukagina, just before the time of Sargon), or in 
the well-attested court intrigues; it can break out as 
revolts led by nobles or elites from subjugated cities 
or kingdoms seeking power and independence; and it 
can also surface as the less noticeable but nevertheless 
effective behaviour of community institutions (such 
as councils and assemblies) seeking to maintain their 
local authority. Naturally, these oppositional strategies 
are not mutually exclusive. Their co-occurrence can be 
disastrous for the central government when economic 
crisis or the incursions of ethnic groups join the picture.
Figure 10.2. Uruk levels V and IV.








































It is possible, as one archaeologist has thought, that 
refugees from Uruk IV established new ‘Urukian’ out-
posts in Syria and Iran (where Urukian traits are found 
that looks just like those in Uruk) (Johnson 1988-89).
In any case, Uruk, the city did not disappear with 
the destruction of Eanna. Uruk was a major player in 
city-state rivalries in the early third millennium, and, 
indeed, Uruk flourished through the Hellenistic period, 
roughly 3000 years after its urban foundation. Perhaps 
we can compare the destruction of the Uruk temple 
complex in Uruk level IV with the fiery destruction of 
the ceremonial precinct of the city of Teotihuacan in 
about ad 550. Teotihuacan was the colossus of Mesoa-
merica from about 200 bc to the massive conflagration. 
Rene Millon (1988) noted that there was no rival of 
Teotihuacan that could have successfully attacked 
it. Furthermore, only the central ceremonial district 
of Teotihuacan was torched. The neighbourhoods of 
Teotihuacan were untouched, and in fact there is a 
population centre at Teotihuacan today.
In any case, although Uruk and some other Meso-
potamian cities survived hundreds of years, their forms 
of government and social relations changed greatly 
as did their relation to other cities and ephemeral 
estimated at 250 hectares (over 600 acres; the Eanna 
precinct alone covers 9 hectares, over 22 acres), and 
the population of the city has been thought to be in the 
tens of thousands. The city of Uruk developed from a 
time of humble villages, since only villages (around 
10 hectares or less) in Mesopotamia are known before 
4000 bc. Thus, the evolution of Uruk was not gradual, 
but explosive. Demographic change resulted from 
the depopulation of the countryside, which trend 
accelerated in the first half of the third millennium bc. 
Writing, seals, monumental structures, and high art, 
and statecraft itself were inventions in the new urban 
setting with its rulers and subjects (Nissen 1988). 
It is the rapid and transformative evolution of the 
city of Uruk that archaeologists and historians have 
focused on explaining. Uruk was the first city and the 
first city-state. However, what happened to the Eanna 
temples and ceremonial structures and the first state in 
Mesopotamia? (There are also urban developments as 
early or earlier than Uruk in Northern Mesopotamia, 
but these are less well known). The Eanna level III (Fig. 
10.3) precinct was systematically levelled, and various 
fire installations were installed (Barrelet 1974), presum-
ably commemorating the collapse of the Uruk IV state. 
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Akkadian dynasty (most recently Marchesi 2010, 233, 
Foster 2016).
Undertakings of the Akkadian kings confronted 
the fragility of their realm. All of them, from Sargon to 
his great-grandson Shar-kali-sharri, carried out numer-
ous military campaigns. They monitored previously 
conquered territories and attempted to incorporate new 
ones in the Akkadian state. Important administrative 
measures were implemented to maintain the cohesion 
of the reign, from Sargon’s establishment of Akkadian 
governors throughout the kingdom to his grandson, 
Naram-Sin’s regulation of accounting and record-
keeping techniques and bureaucratic reforms. Loyal 
followers and their support were secured through 
grants of land. A famous monument, known as the 
obelisk of Manishtushu, records the purchase of 3450 
hectares of arable land. The king bought the ancestral 
fields of several hundred men, so enlarging the royal 
domains and rewarding his own men. To secure divine 
favour, temples were built and war booty offered to the 
gods. In an unprecedented act intended to link their 
dynasty with ancient sanctuaries, Sargon designated 
his daughter as a priestess of the moon-god at Ur, 
and Naram-Sin appointed three of his daughters as 
priestesses at Nippur, Ur, and Sippar. 
None of these strategies, however, was enough to 
secure the kingdom and overcome fragilities. Although 
no incident is reported from the 56 years of Sargon’s 
reign, problems emerged under his successors. It is 
possible that both sons and successors of Sargon, 
Rimush and Manishtushu, met with violent deaths 
in palace conspiracies (Foster 2016, 8, 10). Rebellions 
broke out in Sumer and Akkad (southern and middle 
Mesopotamia) under Rimush’s and Naram-Sin’s rule. 
The revolts against Naram-Sin, recorded in literary 
texts and other inscriptions, have been characterized 
as the most dramatic events of his reign. Uprisings 
occurred in the core of the kingdom, with a new leader 
from nearby Kish allied with other leaders. Another 
rebel from Uruk allied with other southern cities. All 
these revolts were crushed and Naram-Sin’s son, Shar-
kali-sharri, whose name ironically means ‘king of all 
kings’, ruled for 25 years before the Akkadian state 
finally collapsed under his short-lived successors. A 
military officer seized power in Lagash, another man 
ruled over Susa, and Guti people from the Zagros 
Mountain area (bordering Iraq and Iran) plundered 
some cities. At this point, the Sumerian King List, which 
monotonously records one king after another, asks 
‘who was king, who was not king?’ (Jacobsen 1943)
Southern and central Mesopotamia (c. 2000–1155 bc)
During most of the second millennium territorial 
states were few and didn’t last long. Until its collapse 
territorial states, as did the ethno-linguistic composition 
of the cities. Nevertheless, cities in Mesopotamia, from 
the earliest dates onward, usually asserted their own 
desire for independence against other cities, contained 
forms of community authority, and were scenes of 
various forms of struggle for power and wealth within 
city walls (as we have noted above and see below).
We don’t know the circumstances of the destruc-
tion of the Eanna precinct, but we can easily think that 
the massive bureaucratic structure of the first state in 
Mesopotamia was resisted by the dissident population 
of Uruk. The presence of thousands of ration-bowls, 
presumably for the workers who constructed the 
massive temples in the Eanna precinct, ends after the 
destruction of Eanna.
In the first half of the third millennium bc Meso-
potamian city-states fought each other constantly. In 
the best known of the petty wars, the neighbouring 
city-states of Lagash and Umma battled each other 
over the fertile land between them. The internecine 
conflicts lasted more than a century as recorded in 
inscriptions found at Lagash. These texts invariably 
report on victories by Lagash rulers as well as the kings’ 
boastful claims of divine support (Van De Mieroop 
2015). But, as fortune would have it, a Lugalzagesi of 
Umma conquered Lagash and several other southern 
city-states as well. His territorial control was short-
lived, however, when a new king from Kish, Sargon, 
defeated him and so took over his conquests.
The Akkadian state (c. 2334–2200 bc)
Sargon of Akkade (or Agade, c. 2334–2279 bc) brought 
all warring city-states of southern Mesopotamia under 
his control. He conquered territories from the Diyala 
River down to the Gulf, the core of his kingdom, and 
then moved into more distant regions. It is difficult 
to ascertain how effective his rule was over cities in 
Iran (e.g., Susa) and farther up the Euphrates (e.g., 
Mari and Ebla). Sargon and his successors managed 
to hold power for about 150 years, though unevenly. 
The succession of five kings from the same dynasty 
and their dominion over a considerable extension of 
land was unprecedented and signalled quantitative 
and qualitative transformations in the socio-economic 
and political structure of power. The builder of the 
Akkadian territorial state (or ‘empire’) was a usurper 
in the court of the city of Kish. He established his own 
royal residence in a new city, Akkade and conquered 
local opposition, ending the struggle among middle 
and southern city-states in Mesopotamia (in the Early 
Dynastic period, c. 2900–2350). It is plausible that the 
Sumerian King List, a composition devised to promote 
the idea that one city at a time ruled all over the land 
thus creating a cultural unity, was conceived during the 
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during the time before Hammurabi. The kingdom of 
Elam in today’s Iran and the kingdom of Yamhad in 
Syria also contended for power in this time.
The political interactions among the various inde-
pendent cities in the period before Hammurabi were 
complex. There were diplomatic arrangements and 
spying, royal marriages, court intrigues, and assassina-
tions. Amorite chieftains, who led separate lineages, 
allied with and betrayed one another in their successful 
attempts to seize power within venerable cities in a 
bewildering kaleidoscope of shifting powers in cities 
and in the countryside. Traditional and new urban 
elites alike resisted the domination of neighbouring 
kingdoms, even though many of them, individually 
or in concert with ambitious allies, were seeking to 
impose their own superiority over their neighbours. 
Thus, for instance, Yamhad and Eshnuna simultane-
ously attacked Samshi-Adad before he died in 1776. 
In the next decade, Hammurabi of Babylon rose to 
prominence. In 1766 Elam, in allegiance with Babylon, 
Mari and possibly also Larsa, attacked Eshnuna. Then 
Eshnuna helped Hammurabi of Babylon when in 1764, 
together with Mari and Aleppo, he defeated Elam. In 
1763 Hammurabi overthrew Rim-Sin of Larsa, sacked 
Eshnuna in 1762, and finally turned against his ally 
Zimri-Lim of Mari and conquered that city in 1761. 
Thus, in about five years Hammurabi managed to bring 
all of central and southern Mesopotamia under his 
rule in Babylon. His only opponent was the kingdom 
of Yamhad (modern Aleppo), located too far away in 
Syria to be a direct threat. 
Hammurabi’s victories were duly mentioned in 
the prologue of his famous ‘Law Code’, written towards 
the end of his reign (Roth 1995). The prologue of his 
code exhibits a list of some 25 cities, the crown jewels, 
that the sovereign ruled, all of them in Babylonia, 
except for Mari, Tuttul to the northwest and Ashur 
and Nineveh to the north. Hammurabi’s victories, 
he declares, were endorsed by the respective tutelary 
deities of the conquered cities. Although one of the 
epithets of king Hammurabi, ‘the queller of rebel-
lions’, eloquently summarizes the king’s conquests, 
his authority over his domain did not last long. 
Revolts broke out within the first decade of the 
reign of Samsu-iluna, Hammurabi’s son and succes-
sor. In the ninth year-name, the king claims to have 
defeated the army of the Kassites, an ethno-linguistic 
group first attested in archival records around the 
eighteenth century. Contradicting this claim of defeat-
ing them, Kassites were employed as mercenaries of 
Old Babylonian kings and also established their own 
armed encampments in the Babylonian countryside 
(Richardson 2005). In the tenth year-name of Samsu-
iluna, the king mentions his victory over Idamaras 
in around 2000 bc, the Ur III state had controlled and 
imposed tribute over a vast territory, from Assyria 
down to the Gulf, including also regions east of the 
Tigris River. After the fall of Ur, a constellation of 
independent kingdoms, whose fortunes were inextri-
cably intertwined, emerged. Political fragmentation 
and territorial disputes characterized the next two 
centuries. Ishbi-Erra, a general in the army of Ur, 
seized power in the city of Isin, expelled the Elamites 
from Ur, established a dynasty, and dominated much 
of the region. Further south, the city of Larsa became 
influential when in 1897 king Abi-sare attacked Isin 
thus challenging its supremacy. Larsa, however, expe-
rienced a period of political instability with rulers from 
different lineages; then a family, possibly of Elamite 
ancestry, gained power and ruled for about seven 
decades. Rim-Sin, the second and most prominent 
monarch of this newly established dynasty, put an 
end to the Isin-Larsa rivalry when he captured Isin 
in 1793. His victory was deemed so important that he 
dated the remaining thirty years of his reign after this 
event (‘the first year after the king defeated Isin’, ‘the 
second year after the king defeated Isin’, and so forth). 
In central Mesopotamia, in the Diyala valley, 
Eshnuna had detached itself from Ur and conquered 
previously independent cities of the area, such as Ner-
ebtum, Shaduppum, and Dur-Rimush, becoming one 
of the powerful states of the early eighteenth century. 
North-west of Eshnuna, in Assur, after the fall of Ur, 
local rulers took the title ‘governors of the god Assur’ 
(see below on Old Assyrian politics and economics). In 
the nearby city of Ekallatum, Shamshi-Adad inherited 
the throne of his father and conquered Assur. He later 
established his royal seat in Shubat-Enlil, and installed 
his elder son on the throne of Ekallatum and his 
younger on the throne of Mari. By the time of his death 
in 1776, Shamshi-Adad controlled the entire region 
north of Babylonia, although his Kingdom of Upper 
Mesopotamia disintegrated soon after his demise. On 
the banks of the Euphrates in Syria, Mari had not been 
under the direct control of the Ur III kings, although 
the two cities were in diplomatic contact. Yahdun-
Lim, who by the mid-nineteenth century had begun a 
new dynasty, was assassinated in a palace conspiracy 
and his son did not long survive him. Shamshi-Adad 
then established his control of the area and appointed 
his offspring as king of Mari. Following the fall of 
the ‘Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia’, Zimri-Lim, a 
relative of Yahdun-Lim, became the new king of Mari 
and one of the powerful contenders in the political 
arena. In Babylon, a local dynasty, ruled from the early 
nineteenth century, and about a century later, in 1792, 
Hammurabi succeeded to the throne. Other cities such 
as Uruk, Kish, and Sippar had their own dynasties 
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were in power there since the eighteenth century. They 
later styled themselves ‘king of the Sealand’ (Dalley 
2010; Boivin 2018; Shepperson 2018). These southern 
territories were defeated by Kassite rulers who, by 
the fourteenth century, controlled all of Babylonia. 
They were regarded, in the Amarna correspondence, 
as one of the members of the ‘Great Powers Club’ 
together with Assyria, Mitanni, the Hittites and Egypt 
(Liverani 2000). 
Certain incidents occurred between Babylonia 
and Assyria after the assassination of the Kassite 
king Kara-hardash in a rebellion. Assur-uballit of 
Assyria, the builder of the ‘Middle Assyrian’ state (see 
below), the grandfather of the deceased ruler, invaded 
Babylonia and installed a puppet king on the throne of 
Babylon (c. 1332). About a century later, another Assyr-
ian monarch, Tukulti-Ninurta I, invaded Babylon and 
overthrew Kashtiliashu IV (c. 1225). Tukulti-Ninurta 
I (see below) ruled Babylonia briefly through puppet 
rulers, until a revolt in Assyria deposed him. The Kas-
sites attempted a return to power, but Elamite raids 
finally put an end to the Kassite dynasty in 1155. 
Assyrian Councils, Nobles, Economy: Decentralized 
States, The Changing Roles of Kings in Northern 
Mesopotamia (c. 2000–1200 bc)
Before Shamshi-Adad (Samsi-Addu) founded his 
‘Kingdom of Upper Mesopotamia’, including Assyria, 
in the early eighteenth century, a native Assyrian 
dynasty ruled the city of Assur and nearby territory 
on the eastern bank of the Tigris River for about 200 
years. Except for a few building inscriptions recovered 
from a temple, almost all of the documentation from 
this period comes from the archives of traders found in 
the city of Kanesh in central Anatolia (Asiatic Turkey). 
We summarize the economic affairs of the traders (see 
Larsen 2015) but in particular emphasize the nature 
of authority in Kanesh and Assur. 
The Old Assyrian commercial system (c. 1920–
1750 bc) can be reconstructed from the survival of about 
23,000 merchant records written on clay tablets of about 
500 Assyrian traders. Most of the Assyrian traders 
lived in the Lower Town of the city of Kanesh (modern 
Kültepe) alongside ‘native’ Anatolians (of various ethno-
linguistic groups). The karum of Kanesh was not itself 
the Lower Town, but the institutional association of 
the Assyrian traders. The palace of the Anatolian ruler 
of Kanesh was located in the citadel of Kanesh. The 
Assyrian merchants were politically subservient to the 
Anatolian prince to whom they paid taxes. 
The Assyrian traders moved tons of tin and high-
value fabrics from Assur to Kanesh. They traded these 
goods in Anatolian markets (through about a dozen 
smaller Assyrian enclaves) for silver and gold, which 
(variant has the army of Eshnuna), Emutbal, Uruk, 
and Isin. The statement suggests that insurgencies 
had taken place more or less simultaneously all over 
the kingdom. In one of his royal inscriptions (Frayne 
1990, 384–8, RIM IV E4.3.7.7), the king also claims 
to have killed and buried Rim-Sin II (a rebel from 
Larsa), to have executed 26 rebels, and defeated Iluni 
of Eshnuna and cut his throat. Of the 28 rebels that the 
king mentions in his royal inscription, administrative 
records document the following leaders: Rim-Sin II 
(Larsa), Rim-Anum (Uruk), Daganma-ilum (Kazalu/
Muti-abal), Ilima-ilum (Nippur), Iluni and Munaw-
wirum (Eshnuna) (Seri 2013). The revolts were put 
down, but the fragility of the state sprouted. There 
were signs of economic, institutional, military, and 
environmental difficulties, and southern and central 
cities were abandoned (for a time). The last kings of 
the dynasty of Hammurabi of Babylon, however, ruled 
until 1595, albeit with reduced hegemony, basically in 
the countryside around Babylon.
Besides court intrigues and revolts, the forms 
of resistance traditionally attested, tablets from the 
first half of the second millennium bc allows us to 
trace, for the first time in Mesopotamian history, the 
activities of community institutions whose authority 
could overlap with and limit royal power. Cities and 
villages included a network of local authorities, such 
as the chief of the city, the elders, the city, the port 
authority, the city ward, and the assembly (Yoffee 
2000, Seri 2005). These institutions were involved in 
the settlements of various disputes and litigations, in 
the management of labour force, in the distribution 
and sometimes also in the sale of real estate, and in 
the collection of taxes, among others things. They 
acted as hinges that articulated the crown and society. 
They further show collaboration between the state 
and local powers as well as tensions over the control 
of local resources. Unlike the straightforward military 
opposition of rebellious leaders and their armies, the 
dealings of local authorities display a complex array 
of everyday-life resistances. 
In traditional histories, kings of the First Dynasty 
of Babylon ruled for 155 years after Hammurabi. 
The collapse of the state is much debated and poorly 
known. The final blow allegedly came from a Hittite 
incursion. In 1595 Babylon was sacked, and the ‘weak’ 
king Samsu-ditana was defeated. Many people aban-
doned their cities.
The ensuing vacuum of power was filled by Kas-
site leaders (of several allied lineages) who established 
a dynasty in Babylon. The beginning of this new 
period in Babylonian history is uncertain. In 1475 king 
Ulamburiash overthrew a Sealand dynasty in the very 
southern-most, marshy part of Babylonia whose leaders 
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not what one reads in economic histories in which mer-
chants were thought to be state agents, and cities were 
not centres of production, export, and import. Now, it 
is true that Assur in the Old Assyrian period may not 
have been typical of other Mesopotamian states, or so 
some have said. However, the biased sample of docu-
ments allows a certain scepticism of those sceptics. In 
Old Assyria our tablet-sources come almost entirely 
from the private archives of merchants. We know little 
about the working of the palace or the temples in the 
city of Assur. Compare this sample to the tablet-sources 
from third millennium cities, which are overwhelm-
ingly from temple or palace archives. In those cities we 
have occasional references to assemblies and councils 
and traders, and we have clear archaeological finds of 
distant goods. Who were the traders? How did they 
trade? How important was trade to third millennium 
cities? New studies are piecing together the disparate 
evidence for mixed economies and dispensing with 
the older ideas that one must choose between either 
public or private control of trade.
After the Old Assyrian period, from c. 1700–
1356 bc, there was a consolidation of territorial states 
in Mesopotamia and then the collapse of those states, 
resulting in a proliferation of smaller states with 
varying amounts of royal authority and military 
tactics. In 1356, Assur-uballit of Assyria (see above) 
consolidated a new Assyrian state (in the time called 
the ‘Middle Assyrian’ period), successfully warded off 
local powers and undertook adventures to the south 
in Kassite Babylonia. Such adventures of succeeding 
kings culminated in the reign of Tukulti-Ninurta 
(1233–1197). The king, as depicted in an epic poem, 
decided to defeat the Babylonian (Kassite) king who, 
as he claims, violated treaty obligations. The gods, he 
claims further, supported his campaign, and he sacked 
Babylon, carried off the statue of Marduk, chief god of 
Babylon, to Assyria (Machinist 1976, 1978). 
Tukulti-Ninurta, however, faced local opposi-
tion which consisted of the nobles of Assur and his 
own sons. His desecration of Babylon was regarded 
as impious, as was his behaviour to the gods of Baby-
lon. Furthermore, Tukulti-Ninurta decided to move 
his government to a new city, 3 km north of Assur, to 
build a new palace complex, establish a new religious 
precinct, and construct a new irrigation system to sup-
port the new capital. The vicious and callous behaviour 
towards Babylon, a seat of traditional Mesopotamian 
religion and scholarship, was a grievous sin to the 
old-line nobility (‘great men’), who were also being 
disenfranchised by a new administration. They assas-
sinated Tukulti-Ninurta. This was not the first royal 
assassination known in Mesopotamian history, since 
Rimush, son of Sargon of Akkade (and perhaps his 
were relatively plentiful in Anatolia. The Assyrian 
texts allow a picture to be drawn of enterprise based 
on private initiatives, risk-based and profit-seeking 
behaviour, free-floating capital, bearer’s checks, and 
similar ‘modern’ features (Yoffee & Barjamovic 2018). 
This picture utterly refutes previously held notions 
(by Polanyi 1957, Finley 1973, and others) of state-
organized trade, fixed prices, and merchants who were 
agents of the state.
There is only a single mention of a ‘palace’ at 
Assur, the home-base of the merchants, who travelled 
over 1000 km to Kanesh, established residences, mar-
ried Anatolian women (having left their Assyrian 
wives in Assur), and lived for three generations in 
Anatolia. The Assyrian trading system was based on 
communities of private agents who maintained legal 
and financial institutions independent from the society 
in which they settled. In Assur itself, which was much 
smaller in size than Kanesh, the government consisted 
in an oligarchy that was linked to the city’s specializa-
tion in trade. Rulers styled themselves as ‘stewards’ 
of the state deity. Both at Assur and Kanesh, there are 
assemblies of ‘big and small men’ who decided legal 
issues, especially among merchants quarrelling over 
deliveries of goods and long-term partnerships com-
bining financial resources (Barjamovic 2011).
The profits made from the long-distance trade 
were enormous, but the trade depended on the frag-
mented nature of the political scene during this period. 
The rise of centralized states in the eighteenth and 
seventeenth centuries bc effectively put an end to the 
trade that depended on the movement of goods, the 
payment of bribes to local chieftains along the routes, 
and taxes owed to the palace in Kanesh. It is important 
to note that the privately organized trade required 
a level of state intervention and support. The state, 
however, was itself a kind of collective government 
in which the traders played roles. The state facilitated 
transport through the building and maintenance of 
roads, bridges, harbours, and inns and through the 
negotiation of treaties with local potentates.
The small size of a polity like Assur effectively 
meant that the same group of individuals shared roles 
as agents, financiers, and legislators. All actors were 
closely related in terms of kinship, which meant that 
the system could be built on mutual trust instead of 
competition. The entire city-state of Assur can be seen 
as a corporate entity in external competition with a 
number of similarly organized political units. The 
governing institutions, whose members were for a large 
part involved in the trade, left the actual running of 
the business to private enterprise, family firms.
It will not escape the reader of Mesopotamian 
histories that this picture of city-state governance is 
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of Hammurabi’s ‘empire’, which lasted for only the 
last 5 years of his reign and the early years of his suc-
cessor’s, the following scenario can be reconstructed. 
First, there was a traditional revolt of the city-states 
that Hammurabi had conquered. In the eighth year of 
Samsu-iluna, son of Hammurabi, a king named Rim-
Sin (the second Rim-Sin), from Larsa martialed troops 
against the king from Babylon. An archive from the city 
of Uruk, dealing with the house of prisoners of war, 
shows that revolts against Samsu-iluna involved local 
leaders from all Babylonia trying to achieve independ-
ence from the central government.
A subsequent uprising was led by a ‘Sealand’ 
dynasty, that is, a local dynasty that emerged in the 
marshy southmost part of the land. Rulers from this 
dynasty were able to fight a kind of guerilla war against 
the diminished power of the kings in Babylon. In 
central Mesopotamia, not far from the former capital, 
Babylon, armed groups of Kassites established camps 
in the countryside. In Babylon and the nearby cities still 
under its control, the Crown’s funds, from tribute and 
taxes of conquered territories, were failing. Agricultural 
labourers on royal estates could no longer be permanent 
employees but were hired for seasonal work (Yoffee 
1977). However, the palace required the permission of 
the local ‘head-man’ (or mayor) to requisition commu-
nity members for the work (Stol 1976). Urban temples 
in this period were similarly desperate for funds. They 
created a series of loans in which the ‘debtor’ borrowed 
money from the temple and promised to return the 
loan with interest when they were ‘healed’ through the 
intercession of the gods. Finally, the nearly powerless 
royal house in Babylon was attacked by an expedition-
ary force of Hittites from Anatolia. The Hittite army had 
launched a campaign in northern Syria, which was a 
vital corridor for communication with the south, east, 
and west. Finding no opposition, the army proceeded 
to Babylon, sacked the city and carried off the sacred 
statue of the patron god of Babylon, Marduk. 
Whereas some Mesopotamian history textbooks 
report that the Hittites came down ‘like a bolt from the 
blue’ (Postgate 1977, 100, Oates 1979, 84), in fact this 
was not a case of a stable and integrated Babylonian 
state that was defeated by a superior armed force. 
Babylon fell from a variety of factors – local city-state 
resistance to territorial state created by Hammurabi, 
several ethno-linguistic ‘tribes’ (as Kassites are some-
times described) who had been attracted to Babylonia 
by its riches and possibilities of serving Babylonian 
rulers as mercenaries, and not least resistance within 
city-states by the locally constituted/community 
authorities who acted against the rulers of their cities.
How typical of contestation and resistance 
to the goals of rulers in other times and places in 
brother, too), was also killed in a court intrigue. After 
several centuries of central weakness in Assyria and 
also a time of collapse and decentralization of other 
states in Mesopotamia and throughout the Near East, 
a new Assyrian state arose with militaristic kings who 
attempted to bring the entire region under their control.
Contestation, resistance and fragilities in early 
Mesopotamian states
Piotr Michalowski (2011, 84) writes that ‘traditionally 
the study of [Mesopotamian] history has focused on 
a succession of “peoples:” Sumerians, Akkadians, 
Amorites, Kassites, Arameans’ and others. In the 
earlier part of the twentieth century, such views were 
racially charged: Semitic Akkadians debased the heroic 
Sumerian culture. As we noted earlier, another, rather 
Whiggish view, was that of a progression from tem-
ple (theocratic)- states to ‘despotic states’ controlled 
by a totalitarian royal palace bureaucracy (in the Ur 
III period, c. 2100–2000 bc). The collapse of the Ur III 
state (c. 2000 bc), in which the militaristic monarchy 
lost control of regions near the capital and all its 
foreign conquests, was followed (in the traditional 
histories) by an ‘Amorite’ ethnic-group invasion and 
the installation of various dynasties led by kings with 
Amorite names. In an Old Babylonian document, the 
population of the time consisted of ‘Akkadians and 
Amorites’. Michalowski, however, has refuted the 
ideas of an Amorite threat to the royal house of Ur 
and an invasion of nomadic Amorites who bested local 
dynasties in city-states. Amorites, who in Ur III times 
were military guardsmen of the royal house and also 
officials in various cities, seized power in the cities 
through the interplay of struggles with both local elites 
and leaders of (named) Amorite lineages, of which 
there were many. Amorites were certainly not a horde 
of foreigners who swooped down on Mesopotamia.
The picture of political change in early Mesopo-
tamia is one of resistance to the control of any king 
or city-state. Although the ‘Sumerian King List’ may 
portray an ideal of one city ruling over Mesopotamia, 
the facts on the ground were of armed rebellion against 
any ruler who attempted to establish hegemony over 
neighbouring city-states. This much is clear. In the 
domestic arena in cities, certain forms of contestation 
are apparent, but an overall picture is elusive. No extant 
text from an archive records a social revolt similar to 
the uprising of the primeval ‘proletarian’ gods of the 
Atra-hasis Epic. But resistance to power in the actions 
of local authorities and local elites (as we have men-
tioned, and see below) is occurred.
In the Old Babylonian period, there is a veritable 
perfect storm of resistance to power. After the collapse 
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there were members of distinct ethno-linguistic groups 
(such as Amorites and Kassites, that is, people whose 
ancestral languages were not Akkadian or Sumerian) 
who interacted with each other in the complexity of 
kinship relations and with other residents of cities. 
Cities were originally formed (in the last part of the 
fourth millennium bc) as people in the countryside 
migrated into what became cities. The countryside 
became depopulated in this process, which lasted 
nearly a millennium, then became repopulated as new 
villages were established, some in relation to the new 
cities, others as self-sufficient communities inhabited 
by urban refugees. Fragility has an evolutionary logic 
that led to a variety of cracks, fissures, and resistances 
to the political order.
This picture of stratified and differentiated Meso-
potamian societies is at variance with the fetish of 
Oriental despotism (which one Classical archaeologist 
calls ‘Occidentalism’). We have discussed the history of 
the demolition of this fetish in the first part of our essay.
We have also discussed certain patterns of resist-
ance in Mesopotamia as a whole and in the city-states 
in particular. Most visible is the resistance to hegemonic 
control by the city-states. The formation of the first 
territorial state in Mesopotamia by Sargon of Akkade 
was followed quickly by armed rebellions against the 
rulers. At the end of the Ur III period, cities – one after 
the other – stopped paying tribute to the last king of 
the short-lived dynasty creating an economic crisis 
in the capital and leaving Ur vulnerable to its foreign 
and domestic enemies.
In the succeeding Old Babylonian period we have 
noted a variety of resistances to power, including in the 
cities themselves which was led by community leaders. 
Indeed, in the preceding, highly centralized territorial 
state in Ur III times we have noted that legal decisions 
were made by community leaders, even as the official 
records were part of the state’s archival system. In the 
Old Babylonian period, the famous ‘Code of Hammu-
rabi’ was not used in the judicial system which was 
maintained by local judges, elders, assemblies.
In this essay, we haven’t dwelled at length on the 
various textual curtains that have veiled the fragili-
ties of Mesopotamian societies. We have noted that 
scholarly reliance – mainly but not only in previous 
generations – on royal inscriptions which simply 
glorify the accomplishments of kings. This has led to 
the ‘report-card’ version of history: successful kings 
conquered many places because of their personal 
abilities; unsuccessful kings were weak-minded and 
lost territories built up by their abler predecessors. 
Finally, we admit that we haven’t written about 
the continuities in Mesopotamian culture that made 
possible the ‘regeneration’ of Mesopotamian political 
Mesopotamia was this Old Babylonian scenario? We 
hold that whereas there were of course specific differ-
ences in means and tactics of resistance, the inherent 
fragility of governance in early Mesopotamian history 
make the Old Babylonian patterns of behaviour far 
from anomalous. Stability is a kind of historical fic-
tion, as is the uncontestable power of the strongest of 
Mesopotamian kings. Although rulers were certainly 
powerful and were brutal tyrants who built enormous 
palaces and furnished magnificent temples and led 
mighty expeditionary forces, the irony of such power 
is that it led to systematic and successful resistance. 
The incidence of warfare in Mesopotamia that 
we have described (for the Early Dynastic period in 
the early third millennium and in the Old Babylonian 
period in the early and mid-second millennium) was 
itself a critical component in the fragility of political 
systems on both the territorial and local (urban) level. 
The need to enlist soldiers, mainly as corvée labourers 
(Steinkeller & Hudson 2015), and for the construction 
of palaces, temples, and city-walls, on a more or less 
constant basis, posed a problem for the maintenance 
of agricultural activities and irrigation. We don’t know 
a lot about how soldiers were requisitioned. There are 
documents about the hiring of ‘substitutes’, as wealthy 
men could pay for others to work and fight for them. 
We know little about how these soldiers were fed 
(Landsberger 1955, Wilcke 1983).
In late periods (in the late second and first millen-
nia bc), which we have not incorporated in this essay, 
the Assyrian army defeated territories that didn’t pay 
tribute and deported tens of thousands of people into 
the Assyrian heartland (Oded 1979, Wunsch 2013). 
These deportees worked in the latifundia of Assyrian 
nobles (often army generals) and in new capitals as 
builders and craftsmen. 
The enormous amount of military actions in 
Mesopotamia, in which there was seldom an absence 
of war, destabilized states and empowered those in 
the countryside to take power in fragile Mesopota-
mian cities.
Coda
We argue in this essay that early Mesopotamian cities 
and states were inherently ‘fragile’. The fragility of ter-
ritorial states is clear: they didn’t last long. Cities were 
constituted in various social and economic groups in 
cities which had their own leadership structures, and 
the cities were embedded in a countryside in which 
villages and territory were characterized by farmers, 
pastoralists. Cities were in a sense resilient, providing 
the main identity for citizens, above and beyond other 
social identities. In both cities and the countryside, 
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systems of dynastic rule and ambitions to create a 
territorial state, a Mesopotamia in the political sense 
of the word. Dynasties of Amorite and Kassite kings, 
whose languages we know entirely from their personal 
names, did not have their scribes write in their own 
languages. Rather, these rulers were intent on becom-
ing Mesopotamians. Under their rule (and then later 
in Mesopotamian history in the first millennium bc, 
which we haven’t considered in this essay), scribes 
copied Sumerian and Akkadian texts, which were 
used in schools all over the land, and worshipped 
Mesopotamian gods. Among other things, these liter-
ary and school texts promoted the normative picture 
of kings as absolute rulers of stable and integrated 
cities, favoured by the gods, and instructed to conquer 
their neighbours.
As we have elaborated in this essay, this was an 
impossible dream. 
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The Evolution of Fragility: Setting the Terms
Explanations for the collapse of early states (and complex societies) often assume that they 
were integrated and stable until something bad happened, usually environmental change  
or because enemies overwhelmed them. In fact, many of these early states lasted a relatively 
short time, at least in archaeological reckoning. Others were longer-lived, but struggled to 
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